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Abstract 
This thesis examines the diplomacy of Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, the founder of 
modern Saudi Arabia in his struggle for political legitimacy, financial stability 
and national security during the period 1896-1946. This study combines 
analytical and historical approaches to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of three broad issues. First, the extent to which 'Wahhabism' 
formed the raison d'etre for the creation of the modern Saudi state. How could 
a ruler claiming legitimacy through religion then turn to 'non-believers' for 
support against the Muslim Ottoman Porte? Among the most significant points 
discussed is the role of Mubarak al-Sabah, ruler of Kuwait in the shaping of 
Abdul Aziz's political philosophy and support for early Saudi forays in Arabia. 
This topic, dealt in detail in this work, is often understudied in the 
contemporary literature. 
Second, Abdul Aziz's autonomy or lack thereof in his expansionist 
policy and the role of tribal politics, Ottoman intrigue, and the establishment of 
Britain as the major supporter of the Al-Saud. Previous scholarship has often 
underestimated how early on treaty relations were initiated with the Porte. 
Third, the factors that led to American involvement in Saudi Arabia and the 
interplay of corporate, government and Saudi officials which, in part, 
contributed to Anglo-American tensions during the Second World War period. 
Also examined are the strategies employed by Washington and London to 
maintain what they perceived as, control over Abdul Aziz and the gradual 
emergence of the United States as guarantor of Saudi security and stability. 
How did the ruler of a distant Arabian country, which took no part in the war 
effort, manage to gain special extension of Lend Lease Aid by the President of 
the United States when all other nations, including Britain were cut off in 1945. 
This work contrasts some of the existing scholarship on the history of 
the Middle East which emphasises the role of Western colonial powers in 
shaping the political landscape of the region, often underestimating the role of 
local actors. 
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Transliteration Note 
A modified version of the International Journal of Middle East Studies 
transliteration system has been used for this thesis. For practical purposes 
diacritical marks have been eliminated. Place names with an accepted 
English spelling and personal names of prominent political leaders, 
cultural or religious figures are spelled in accordance with English norms. 
Thus Mecca rather than Makkah, Abdul Aziz rather than Abd al-Aziz, and 
sheikh rather than shaykh. 
The 'al' preceding family names are capitalised to indicate 
prominent family and tribal groups i. e. Al-Saud and Al-Rashid. In the case 
of individual names, such as Faisal al-Duwish, the 'al' has not been 
capitalised. 
The name of the founder of modern Saudi Arabia is spelled by the 
Saudi Ministry of Information as King Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al- 
Saud. To avoid excessive verbiage I have used the shortened form Abdul 
Aziz Al-Saud or as he is commonly referred to in English, Ibn Saud. 
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Introduction 
'Modern Arab politics is conditioned by leaders more than by political issues' 1 
E. A. Speiser 
1 
The ultimate source of power here, as in the whole course of Arab history, is the 
personality of the commander' 
Gertrude Bell 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2 
Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia 
OF ' 
". 
authorised the deployment^American and allied troops into the Kingdom. 
Although approval was ostensibly given by the leading religious scholars, 
including the chief of the council of scholars and grand mufti, Sheikh 
Abdul Aziz bin Baz, the decision resulted in much controversy within the 
country and the wider Islamic world. 3 
The repercussions of that decision and the subsequent increase in 
the American military presence in the region have impacted on the 
Kingdom tremendously. An increasingly vocal and visible opposition 
movement has developed inside and outside the country. Attacks on 
American targets in 1995 and 1996, and more recently the events of 
September 2001, are indicative of the extent to which they are willing to use 
violence and murder to achieve their aims. 
As a consequence relations between Saudi Arabia and the United 
States are undergoing tremendous scrutiny and re-examination. In 
particular questions are being asked about the nature of the Kingdom's 
Wahhabi ideology, its legitimacy and its future path. These issues all have 
their roots in the historical past and by examining the precedent 
1 E. A. Speiser, The United States and the Near East, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1947, p. 109. 
2 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was officially founded on September 23,1932. Prior to this 
the territory of was known as the 'Kingdom of Hijaz and Najd and its Dependencies'. 
3 Mordechai Abir, Government, Society and the Gulf Crises, London: Routledge, p. 178. 
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established by the late King Abdul Aziz it may be possible to find insight 
into the determinants of current and future Saudi policy. 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia comprises the largest country in the 
Arabian Peninsula and is home to Islam's holiest cities. Its role as the 
spiritual centre of the Muslim world is matched, if not exceeded, by its role 
as the world's largest oil producer. Saudi Arabia contains one quarter of the 
world's total oil with reserves exceeding 260 billion barrels of oil. The 
wealth provided by oil has led to rapid economic development and social 
change and has brought with it tension and deep divisions which have 
become increasingly evident in the last decade. 
Though the modern Kingdom is in its seventh decade, it traces its 
origins back to an eighteenth century alliance between the religious 
reformer, Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, and the political leader 
Muhammad Al-Saud in the central Arabian region of Najd .4 This union 
provided legitimacy to the house of Al-Saud and fused it to the cause of 
Abdul Wahhab's revivalist mission which sought to return Arabian society 
to the practices of the very first Islamic community .5 Abdul 
Wahhab's 
primary concerns were with the beliefs and rituals of the people around 
him-the pagan practices, superstitions, and ignorance of traditional Islamic 
learning that was prevalent at the time. Political leadership was left to his 
strategic partner Muhammad Al-Saud and Abdul Wahhab's followers were 
4 By 1806 the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance had the holy cities of Mecca and Medina from 
Ottoman control. In response the Ottoman Porte launched an assault on Arabia which 
crushed the alliance in the early nineteenth century. A second attempt by the descendants 
of Muhammad Al-Saud to revive the Saudi-Wahhabi entity later that century was 
partially successful until it too was defeated by the rival family dynasty of the Al-Rashid. 
See E. Rehatsek, 'The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' Art. XVIII , January 14, 
1880 in the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. XIV, 1880, pp. 274- 
401. A history of the Wahhabi movement forms part of the Report on Ibn Saud, January 21, 
1918, India Office Records, The British Library, London (hereafter cited as IOR) 
L/P&S/18/B270. 
5 Abdul Wahhab followed the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence, and his guiding 
principle was that of tawhid (unity) which brought together belief in one creator and 
obedience to the Qura' n and Sunnah (the sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad). 
See Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1991, pp. 257-258,280,349. Also R. Bayley Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965, pp. 6-7. 
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instructed that obedience to the amir was a part of faith. 6 After initial 
successes, Ottoman and Egyptian forces crushed the alliance in the early 
nineteenth century. Attempts to revive the Saudi-Wahhabi entity later that 
century were partially successful until defeated by the rival family dynasty 
of the Al-Rashid. 
In the early twentieth century the founder of the modern Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, considered himself heir to this 
Saudi-Wahhabi alliance and established his rule on the principles 
established by his predecessors. As a result Saudi Arabia's constitution is 
the Quran and its laws are derived from shari'ah (Islamic jurisprudence) 
making it one of the most conservative regimes in the Middle East. 7 
However, despite this Abdul Aziz began from an early stage to court the 
'infidel' British and helped undermine the authority of the Muslim 
Ottoman sovereign in the region. In fact, Britain more than any other 
Muslim power became the source of economic and political stability for 
Abdul Aziz. This role was subsequently taken over by the United States 
during the Second World War. Throughout, as shall be seen, Abdul Aziz 
successfully played the 'great game' in Arabia, negotiating with competing 
colonial and imperialist powers to achieve his political ends. 
Major Themes 
This thesis shall examine Ibn Saud's struggle for political legitimacy, 
financial stability and national security. It shall focus particularly on his 
relationship with Britain and the United States and the development of 
dependency on these foreign powers. Within the scope of this work three 
broad issues will be addressed. First, the extent to which 'Wahhabism' 
6 This association between the Al-Saud and the Al-Alshaikh, as Muhammad ibn Abdul 
Wahhab and his descendants came to be known, translated political loyalty into a 
religious obligation. According to Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab's teachings, a Muslim 
must give an oath of allegiance, bai' ah to a ruler who is owed allegiance as long as he 
follows and implements Islamic law. See Ayman al-Yassini, Religion and State in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, London: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 26-29. 
7 Turki al-Hamad, Political Order in Changing Societies- Saudi Arabia: Modernization in a 
Traditional Context, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Southern California, 1985, p. 73. 
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formed the raison d'etre for the creation of the modern Saudi state and the 
seemingly contradictory and paradoxical attempts of Ibn Saud, a ruler 
claiming legitimacy through religion to turn to 'non-believers' for support 
against the Ottoman Porte? Second Ibn Saud's autonomy or lack thereof in 
his expansionist policy and the role of tribal politics, Ottoman intrigue and 
the establishment of Britain as the major supporter of the Al-Saud. Third, it 
shall examine the early years of American interests and subsequent 
supplanting of Britain as the guarantor of Saudi security and stability. All 
the while it shall seek to contrast much of the existing scholarship on the 
history of the Middle East which emphasises the role of Western colonial 
powers in shaping the political landscape of the region, often 
underestimating the role of local actors. 
Sources and Methodology 
Primary sources consulted for this thesis came from the official archives of 
Britain and the United States. Documents of the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, Colonial Office and Cabinet papers were examined 
at the Public Record Office at Kew. The records of the Government of India 
pertaining to the Gulf were examined at the India Office Records, British 
Library, London. U. S. State Department and Defence Department 
documents were examined at the National Archives in Washington, D. C. 
and Suitland, Maryland. 
Papers relating to Congressional Hearings on Petroleum, the records 
of the Petroleum Administer for War, and the Department of the Interior 
were consulted at the Library of Congress, Washington D. C. Other primary 
sources included the published collections of declassified documents, 
private papers and memoirs. Secondary sources were consulted at a variety 
of private and institutional libraries. 
Primary and secondary sources were consulted at the following 
institutions: King Abdul Aziz University Library, Jeddah; King Faisal 
Foundation Library, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Gellman Library, George 
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Washington University, Washington, D. C; Bodleian Library, Rhodes House 
Library and Middle East Centre Library, Oxford University; British Library 
of Political and Economic Science, LSE, London, Library of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, London; Liddell Hart Centre for Military 
Archives, King's College, London. 
While traditional scholars of state formation, such as Tilly, focus on 
formal institutions-parliaments, bureaucracies, etc., Davis argues that in 
the case of societies in the Gulf, the ruler must be capable of producing 
cultural and ideological symbols that tie him to the population 8 When that 
linkage fails or when regimes simply rely on distributive methods i. e. 
circulation of oil wealth, then this may lead to the collapse of authority-as 
occurred with the Shah of Iran. 9 This thesis supports that view and 
examines how Abdul Aziz formulated those symbols and then turned 
against them when it conflicted with realpolitik which has created a 
constant imbalance in Saudi political legitimacy. 
This thesis combines analytical and historical approaches to provide 
a more complete picture of the underlying motivations of Ibn Saud's 
domestic and foreign policies. It charts the uneasy dichotomy between 
economic and security interests on the one hand, and the domestic socio- 
political pressures stemming from Wahhabi ideology on the other. In doing 
so it seeks to provide a bridge between earlier historical studies oriented 
towards state formation and tribal politics with those focused on the 
political economy of oil in the post Second World War period leading up to 
the oil crises of 1973. It also provides insight into the origins of the current 
opposition movement in Saudi Arabia which have been increasingly visible 
in the post Gulf war period and most especially and tragically since 
September 2001. 
8 Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1975. 
9 Eric Davis, 'Theorizing Statecraft and Social Change in Arab Oil-Producing Countries' in 
E. Davis and N. Gavrielides eds., Statecraft in the Middle East: Oil, Historical Memory, and 
Popular Culture, Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991, p. 13. 
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There are several historical works on Arabia prior to the 
establishment of the modern Kingdom of Saud Arabia. These provide 
particularly valuable material on specific moments in Arabian history. 
Most notable are the contributions of Winder who covered the early Saudi- 
Wahhabi polities in the nineteenth century and Troeller whose interest lay 
in the 1910-1926 period. Kostiner focuses on aspects of state formation and 
tribal politics in a valuable study of the 1916-1936 period, as does Helms 1° 
Leatherdale's work follows British interests in Arabia from the conquest of 
Hijaz to the era immediately preceding the outbreak of the Second World 
War. " These works are primarily pre-occupied with examining Ottoman 
and British interests and often underestimate the importance of Kuwait in 
the establishment of the Saudi state. 
Those that do have an American dimension tend to be written from 
the perspective of the post-1973 oil boom and as such centre on the 
economic and political stability of the Kingdom. Important examples 
include works by Abir, Bligh, Quandt and Safran. 12 The latter two 
concentrate on Saudi security from the perspective of the United States in 
light of Cold War politics. Others focus on oil and the political economy of 
Saudi Arabia. Of these the most notable are by Anderson, Miller, Painter, 
and Stoff. 13 Barry Rubin provides a lucid examination of Anglo-American 
10 Christine Moss Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1981; Joseph Kostiner, The Making of Saudi Arabia: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical 
State, 1916-1936, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
11 Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, Gary Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: 
Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud, London: Frank Cass, 1976; Clive Leatherdale, 
Britainänd Saudi Arabia 1925-1939: The-Imperial Oasis, London: Frank Cass, 1983. 
12 Mordechai Abir, Oil, Power and Politics: Conflict and Arabia, the Red Sea and the Gulf, 
London: Frank Cass, 1974; Alexander Bligh, From Prince To King: Royal Succession in the 
House of Saud in the Twentieth Century, New York: New York University Press, 1984; Nadav 
Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 
William Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil, Washington, 
D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1981. 
13 Irvine Anderson, Aramco, the United States and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of 
Foreign Oil Policy, 1933-1950, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981; Aaron Miller, 
Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy 1939-1949, Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1980; David Painter, Oil and the American Century: The 
Political Economy of U. S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941-1954, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986; Michael Stoff, Oil, War and American Security: The Search for a 
National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941-1947, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1980; 
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relations during World War Two. More recent post Gulf war works by 
Simmons and Vassiliev have focused on current dissent and regime 
stability. 14 They do provide a historical narrative, yet their sources are 
exclusively biographies and travel accounts and do not include diplomatic 
papers or official reports. 
One of the most prolific writers on Saudi Arabia has been the British 
diplomat/ adventurer Harry St. John Philby. As an advisor to Ibn Saud he 
had a unique perspective. His work is a fascinating insight into the rituals 
of court life, Arabian history and culture. Philby had served as official in 
the British Indian Government but left service acrimoniously prior to the 
establishment of the Kingdom. This left him with a life-long disdain for 
British policy which is reflected in his work. While Leslie McLoughlin 
provides a worthwhile biography on Ibn Saud, primarily based on other 
biographies, memoirs and anecdotes, but lacking in its use of diplomatic 
records. More popular and journalistic accounts of Saudi Arabia also have 
been written by Robert Lacey, David Holden, Richard Johns, and Said 
Aburish. 15 
There are two classic works in Arabic dealing with eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Saudi history. The first is Unwan al-Majdfi Tarikh Najd, 
(The Symbol of Glory in the History of Najd) by Uthman Ibn Bishr who 
died in 1873. The second is Husayn Ibn Ghannam's Tarikh Najd. A more 
contemporary work is the four volume Shibh al-Jazirah fi ahd al Malik Abd al- 
Aziz, published in 1970 and written by a Syrian, Khair al-Din Zirkili who 
worked in the Saudi Foreign Ministry. However, Zirkili sources much of 
14 Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East: 1941-1947, London: Frank Cass, 1980; 
Geoff Simmons, Saudi Arabia the Shape of Client Feudalism, London: Macmillan 1998; 
AlexeiVassiliev The History of Saudi Arabia, London: Saqi Books, 1997. There has been a 
proliferation of journal articles as well as books focused on post-Gulf war opposition 
movements. One recent example of note is the informative work by Mamoun Fandy, Saudi 
Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. 
15 Leslie McLoughlin, Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom, London: Macmillan, 1993; Robert 
Lacey, The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Saud, New York: Avon, 1981; David 
Holden, and Richard Johns The House of Saud, London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1981; Said 
Aburish, The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud, London, Bloomsbury, 
1994. 
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his information from his mentor, fellow compatriot and advisor at the royal 
court, Sheikh Yusuf Yassin. Though Zirkili provides worthwhile insights 
into the development of the Kingdom in the twentieth century one must 
recognise its origins as an 'official view'. One work that could serve as an 
official history has been produced by Professor Abdullah Salih al- 
Uthaymeen, Dean of the Department of History at King Saud University, 
Riyadh. His multi-volume Tarikh al-Mamlakah al-Arabiyyah al-Suudiyyah is 
well past its eighth re-print. 16 It relies extensively on Ibn Bishr, Zirkili, and 
English writers such as Burkhardt and Philby. Due to the dearth of de- 
classified official documents by the Saudi authorities several contemporary 
Arabic works on Saudi political history have relied on English language 
sources. Arabic authors gather material from memoirs, biographies and 
published collections of declassified documents and translate the 
information for their own audience. 
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 examines the life, 
work and ideology of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab and his contribution 
to the creation of the Al-Saud dynasty. It traces successive attempts by the 
Al-Saud to establish political entities during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries in central Arabia. Chapter 2 traces the early influences on Abdul 
Aziz, his rise as a desert ruler, and the use of religion and tribal politics to 
establish a polity that was ultimately reliant on settled urban communities. 
It will examine the influence of the Kuwaiti ruler, Mubarak al-Sabah, and 
early intrigue against the Ottoman Porte. Chapter 3 introduces a new band 
of warriors, the Ikhwan, and examines their origins, ideology and their 
efforts to expand the Saudi polity. Chapter 4 covers the period of the First 
r 
16Uthman Ibn Bishr, Llnwan al-Majdfi Tarikh Najd, (The Symbol of Glory in the History of 
Najd), reprinted Riyadh: Matba'at al-Riyadh al-Haditha, no date, 2 vols; Abdullah Saleh 
Al-Uthaimeen, Tarikh al-Mamlaka al-Arabiyya al-Suudyah, Riyadh: al-Ubaikan, 2 vols. 1996; 
Khair al Din Al-Zirkili, Shibh al-jazira fi ahd al-Malik Abdul Aziz, Beirut: Dar al-Qalam, 4 
parts in 3 Volumes, 1970. 
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World War, and Ibn Saud's attempts to obtain British recognition and the 
policy debates that ensued in Whitehall and India. It also examines the 
animosity between Ibn Saud and Sharif Hussein. Chapter 5 details Ibn 
Saud's post war expansion; the conquest of Hijaz; raids into Iraq and 
Transjordan, and the subsequent rebellion of the Ikhwan. In this period Ibn 
Saud succeeds in being accepted by Britain as the main power to back in 
Arabia. Chapter 6 traces the origin of American interests in Arabia in the 
1930's; Ibn Saud's negotiations with the oil company and the development 
of Saudi-American relations. Chapter 7 examines Anglo-American rivalry 
over Saudi Arabia as an outcome of the strategic concerns of the Second 
World War; and also the strategies employed by Washington and London 
to maintain, what they perceived as, control over Ibn Saud; and the 
subsequent position of dominance that the United States occupied at the 
end of the War. 
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Chapter 1 
The Creation of a Dynasty: 
The Rise of the House of Al-Saud Prior to the 20th Century 
10 
The tribal origins of the Al-Saud are located deep within the interior of 
central Arabia -the region of Najd and its core known as the aridh. 1 Great 
deserts surround Najd on three sides. As a plateau Najd is divided into two 
sections. Upper (aaliyat) Najd is composed mainly of hard volcanic rock, 
gravel and sand. Its thin layer of soil can only sustain scrubs but it is the 
area in which most of the nomadic populace live. Lower (safiylat) Najd has 
plains of limestone rock and shale. This area receives a greater amount of 
rainfall. The greener pastures and fertile soil conditions nurtured the 
growth of towns and agricultural settlements in the area. 
The greatest period of growth was from the fifteenth to eighteenth 
centuries when several streams of migrating tribes from the mountainous 
areas of the west and southwest made their way into Najd? Attracted by 
the availability of water and the absence of foreign political forces, these 
tribes sought independence from Hijazi and Yemeni authorities and the 
Sheikhs of the Gulf coast. The newcomers also altered the demographic 
makeup of the region. Indigenous tribes of Najd such as the al-Mughira, al- 
Fudul and al-Katheer faced competition for resources from the newcomers 
who were primarily from sections of the Anaizah, al-Dhafir, Qahtan, al- 
Dawasir and Banu Khalid tribes .3 Control and access to water wells and 
1 E. Rehatsek, The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' Art. XVIII, January 14, 
1880 in the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. XIV, 1880, pp. 274- 
401. A history of the Wahhabi movement forms part of the Report on Ibn Saud, January 21, 
1918, IOR, L/P&S/18/B270. Another important work on this period is R. Bayley Winder, 
Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965. 
2 Western travellers to the region in the Nineteenth Century that published informative 
works about this region include: William Palgrave, Narrative of a Year's Journey Through 
Central and Eastern Arabia, London Macmillan, 1865 Vol. I&II; John L. Burckhardt, Travels 
in Arabia, London: Colburn, 1829; Charles Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta, London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1936; G. F. Sadleir, Diary of a Journey Across Arabia, 1819, (first published 
1866) Cambridge: Oleander, reprinted 1977. 
3For details about tribal migrations and socio-political conditions of Arabia see John Habib, 
The Ikhwan Movement of Najd: Its Rise, Development, and Decline, Ph. D. Thesis, University of 
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pasture became matters of survival. Only the largest and strongest tribes 
could guarantee access to them. Weaker tribes were pushed out, sometimes 
finding refuge among townspeople where they settled and engaged in 
commerce or shepherding for a livelihood. Some tribes left Najd for other 
areas; the Bani Lam migrated to southern Iraq, while units of the Shammar 
and the Anaizah moved north towards Damascus. Further movements 
were fuelled by the occurrence of several unusually long droughts in the 
seventeenth century. Yet frequent migrations and changes in tribal power 
structures were common in Najdi history. A particular tribe could 
dominate for no more than a hundred years before succumbing to another 
more powerful one .4`, 
All tribes, settled and nomadic, had their own chieftainS. In some 
cases several settlements or tribal groups were under the influence of a one 
particular chieftain and his family. He would be responsible for securing 
access to water and pasture whether through agreement to share areas 
with other tribes or by forcibly holding land and expelling all rivals. It was 
only when a superior force imposed itself on the area (such as the Ottoman, 
Saudi or Rashidi powers) that disputes over resources were settled by the 
established authority. Once that authority receded or was expelled then 
friction among the tribes returned. Even so, the limited jurisdiction of the 
chieftains reduced their ability to maintain order to a small area. Caravans 
and travellers were prone to assaults by robbers when outside the dira 
(tribal area) of a friendly chieftain. 5 
A common form of attack among the beduin tribes was the raid 
(ghazw). Its objective was usually to gain food, supplies and travel animals. 
Camels were the most popular target because of their high value. The 
Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1978, p. 11. See also Uwaidah al-Juhany, The History of Najd Prior to 
the Wahhabis; A Study of Social, Political and Religious Conditions in Najd During Three 
Centuries Preceding the Wahhabi Reform Movement, Ph. D. Thesis, Univ. Microfilms Int., Ann 
Arbor, 1984, pp. 62,153. Also Joseph Kostiner, The Making of Saudi Arabia: From Chieftaincy 
to Monarchical State 1916-1936, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Hereafter cited as 
MOSA. 
4a1-Juhany, A History of Najd Prior to the Wahhabis, pp. 123,131. 
SIbid., pp. 165-166. In addition to the caravan trade townspeople also engaged in some 
agricultural production when they had access to good water wells. 
ABEDIN-ONE 12 
ghazwWas` usually swift and not necessarily bloody. Xt differed from 
those raids born out of blood feuds or motivated by the goal of expanding 
territory-raiders would seek to gain as much booty as possible in a short 
span of time before fleeing back to their own encampments. 6 
In the struggle for leadership, primogeniture was not the 
predominant method of gaining power. Although chieftains could be 
succeeded by their eldest sons, any male relative, brother, cousin, uncle or 
nephew was an equally eligible candidate. Personality and physical 
prowess (at hunting, fighting, falconry, etc. ), were significant factors in 
determining who actually took power. Large families often became victims 
of sibling rivalry, and vicious feuds, as numerous claimants would fight for 
the chance to attain the highest position. Once in power the chief was 
considered the legal owner of all land under his control; free to lease, sell or 
give to whomever he chose. Yet having no standing army of his own, the 
tribal chieftain relied on loyal members of the tribe to secure the 
enforcement of his instructions. His effectiveness as ruler often lasted only 
as long as his prestige. If a chieftain was no longer respected and feared, his 
leadership could face serious challenges. 
Efforts to bolster his support often involved inviting settlers into the 
tribal dira (territory) who would ideally, but not necessarily, be related to 
the chieftain's clan. These new arrivals would merge with the larger tribe, 
over time becoming absorbed completely. Their presence increased the size 
of the chieftain's supporters and broadened the revenue base. In return for 
permission to settle in his dira the chieftain extracted taxes from crops and 
imposed a form of sales tax, the rate of which varied from family to family 
depending on the strength of their relationship to the chief.? Extending 
invitations was at the chiefs discretion and could be done to individuals as 
well as to groups. One such invitation, that was to have lasting impact on 
6 As'ad AbuKhalil, 'Ghazw' in the Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, New 
York; Oxford University Press, 1995. Vol. 2, pp. 66-67. Hereafter cited as Oxford 
Encyclopedia. 
7a1-Juhany, A History of Najd Prior to the Wahhabis, pp. 177,181. 
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Najd and Arabia as a whole, was made in 1744 in the Najdi town of 
Diriyya. Its chief, Muhammad ibn Saud offered sanctuary to Sheikh 
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, a religious scholar who had been 
persecuted and forced out of his previous home. 8 
Born in the central Najd town of Uyayna in 1703, Abdul Wahhab 
came from a long line of religious scholars. At the time of his birth his 
grandfather, Sulayman ibn Ali Musharraf, was the chief qadi (judge) of the 
town and was noted for having studied under the tutelage of the famed 
scholar of Damascus, Musa al-Hujawi. 9 The young boy received instruction 
from his grandfather in subjects such as the Qur'an, and principles of 
Islamic law (figh). In 1713 Sulayman passed away leaving his post as qadi 
and the responsibility for tutoring Muhammad to his son Abdul Wahhab. 
Yet in 1727 Abdul Wahhab left Uyayna as a result of a disagreement with 
the amir of Uyayna. 10 Forced to seek patronage elsewhere, his family was 
welcomed in the neighbouring town of Huraymila. However, even there 
difficulties arose because Abdul Wahhab's son, Muhammad, was openly 
critical of the religious practices of the townspeople. 
Though the people of Najd had not adopted any other religion, 
Islamic practices had weakened and there had been a resurgence in rituals 
of a pre-Islamic and tribal origin. One such example was prayers offered to 
so called 'holy trees' in order to guarantee safe passage while on a journey; 
8 Philby, Saudi Arabia, London: Ernest Benn, 1955, pp. 34-35. A biography of Muhammad 
Ibn Abdul Wahhab and history of the early Saudi state can be found in Memorial of the 
Government of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jeddah; July 31,1955, Vol. 1. 
9 For the history of Najd in the Nineteenth Century there are few surviving Arabic sources 
written in the period. One of the most significant is Unwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd, (The 
Symbol of Glory in the History of Najd) by Uthman Ibn Bishr who died in 1873. Reprinted 
in Riyadh: Matba'at al-Riyadh al-Haditha, no date, 2 vols. See vol. 1, p. 6. Philby uses Ibn 
Bishr extensively in his book Saudi Arabia, London: Ernest Benn, 1955. This author has 
used both sources. One of the first responsibilities assigned to young Muhammad was to 
complete the rituals of the pilgrimage to Mecca. Thus at age twelve Muhammad ibn Abdul 
Wahhab made the long journey from central Najd to the Hijaz. During his visit he came 
across a far more diverse culture and population unlike the uniformity of Najd. However, 
he also found many Hijazi's lax in their religious practices which would later provide the 
impetus for reform across Arabia. 
1°Uthman Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majdfi Tarikh Najd, Part 1, p. 10. Also Derek Hopwood, The 
Ideological Basis: Ibn Abdul Wahhab's Muslim Revivalism' in State, Society and Economy in 
Saudi Arabia, ed. Tim Niblock, London: Croom Helm, 1982, p. 26. 
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or the prayers made at the graves of pious men asking for worldly 
success. " Although mosques still functioned in some towns, as did the use 
of the Islamic sharia, the use of tribal law and customs or urf instead of 
Islamic law was prevalent. 12 This traditional practice was based on oral 
custom passed down through the generations and it contrasted with the 
more text-based Islamic law. In cases involving urf, the chief was the final 
arbitrator and could legislate new laws or annul old ones. Since the sharia 
sought to restrict activities to what was permitted by revelation many 
chiefs discouraged or restricted the activities of sharia judges out of fear of 
losing their own power to make the law. 13 
Being the son and grandson of judges, Muhammad ibn Abdul 
Wahhab understood the difficulties of implementing Islamic law when the 
influence of tribal custom was still strong. He was also in a position to 
observe the abuse of authority by other judges-which was perhaps 
encouraged by the harsh conditions in which they functioned. With no 
formal court buildings or permanent court officials to assist, the qadi would 
often have to dispense his services from his home, the mosque, on the 
street or in the marketplace. At times the judgements were not written or 
recorded anywhere and it was not uncommon for the judge to be asked to 
simply rule in favour of the claimant in return for a gift or payment. 
Without a fixed income or government subsidy, the qadi would often have 
to supplement their income by other work, although some received 
stipends from the community or had litigants pay all expenses. However, 
when this was abused, it resulted in the buying of verdicts, allowing a 
litigant to bribe the judge to obtain a favorable ruling. 14 
11 Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majdfi Tarikh Najd, Part 1, p. 9. Also Rehatsek, 'The History of the 
Wahhabys in Arabia and India' 
'2 John L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedwins and the Wahhabys, London: Colburn, 1829, Vol. 1, 
pp. 288-289. 
13a1 Juhany, A History of Najd Prior to the Wahhabis, p. 180. Philby's impression of the 
situation at the time of ibn Abdul Wahhab's youth was one where ; "Islam was definitely 
the religion of all self respecting people in the towns and villages of Najd; and there was 
pity, amounting to sympathy, rather than condemnation for the practices of the ignorant". 
See Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 34. 
14 al-Juhany, A History of Najd Prior to the Wahhabis, p. 180. 
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Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab considered paying for legal services 
as abhorrent and tantamount to bribery. 15 Yet his own father took such 
payment and was dependent on this system as well as on the patronage of 
the amir. This is perhaps why his father did not share the same exuberance 
for a forceful change to the status quo that fired his idealistic son. Unable to 
alter local practice and being perceived by the local leadership as not 
having the maturity or religious knowledge to be taken seriously, 
Muhammad became increasingly frustrated. Leaving home seemed to be 
the best choice and so, with the intention of travelling and studying, he set 
out to journey to the centres of Islamic learning. 
He began in Medina, a city that attracted scholars of jurisprudence 
(flqh) from varying backgrounds and traditions from across the Islamic 
world. There Muhammad formed important relationships with leading 
religious figures and subsequently became a student of Sheikh Muhammad 
Hayat al-Sindiýa noted Hanafi scholar and leader in the Naqshabandi sufi 
order. 16 Through his contacts in Medina Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab 
gained introductions to scholars in Iraq. Moving to Basra he found tutelage 
under Sheikh Muhammad al-Majmu'e, a scholar of the Maliki and Shafi'e 
schools of jurisprudence. It was during his stay in Iraq that Muhammad ibn 
Abdul Wahhab developed some of his most notable views. There he 
witnessed the prolific practice of ziyarat al-qubur (visitation of graves) of 
martyrs and pious persons, notably at the tombs of the grandson and 
nephew of Prophet Muhammad. The deceased were asked for tawassul 
(intercession) with God on the supplicants behalf. 17 Muhammad ibn Abdul 
Wahhab was abhorred by this and could accept nor remain silent about its 
1sIbid., pp. 283-284. Also Rehatsek, 'The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India'. 
16The Naqshbandiyah Sufi order was one of the most prominent in Central Asia, the 
Indian Subcontinent and Mesopotamia between the 14th and 18th centuries. Followers of 
this order were strict in following the sharia and were noted for their shunning of music 
and dance. Emphasis was on prayer as was well as political activism. These qualities 
seemed to have deeply influenced Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. See Hamid Algar on 
'Nagshbandiyah' in Oxford Encyclopedia, Vol. 3 pp. 226-229. 
17See Ayman al-Yassini on'Wahhabiyah', Oxford Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, pp. 307-308 
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practice. His views however, brought him into conflict with local 
worshippers. 
Financially drained yet filled with knowledge and the experiences of 
his travels Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab decided to return to his family 
in Huraymila. The relationship with his father was still strained over 
religious issues, but in deference to him Muhammad did not openly preach 
until his father's death in 1740. 
The Education of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab 
The focus of study for a young scholar at that time was fiqh (jurisprudence), 
tafseer (the meaning of the Qur'an) and the hadith (traditions of the 
prophet). Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was also influenced by the work 
of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, a ninth-century scholar (778-855 CE) who founded 
the Hanbali fiqh or school of jurisprudence. 18 Hanbal was noted for his 
outstanding criticism of the ruling Caliph for allowing Aristotelian 
philosophy and speculative reasoning, called kalam, to enter into the 
religious schools of thought. The most active proponents of speculative 
reasoning-the 'Mu'atazila'-sought rational explanations for divine 
attributes and ventured into the interpretation of anthropomorphic 
descriptions of God in certain Qura'nic verses. 19 Ahmad ibn Hanbal spoke 
out against the introspective and divisive field of debate but was jailed for 
his opposition because the Caliph Al-Mamun himself was sympathetic to 
the Mu'atazila. It was not until the reign of Caliph Al-Mutawakkil (841-861 
CE) that Hanbal could teach openly again and his ideas attracted a large 
following. 
A later adherent of Hanbal, Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiya (1263- 
1328 CE) was to have even more influence on Abdul Wahhab's thought. 20 
18Ahmad ibn Hanbal was born in Baghdad and studied in both Basra and Hijaz. He had 
among his teachers notable Hanafi jurists such as Abu Yousef and in addition, the leader 
of the Shafi'e school, Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'e. 
19lgnaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, Tr. by Andras and Ruth 
Hamori, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 85-87. 
2OIbn Taymiyah was born in Harran where both his father and grandfather had been 
leading scholars of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence. Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiya, 
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Ibn Taymiya was noted for his outspoken views against falsafa 
(philosophy), worshipping at gravesites, veneration of saints and the 
pantheistic practices of some sufi orders. 21 He accused the ulema of the time 
of neglect and encouraging the "propagation of sins and heretical 
innovations" for which they should be punished since it was they "more 
than others" who had a responsibility to preserve the Islamic ummah 
(community). 22 
Ibn Taymiya was also critical of the blind following of religious 
practices and refused to accept that ijtihad (independent reasoning) was 
closed. 3 Moreover, he asserted that the simple act of declaring faith was 
not enough to become a true believer, that all of a persons outward actions 
and inward intentions had to be in accordance with Islamic norms. He 
viewed the practices of ziyarat al-qubur as bid'a (an innovation) and 
something which led to shirk (violating the unity of Allah) 24 Those that 
committed acts of shirk were to be fought, even killed, even if they claimed 
to profess faith. 
Ibn Taymiya looked to the salaf al-saleh (the first three generations of 
Muslims) to serve as manifestations of the proper Islamic model25 That 
generation was to have set the highest examples of leadership and Islamic 
living. Subsequent scholars had the duty of ensuring that same model was 
continued. The umara (rulers) were to ensure the implementation of Islamic 
laws and prevent bid'a (innovations) from diluting that inherited model. 
Sharh al-Ageedah al-Wasitiyah, Riyadh: Darrusalam Publishers, 1996, p. 9. Also Richard 
Martin, and Mark Woodward, Defenders of Reason in Islam, Oxford: Oneworld, 1997, pp. 
123-125. 
2lTagi al-Din Ibn Taymiya, Mukhtaser Iqtida al-Sirat al-Mustaqeem, Riyadh: Darrussalam 
Publishers 1996, pp. 129-133. Also Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, 
p. 110-111 
22Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiya, al Hisbafi al-Islam (Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of 
the Hisba) Tr. by Muhtar Holland, Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1992, pp. 131-132. 
231yad Hilal, Studies in Usul al-Fiqh, Walnut, CA, Islamic Cultural Workshop, (no date), 
p. 129-131. 
24Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiya, Sharh al-Ageedah al-Wasitiyah, pp. 11-12. Also Ronald Nettler on 
'Ibn Taymiyah' in Oxford Encyclopedia, Vol. 2 pp. 165-166. The Mongol invasion had a deep 
impact on Ibn Taymiya; his family had to move to Damascus to avoid a brutal Mongol 
occupation; and the activities of certain non-Muslim minority groups at the time led to his 
belief that they should be treated harshly for their betrayal. 
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Ibn Taymiyä s view was that as long as the amir (ruler) fulfilled this duty 
then he was to be obeyed. Only if there was a clear violation of Islamic law 
could his removal be justified. Even if the leader was harsh and oppressive 
the ulema had a responsibility to try and correct him before trying to 
remove him. Ibn Taymiya described it thus: 
Everyone to who obedience is paid is one of those 
in command, and every one of these is under obligation 
to command what Allah has commanded and to forbid 
what he has forbidden. And everyone who owes them 
obedience is obliged to obey them in obedience to Allah, 
and not to obey them in defiance of Allah. 26 
Ibn Taymiya was fiercely opposed to the Mongol rulers because he saw 
them publicly claiming to be adherents of Islam but in reality working to 
undermine it. He lashed out at some ulema for subverting the faith of 
believers by not fulfilling their duty to Islam, seeking instead to ingratiate 
themselves with the new leadership. They were violating the unifying 
principle that kept the Islamic community together; that of tawheed and 
instead, tolerated the expression of shirk manifested in Mongol rule. 
Tawheed literally means 'oneness' and unity of God. Yet the essence 
of this concept was not confined simply to belief, it was also supposed to 
manifest itself in a person's speech, actions, and even emotions. Ibn 
Taymiya wrote passionately about tawheed and this would later greatly 
influence the young mind of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab who 
considered tawheed the "eternal religion of God" and "the religion of Islam 
itself" 27 To understand the beliefs of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab more 
about this should be said. The concept of tawheed is comprised of three 
main elements: 28 
First, tawheed al-rububiyah; the unity of Lordship, required the belief 
that God was the Creator of all things and did not depend on anything for 
25Taqi al Din Ibn Taymiya, Muqdimahfi Amwal al-Tafseer (An Introduction to the Principles 
of Tafseer) tr. by Muhammad Ansari, Birmingham, UK: Hidayah 1993, pp. 12-16 
261bn Taymiya, al-Hisbafi al-Islam, p. 117. 
27Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, Kitab al-Tawheed Riyadh: Dar al-Salaam Publishing, 
1986, p. 14. 
28A. A. Bilal Philips, The Fundamentals of Tawheed, Riyadh: Tawheed Publications, 1990, 
pp. 5-26 provide detailed description of these concepts. 
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sustenance. The fact that living things or objects had the ability to move, 
change and grow was because God gave them permission to do so. 
Furthermore a person's fortune or misfortune were to be considered tests 
from God and not the result of using charms, amulets, potions or other 
superstitious devices. Man's actions were the result of his choices, a good 
result could come from a bad situation, and vice-versa, but all were tests of 
faith. To believe otherwise or rely on the zodiac, good luck charms or to 
have fear of black cats and broken mirrors were contradictory to this aspect 
of tawheed. 29 
Second, tawheed al-asmaa wa al-sifaat; embodied the concept of the 
unity of God's names and attributes, whereby God must be referred to 
according to the descriptions in the Quran without adding meaning to the 
names or inferring other meanings. His attributes were similar to human 
beings in name only not in degree, thus when God is said to be 'seeing and 
hearing' it is taken in the absolute sense without the limitations that 
humans have. This was an issue because of the philosophical arguments 
that arose over the concept of the nature of God and Ibn Taymiya had 
strong views about the dangers of indulging in such discourse. 
Third, tawheed al-ibadah or tawheed al-ilahiya; unity of worship, where 
prayer and worship were to be directed towards God only. No intercessors 
between man and God were acceptable, whether pious men or prophets. 
Worship or ibada, in this case also includes having love for, trust in and fear 
of God. The fulfilment of worship was the adherence to the 
commandments and abstention from the prohibitions of God's law in all 
areas of public and private life. Not following or implementing the sharia, 
for example, would be a violation of this part of tawheed. 
However, in the time of Ibn Taymiya many of these principles were 
not followed. The prevalence of kalam and the practice of ziyarat al qubur 
were examples of the violations of tawheed al asmaa wa al-sifat and tawheed 
291bid. See also Qura'n, chapter : verse 39: 62,64: 11 and 2: 155. 
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al-ibadah 30 Moreover, supplications addressed to saints or to the Prophet 
Muhammad were considered acts of shirk (associating partners with God), 
and forms of idolatry. 31 A Muslim who indulged in these practices was 
considered a hypocrite and should be fought, even killed 32 Though the 
people of Arabia had not formally adopted any other religion besides Islam 
their actions and superstitions went against what tawheed represented and 
for that reason Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was motivated to change 
society. He also believed that if a believer willingly followed a leader or 
obeyed the laws of a group or society that did not uphold the principles of 
tawheed then he had become an unbeliever. He declared that anyone "who 
makes a judgment other than by the book of Allah is a kafir" and "all taghut 
are kafir" 33 Taghut referred to those forces which compete for man's 
attention such as tribalism, nationalism etc. Beduin customary law (urf) and 
Ottoman law were considered to be among the taghut. 34 
Shirk too, could be committed in many ways; shirk al-iddiya: 
worshipping other than Allah, shirk al niyya wa al-irada wa al-qasd - having 
the intention or will to violate the principles of tawheed; shirk al-ta'a - 
obeying and accepting rulers who were themselves in a state of shirk; and 
shirk al-mahabba - loving something more than God 35 The guardians of 
tawheed were, as ibn Taymiya stated, those "who hold command" (i. e. the 
scholars and leaders). Muhammed ibn Abdul Wahhab was therefore 
conscious of the need to secure political backing of an amir in order to 
establish a proper Islamic entity (dawla islamiya or dar al-Islam) where the 
sharia would be enforced and innovations quashed. His ideas have often 
30Kalam was the practice of theological speculation where doctrines considered beyond 
human comprehension (such as the nature and essence of God) were debated and 
analyzed in order to develop rational explanations for them. See Goldziher, Introduction to 
Islamic Theology and Law, p. 85. 
31 Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, Kitab al-Tawheed, pp. 130-131. 
32 Philips, The Fundamentals of Tawheed, pp. 5-26. 
331bid., p. 26. kafir literally means'one who conceals the truth' but is often simply 
translated as unbeliever. Cited in Christine Moss Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, pp. 88-89. 
34 Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedwins and the Wahhabys, vol. 1 pp. 288-289. Qura'nic references 
to these subjects can be found in Chapter 3 verses 31-32,16: 36 and 4: 80. 
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been referred to as 'Wahhabi but neither he nor his followers used that 
term. Rather his followers described themselves as ahl al-tawheed (people of 
unity) or the Muwahhfdun (unitarians). 
The Search for Political Legitimacy: Alliance and Empire 1744-1818 
After his period of travel, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab returned to 
Huraymila and though in his mid-thirties, still deferred to his father and 
did not publicly preach his views. The ideas of the son were still not 
welcome in the community and his father was keen to avoid 
embarrassment to the family 36 Nevertheless, during this period 
Muhammad was able to produce kitab al-tawheed, a book which outlined 
many of his basic thoughts and principles. It was not until the death of his 
father in 1740 that Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab allowed himself to 
preach openly. Initially he secured the patronage of Uthman ibn Muammar 
the amir of Uyayna, the town where he had been born and where his family 
had prestige. Muammar offered protection and instructed his people to 
follow the teachings of their new imam, now referred to as Sheikh 
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. The marriage into Muammar's family 
solidified the relationship between the two men. 37 
With the political backing of Muammar and the men of Uyayna at 
his disposal Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was able to implement the 
Muwahhldun principles and begin reforms. As the imam and chief qadi he 
started implementing sharia laws in many areas. Crimes of theft and 
murder were punished with amputation and beheading. Domes and 
mausoleums erected upon the tombs of holy men (i. e. the 'companions' of 
Prophet Muhammad) were demolished. Books were destroyed if they did 
not fit the interpretation of the Muwahbddun doctrine. The practices of 
35Sheikh Abdul Rahman ibn Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab in Majmu'at al 
Tawheed ed. by Rashid Rida, Cairo: al-Manar, 1927. Cited in Helms, Cohesion, p. 91 
36Derek Hopwood, The Ideological Basis: Ibn Abdul Wahhab's Muslim Revivalism' in 
State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia, ed., Tim Niblock, London: Croom Helm, 1982, 
p. 29. 
37 Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd, vol. 1 pp. 9-10. 
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praising the rulers in the Friday sermons and -special prayers 
for the 
Prophet were forbidden 38 In addition other ulema, were criticised for their 
complacency, accused of corruption and weakness and for failing to end 
religious innovation (bid'a). They were to blame for the ignorance and lack 
of religious education of the public. 
In response, the established ulema accused ibn Abdul Wahhab of not 
following the sharia himself by creating trouble and encouraging people to 
revolt against their lawful amirs. One chief in particular, Sulayman ibn 
Hamad al-Humaidi, was particularly angered by this incitement. Al- 
Humaidi was head of the powerful Banu Khalid tribe in the eastern region 
of al-Hasa. It was through his ports that much of the trade with Uyayna 
was conducted. Sulayman threatened to impose economic sanctions on 
Uyayna if Uthman ibn Muammar did not expel the aggravating Sheikh. 39 
Unable to withstand the pressure from al-Humaidi, Muammar was forced 
to comply. He arranged for one of his men to escort the Sheikh out of town. 
According to an account by Harry Philby, the escort had orders to kill the 
Sheikh once beyond the town limits, but the task proved too difficult for 
the man and Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was able to leave safely 40 
Abdul Wahhab found refuge in the town of Diriyyah in 1744. The 
people of Diriyya had a long rivalry with the Banu Khalid and several 
prominent residents of the town including relatives of its amir, Muhammad 
ibn Saud, had adopted Muwahhidun concepts 41 It is to the amir's wife, 
Mudhi, that some accounts attribute the success of convincing Muhammed 
ibn Saud to give patronage to the Sheikh 42 She prevailed despite the 
38al-Yassini, Religion and State, pp. 24-25. 
39Rehatsek, 'The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' p. 278. The Banu Khalid 
territory lay between Najd and the Gulf coast and were in a position to threaten vital trade 
routes which passed through al-Hasa. 
4OPhilby, Saudi Arabia, p-38- 
41 J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, London: 1913, Part I, 
Vol. II, Chapter VII, p. 1053. Also Report on Ibn Saud, January 21,1918, PRO, IOR 
L/P&S/18/B270. 
42 Leslie McLoughlin, Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom, London: Macmillan, 1993, p. 7. Also 
Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 39; al-Yassini Religion and State, p. 25; Rehatsek, The History of the 
Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 274-401. This was done over the protests of Thunayyan 
ibn Saud, the amir brother who opposed the alliance. 
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protests of her brother-in-law, Thunayyan Ibn Saud, who opposed any 
alliance with Abdul Wahhab. The Saudi-Muwahhidun (sometimes referred 
to by other authors as Saudi-Wahhabi) alliance that began in 1744 was to 
impact greatly on Arabian politics well into the twentieth century. 43 
The first two years of the Sheikh's stay were spent in spreading the 
call of the return to the 'proper practice' of Islam. He taught and lectured 
and wrote letters to neighboring rulers and notables enjoining them to 
follow the path of tawheed. 44Encouraging unity based on a brotherhood of 
faith and not along tribal bonds, Abdul Wahhab hoped to initiate a change 
in the mentality of the beduins. He warned of the seriousness of 
committing shirk and disobeying the commands of Allah. He reinforced 
and legitimized Muhammad ibn Saud's rule by exhorting people to obey 
their amir. Following ibn Taymiya's argument on obedience to rulers, the 
Sheikh taught that as long as the sharia was implemented, Muhammad ibn 
Saud could not be opposed and that to defy their Islamic leader was 
against the faith. Those that did not manifest their faith in their actions 
would be fought and killed 45 
With the patronage of the amir of Diriyyah, Abdul Wahhab was able 
to preach his ideas openly and began to propagate them among the people 
of Najd without fear. After building a base of support and an 
understanding of his ideas he began the second part of 'commanding the 
good and forbidding the evil' which was physical action. From 1746, 
Muhammad ibn Saud's men began their forays into neighboring towns to 
implement the rule of the sharia. Those towns that resisted were fought 
until they submitted. The Sheikh also secured from Muhammad ibn Saud a 
pledge to receive a fifth of all revenues and booty which could be spent on 
43al-Juhany, A History of Najd Prior to the Wahhabis., p. 288. The descendants of Muhammad 
ibn Abdul Wahhab are often known by family name of 'al Al-Sheikh'. 
44al-Yassini, Ayman. 'Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab' in Oxford Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, 
pp. 159-160. 
45Ibn Taymiya, al-Hisbafi al-Islam, p. 117. 
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what he saw fit 46 In fact, Abdul Wahhab controlled all areas of religious, 
educational and judicial concern. 
The two decades following the alliance saw the expansion and 
consolidation of territory. Tribal chiefs from al-Hasa in the east, Najran in 
the southwest and Hijaz in the west made various attempts to keep the 
Muwahhldun warriors of Najd confined to central Arabia. Though they 
came close to success on several occasions they were unable to remove the 
challengers from the scene completely. Najd had the support from tribes 
that were either convinced of the Muwahkidun call, or who sought to 
benefit from ghazw or those who were simply afraid of being the victims of 
ghazw themselves. In any event, Muwahh dun forces always managed to 
resupply themselves 47 This struggle did not stop at the death, in 1765, of 
Muhammad ibn Saud. His son Abdul Aziz simply stepped in and was 
given the pledge of allegiance (bai'a). Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab 
continued to give his support and advice to the new amir and carried on his 
programme of religious reform. 48 
This period was also observed by one of the first Europeans to 
venture into Arabia, certainly the first serious explorer, Carsten Niebuhr. 
He was a Dutch officer in the Corps of Engineers on a surveying mission 
chartered by King Frederick V. 49 The King sought to gain a greater 
understanding of the Bible by examining the geography, culture and 
languages of the Middle East and the Holy Lands. In 1762 Niebuhr visited 
Jeddah on the Red Sea and during 1764-1765 travelled along the eastern 
coast of Arabia where he learned of the spread of the Saudi-Muwahh dun 
alliance. Though he was a contemporary of Muhammad ibn Abdul 
46a1-Yassini, Religion and State, p. 31. 
47Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1988 p. 10. 
48 Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Part I, Vol-II, Chapter VII, p. 1054. Also Memorial of 
the Government of Saudi Arabia, 1955, Vol. 1, pp. 120-121. 
49 The court of the King had drawn up a 235 page dossier full of questions to which it 
sought answers. The questions covered geographical, linguistic, sociological and 
zoological topics. It was the objective of the mission to answer as many of the questions as 
possible. As a result of this mission Niebuhr became the first European to accurately 
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Wahhab the two men never met and it appears that he was able to 
appreciate the underlying purpose of the Muwah'Edun mission. Niebuhr's 
comments made 167 years before the establishment of modern Saudi 
Arabia are prophetic: "It has already produced a revolution in the 
government of Arabia, and will probably hereafter influence the state of 
this country still further. "50 
Niebuhr was part of a six strong team but none of the others 
managed to survive the harsh climate, the ravages of disease, and the long 
journey home. Niebuhr's determination and will to survive was matched 
by his curiosity and interest in learning. He was fascinated not only in the 
geography and history of the Arabia but in flora and fauna as well. 
Niebuhr also seems to have made a genuine effort to understand local 
people, seeking out the common man, the merchant, student and religious 
leaders to learn their ways and ideas. His work was a major contribution to 
the understanding of the region in his time. Though his knowledge of 
Islam and Arabian politics was limited prior to his travels he seems to have 
gained considerable grasp of both: 
The Musulman religion, as professed by the Sunnites, is surely far 
different from what it was instituted by Mahomet. This sect follow 
the authority of some commentators, who explain the Alcoran by 
their own whimsies, and exalt their private opinions into doctrines 
of the Mahometan system. It acknowledges a long train of saints, 
who are invoked in cases of necessity, and to whom many absurd 
miracles are ascribed, and these said to have been wrought in favour 
of persons who addressed themselves to the saints, in preference to 
God. It gives faith to the virtues of amulets, and the efficacy of 
foolish vows. In short, it has gradually adopted many pieces of 
superstition, which are condemned in the Alcoran, and justified only 
by the strained interpretations of the Doctors ... The new religion of 
Abd ul Wahheb deserves therefore to be regarded as a reformation 
of Mahometism, reducing it back to its original simplicity. He has 
gone further than some other reformers: but an Arab can hardly be 
expected to act in such matters with a delicate hand. 51 
calculate the height of the pyramids in Egypt and had also to visit the cities of Najaf and 
Karbala in Iraq. See Robin Bidwell, Travellers in Arabia, Garnet: Reading, 1994, pp. 32-49. 
50Carsten Niebuhr, Travels Through Arabia, and Other Countries in the East, Translated by 
Robert Heron, Edinburgh: R. Morrison and Son, 1792. Reprinted 1994, Reading: Garnet 
Pub, Vol. 2, p. 131. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established in 1932. 
51Niebuhr, Travels Through Arabia, and Other Countries in the East, pp. 135-136. 
ABEDIN-ONE 26 
Unfortunately, few historical accounts refer to Niebuhr and this author 
could not find reference to his contribution to the history of Arabia in the 
works of, al-Yassini, Kostiner, Lacey or Safran. 52 Yet Hogarth said that he 
knew of no serious explorer who did not consult Niebuhr's work before 
embarking on a trip to Arabia or who did not end up quoting him on his 
return. 53 
By 1770, much of the peninsula, with the exception of Yemen, was 
under Muwaridun influence. In the north, raids were carried out into 
Mesopotamia and Syria to the outskirts of Damascus, thus placing 
important caravan and pilgrim routes from the centre of the Ottoman 
empire under Saudi dominance In 1773, Riyadh, the chief city in Najd 
was finally taken-thus vindicating Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. At 
age seventy he had spent almost thirty years guiding his followers and 
supporting the House of Al-Saud. In return he had been entrusted with the 
responsibility for all religious, educational, and judicial issues. Now in 
semi-retirement, he let the amirs of the Al-Saud broaden the boundaries of 
the realm. Thus the Sheikh lived long enough to influence the first two 
amirs of the Saudi-Muwahdun entity. Moreover, he was able to inculcate 
his ideas into the minds of sons and grandsons of the Al-Saud family who 
would themselves be taking future leadership roles. When in 1792 
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab himself passed away his four sons 
continued their father's work. In his lifetime he had seen the creation of a 
polity that had come to dominate a considerable portion of Arabia. 
52 Robert Lacey, The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Saud, New York: Avon, 1981; 
al-Yassini, Religion and State; Safran, Saudi Arabia,; Kostiner, MOSA . Meanwhile Niebuhr's 
historic contribution was recognised as early as 1880 by Rehatsek, 'The History of the 
Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 274-401. 
53Hogarth, quoted in the Introduction to Niebuhr's Travels Through Arabia, 1994 reprint 
, p. VI. 
S4Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VII, p. 1054. The precedent 
established in this time of raiding up to the Euphrates and to the outskirts of Damascus 
was used in the twentieth century by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud to increase the size of his 
territory during the Uqair conference of 1922 where boundary agreements with Iraq and 
Transjordan were being discussed. 
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The one area where Muwahhddun operations were slow to penetrate 
was the western region of Hijaz where the ruler, the Sharif of Mecca, 
Ghalib ibn Musa'd was opposed to the Muwahiddun/Wahhabi polity. 55 
The strength of Ghalib's rule varied, and was dependent upon the success 
of his manipulation of tribal differences and distribution of largesse. Yet he 
did successfully challenge the encroachment of the Saudi-Muwahh dun 
forces. Much of the 1790's was spent in battle, with neither side achieving a 
decisive victory. 56 In 1799, after many stalemates, a truce was finally 
agreed in which Sharif Ghalib was recognised as having jurisdiction over 
Mecca, as well as the Utayba and Harb tribal territories and all of northern 
Asir. 57 Abdul Aziz and his men were invited to perform the pilgrimage in 
Mecca and to celebrate the Eid festival. However this nearly led to further 
clashes when the boisterous Hijazi ceremonies included singing and 
dancing which inflamed the Muwahdun sensitivities. 58 Abdul Aziz 
abruptly withdrew his men before an incident occurred and turned their 
attention eastwards. 
The city of Karbala, in Iraq was famous for the tomb of Hussain, 
grandson of the Prophet. Its presence was a matter of immense local pride 
and it was a site that attracted numerous worshippers. To the strict 
S5Using Turkish sources from Istanbul and Baghdad, Gerald de Gaury in his book Rulers of 
Mecca provides an interesting history of Hijaz and the office of Sharif of Mecca. See Gerald 
DeGaury, Rulers of Mecca, New York: Roy Publishers, 1949, especially pp. 177-207. 
56 Rehatsek, 'The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 281-282. 
57 DeGaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 181 
58Charles Didier, Sojourn with the Grand Sharif of Makkah , tr. by Richard Boulind, 
Cambridge: Oleander Press, 1985, pp. 8,55, and 63. This is an account of a French traveller 
who visited the Hijaz during the period 1854-1856. Didier observed grand mausoleums 
constructed over the tombs of pious saints and the long robes which the people wore were 
deemed ostentatious by the Muwahkldun who kept their robes short and above the ankle 
so as not to 'waste' cloth and be arrogant. Another practice Didier described was the 
'branding' of male children on the fortieth day of their birth with deep incisions, three on 
each cheek and two on the temple. The scars were permanent and identified the person 
as being from the 'Holy Land'. Among the beduin, superstitions and occult beliefs 
abounded. Trees that were considered 'holy' could be found strewn with pieces of cloth 
placed by travellers to ward off evil spirits. Sacrificing camels was also done as parts of 
exorcism ceremonies. These customs were also vividly described in the Safarnameh of 
Mirza Mohammed Hosayn Farhani, (tr. by H. Farmayan and E. Daniel as'A Shiite 
Pilgrimage to Mecca 1885-1886' Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990, pp. 225-228. ). 
Farhani was an Iranian notable who wrote an account of his pilgrimage journey. An 
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interpretations of ibn Abdul Wahhab the veneration of any man was 
antithetical to Islam. 59 In 1801 Abdul Aziz lead a force of roughly 10,000 
men and 6,000 camels to attack the city 60 Several thousand people were 
killed, the tomb and other gravesites were pillaged and the city 
plundered. 61 Unlike attacks in and around Najd, the Saudi forces did not 
seek to obtain territorial control nor did they seek to establish their 
sovereignty or extract tribute from the people. Such an occupation would 
likely result in the dispatch of the Ottoman army. Abdul Aziz chose to 
attack and then retreat, allowing his men to enjoy their plunder and giving 
them g boost of morale. 62 
It is ironic that during the lifetime of the Sheikh such a campaign 
against a major site of Shi'i pilgrimage was not initiated. Indeed with the 
reputation of ibn Abdul Wahhab and his followers for enacting strict 
punishments against violators of Muwahiddun principles it is surprising 
that the most notorious act which the Muwahhidun army embarked upon, 
occurred almost a decade after the death of the Sheikh. Especially since that 
incident was in itself part of what made the reputation of the 
Muwahhidun. The Karbala attack highlights the differences between raids 
during the lifetime of the Sheikh and those after his death. Muhammad ibn 
Abdul Wahhab was primarily a teacher and a man of scholarly debate. 
Even though he promulgated strong verdicts against those who 'deviated 
from the faith', he was realistic and politically pragmatic. 
Although his support for the Al-Saud legitimized their rule there 
was no standing army assigned to the task of spreading the faith. Rather, 
conscripts were drawn from beduin tribes and towns. The Sheikh rallied 
elaborately decorated version of his book was presented to the Qajar ruler Naseruddin 
Shah in 1887. 
59 Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VII, p. 1059. See also David 
Edens, The Anatomy of the Saudi Revolution' in the International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, vol. 5,1974, pp. 50-64; Philby Saudi Arabia, pp. 92-93.. 
60 Rehatsek, 'The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India', p. 284. 
61 Wahba, Arabian Days, p. 91and Philby Saudi Arabia, p. 93. 
6TThis was not the first time that Karbala had been attacked and the ornate graveyards 
levelled. In 851 the Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil also destroyed the tombs to curtail the 
growing importance placed on shrines by Shi'a inhabitants. See Lorimer, Gazetteer of the 
Persian Gulf, Vol. 1, part 1, pp. 179-180. 
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his followers to rebel against the Ottomans who had 'left their religion' by 
adopting foreign practices. Those that joined the struggle were promised 
'paradise' through martyrdom while those that lived could look forward to 
their share of booty, in addition to a reward from the almighty. 63 It was 
through the appeal of both 'worldly' treasures and reward in the 'afterlife' 
that the beduin were drawn into the Muwahiddun cause. 
Within two years of the attack on Karbala Abdul Aziz had launched 
major assaults westwards into the Hijaz. In May 1803 he wrested control of 
the holy city of Mecca from the grasp of Sharif Ghalib. 64 The defeated 
leader and the ulema of Mecca were obliged to pledge their allegiance 
(bai'a) to Abdul Aziz and acknowledge their acceptance of Muwahkldun 
principles. To the surprise of many local merchants the conquerors did not 
prohibit trade and ensured that business continued as usual. However, the 
social and moral codes of the city were made stricter, prohibiting music 
and tobacco, but they were more fortunate than the inhabitants of previous 
Muwahbidun conquests; many of whom met their deaths. 
For Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, the victorious capture of the holy city was 
short lived. Upon his return to Diriyya, he was attacked and killed after 
Friday prayers by a man who sought to avenge the death of his sons in the 
raid on Karbala. Succession was granted to his son Saud who was already 
an experienced leader. 65 Determined to continue his father's legacy Saud 
organised his forces to capture the city of Medina-where some practices, 
especially by visiting pilgrims, did much to inflame Muwahvidun 
sensibilities. The tomb of the Prophet had become a mausoleum, adorned 
with gifts and had turned into a site for pilgrims to pray for intercession 
with the Almighty. 66 The new ruler had extraneous decoration pieces 
63Aziz Al-Azmeh'Wahhabite Polity' in Arabia and the Gulf From Traditional to Modern 
States, ed. I. RNetton, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble, 1986, pp. 75-91. 
64 Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 95 and DeGaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 186. 
65 Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VII, pp. 1062-1063. 
66 Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab had been extremely critical of superstition surrounding 
trees and devoted a chapter in his Kitab al-Tawheed against it. See ibn Abdul Wahhab, Kital 
al-Tawheed Chapter 9. Part of the ritual of tree worship included tearing off a piece of 
clothing and hanging it on the tree to keep evil spirits away. Another practice involved the 
slaughtering of a camel to rid a town of disease or a bad omen. The animal would be first 
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removed from the tomb. Prayers to the dead and other unorthodox rituals 
were banned. This made Saud unpopular among some, but the people 
undoubtedly feared him. 
Having secured the two holy cities Saud was in a powerful position. 
Though he had taken the role of amir, he did not alter the political status 
quo, choosing to allow Sharif Ghalib to remain a figurehead leader-albeit 
to forestall an immediate Ottoman attack. Saud did, however, appoint a 
new qadi in Mecca who was to ensure that the religious practices of the 
people followed the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. Who 
better to serve that function than the grandson of the 'great Sheikh' himself 
Sulayman ibn Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. 67 This was 
followed by other appointments of members of the family of ibn Abdul 
Wahhab to judicial positions throughout Hijaz. These judges were to 
dispense their services without taking payment of any kind from the locals. 
In case of disagreement with a particular verdict, the appeals could be 
lodged directly with the amir, thus giving Saud the ultimate power of veto. 
Collections for the public treasury, or bayt al-mal were undertaken 
by special agents appointed by Saud, who taxed merchant capital and 
received a portion of raiding booty. 68 At the same time, in typical beduin 
chief style, Saud entertained the noble and the poor at his majlis and 
proffered gifts to respected guests. He successfully extended influence 
throughout western Arabia, reigning in wayward tribes and raiding 
heavily into Syria right up to Damascus and Aleppo. This balance of 
military success and diplomatic manoeuvring was essential to the 
maintenance of effective rule and would have been successful if it were not 
for the determination of Constantinople to exact its revenge. 
led around the town where it was believed it would absorb evil spirits and then it would 
be sacrificed which was thought to kill the bad omen. These examples can be found in 
Didier, Sojourn With the Sharif, pp. 8 and 63. See also Edens, The Anatomy of the Saudi 
Revolution' pp. 50-64. 
67 al-Yassini. Religion and State, p. 43. 
68 Didier, Sojourn With the Sharif, p. 97. Also Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Part. I, Vol. 
I, p. 179. 
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Ottoman and Egyptian Intervention in Arabia 69 
The Ottoman response to the loss of Hijaz was slow. European intrigue and 
conflict in the Central Asian provinces diverted the attention of an already 
weakened Caliphate. Beleaguered in Constantinople, Sultan Selim. 
delegated the task of recapturing the holy places to Muhammad Ali of 
Egypt. However, Ali had problems of his own with the Mamluk dynasty 
and took time to consolidate his power in Egypt before acting on the 
order 7° In fact Muhammad Ali 's force, consisting largely of Albanian 
soldiers and led by his son Tusun, did not land in Hijaz until October 1811, 
seven years after Saud captured Mecca. Marching northwards towards 
Sinai, the soldiers took territory where there were fewer strongholds of the 
Al-Saud before making an attempt, in early 1812, on the key city of 
Medina. Due to the allegiance of many local tribes Saud was forewarned of 
the advancing army. He moved first to catch the attackers in an ambush as 
they passed through a valley. The overconfident Egyptian force was caught 
by surprise and forced to retreat with many casualties. 71 
Tusun would have to wait the best part of a year for reinforcements 
to arrive from Egypt and in the meantime he began a campaign to win over 
local tribal chiefs with gifts and bribes. Thus when reinforcements finally 
did arrive in October 1812 he was able to field a combined beduin-Egyptian 
force to lay siege on the city of Medina. His tight hold forced the city to 
69Egyptian operations in Arabia and a history of Wahhabi power in eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries are provided in detail in a War Office report of January 21,1918, IOR 
L/P&S/18/B270/P337. Also Lorimer Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Part I, Vol. II pp. 1081- 
1093. See also M. W. Daly, ed. The Cambridge History of Egypt, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998,2Vols, and Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, especially 
Chapter 2. 
70Muhammad Ali became the wali (governor) of Egypt in 1805 when the Ottoman Sultan 
was forced to appoint him in order to maintain the delicate political situation following the 
French withdrawal. Ali was concerned from the beginning that the Sultan would try and 
remove him. It was possible that the mission to the Hijaz was designed to distract him and 
stretch his resources to exhaustion. Nevertheless Ali also realised that controlling the holy 
cities would give him immense prestige in the Muslim world and provide him a staging 
area for other conquests. See Daly, Vol. 2 pp. 139-146. Also Rehatsek, The History of the 
Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 322-325. 
71 Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majdfi Tarikh Najd, Part I, pp. 155-156; Lorimer, Gazetteer of the 
Persian Gulf, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, pp. 1080-1085. Also Daly, The Cambridge History of 
Egypt, Vo1.2 p. 198 and the Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia, 1955, Vol. 1, p. 136. 
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surrender within a fortnight-boosting Tusun's confidence and his troops 
morale immeasurably. 72 He went on to take Mecca in January 1813. The 
successes brought more beduins looking for booty to Tusun's camp. Saud 
found he was unable to retain beduin allegiance when they sensed better 
spoils with the Egyptian side. Being half way across the peninsula in 
Diriyya, he could do little to ensure the Hijazi tribes stayed in line. Before 
Saud could organise a Najdi force to re-take Hijaz, he died suddenly in 
April 1814.73 
Leadership was handed over to Saud's son, Abdullah who took over 
at a difficult time. Battlefield losses and tribal defections meant that he had 
quickly to reassert control and establish undisputed authority among the 
tribes. 74 Matters were complicated when a great uncle (the brother of his 
grandfather), challenged the young leader and tried to claim his own right 
to rule based on being the son of Muhammad ibn Saud-the dynastic 
founder. Tension increased within the family and among the tribes as the 
issue of rightful succession was debated. Abdullah ibn Saud eventually 
staved off the challenge from his great uncle but could not repair the 
damage to Muwahiddun unity. Sensing this weakness, more opportunistic 
beduin tribes defected to the Egyptian side. 75 With the Al-Saud weakened 
and confined mainly to Najd, Tusun seemed confident he had put an end 
to the threat. Reluctant to engage in further bloody battles he secured a 
treaty with Abdullah ibn Saud that maintained the status quo and in which 
the Muwahiddun would give up their claims to the Hijaz. With a treaty 
negotiated, Tusun returned to Egypt in November 1815, whereupon he 
contracted plague and died shortly thereafter. 76 
In the absence of a strong Egyptian presence Abdullah ibn Saud 
began to re-assert his authority in the peninsula. Muhammad Ali, incensed 
n Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majdfi Tarikh Najd, Part I, pp. 157-158. Also Rehatsek, "The History 
of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 322-325. 
73 Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majdfi Tarikh Najd, Part I, p. 176 
74 D. G. Hogarth, A History of Arabia, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922, p. 104. Didier, Sojourn 
With the Sharif, p. 103. Lorimer, Gazetteer, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, p. 1082. 
75 War Office Report, January 21,1918, PRO, IOR L/ P&S/ 18/ B270/ P337. 
76 Daly, The Cambridge History of Egypt, Vol. 2 p. 201 
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by this violation of the treaty, sent his elder son Ibrahim to the Hijaz with a 
heavily armed contingent of soldiers in September 1816 7' Their mission 
was to reach into the heart of Arabia and destroy the Saudi power base in 
Najd. Following the tactics of Tusun, Ibrahim began by undermining the 
web of tribal alliances that was the backbone of the Al-Saud's strength. 
Through money, guns and gifts, tribe after tribe was seduced to the 
Egyptian side. As Ibrahim pushed towards Najd, sections of Mutayr and 
Harb tribesman defected to join him. Abdullah Al-Saud could not provide 
strong leadership nor promise sufficient booty to keep them in his fold. 
Moreover, many tribes saw this as an opportunity to escape the tax and 
tribute they were required to pay as part of their allegiance to the Najdi 
amir. 
Despite Ibrahim s desire for a swift victory, his army of over five 
thousand soldiers and a dozen artillery guns, directed by a French 
engineer, lay siege around Diriyya for more than six months. Abdullah ibn 
Saud eventually agreed to surrender in the hope that the town and his 
family would be spared. However, Muhammad All was not a 
magnanimous victor. Upon hearing that his army had Najd virtually in 
their grasp he ordered Diriyyah's houses to be ripped down and burnt- 
the town's walls were to be shelled into pulp. Several hundred members of 
the Al-Saud and ibn Abdul Wahhab families were expelled from Najd and 
brought to Cairo. Shortly thereafter Abdullah Al-Saud was moved to 
Constantinople where he was publicly executed for treason. 78 Meanwhile 
Ibrahim was instructed to proceed through Najd and the surrounding 
territories to destroy any remaining pockets of Saudi/Muwahhidun 
sympathisers. The defeat of the Al-Saud reduced the importance of central 
Arabia as Saudi power was crushed, returning Najd to tribal feuding. 
77 P. M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922, London: Longmans, 1966, p. 180. 
78 Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Part. 1, Vol. II p. 1090; Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majdfi 
Tarikh Najd part I p. 207; Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922, p. 180. See also 
Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 16-18, Hogarth A History of Arabia p. 105; 
Lacey The Kingdom, p. 62 and Safran Saudi Arabia, p. 13 for details of the destruction of 
Diriyya. 
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Muhammad Ali had no interest in maintaining permanent garrisons there 
and retired his forces to the western coast of Hijaz. 79 
European Penetration 
Ironically, the destruction of the Saudi entity opened the way for greater 
European penetration of Arabia. Muhammad Ali of Egypt, anxious to 
obtain approval of his rule indulged the requests of curious and 
adventurous Europeans who sought to explore the interior of Arabia. The 
famous Bruckhardt expedition was provided with an escort and allowed 
unprecedented access by a non-Muslim to Mecca and Medina. French 
officers and Italian doctors were feted with Egyptian hospitality on their 
trips into Asir and the Hijaz. Britain, though not entirely displeased by the 
destruction of Saudi-Muwahhldun power, was nevertheless made anxious 
by the extension of Muhammad Ali's influence into Arabia. This in turn 
provided an avenue for Egypt's ally, France to enter the strategically 
important Persian Gulf. French warships harassed British merchant vessels 
and French agents were active in fomenting anti-British sentiment among 
the local chiefs-80 
British interests in the Gulf were motivated by the desire to defend 
shipping routes to her colonial prize-India. The period 1793-1810 saw 
considerable disruption to trade and supply routes due to French attacks as 
rom 
well as local raiders 
flee 
fk as the Qawasim. However, Britain did not wish 
to commit large naval forces to the role of policeman in the Gulf. Instead, 
Britain sought to employ local rulers for the task. A flurry of treaties were 
signed with Arab Sheikhs beginning with Bahrain in 1820.81 In return for 
subsidies and protection, the Arab rulers had to take on a British agent and 
79 Arnold T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928, pp. 198-199. Also 
Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Part. 1, Vol. II p. 1090. 
80 The French landed in Egypt in 1798 and Napoleon was anxious to build up France's 
presence in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Captain G. Sadlier was sent by the Government 
of India to investigate Egyptian-French threats to British interests in the Persian Gulf. His 
trip was the first documented crossing of the Arabian Peninsula from east to west. See 
Sadlier Diary of a Journey Across Arabia. 
81 Lorimer, Gazetteer, Part I Vol. I, pp. 658-677; Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, p. 15. and 
McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, p. 10. 
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support the suppression of piracy against British ships. These provisions 
were later expanded to stipulate that the Sheikhs were not to accept 
subsidies from any other power nor lease land without British approval. 
This did not however end French involvement. The rule of Muhammad Ali 
in Egypt was a constant reminder of France's influence in the region. 82 
For all his French sympathies Muhammad Ali 's chief concern was 
the expansion of his power, preferably at the expense of the Ottoman 
Sultan. He worked to create a highly centralised nominally independent 
state, taking advantage of Constantinople's weakened leadership. In fact 
his power was such that even the Ottoman Sultan was seeking his 
assistance. Sultan Mahmudnhad reluctantly asked for help to suppress a 
rebellion in Greece that Ottoman soldiers had been unable to quell. 
Egyptian forces not only succeeded but advanced to take Athens. 83 In the 
Hijaz, three hundred members of the Sharifian family, from among whom 
the Sharif of Mecca was traditionally selected, were exiled to Egypt. 
Muhammad Ali appointed a Sharif of his own choice with a stipend and 
limited authority thus making the position little more than that of an 
Egyptian civil servant. 
The Second House of Al-Saud 
Najd became the focus of renewed activity among the Saudi-Wahhabi 
families but from a different branch. Until that time the Saudi amirs were 
descendants of Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad Al-Saud, the eldest son of the 
founder. With much of that branch exiled by Muhammad Ali to Egypt 
there was an opportunity for others in the extended family to come 
forward and take a leadership position. This was seized upon in 1824 by 
Turki ibn Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn Saud. 84 Turki was also a grandson 
82 War Office report of January 21,1918, IOR L/P&S/18/B270/P337; Hogarth, A History 
of Arabia, p. 110. 
83 Muhammad Ali also sent several armies southwards into the Sudan, see Daly, The 
Cambridge History of Egypt, Vol. 2, pp. 204-210. 
84 Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Part. I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, pp. 1093-1094. Also 
Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 31,1955, Vol. 1 
p. 155. 
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of the founder but from the line of the second son, (this was the same 
Abdullah ibn Muhammad who had made an unsuccessful attempt to 
challenge Abdullah ibn Saud for control in 1814). 
Throughout the decade of 1824-1834, Turki concentrated on 
building his power base around Riyadh using familiar tactics of rallying 
tribal support and conquering territory. With support from the ulema of 
Riyadh and from the family of the 'Al-AlSheikh' (known as the family of 
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab), Turki was able to extend his influence 
into much of central Arabia. Yet he was careful to avoid direct 
confrontations with Egyptian and Ottoman forces as well as the Sheikhs on 
the Gulf coast with whom Britain had interests. 85 However, he was clever 
enough to, negotiate with the Sheikhs of Bahrain and Qatar to pay tribute in 
order for them to be free from Muwähh{dun raids. 
By 1834, as had occurred in the past, dissension and rivalry within 
the extended family threatened the dynasty. This time the instigator was 
Mishari ibn Abdul Rahman ibn Saud, a cousin from the Abdul Aziz line of 
previous amirs who sought to claim power for himself. His method was 
simple and daring. He followed Turki out of the mosque after prayers and 
killed him. Proceeding to the houses of the Al-Sheikh family he obtained 
bai'a from them after promising that their lives would be spared. 86 Mishari 
was in power for just a few weeks before the son of the murdered amir 
returned to Riyadh. Faisal ibn Turki had been on a campaign at the time of 
his fathers assassination and had come for revenge. He refused to accept 
the murderer of his father as the amir. Faisal rallied his men to storm his 
father's former fortress that Mishari had taken over. During the night raid 
one of Faisal's trusted Lieutenants, Abdullah ibn Al-Rashid, managed to 
break into Mishari's bedroom and avenged the death of the late amir Turki. 
85 Rehatsek, 'The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 337-339. See also 
undated India Office report entitled 'Note on Central Arabia' IOR L/P&S/18/B334; Ibn 
Bishr, Unwan, pp. 13-17. 
86 Wahba, Arabian Days, p. 114; Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Part. I, Vol. II, Chapter 
VIII p. 1094; Ibn Bishr, Linwan, Part II, pp. 38-39. 
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Forever grateful for this service Faisal appointed Abdullah Al-Rashid 
governor for life of Hail a town in northwest Najd. 87 
Meanwhile such disruption and instability in Riyadh prompted the 
amirs of Bahrain and Qatar to renounce their fealty to the Al-Saud. Other 
tribes, notably the Banu Khalid of al-Hasa also saw their chance to rebel. 
Though Faisal secured a second reign for the Abdul Aziz line, Saudi 
territory had significantly shrunk in size. Again inter-family rivalry and 
loss of tribal support had plagued the stability of the Saudi-Muwahhidun 
entity. In a 
move that was designed to fortify his position in northwestern 
Najd, Faisal appointed Abdullah ibn Ali Al-Rashid as governor of the Hail 
region. At the time it was a shrewd move but the appointment was to 
haunt successive Saudi amirs into the twentieth century as the Al-Rashid 
became fierce rivals, launching a dynasty of their own and seeking to 
dispel the Al-Saud altogether from the Arabian peninsula. 88 
Observing the renewed activity in Najd and the return of the Al- 
Saud, Muhammad Ali in Egypt became concerned at new threats to his 
prize of Hijaz. He reached into his pool of captives from the 1818 assault on 
Diriyya to find a young Saudi who could lead an assault on Najd. The 
Egyptian ruler selected Khalid ibn Saud from the Abdul Aziz line for the 
task. Khalid was the youngest brother of the very same Abdullah who had 
surrendered at Diriyya and had then been executed in Constantinople. 
Khalid was a small boy at the time of his capture and was raised and 
educated in Egypt at Muhammad Ali 's instruction. 89 Having grown into a 
young man he was to be used to divide loyalties in Najd and become the 
instrument to prevent a Saudi-Muwahiddun bid to establish a 'second 
kingdom' 90 
87 Abdullah was also provided with men and supplies to make Hail his capital. This 
generous reward was to cast a long shadow as the Al-Rashid emerged as a rival dynasty 
that would haunt all Saudi amirs until the early 20th Century. Rehatsek, The History of the 
Wahhabys in Arabia and India' Art. XVIII, p. 339. 
88 Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 105 
89 Lorimer, Gazetteer, Part I, Vol. lI, Chapter VIII, p. 1104; Didier, Sojourn With the Sharif, 
p. 108. 
90 Wahba, Arabian Days, pp. 113-115. 
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Provided with Egyptian arms, soldiers and joined by beduin seeking 
to ingratiate themselves with Egypt, Khalid dutifully marched on Riyadh. 
Learning of the advancing army Faisal attempted to ambush the force but 
faced mass desertions after his men heard reports about the size of 
Egyptian units. 91 It was not only the size but experience of the officers that 
helped Khalid make rapid progress into Arabia. By the end of 1838, Khalid 
had achieved his goal and sent the captured Faisal and sons into exile in 
Cairo 92 
Ottoman-Egyptian Rivalry 93 
Flushed with victories in the Sudan, Greece and Arabia, Muhammad Ali 
sought more glory. His greatest desire was to possess Syria and he 
expected that he would receive it as his reward for aiding his Ottoman 
superior in the suppression of the Greek rebellion. 94 Sultan Mahmudi. 
however, concerned at Ali 's ambitions for power, refused to award Syria to 
him. In 1832 Muhammad Ali resolved to take Syria by force and amassed 
his troops for an invasion. With his eldest son Ibrahim in command the 
forces stormed into Syria, routing the Ottoman army. The vicious attack 
prompted the Sultan to declare war on the occupiers and launched 
Ottoman ground and naval units against Egyptian forces in Syria. 
Ibrahim however, managed to fight, as well as bribe, Ottoman forces 
into defeat. The Ottoman naval commander simply sailed his fleet into 
Alexandria harbour and surrendered to Muhammad Ali. 95 For the 
following eight years Syria remained under Egyptian authority. 
91'Note on Central Arabia' India Office Report (no date) IOR L/P&S/18/B334; Ibn Bishr, 
Unwan, Part II, p. 70. Lorimer, Gazetteer, Part I, Vo1. II, Chapter VIII, p. 1097 
92 Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 118-120 ; Ibn Bishr, Unwan, Part II, 
p. 81-83; Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, s p. 15. 
93 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to delve into the history of Ottoman-Egyptian 
relations or the details of Muhammad All's downfall. A useful source for this is Daly's, The 
Cambridge History of Egypt, Vo1.2, especially pp. 165-179. 
% Syria would provide extra manpower for his armies and was also a rich source of wood 
which was in short supply in Egypt. Ibid., p. 166. 
95 Muhammad Ali successfully bribed the Ottoman grand admiral Ahmad Fawzi. Daly, 
The Cambridge History of Egypt, Vol. 2. p. 172. See also Mansfield, A History of the Middle East, 
p. 58. 
ABEDIN-ONE 39 
Meanwhile Muhammad Ali 's rebellious but successful campaigns were 
seen by European powers as a danger to the integrity of the Ottoman 
empire and a threat to colonial territories. Egypt already had strongholds 
along the Red Sea and a presence in central Arabia which pressured the 
British route to India. Fearing that Russia might take advantage of 
Ottoman-Egyptian tension to make territorial acquisitions of its own 
Britain and France came to the aid of the Ottoman Caliph. The Prime 
Minister of Britain, Henry Palmerston, lobbied the major powers of Europe, 
principally Austria, Prussia, and France to demand that Muhammad Ali 
leave Syria and return the Ottoman fleet to Mahmud. 96 
Muhammad Ali, however, flatly refused. Britain resolved to employ 
force and sent in her navy to shell Beirut and land troops in the city. 
Muhammad Ali 's son 'Ibrahim led a force to push back the invaders but 
was defeated and subsequently fled to Egypt. Facing direct confrontation 
with Britain, Muhammad Ali succumbed to European demands. Egypt 
returned to being a province of the Ottoman Empire. Muhammad Ali 's 
acquisitions in Syria, Greece (Crete), and Hijaz were revoked and were 
once again made Ottoman territories. 97 The famed Egyptian army was 
ordered reduced in size. Total numbers for all armed forces were capped at 
eighteen thousand, down from an all time high of over two hundred 
thousand. 98 Egypt and Muhammad Ali became a shadow of their former 
selves. 
This had substantial repercussions for Najd and Khalid Al-Saud's 
Egyptian proxy rule. By late 1841 most of Muhammad Ali 's troops had 
pulled out, leaving Khalid with only a small force. To compound matters 
Khalid had not been very successful in winning the hearts or the respect of 
people, or the ulema. His mannerisms, habits, even language had Egyptian 
96 J. B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, 
pp. 270-279. 
97 The Ottoman Sultan issued an order on June 211841 which declared that Muhammad 
Ali would be ruler of Egypt for life but that his armies be reduced in size and that Egypt 
was bound to the same treaties with foreign powers as the Ottoman state. Daly, The 
Cambridge History of Egypt, Vol. 2. 
98'Note on Central Arabia' India Office Report (no date) IOR L/P&S/18/B334. 
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and European influences which alienated him from the society around him. 
He had relied greatly on Egyptian soldiers and beduin mercenaries to 
maintain his position. With the loss of his Egyptian benefactor, it was not 
long before a distant family member challenged him for leadership. 
Abdullah ibn Thunayyan was the son of Thunayyan ibn Saud, the 
younger brother of the dynastic founder. Thunayyan had been a notable 
opponent of the alliance with ibn Abdul Wahhab and his descendants had 
not previously enjoyed any share in ruling. Gaining the backing of local 
notables and from among the ulema Abdullah was able to force Khalid to 
step down. For the greater part of the next two years Abdullah ibn 
Thunayyan managed affairs of Riyadh but faced constant harassment from 
the deposed Khalid who remained in the vicinity of Najd and kept 
scheming to regain his lost influence. 99 
The Return of Faisal ibn Turki 
The years 1814-1843 marked a period of intense inter-family rivalry, 
external threats and a reduction in Saudi territory. 100 An effective Saudi 
amir required two elements to maintain his rule. First, the diplomatic skills 
to manage tribal chiefs and keep good relations with other amirs both large 
and small. Many battlefield and territorial losses could have been 
prevented if beduin tribes had not defected to the other side. Successful 
campaigns against larger Egyptian or Ottoman forces were usually those 
that employed hit and run tactics. Successful Saudi amirs such as Saud ibn 
Abdul Aziz (1803-1814) had been victorious because they rarely made 
direct assaults on the better-equipped forces of their enemies. Second, the 
amir required a personality that was firm but also forgiving and generous. 
He had to appeal to the ulema but face down any relative or tribal chief that 
99 While on a visit to Jeddah in 1854 the French traveller Charles Didier met with the 
deposed Khalid who had decamped to the less restrictive atmosphere of the Hijaz. The 
former amir regaled the Frenchman with stories of Muwahhidun politics in the stormy 
1830's and 40's. Despite his loss of prestige Khalid apparently bore no personal animosity 
towards Faisal or other family members. Didier, Sojourn with the Sharif, p. 108. 
1°° Winder, Saudi Arabia, in the Nineteenth Century, p. 65; Ibn Bishr, Unwan part II, pp. 11- 
17; Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Part. I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, pp. 1096-1098. 
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might seek to challenge him. Even without the interference of Ottoman 
and Egyptian powers that was a delicate task. 
It was not until 1843 that a period of relative stability began in Najd. 
In that year Faisal ibn Turki, who had been exiled to Cairo in 1838, 
managed to escape from Egypt and return to Najd. 101 Abdullah ibn 
Thunayyan knew that he did not have the popularity of Faisal, who was an 
already distinguished and well respected leader. Thunayyan stepped aside. 
Faisal established a new fortress in Riyadh and built a large mosque in the 
city. The second reign of Faisal was marked by the apparent realization 
that Saudi power could not be unilaterally projected and sustained 
throughout Arabia. In accepting the realpolitik of his situation Faisal kept 
his distance from British interests on the coast and from Ottomans in Hijaz, 
tempering the zeal which characterized early Saudi-Muwahhidun 
conquests. Although Faisal ensured the spread of the teachings of Sheikh 
ibn Abdul Wahhab, he did not force beduin in all areas to conform to the 
religious doctrine. Any challenges to his political authority however, were 
ruthlessly suppressed. Relations with important families were 
strengthened by the marriage of Faisal's sons into the Al-Rashid family and 
the Ajman tribe. In dealing with rulers of Qatar and Bahrain his appointed 
agents were drawn from local families to reduce antagonisms. As long as 
payment of tribute was made to Faisal, acknowledging his authority, local 
chiefs were left more or less alone. Thus a combination of shrewd 
diplomacy and forceful personality allowed Faisal to maintain stability and 
control of Najd from 1843 till his death in 1865.102 
The period after Faisal's death was to become reminiscent of the 
family feuds of the past with quarrelling and constantly changing amirs. 
101 Rehatsek, 'The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 335-339. Also Lorimer, 
Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Part. I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, p. 1107. 
102'Note on Central Arabia' India Office Report (no date) IOR L/P&S/18/B334. Memorial 
of the Government of Saudi Arabia, Jeddah: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 31,1955, Vol. I, 
p. 191 
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Fathering four sons (Abdullah, Sa'oud; 03 Muhammad and Abdul 
Rahman), there were several possible successors. They were all from 
different mothers and tension between them was often high. Although 
Abdullah was the eldest and had been nominated as successor he still felt 
threatened. In order to secure his position he placed men loyal to him in 
positions of power around the court. This came at the expense of his 
younger brothers who had aspirations of their own. Fearing that 
Abdullah's appointees would conspire to rob him of his chance to rule the 
third brother, Sa'oud, plotted to take over. With support from the Ajman 
tribe, from which both his wife and mother originated, Sa'oud seized 
power from Abdullah in 1871. The family was split by the conflict and 
internal divisions ensued. Muhammad rallied to Abdullah's side but was 
quickly arrested by Sa'oud. Finally, a paternal uncle, Abdullah ibn Turki, 
who did not accept the coup, used tribal and family alliances of his own to 
force Sa'oud out. 104For a two-year period Abdullah ibn Turki ruled with 
the help of his nephew and former amir, Abdullah ibn Faisal. 
However, Sa'oud retaliated in 1873, mustering support to regain 
power. He placed his uncle Abdullah ibn Turki in prison, where he died 
soon after, while his brothers Abdullah and Muhammad escaped capture. 
The youngest brother Abdul Rahman was not viewed as a threat and was 
allowed to stay close to Sa'oud in Riyadh. Yet Sa'oud himself fell victim to 
small-pox and died in 1875. For Abdul Rahman, in his twenties, and the 
only other brother in the city at the time, this meant he would become the 
new amir. However, upon hearing the news of Sa'oud's death, Abdullah 
and Muhammad made their way back to Riyadh where they confronted 
lo3Though this name can also be spelled 'Saud', to avoid confusion with the family name 
'Al-Saud' and other relatives of the same name I have adopted this spelling to distinguish 
this individual. 
104 For details of family dynamics see Lorimer, Gazetteer, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, pp. 
1121,1128-1130. Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 226 and Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth 
Century, pp. 229-261. 
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Abdul Rahman. Exerting pressure on their youngest sibling they 
encouraged him to step down in favour of Abdullah. 105 
While the brothers were still debating who should rule, their 
nephews, the sons of Sa'oud, had organized a force of their own. They 
hoped to save Riyadh from their bickering uncles by taking the city 
themselves. However, this threat seems to have motivated the uncles to 
settle their differences. Abdul Rahman, who had just become a proud 
father of new-born son, Abdul Aziz, ceded his place to the elder Abdullah. 
The nephews, though frustrated, did not give up hope of returning the 
dynasty to their family line. 
Hail Eclipses Riyadh 
In Hail, Muhammad ibn Abdullah Al-Rashid, the son of the governor 
appointed by Faisal, took advantage of the quarrelling among the Al-Saud 
to broaden his own power base. During the late 1870's and early 80's he led 
an active campaign to spread his rule, which notably included taking over 
central Arabian towns in al-Qassim and forming alliances with eastern 
sections of the Harb and Mutayr tribes. 106 This enabled Al-Rashid to 
control the trade routes coming out of the Hijaz towards Najd and Kuwait. 
Not only did the Al-Saud suffer a drop in trade but they no longer received 
tribute payments from the towns of al-Qassim or Hail. 107 Abdullah and his 
brothers made several attempts to recapture territory without success. 
However, the Al-Saud had lost their fortune and had been overshadowed 
by the Al-Rashid. The ruler of Hail did however, spare Riyadh the 
humiliation of being sacked and allowed Abdullah to remain in power. He 
did not actively seek the removal of the Al-Saud from authority, being 
content with their subservience. 108 
105 Gary Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, London: Frank Cass, 1987, p. 18 ; Lorimer, 
Gazetteer, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, pp. 1133-1134. 
106 War Office Report, January 21,1918, IOR L/P&S/18/B270/P337. 
107 Hogarth, A History of Arabia, p. 115. 
108 Lorimer, Gazetteer, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, pp. 1136-1137. 
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Yet in 1887 the infamous nephews, (the 'sons of Sa'oud'), made a 
second attempt to take Riyadh. This time, they were successful in taking 
their uncle Abdallah prisoner. Concerned about the stability of Riyadh, Al- 
Rashid ended his 'hands off' approach, sending in a large force to re-take 
the city and to free Abdullah. However, fed up with the weakness of Saudi 
rule Muhammad ibn Al-Rashid placed his own man, Salim ibn Subhan, as 
amir of Riyadh. Abdullah Al-Saud was 'invited' to Hail as a 'special 
guest'. 109 The ulema of Riyadh acknowledged the new Rashidi amir and 
pledged their fealty. Salim ibn Subhan meanwhile, decided to pursue the 
'sons of Sa'oud' on his own initiative. This resulted in further battles in 
which two of the sons were killed. The third sought refuge in Hail and 
begged for clemency. Muhammad ibn Al-Rashid granted the request and 
was displeased with Subhan's unauthorised pursuit and dismissed him. 
Abdullah ibn Faisal was then allowed to return as amir under Rashidi 
suzerainty. 
When Abdullah died in 1899 his youngest brother Abdul Rahman 
returned to power. For the next two years relations between Riyadh and 
Hail were strained due to various attempts by Abdul Rahman to break 
away. At first this was met with patience and diplomacy by Al-Rashid. 
However, when tribes in al-Qassim sought to take advantage of the soft 
line Hail seemed to be employing with Riyadh they rebelled themselves. 
Soon Abdul Rahman threw in his lot with them. With this mass show of 
rebellion Al-Rashid's patience evaporated and he moved to crush forcibly 
the renegades. Both sides faced each other at the battle of Mulaida in 1891 
but the rebellious tribes were decisively defeated. Riyadh returned to the 
firm grasp of Hail and the ulema quickly reaffirmed their allegiance to 
Muhammad ibn Al-Rashid. 110 Abdul Rahman went into exile in the desert. 
He took with him his young son Abdul Aziz, while sending the rest of the 
109 Ibid. This essentially meant that Abdullah was under house arrest and though provided 
with food and shelter, was constantly under watch. Also Winder, Saudi Arabia in the 
Nineteenth Century, pp. 270-271. 
110 Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 272-273. 
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family to Bahrain where they were welcomed into the house of the ruling 
amir. 
Throughout these fluctuations in leadership the ulema of Najd 
played a background role politically, in that they did not espouse 
leadership for themselves. However, they did influence the contests for 
leadership by endorsing the rule of the victorious amir-in principle to 
prevent bloodshed and fitnah. To prevent fitnah was one of the cardinal 
concepts of Muwahhklun belief and a pillar of Ibn Taymiya's argument on 
political leadership; the individual leader was less important than 
maintaining civil order and Islam as the faith of the nation. "' In the 
Quran, fitnah is described as "worse than killing" and this motivated the 
ulema to find quick solutions to prevent its occurrence. 112 Concern over 
igniting fitnah was the justification used by the ulema in Najd to accept 
whichever ruler took power because to resist could cause bloodshed and 
loss of life and property. Even though many of, the prominent members 
were from the family of ibn Abdul Wahhab and married into the Al-Saud 
they too considered it better to accept a ruler, even an oppressive one, so 
long as he enforced Islamic law. Thus as Riyadh passed through the hands 
of the Saudi, Egyptian, and Rashidi powers the ulema pledged allegiance to 
whoever was the victor at the time. 113 
Since principles of governance were the same no matter who ruled, 
the fight was over which individual had the opportunity to implement 
them. Thus the religious order remained stable but the political one 
fluctuated. With the defeat at Mulaida the political order of Najd had 
changed hands once again. 114 
4W 
"'Ibn Taymiya, al-Hisbafi al-Islam. 
112 John Williams on'Fitnah' in Oxford Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, pp. 26-28. Also the Quran 
chapter 2, verses 191 and 217. 
213 Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, pp. 80-81 
114 Lorimer, Gazetteer, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, p. 1144. 
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Chapter 2 
Exile in Kuwait 
46 
Mubarak Al-Sabah, the ruler of Kuwait, served as mentor, guide and 
political instructor to the young Abdul Aziz Al-Saud. The contribution of 
the Kuwaiti ruler to the development of Saudi political strategy is 
extremely significant. 1 
Humbled and defeated at the battle of Mulaidah, the Al-Saud were 
forced out of Riyadh. There were few tribes prepared to risk the wrath of 
the Al-Rashid by offering them protection. Initially, the Al-Saud found 
shelter in Al-Qassim, the tribal home of the Ajman. But there was a price 
on the head of Abdul Rahman, and no guarantees that an enterprising 
tribesman, would not turn him in. Arrangements were made for the family 
members of the Al-Saud to go to Bahrain while Abdul Rahman entered the 
vast central Arabian desert known as the Rub al-Khali (the Empty 
Quarter)? Far from the reaches of the Al-Rashid and the Ottomans, he was 
able to hide in the company of the Al-Murrah tribe. Sheltered from the 
outside world by their desert domain the Al-Murrah still lived a primitive 
existence. Barely clothed, unkempt and dishevelled in appearance they 
lived a basic existence, surviving on a diet of dates and camel's milk. 3 
However, the Al-Murrah had a reputation as fierce raiders and were 
notorious for racing out of the desert to attack caravans before swiftly 
retreating into the dunes. Few dared to venture after them. 
1 For details of this period see Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Part I, Vol. lI, Chapter 
VIII, pp. 1141-1145; H. C. Armstrong, Lord of Arabia: Ibn Saud, Intimate Study of a King, 
London: Arthur Baker, 1934; Ameen Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia, Boston: Houghton- 
Mifflin, 1928; Muhammad Asad, The Road to Mecca, Gibralter: Dar al-Andalus, 1980; David 
Howarth, The Desert King: A Life of Ibn Saud, London: Collins, 1964; William Yale, The Near 
East, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968; Daniel Van Der Meulen, The Wells of 
Ibn Saud, London: Murray, 1957. Also Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, and Troeller, The 
Birth of Saudi Arabia. 
2 Van Der Meulen, The Wells of Ibn Saud p. 40. Van Der Meulen was the Dutch Consul in 
Jeddah and had studied Arabic and Islam under the famous Professor Snouck Hurgronje 
at Leiden. Also Armstrong, Lord of Arabia, p. 29. 
3The Al-Murrah were fiercely independent tribe and only some sections of it had any 
contact with the Muwahiddun movement in the late 18th Century, see Rehatsek, The 
History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 274-401. 
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In contrast to the scarcity of the Empty Quarter, the women and 
children of the Al-Saud family enjoyed the comfort and protection of the 
ruling family of Bahrain. It was there that Abdul Aziz, the young son of 
Abdul Rahman became very ill. Diagnosed with rheumatic fever the boy 
was treated by doctors from the medical mission of the Dutch Reformed 
Church of America. This early exposure to modern medicine instilled a 
lifelong reliance and trust in physicians in the future King. 4 Upon recovery 
from his bout of fever Abdul Aziz joined his father with the Al-Murrah and 
spent two years living the carefree life of a beduin boy, learning the skills 
of the desert; tracking, horsemanship, swordplay, gaining knowledge of 
plant and wildlife .5 His time spent in the 
desert would provide him with 
insight into the customs and lifestyle of the desert peoples. For his father 
however, it was not the life for a boy from a respectable religious family. 
Proper study of Islamic texts was necessary, but there were no such 
opportunities with the family split and living in exile. 
It came as a welcome relief when in 1893 the ruler of Kuwait, 
Muhammad Al-Sabah, extended an invitation to the family. With the 
promise of safety (aman) and a monthly stipend Abdul Rahman and his 
family could once again be united .6 Summoning the women and children 
from Bahrain, they settled down for almost a decade-long stay. Abdul Aziz 
was suddenly thrust into the exotic mix of cultures and distractions of a 
busy commercial city. In the 1890's Kuwait was a key port in the Gulf, 
where caravans from central Arabia and Iraq came to trade with ships from 
across the world. Coffee, tea, rice, guns and pearls were bought and sold. 
There were "merchants from Bombay and Teheran, Indians, Persians, 
41n fact in his later years as King, Abdul Aziz would frequently request Western medical 
attention for his ailments. Van Der Meulen, Ibn Saud, pp. 40-41. 
5Dates for Abdul Aziz's birth vary between 1876 and 1880. See Leslie McLoughlin, Ibn 
Saud: Founder of a Kingdom, London: Macmillan, 1993, p. 14; Armstrong, Lord of Arabia, p. 29. 
6The stipend was actually provided by the Ottoman Porte. From 1893 till 1904 Abdul 
Rahman received a monthly stipend of 58 Turkish Liras. It was part of a policy designed to 
keep Arab various leaders 'in play' and allowed the Porte to use one chief against the 
other when it suited Ottoman politics. See report by the British Ambassador, 
Constantinople to SSFA, March 27 1905, FCO Confidential Print: Affairs of Arabia, PRO FO 
406/21 F8482/R87/I. 
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Syrians from Aleppo and Damascus, Armenians, Turks and Jews, traders 
from all the east" .7 Streets 
full of sailors and travellers exchanging news of 
far away cities and events; a sensuous atmosphere unlike the rough 
barrenness of the Empty Quarter. As a father, Abdul Rahman was certainly 
concerned about his son becoming enamoured by the distractions of the 
city and so a tutor was summoned from al-Qassim to provide Abdul Aziz 
with the proper instruction in the principles of faith and teachings of 
Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab. 
In addition to this classical religious education Abdul Aziz benefited 
from a budding friendship with Mubarak Al-Sabah, the younger brother of 
the Kuwaiti ruler. Although much older, Mubarak took a liking to the 
teenager and spent much time mentoring Abdul Aziz. 8 Later, when 
Mubarak himself became ruler, Abdul Aziz was a frequent guest at the 
royal court and able to witness political and diplomatic intrigue first hand. 
It was Mubarak who provided the young boy with his first introduction to 
British power in the Gulf and who introduced him to visiting officials from 
His Majesty's Government. Attired in their dress uniforms, adorned with 
medals, colourful sashes and polished swords, British officers were a feast 
for the eyes of a boy from the desert. As Harry Philby remarked: 
It was undoubtedly at this period that the young Abdul Aziz 
developed a boyish admiration for British imperialism which 
accompanied him through life, modified only by the proviso 
that it should not impinge upon his own sphere of activity. 9 
However, at the time Abdul Rahman moved to Kuwait, tensions were high 
within the ruling Al-Sabah family. The amir, Sheikh Muhammad, and his 
brother Jarrah were in disagreement with their ambitious younger sibling 
Mubarak. Besides personality clashes, tight controls had been placed on 
Mubarak's expenditures which fuelled tensions further. 10 One of the issues 
7Armstrong, Lord of Arabia, p. 38. 
8 Van der Meulen, Wells of Ibn Saud, p. 44 
9 H. Philby, Arabian Jubilee, London: Hale, 1952, p. 6 
10 As a young man Mubarak's rebelliousness caused him to be sent off to Bombay where 
he incensed his brothers further by squandering his funds in gambling and other 
indulgences, Armstrong, Lord of Arabia, pp. 40-43 
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upon which the brothers disagreed was the relationship with the Ottoman 
Porte. Mubarak opposed his brothers pro-Ottoman sympathies, believing 
instead that Kuwait should strive for greater independence 11 He admired 
the arrangements of the Trucial States that had treaties with Britain 
providing them with assistance, supplies and protection. The treaties also 
guaranteed that Ottoman interference was kept to a minimum. Sheikh 
Muhammad, however, had no desire to change the status quo and was 
unhappy with Mubarak's interference. Hoping to keep him distracted 
elsewhere Mubarak was dispatched to deal with a rebellion of tribesmen in 
the south. However, to the disappointment of his elder siblings, Mubarak 
returned victorious and even more determined to make his mark on the 
future of Kuwait. 
On the night of May 17,1896, as Sheikh Muhammad slept, Mubarak 
led a small band of men onto the rooftop of his brother's house. Sneaking 
into the master bedroom Mubarak shot his brother in the head at point 
blank range. At another house nearby Mubarak's other brother Jarrah met 
the same fate. The next morning stunned family members learned of the 
deaths when they found Mubarak presiding over the royal court. He had 
ipso facto become the new Shaikh of Kuwait 12 
To pre-empt any moves against him he pledged allegiance to the 
Porte and kept the Ottoman flag flying at the palace. 13 Then using the 
wealth of his late brother, Mubarak attempted to bribe Ottoman officials to 
recognise him as the lawful ruler of Kuwait. However, this was not 
11 Salwa Alghanim, The Reign of Mubarak Al-Sabah: Shaikh of Kuwait, 1896-1915, London: 
I. B. Tauris, 1998. See especially chapter 1 for detail on inter-family rivalry of the Al-Sabah. 
Also Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 136-137 and Frederick Anscombe, The 
Ottoman Gulf the Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997, pp. 93-94. 
12 British Embassy, Constantinople to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (hereafter 
SSFA) July 6 1896, PRO FO 406/14 F7380/E1/R1/I. 
13Soon after taking over, Mubarak's nephews (sons of the murdered Muhammad) made an 
unsucessful attempt to retake the city with the help of their maternal uncle Sheikh Yusuf 
Ibrahim of Durra. Then Saood, another son, approached the British Consul at Basra and 
sought assistance in retaking Kuwait in return for loyalty to HM Government. See 
Secretary of State for India (hereafter SSFI) Hamilton to Government of India, July 23, 




straightforward as the vali of Basra, Hamdi Pasha was insulted by the offer 
of 10,000 Lira and was in fact more in favour of bringing Kuwait under 
direct Ottoman control. 14 At the very least, he preferred that the Porte 
recognise one of the surviving sons of the murdered Muhammad Al-Sabah. 
Through strategic donations of cash and gifts to advisors at the court in 
Constantinople, Mubarak was able to prevail. Not only was Hamdi Pasha 
instructed, to extend all courtesy to Mubarak as the new kaimakam 
VIStficE CrDVt(rDf 
(adtRi-nistr ) of Kuwait but Hamdi himself was later transferred from 
his post. If this bold move surprised the young Abdul Aziz it was only to 
be the beginning of a long tutorial for the future head of the Al-Saud. 
Taking Advantage of Anglo-Ottoman Rivalry 
Mubarak was a shrewd ruler and knew that he would have to proceed 
cautiously. Although he had obtained Ottoman patronage, Mubarak kept 
this secret and looked for additional sources of support. In September 1897 
he appealed to the British to grant him protection on the same terms as 
Sheikhs of the Trucial coast because of his concerns that the Ottoman 
Empire would absorb Kuwait. In return, he offered to assist Britain in 
keeping the peace in the Gulf. 15 Lieutenant Colonel M. J. Meade, the British 
Resident in the Gulf, was intrigued by this request and believed there 
would be benefits in responding favourably: "Koweit posses an excellent 
harbour, and will, under our protection undoubtedly become one of the 
most important places in the Persian Gulf". 16 
However, Meade's superiors were reluctant to proceed and chose 
not to respond to Kuwaiti overtures. Mubarak persisted and on November 
6,1897, while meeting with Commander Moubray of the British warship 
Pigeon he reiterated the request for British protection. Mubarak cited 
14 Memo Captain J. F. Whyte to British Consul, Basra, March 22 1897, FO 406/14 
F7380/E1/R3/I. 
15 India Office to Foreign Office , April 7 1987, FO 406/14 F7380/R5/I, See also 
Government of India to SSFI, September 19,1897, FO 406/14 F7380/E1/R6/I. 
16 M. J. Meade, Resident, Gulf to Government of India, September 25,1897, FO 406/14 
F7380/E4/R23/I. 
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correspondence from his ally Sheikh Issa of Bahrain who had extolled the 
virtues of British rule. When the Commander inquired as to whether in fact 
the amir was not already under Turkish protection Mubarak vehemently 
denied the allegation, and on the contrary, told the Commander that he 
sought to "throw off all [the] Turkish yoke" 17 
Although Britain did not recognise Kuwait as an integral part of the 
Ottoman empire, she acknowledged Ottoman influence in the country 18 
Mubarak was seen as an Ottoman subject and the Government of India 
"did not propose to interfere in the affairs of that Chiefship more than may 
be necessary for the maintenance of the general peace of the Persian 
Gulf". 19 The Foreign Office concurred with this view and no further action 
was taken. 20 
About this time reports were circulating of Russian designs on 
Kuwait and that Moscow was anxious to set up a coaling station in the 
territory. 21 This new Russian interest led to a flurry of correspondence 
between the Secretary of State for India and the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. While there was uncertainty as to the seriousness of the 
Russian move, neither the Foreign Office nor the India Office was sure how 
to proceed. However, the Admiralty believed that the Russian threat 
should be taken seriously: "If however, Russia ever descends through 
Persia to establish herself on the shores of the Gulf, Koweit would be the 
natural port for any ships which she might get into the Gulf. "22 
In the opinion of the Resident, M. J. Meade, closer British ties with 
Kuwait were extremely desirable. Not only would that allow Mubarak to 
play an important role in the fight against piracy and the slave trade but 
17 Lt. Commander Moubray to Resident, Gulf, November 7,1897, FO 406/14 
F7380/E2/R26/I. See also B. C. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914, Berkeley: 
Univ. of California Press 1967, p. 102. 
is Secretary of State for India (SSFI) Hamilton to Government of India, July 23,1897, FO 
406/14, F7380/E1/R14/I. 
19India Office to Foreign Office, September 28,1897, FO 406/14 F7380/R16/I. 
20 Foreign Office to India Office, November 28,1897, FO 406/14 F7380/R24/I. 
n British Consul General, Baghdad to Government of India, December 22,1897, FO 406/14 
F7380/E2/R27/I 
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would prevent other powers from establishing a much coveted foothold: 
"Even if we are not immediately interested in getting hold of Koweit for 
ourselves we cannot afford to let it fall into the hands of any other 
power". 23 
The Foreign Office was unable to establish clear policy guidelines on 
the matter and left the decision to the Government of India. The Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs was willing to support a proposal to make 
Kuwait a British protectorate, but only if the Viceroy felt it was desirable. 24 
In fact the Government of India was becoming increasingly nervous about 
other European powers entering Kuwait. Germany, Russia and France 
were all seeking footholds in the strategic Gulf region -a prospect that cast 
a shadow on the vital link to India. 25 Fearing further encroachment of these 
powers the Viceroy changed tack and authorised negotiations with 
Kuwait. 26 Provided that Mubarak did not cede, lease, or mortgage any of 
his territories to any foreign government or subjects of a foreign power 
without prior British consent, the Viceroy was ready to finalise a treaty. 
The task of negotiating the treaty with Mubarak was given to the 
Resident, M. J. Meade. Although Meade was authorised to offer a monthly 
subsidy in order to sweeten the deal it was clear that Mubarak was not 
interested in British money. Instead he wanted guarantees that Britain 
would protect his personal real estate holdings inside Ottoman territory. 
The Al-Sabah family owned sizeable portions of land and lucrative date 
farms near Basra, but under Ottoman law, only citizens of the Porte could 
own property. If a treaty was signed with Britain, Mubarak risked losing 
his Ottoman citizenship. His family property could be forfeited and 
considerable annual income would be lost. Mubarak also wanted written 
assurances that Britain would come to his aid if any military action was 
22 Admiral Beaumont, Admiralty to Foreign Office , February 18,1898, FO 406/14 
F7380/R32/I. 
23 Colonel M. J. Meade, Resident, Gulf to FCO, March 28,1898, FO 406/14, F7380/R33/I. 
24 Foreign Office to India Office, December 5,1898, FO 406/14 F7380/R36/I. 
25 Electric telegraph lines ran overland through Iran and Iraq to India. See McLoughlin, Ibn 
Saud, p. 17 and Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 35. 
ABEDIN-TWO 53 
taken on his land by Ottoman forces. In fact, Mubarak's other brothers, 
Hamud and Jabir, declared that their acceptance of a British treaty was 
conditional upon such assurances. 
However, Colonel Meade had no authority to grant such assurances 
änd after being pressed, declared that he would have to leave Kuwait to % 
seek further instruction from his superiors and then return at some later 
date to finalise the agreement 27 Mubarak did not wish to risk losing the 
opportunity to have a treaty in hand and agreed to drop the issue. His 
brothers objected, preferring to wait until Britain made promises in 
writing. Mubarak overruled them and signed the treaty with Britain on 
January 23,1899. One of the most important clauses was that the treaty 
remain a secret 28 Though identical to those established with other Trucial 
states the treaty with Kuwait had one important exception-a clause that 
prohibited Mubarak from accepting representatives of- foreign powers 
without prior British consent. The Indian Government or the Foreign Office 
had not included this new stipulation. It was added by the British Resident 
himself and was, as will be discussed later, to have a lasting impact on 
future events. 29 
When Lord Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India became aware 
of the provisions of the treaty he protested to the Government of India that 
the Resident in the Gulf "was not authorised" to include the prohibition on 
foreign representatives 30 Such a clause might be used to deny Ottoman 
officials entry into Kuwait which could adversely affect Anglo-Ottoman 
relations. Defending his actions, Meade stated that Mubarak himself had 
requested the clause to prevent the representatives of other powers from 
26 Foreign Office to India Office, January 4,1899, FO 406/14, F7380/R40/I. 
p Resident, Gulf to Government of India, January 30,1899, FO 406/14 F7380/E2/R71/I. 
28The text of the treaty dated 23 January 1899, can be found in India Office to Foreign 
Office, March 14,1899, FO 406/14, F7380/E3/R71/I. 
29 Some authQrs have incorrectly argued that the clause was deliberately added by the 
British to prohibit Ottoman officials from Kuwait, however the Secretary of State for India 
was anxious that this not even appear to be the case. See David Finnie, Shifting Lines in the 
Sand: Kuwait's Elusive Frontier with Iraq, Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1992 p. 16-17. 
30 Secretary of State, India to Government of India, March 30,1899, FO 406/14: 
F7380/R81/I. 
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taking up residence in Kuwait 31 Although still unhappy at the inclusion of 
the clause, the Secretary of State was nevertheless, resigned to leaving it in 
place. Hamilton had also been concerned that Mubarak should not become 
emboldened by his treaty with Britain and engage in further intrigue to 
Kuwait's advantage. 
Hamilton was not pleased when his suspicions turned out to be true. 
Mubarak did indeed exhibit greater confidence after signing the treaty. He 
leaked news of his new relationship with Britain and wasconfident enough 
to raise import taxes on goods of Turkish origin. 32 Ottoman officials were 
immediately suspicious of British intentions in Kuwait 33 It had not been 
possible to keep secret the fact that Mubarak had received the British 
Resident at court. Meade himself had to grudgingly report that "the Turks 
appear to have some knowledge of our recent negotiations with the Sheikh 
of Koweit" M In fact when Meade learned that reinforcements had been 
sent to the garrison in Basra, it seemed to suggest a military strike was 
being contemplated. Meade suggested diplomatic approaches be quickly 
made to resolve the issue of Kuwait. Otherwise, if Turkish forces were 
mobilised to attack it would be difficult to prevent their movement without 
a direct confrontation and would likely escalate Ottoman intrigue in the 
area: 
Our interests in the Persian Gulf however, make it well nigh 
impossible that we should allow Turkey or any other Power, 
or its subjects, to obtain a foothold at Koweit, which may 
become the eastern terminus of a railway on the shortest 
route to India. Its natural advantages and good harbour are 
all such that it will affect us seriously if it ever passes into 
31 Resident, Gulf (Meade) to Government of India, May 21 1899, FO 406/14: 
F7380/E2/R93/I. 
32 Mubarak levied a 5% import tax on all imports which was a clear challenge to Ottoman 
sovereignty. British Consul, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople, May 3,1899, FO 
406/14: F7380/E2/R86/I. 
33 What they did not know was that the Admiralty had been given orders to "forbid and 
prevent any armed attack which may be made upon Kuwait by the Turkish authorities. " 
FO to Admiralty, February 6 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R47/I. 
34 Resident, Gulf to Government of India, April 30,1899 FO 406/14: F7380/E1/R85/I. 
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other hands, and we should be prepared to sacrifice much 
before we relinquish our interest in the place 3s 
However, the situation was already escalating. The British Consul at Basra, 
A. C. Wratislaw, alerted the Foreign Office to the seriousness of Ottoman 
concerns by reporting that Mubarak's old nemesis, Hamdi Pasha, had been 
reinstated as vali of Basra. This return meant that the estranged nephews 
(sons of the brothers murdered by Mubarak) would have the political 
support they needed to make claims on Kuwaiti leadership 36 They would 
be more amenable to Ottoman control and could be used by Hamdi to 
provide the necessary pretext for military action. 37 The Imperial court was 
already suspicious of British support for Mubarak. The situation was not 
helped by Mubarak's brazen imposition of taxes or his boasting. It had 
only been through lavish bribery that Mubarak had been able to defeat 
Hamdi's last attempt to invade and annexe Kuwait into the Basra vilayet. 
The British Ambassador, Nicholas O'Conor agreed that it would be 
prudent to warn the Porte against any military action in Kuwait 38 
However, it was equally, if not more, important for Mubarak to be told to 
"be more cautious in his action and language" 39 
Consensus had developed in the field and within certain quarters in 
London on the need to be forthright about British interests in Kuwait. The 
35 Resident, Gulf to Government of India, May 7 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/E3/R91/I. In fact 
there was some disagreement between British officials in the Gulf. The Consul, Basra 
asserted that Mubarak had been appointed by the Porte as the kaimakam 
fa 
of 
Najd, while the Political Resident (Meade) had no idea Mubarak had taken a Turkish title. 
In fact the Resident did not believe the Consul's assertion. Meade's own man had spoken 
to Mubarak and asked if the Sheikh had taken an Ottoman title. Mubarak told him that he 
had not and so Meade felt reassured that the Sheikh had been honest with him. In fact 
Mubarak had indeed taken the title and the Consul's information was correct. 
Nevertheless, this shows the lack of information sharing and the occasional friction among 
British officials vying to be the first to report accurate information back to their respective 
superiors. See also Resident, Gulf to Consul Basra, May 30 1899, FO 406/14: 
F7380/E2/R96/I. ; Consul, Basra to Resident, Gulf June 2 1899, FO 
406/14: F7380/E3/R96/I. 
36 Consul, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople, April 22,1899, FO 406/14: 
F7380/E1/R83/I. 
37 Resident, Gulf to Government of India, May 7,1899, FO 406/14: F7380/E3/R91/I. 
3sAmbassador, Constantinople to SSFA May 24 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R83/I also 
Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA, June 6 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R86/I. 
ABEDIN-TWO 56 
Resident in the Gulf, the Ambassador in Constantinople, the Consul in 
Basra, the India Office and the Government of India were all in agreement 
on this issue 40 Nevertheless, it was a decision for Lord Salisbury, (the 
Prime Minister and Secretary of State) and he had no desire to risk creating 
a potentially tense situation that could result from a direct warning to the 
Porte. Instead Salisbury favoured a more circuitous route and instructions 
were issued to the Consul in Basra that Hamdi Pasha be told in effect that 
an attack upon Kuwait would 'get him into trouble', knowing that the 
message would reach Constantinople soon enough 41 The Consul was also 
to send Mubarak a strong message urging caution in his actions and 
language. The Government of India was also instructed to make sure that 
Mubarak received a similar message from the Resident in the Gulf 42 
In Constantinople, Ambassador O'Conor anticipated that he would 
be called in to explain British policy after the Porte received reports from 
Hamdi Pasha. O'Conor believed that by reassuring the Sultan that Britain's 
only interest was in protecting her commercial and political interests in the 
gulf, and by avoiding any definite statements about Kuwaiti independence, 
the issue could be resolved satisfactorily 43 Upon becoming aware of this 
the India Office immediately rejected this proposal. It felt strongly that the 
January 1899 agreement was based on the premise that Kuwait was 
independent. There should be no encouragement of the view that Turkey 
had any territorial rights over Kuwait. 44 Moreover, the Government of 
India did not want to be in a situation where their ability to respond to an 
appeal for help (which Mubarak was entitled to do under the terms of the 
agreement) was compromised. As a result O'Conor was instructed to 
39Ambassador, Constantinople to Prime Minister (Marquis of Salisbury), June 6 1899, FO 
406/14: F7380/R86/I. 
40 Government of India to SSFI (Hamilton), June 1 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/E1/R91/I ; also 
India Office to Foreign Office, June 71899, FO 406/14: F7380/R85/I. 
41 Salisbury wanted the consul in Basra to inform Hamdi Pasha of the unpleasantness that 
would result from an Ottoman attack on Kuwait. Prime Minister (Marquis of Salisbury) to 
Ambassador, Constantinople, June 17,1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R88/I. 
42 Foreign Office to India Office, June 18,1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R89/I. 
'u Ambassador, Constantinople to PM/SSFA, July 5,1899 FO 406/14: F7380/R95/I. 
44 India Office to Foreign Office, July 18,1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R100/I. 
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restrict his remarks to the Porte to keep in line with the points raised by the 
India Office. 45 
The potential for a rapid escalation of hostilities between the Porte 
and Kuwait raised British concerns about the lengthy communications 
procedures that were utilised by representatives of the Foreign Office and 
the Government of India. The time it took for information exchange was 
hazardous in the dynamic situation in the region at the time. For example, 
if the Consul in Basra had vital information for the attention of the Political 
Resident in the Gulf, he would first send it to the Ambassador in 
Constantinople who would pass it to the Foreign Office in London, which 
would then send it to the India Office (also in London and housed in the 
same building). It would then be sent to the Government of India, which 
would have it finally dispatched to the Resident in the Gulf. It could take 
weeks for a simple cable to travel through all these departments. 
By mutual consent the two branches agreed that the Consul in Basra 
should directly communicate with the Resident on any matter of 
importance regarding Kuwait. If the situation developed seriously enough 
the Consul was even authorised to communicate directly with the 
Government of India 46 In turn the Resident was instructed to keep the 
Consul at Basra up to date on developments in the area 47 This was an 
unusual breaking of the traditional chain of command but it is indicative of 
the growing tensions within the branches of Government. 
Meanwhile, Ottoman officials were increasingly disconcerted over 
the intimate relations Britain seemed to be forming with Kuwait and by 
Mubarak's increasingly bold manner. In an effort to exert greater control 
the Porte attempted to dispatch a customs inspector and harbour master to 
Kuwait 48 However, Mubarak refused to accept the officials and had them 
forcibly expelled. The Ottoman garrison commander in Basra was incensed 
45 SSFA to Ambassador, Constantinople, July 25,1899 FO 406/14: F7380/R103/I. 
46 Foreign Office to India Office, August 30,1899 FO 406/14: F7380/R106/I. 
47 India Office to Foreign Office September 2,1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R108/I. 
U Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA, September 6,1899 FO 406/14: F7380/R109/I. 
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and ready to launch a military expedition against Kuwait to punish 
Mubarak for his defiance. 49 As reports filtered back to London the 
previously cautious attitude of the Prime Minister quickly changed. Within 
hours of receiving the news of - the incident he instructed Ambassador 
O'Conor to be direct with the Porte: 
You should lose no time in warning the Turkish Government 
that Her Majesty's Government, while having themselves no 
design on Koweit, have friendly relations with the Sheikh of 
that place. Further, that a very inconvenient and disagreeable 
question would be realised if an attempt were made to 
establish Turkish authority or customs control at Koweit 
without previous agreement with Her Majesty's 
Government. 50 
Orders were also immediately given to the Admiralty for a British warship 
to be despatched to Kuwait with specific instructions to protect Mubarak 
from any Ottoman attack 51 
The Porte attempted to show its displeasure with Britain and it took 
O'Conor a few days before he was granted an audience with the Ottoman 
Foreign Minister, Tewfik Pasha. The British Ambassador was not put off by 
his hosts. He had the advantage of knowing the extent of Turkish overtures 
to Kuwait since Mubarak had proudly shown the British Resident all the 
correspondence he received from the Porte 52 O'Conor was direct and to 
the point. He warned Tewfik Pasha that Britain had a preponderant 
interest in Kuwait and did not approve of the Porte imposing their officials 
49 Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA, September 8,1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R111/I. 
50 Prime Minister (Marquis of Salisbury) to Ambassador, Constantinople, September 8, 
1899 FO 406/14: F7380/R112/I. 
51 Foreign Office to Admiralty, September 9,1899, FO 406/14 F7380/R113/I. The 
Admiralty dispatched the Sphinx. This decision was communicated to the India Office 
which told the Government of India which in turn informed the Resident, Gulf in the Gulf. 
However, no word was given to the Consul in Basra. The Consul discovered the Ship's 
mission by chance. He received a private letter from the Captain of the Sphinx who 
happened to be a friend. The Captain had written to say that he had suddenly been 
ordered to Kuwait to prevent an attack by the Turks. The Consul was surprised that the 
Foreign Office had taken such action. He saw no reason for alarm since the Turks could 
not launch an invasion of Kuwait overnight. Moreover such an invasion "could hardly be 
organised with such secrecy that no news would reach this Consulate", Consul Basra, to 
Ambassador, Constantinople September 16,1899, FO 406/14 F7380/E2/R130/I. 
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upon the Sheikh 53 Nor would Her Majesty's Government stand idly if any 
attempts were made to impose further changes to the status quo. The Porte 
would "do well not to raise a question now about Kuwait"» 
To the ambassador's surprise the Foreign Minister completely 
backed down, became deferential and apologetic. Tewfik explained that 
there had been a misunderstanding and that there had been no intention of 
establishing a harbour master or launching a military attack on Kuwait. It 
had been the Naval Commander of Basra who had acted of his own device 
and without instructions from Constantinople. -95 Almost immediately, the 
tension diffused. Ultimately Mubarak came out the victor. He had achieved 
direct and overt support from Britain and by virtue of his secret treaty, 
Kuwait was protected from Ottoman reprisals. 
Early Forays into Najd 
Historically, Kuwait was secure so long as the tribes of the interior were 
busy fighting amongst themselves and no unified group emerged that was 
able to threaten the small coastal principality. Assured that British power 
was behind him, Mubarak gained the confidence he needed to expand his 
reach into Najd and the Arabian interior. 56 He was particularly concerned 
with the northeastern city of Hail, the power base of the Al-Rashid. The 
House of Al-Rashid had granted refuge to his disgruntled nephews and 
enjoyed support from Constantinople as well as the allegiance of numerous 
tribes 57 Mubarak had previously been reluctant to engage them fully but 
they could launch an assault on him at any time. However, in 1897 the 
charismatic and powerful head of the family, Muhammad ibn Al-Rashid 
S2Mubarak Al-Sabah to Resident, Gulf, January 13,1900, (translated from Arabic) FO 
406/15 F7495/E4/R16/II. 
53 Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA September 13 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R120/I. 
54 Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA September 15 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R123/I. 
Queen Victoria reigned for sixty three years until her death on January 22,1901. She died 
at eighty-one years of age and was succeeded by King Edward VII. 
ss Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA September 13 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R120/I. 
56 Madawi al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis, London: I. B. Taurus 1991, p. 61. 
57 Ahmad Abu-Hakima, The Modern History of Kuwait: 1750-1965, London: Luzac&Co. 
1983, p. 113; Phiiby, Saudi Arabia , p. 237, 
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died. The ensuing power struggle divided the family and created chaos in 
Hail. 
Mubarak saw an opportunity to strike and chose to place at the head 
of his campaign Abdul Rahman ibn Faisal Al-Saud. Goldberg argues that 
Mubarak was seeking to divert the attention of the Al-Rashid away from 
Kuwait by "lending his support to the plans of the Al-Saud". 58 However, it 
is more likely that the situation was in fact the opposite-with Mubarak the 
one who used the Al-Saud for his own purposes. British reports at the time 
indicate that Abdul Rahman Al-Saud had "few, if any, men of his own" and 
relied greatly for men and supplies on Mubarak Al-Sabah. 59 The Kuwaiti 
ruler was proving to be a shrewd student of the art of desert politics and 
warfare. Although the young Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman Al-Saud is 
not specifically mentioned, it is more than likely that he took part with his 
father in some of these raids. This early period would have provided him 
with the necessary skills that he would use later in his own struggle for 
Riyadh. 
By the summer of 1900, Mubarak had arranged for Abdul Rahman 
to be joined by Shakh Sa'dun of the Muntafik tribe (who was also an enemy 
of the Al-Rashid). With men, money and supplies from Kuwait they 
undertook small scale raids on caravans and tribes loyal to the Al-Rashid. 
British officials in the Gulf initially treated this insignificant and inevitable 
tribal raiding. However, in early October 1900 the force made a particularly 
successful raid on Hail, coming away with booty and animals before 
retreating back to Kuwait. Forces loyal to the Al-Rashid engaged in pursuit 
of the raiders. News of a Rashidi force heading for Kuwait made British 
officials nervous and fearful of a major clash. 60 A proposal to send a 
gunboat was considered, but the Government of India was anxious for 
more details before making such a show of force. Colonel Kemball, the 
58 Jacob Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: 1902-1918, Cambrdige: Harvard 
University Press, 1986, p. 42 
59Consul, Basra to Embassy, Constantinople, December 28,1900, FO F7742/R5/I/III, p. 4. 
60Secretary, Embassy Constantinople to SSFA/PM (Salisbury), October 3,1900, FO 406/15 
F7495/R53/II 
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Political Resident in the Gulf was ordered to proceed to Kuwait and 
establish the likelihood of hostilities breaking out. 61 
Kemball arrived in Kuwait on October 20 and learned that Mubarak 
was still in the interior, at least a day's journey from the city. Nevertheless, 
he interviewed Mubarak's eldest son, Jabir to ascertain the cause of recent 
events. Kemball reported that the Rashidi attack was indeed provoked by 
the Kuwaiti backed raid on Hail. Yet he condoned the Kuwaiti attack as an 
act of self-defence. Mubarak was justified in his actions because he was 
simply trying to weaken the authority of his bitter rivals the Al-Rashid. 
More interesting though is Kemball's assertion that it was the Al-Saud who 
approached Kuwait for assistance in regaining Riyadh from the Al-Rashid 
and that Abdul Rahman Al-Saud was the chief instigator of the whole 
affair. 62 
No doubt this was the view that the Kuwaiti ruler wanted the 
British to take. Kemball's information was based on the accounts of 
Mubarak loyalists. In essence responsibility for the conflict was placed on 
the Al-Saud with Mubarak simply taking advantage of their desire to 
eliminate the threat of Hail. Mubarak was painted as the noble ruler 
coming to the assistance of another respected family chief for the 
honourable task of regaining their family seat. 
In any case, the Government of India was more interested in 
Kemball's security assessment which was dismissive of any serious threats 
to the area as a result of recent activities. He was confident that Mubarak 
would not "proceed to extremes" or prompt unwanted interference from 
the Porte: 
So far as Kuwait is concerned, he is (Mubarak) probably well 
able to hold his own, and he is not likely to take any steps 
which would bring himself into difficulties with Turkey. 63 
61 Government of India to SSFI (Hamilton) October 8,1900 FO 406/15 F7495/E1/R55/II 
62Resident, Gulf (Kemball) to Government of India, November 3,1900 FO 406/15 
F7495/E3/R90/II. 
63 Resident, Gulf (Kemball) to Government of India, October 30,1900 FO 406/15 
F7495/E2/R91/II. 
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India was reassured that the Al-Rashid were already weakened and that 
there was little chance of an attack on Kuwait. Since Mubarak had not 
asked for help, he must have been confident of his position. The Resident 
advised that it was not necessary to have a gunboat sent to the area and felt 
it might actually be counterproductive-giving a larger than necessary 
boost to Mubarak's ego. 
The India Office in London however, was not so optimistic. Reports 
had been received that the Al-Rashid were still bent on exacting revenge 
and that their forces had reached Basra. There they pressed the vali of 
Basra for several demands-that Mubarak make financial restitution for 
the raids, give an apology and recognise that the Al-Rashid, were the 
rightful rulers of Najd-otherwise Kuwait would be attacked. M It would 
seem that none of the reassurances of Kemball's report calmed fears. 
However, it seems likely that his report had not been received at that time. 
Even though Kemball had sent his report on November 3 to the 
Government of India, the India Office in London did not seem to know 
about it. On November 12, the Secretary of State for India, Lord Hamilton, 
cabled the Government of India with a short three line telegram: 
Reported from Bussorah [Basra] that Amir of Najd [Ibn 
Rashid] demands from Turks satisfaction against Koweit, 
failing which he will attack. Has Kemball yet reported to you 
on position there? What are the facts as to the quarrel 
between the Amir and Sheikh [Mubarak]?. 65 
Hamilton was anxious to take action but did not seem to have much 
information to go on. Nor could the Government of India provide much 
solace. Its reply was even shorter and stated simply that no action had been 
64 Admiralty to Foreign Office November 10,1900 FO 406/15 F7495/R62/II and Consul, 
Basra to Secretary, Embassy Constantinople, November 13,1900 FO 406/15 
F7495/E1/R74/II. 
65 SSFI (Hamilton) to Government of India, November 12,1900, FO 406/15 
F7495/E2/R63/II 
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taken on the assumption that London would provide instructions if 
necessary. 66 
With no concrete information about the events in Kuwait, Hamilton 
feared the worst. He requested the Foreign Office to immediately dispatch 
a British Agent on a warship to Kuwait to warn Ibn Rashid against making 
any attempts. If an attack did take place Hamilton ordered the invaders to 
be expelled. Mubarak was to be given shelter aboard the British warship 
until it was safe to return 67 Following this request the Foreign Office 
replied within hours, but felt it necessary to temper the exuberance of the 
Indian branch of the service. There would be a huge political fall out if 
British warships opened fire on subjects of the Ottoman empire (i. e. the Al- 
Rashid), more so if British troops landed at Kuwait. Therefore, while the 
Foreign Office authorised a ship to take an Agent to Kuwait (which would 
again be Kemball) to examine the situation it did not give permission for 
any active measures to be taken nor for the expulsion of any invaders . 68 
While London had been groping to come up with a policy to deal 
with events in Kuwait, the Porte had already decided on action. Three 
battalions of Turkish troops were sent to the Basra area to prevent 
hostilities from breaking out. The vali was instructed to resolve the dispute 
as he saw fit. 69 By this time Hamdi Pasha was no longer vali of Basra and 
his successor, Muhsin Pasha moved quickly. Emissaries were dispatched to 
Ibn Rashid and Mubarak with orders for them to desist. Ibn Rashid was 
urged to return to Hail and allow the Porte to deal with the Sheikh of 
Kuwait. 70 While Al- Rashid was ready to comply, Mubarak tried to ignore 
attempts to restrain him. He rode out to meet Ibn Rashid in the north and 
66 Government of India to SSFI, November 12,1900, FO 406/15 F7495/E1/R63/II. Later, 
the Viceroy would learn that the Al-Saud had been the cause of the incident, see Viceroy to 
SSFI, November 19,1900, FO 406/15 F7495/E1/R75/II 
67 India Office to Foreign Office November 14,1900 FO 406/15 F7495/R63/II 
68 Foreign Office to India Office, November 14,1900 FO 406/15 F7495/R65/II. Kemball 
himself had been opposed to sending a warship. See Resident, Gulf (Kemball) to 
Government of India November 3,1900, FO 406/15 F7495/E3/R90/II. 
69 Consul, Basra to Secretary, Embassy Constantinople, November 13 1900 FO 406/15 
F7495/E1/R74/II. 
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avoided the emissary sent by Muhsin. However, when he reached near the 
town of Zubair the emissary caught up and pressured him to retreat. 
Mubarak was caught-he could not refuse a direct request by the vali and so 
he agreed to travel to Basra where a meeting had been arranged with 
Muhsin Pasha. The exact nature of the discussions is not clear but British 
sources suggest that Mubarak protested his innocence and blamed Abdul 
Rahman Al-Saud as the cause for the fallout with Ibn Rashid. Mubarak also 
managed to ingratiate himself with the new vali through gifts and largesse. 
The Porte was soothed with pledges of loyalty and by the construction in 
Kuwait of a mosque in the name of the Sultan. 71 
Thus, on November 16, Kemball reported that the "Arab crises is 
passed; both sides are on their way home". 72 He was relieved and assumed 
it no longer necessary for him to return to Kuwait. However, the India 
Office still wanted him to go and meet with Mubarak. Kernball protested 
that such a visit might complicate matters by causing Mubarak to believe 
that he would be protected from trouble by the British and so embolden his 
actions. It was only then that the India Office backed down. 73 The Resident 
reassured India that Mubarak had great survival skills. The fact that 
Mubarak had developed a rapport with the vali of Basra meant he was 
likely to receive favourable treatment in case of further clashes with Hail. 
Meanwhile the Al-Rashid would probably be discouraged from attempting 
further attacks on Kuwait. 
It was recognised however, that Mubarak would continue his 
support for the Saudi raids on Hail while disclaiming any involvement: 
"That Mubarak is a clever and ambitious man there can be no doubt. .. and 
he has no intention of coming to any amicable arrangement with the Amir 
" Report of events of November 1900 in Consul, Basra to Embassy, Constantinople, 
November 22,1900, FO 406/15 F7495/R92/II 
71 Secretary, Embassy Constantinople to SSFA/PM (Salisbury) November 12,1900 FO 
406/15 F7495/R73/II. Also Consul, Basra to Embassy, Constantinople, November 22,1900 
FO 406/15 F7495/R92/II. 
72 Resident, Gulf to Government of India November 17 1900, FO 406/15 F7495/E5/R90/II. 
73 India Office to Foreign Office November 21,1900 FO 406/15 F7495/E1/R87/II.; and 
Government of India to SSFI, November 26 1900, FO 406/15 F7495/E2/R87/II. 
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of Najd". 74 In fact Kemball was quite concerned with the attitude of the 
Sheikh. He feared that Mubarak had already become too confident of 
British support and was losing a healthy fear of Ottoman reprisals. 
Kemball would warn Mubarak against provoking the Porte by 
encouraging raids on Hail: "It seems to me that you are pursuing a 
dangerous policy by continuing to provoke the Amir of Nejd, and again I 
counsel you to keep quiet". 75 
Furthermore, the Consul at Basra believed that Mubarak appeared 
to have lost the initiative and could expect Ibn Rashid to try once again to 
settle scores. The Consul was more uneasy with what appeared to be a 
Turkish victory: 
Mubarak has been to much expense and trouble in organising 
an equipping a large army, and yet, at the bidding of the Vali, 
he has to return to Koweit without striking a blow. By his 
visit here he has once more allowed the Turks to assert their 
suzerainty over Koweit, which indeed, in his correspondence 
with the Valis and the Sultan since his accession to the 
Sheikhship, he has constantly admitted. 76 
While the focus of these events was on Mubarak Al-Sabah it is important to 
point out the other important historical actor that emerged from this 
period. Up until this time there was little interest in the Al-Saud. For the 
first time in the twentieth century the Al-Saud begin to appear in British 
reports? ' As a result of British concern over a possible Kuwaiti-Ottoman 
conflict, officials in London and India begin to discuss their family name, 
their history and supposed ambitions and would soon come to view them 
as the most significant power in Arabia. 
74 Resident, Gulf (Kemball) to Government of India December 3,1901, FO 78/5173 
F7742/E3/R6/III. 
75 Resident, Gulf to Mubarak Al-Sabah December 10,1901, FO 78/5173/7742/E3/R9/III 
76 Report of Consul, Basra to Embassy, Constantinople, November 22,1900 FO 406/15 
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F7495/E3/R90/II. And Consul, Basra to Embassy, Constantinople, November 22,1900 FO 
406/15 F7495/R92/II. 
ABEDIN-TWO 66 
Proxy War in Arabia: Mubarak and the Capture of Najd 
Mubarak Al-Sabah did not heed the advice of the British Resident and on 
December 18,1900, he moved northwest out of Kuwait. Meeting up with 
Abdul Rahman Al-Saud and other tribal supporters, preparations were 
made for fresh campaigns against Hail. 78 Taking time to rally tribes and 
gather provisions Mubarak's forces swelled to several thousand. In January 
1901 the force moved their camp inside Najdi territory. 79 Mubarak and 
Abdul Rahman met with the chiefs of the Anayza and Qassimi tribes. 
Selling them on tales of victory and booty they pledged bai'a and joined the 
party. 80 With a stroke Mubarak had gained control of a large part of Najd 
with the exception of Riyadh. 
He made no attempt to take the city himself but in a calculated 
move dispatched his Saudi allies to do the job. While Abdul Rahman 
stayed with the main party, his son, Abdul Aziz went to Riyadh and 
invoked the claim to leadership based on their family heritage 81 The 
townspeople, however, saw him and his soldiers as agents of Mubarak Al- 
Sabah and had no desire to become vassals of the Kuwaitis. Moreover, they 
were fearful of reprisals from the Al-Rashid to whom the ba'ia (pledge of 
loyalty) had already been given. Although the Rashidi governor was 
hiding in the city's fortress it was only a matter of time before 
reinforcements came from Hail. The situation in Riyadh quickly turned 
into a stalemate. Abdul Aziz was left with a tenuous hold on the city. This 
fact did not stop Mubarak from claiming victory. Indeed, he boasted that 
78 Consul, Basra to Embassy, Constantinople, December 28,1900 FO 78/ 5173 
F7742/R5/III 
79Consul, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople, February 16,1901, FO 78/ 5173 
F7742/E1/R14/III, p. 15. Also India Office Report, 'Note on Central Arabia', n. d., IOR 
L/P&S/18/B334. See also Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 238-239. 
80 Secret Agent, Kuwait to Resident, Gulf, February 19,1901, FO 78/5173 
F7742/E3/R41/III, pp. 27-28. 
81 This account from Najdi oral history was given by Dr. A. A Masri, Professor, King Saud 
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all the people of Najd had willingly offered their fealty to him and that he 
had appointed Abdul Rahman as governor of Riyadh. 82 
On February 27,1901, after having staked his claim to Najd, 
Mubarak mobilised his forces for the four hundred-mile journey to the 
Rashidi capital of Hail. Great efforts were made to win over tribes allied to 
Ibn Rashid. Initially this was quite successful, and the force managed to 
cross most of central Arabia with little opposition. It was only when they 
came near to Jebel Shammar, that Ibn Rashid came out to intercept them. 
The two sides met on March 17,1901 at Sarif near the town of Buraydah. 
Official reports for March and April indicate the uncertainty of British 
officials about the outcome of the battle. Rumours were rife of Mubarak's 
death but none of the British political officers in the Gulf had a clear picture 
of what had happened. 83 
Finally, British officials learned from a Turkish source that Mubarak 
was still alive and heading back to Kuwait. M Apparently, during the battle, 
some of the beduins in Mubarak's force deserted, leaving the Kuwaiti party 
outnumbered. Ibn Rashid captured the camels, supplies and ammunition 
of the Kuwaiti forces. Mubarak lost his brother, Hamoud and nephew 
Sabah in the battle and was forced to retreat. 85 Abdul Aziz Al-Saud 
received word about the setback and realised that his hopes of holding 
Riyadh had evaporated. Departing the city at night, he fled to Kuwait. 
The forays into central Arabia had been an unqualified disaster for 
Mubarak and the Al-Saud. Kuwait was now on the defensive. The furious 
Al-Rashid had declared that unless Mubarak was removed as ruler of 
82 Mubarak Al-Sabah to Jabir ibn Mubarak (his son) February 25 1901, letter in Agent, 
Kuwait to Resident, Gulf, February 25,1901, FO 78/ 5173 F7742/E4/R41/I/III, pp. 28-29. 
83 Consul, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople 29 March 1901, PRO FO 195/2096, p. 65. 
84 The Vali at Basra sent his aide de camp to Kuwait to find out what happened and found 
Mubarak was alive and back home. See detailed report by Consul, Basra to Ambassador, 
Constantinople, April 10,1901, PRO FO 195/2096, p. 110-115, also FO 78/ 5173 
F7742/E1/R73/III. See also Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, p. 137. 
85Consul, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople, March 16,1901, FO 78/5173 
F7742/R36/I/III, p. 53. Also Ambassador, Constantinople, March 29,1901, Ibid, p. 64; 
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Kuwait the city would be attacked. 86 Kuwait mobilised defences and 
Mubarak called on his British benefactors for supplies of arms and 
ammunition. The Foreign Office authorised the dispatch of British 
warships to Kuwait's defence. The Admiralty sent three ships, with one 
stationed right inside the Kuwait harbour as a clear sign of Britain's 
commitment to the ruler. 87 The fact that the situation had arisen out of 
Mubarak's confidence in British protection was not lost on British officials: 
The Sheikh of Kuwait appears to be a ruler of considerable 
determination of character, wily and self seeking. He is 
probably emboldened by his Convention with the British 
Government to go farther than he otherwise would do and 
possibly counts upon His Majesty's Government saving him 
from the consequences of an unsuccessful attack upon his 
powerful neighbour Abdul Aziz (Ibn Rashid) of Najd. 88 
By the time the forces of Ibn Rashid came to within a few miles of Kuwait, 
news had spread that the city was heavily defended by the injleezi 
(English) 89 Among the defenders was a small band of Saudi forces carrying 
green banners on which was inscribed the shahadah (the Islamic declaration 
of faith) marking their positions. 90 Avoiding an outright assault the Al- 
Rashid lay siege for a few weeks, during which time only a few hundred 
sheep were taken. With no substantial support from the Porte Ibn Rashid 
finally gave up and withdrew to Hail. It was clear that British support 
made all the difference. Mubarak's special relationship had put off the 
Ottomans and deterred Ibr Rashid. The drama was costly nevertheless for 
Mubarak. Although the Al-Rashid were thwarted, he had risked his 
position in Kuwait, and could have provided the Turks with the excuse 
they sought to invade. 
86 Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA, April 29,1901, PRO FO 78/5173, #29, pp. 154-155 
F7742/R48/IH, p. 31. 
87 Foreign Office to Admiralty, March 30,1901, FO 78/5173 F7742/R212/III, p. 68. 
88Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA, April 10,1901, Affairs of Kuwait: Political 
Department, FO 78/5173 #59, pp. 42-49 F7742/R35/III. 
89Foreign Office to Admiralty, April 29,1901, FO 78/5173 #33, p. 150, F7742/R51/I/III, 
p. 32. Also Admiral Bosanquet to Admiralty, May 1,1901, FO 78/5173 #300, p. 170 
F7742/E1/R55/I/111 p. 34. See also Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 41. 
90 This was later to become the national flag of Saudi Arabia 
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Still an ambitious man however, Mubarak now turned to his protege 
to carry out a proxy war to eliminate the Rashidi menace and establish a 
Kuwaiti protectorate inland. Abdul Rahman who had thus far led Saudi 
forces, withdrew from active campaigning and allowed his son Abdul 
Aziz, to take command of the front line. With Mubarak's encouragement 
Abdul Aziz planned another attempt on Riyadh. With a force of around 
forty men, composed almost entirely of members of the Al-Saud clan, he 
set off in October 1901. Heading southwest from Kuwait he hoped to 
gather support from tribes along the way. Initially this was successful and 
numbers swelled to above sixty, but as the winter drew near, enthusiasm 
waned and numbers dropped. 91 Abdul Aziz took his remaining party into 
the isolation of the Empty Quarter to wait. They rested, prayed and fasted 
the month of Ramadan. By keeping out of sight Abdul Aziz sought to lull 
the Rashidi governor of Riyadh into a false sense of security. After two 
months in the desert they began their quest for the city. On 15 January 1902 
the green banner was unfurled and Abdul Aziz made way for Riyadh. This 
time he wanted the people of Riyadh to know that he was coming in the 
name of Islam and to re-establish the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abdul 
Wahhab. 
An accurate account of how the city was taken is difficult to gather 
since Abdul Aziz himself told the story in many different ways, adding 
new parts and subtracting others when it suited him. Even Philby, in his 
biography Saudi Arabia, states that the details of the capture had "been told 
too often" to know what actually happened 92 However there are some 
basic consistencies. This author found a report in the Foreign Office 
Confidential Print series detailing the capture of Riyadh which was written 
by the British Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain in February, 1902. This 
91Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 239. The amount of booty was relatively small. This and the cold 
winters caused many men to lose their enthusiasm and return to their tribes. 
92Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 239. 
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account has been more or less reproduced by Philby and later chroniclers 
of the event. 93 
Ibn Saud is said to have set out with his band of men for the purpose 
of raiding the beduin of Najd. He did not declare his true intentions until 
he had reached the outskirts of Riyadh. There he announced his plan to 
take the city and to remove the Rashidi governor. Sending the main party 
to take shelter in a date grove near the city walls to avoid detection Ibn 
Saud took just eight of his most trusted men with him inside the city. It was 
a core group made up of two of his cousins, his brother Muhammad and 
loyal retainers. 94 The small group scaled the city walls and crept through 
the darkened streets until they came to the house of Amir Ajlan, the 
governor of the town. Bursting into the house Ibn Saud learned that Ajlan 
was not there and that he spent his nights in the palace fort. It would be at 
least an hour after daybreak before he returned. With tension mounting 
Ibn Saud summoned the rest of his party hiding in the date groves. The 
group waited in Ajlan's house nervously watching the door to the palace 
which was across the street. When the gates were opened to let the amir 
out, the attackers leapt out of hiding. Ajlan turned and ran for the safety of 
the palace but he was struck and killed as he tried to get through the 
door. 95 The raiders pressed on into the palace killing fourteen guards and 
officials of Ibn Rashid. After securing the area, Ibn Saud leapt to the 
parapet and announced to the people that he had re-conquered his 
country. He invited the notables to the palace where he lectured them on 
the misrule of ibn Rashid and on the leniency of the Al-Saud. He urged all 
those who professed to want peace to lay down their arms and submit. 
93 Assistant Political Agent, Bahrain report "Translated purport of an Account of the 
Capture of Riadh by Shaikh Abdul-Aziz-bin-Shaikh Abdur Rahman-el-Faisal Al Saood' 
included in Resident, Gulf to Government of India, March 2,1902, FO 406/16 
F8218/E9/R122/N. For accounts by contemporary authors see Lacey The Kingdom, pp. 48- 
52; McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, pp. 20-22; Yale, The Near East, pp. 257-260; Goldrup, Saudi Arabia, 
pp. 29-31 
% His cousins were Abdullah ibn Jiluwi Al-Saud and Abdul Aziz ibn Musaid Al-Saud. 
95 Also see Dickson Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 138-139. 
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The ulema of Riyadh were hesitant to confer complete authority on 
the young untried Abdul Aziz. By virtue of his successful capture of the 
city they had to accept Abdul Aziz as the amir but they conferred upon his 
father, Abdul Rahman the title of imam. 96 Eager to cement his ties with the 
religious establishment Abdul Aziz married the daughter of the chief qadi' 
(judge) Sheikh Abdullah ibn Abdul Lateef. From this point Abdul Aziz, 
having made a name for himself throughout central Arabia, was often 
referred to simply as 'Ibn Saud'. 
The Al-Rashid despite frustration at the loss of Riyadh took time to 
assemble a force to counter attack. By the time they were ready to move on 
Riyadh the city was too heavily defended. Their attempts were met by hit 
and run manoeuvres, lightening raids and feint attacks, which were Ibn 
Saud's. trade marks. 97 The success of these tactics frustrated Ibn Rashid and 
forced him to wait in vain for Constantinople to send assistance. 
British officials first learned of the capture of Riyadh by the Al-Saud 
in a letter dated 20 Shawwal 1319 (30 January 1902) sent by Mubarak al- 
Sabah. The Resident in the Gulf was informed that the people of Najd were 
rallying round Abdul Aziz and that the fort of Riyadh had been captured. 98 
The Kuwaiti amir led the Resident to believe that this was an entirely 
indigenous reaction and that Abdul Aziz had achieved victory through his 
own solitary efforts: "I do not think that he (Mubarak) is in any way 
responsible for the proceedings of Abdul Aziz". 99 The Resident was unsure 
of the new state of affairs in Najd but was doubtful about the longevity of 
the new Saudi regime: "Whether Abdul Aziz will be able to re-establish 
96India Office Report, 'Note on Central Arabia' IOR L/P&S/18/B334. Also Lacey, The 
Kingdom, p. 67. and Asad The Road to Mecca., p. 172-173. Goldrup's account (Saudi Arabia 
p. 31) is slightly different. He cites Arabic sources as indicating that Abdul Rahman 
emphatically refused the title and threatened to leave Riyadh unless his son became amir. 
This version is quite typical of the exaggerated language style of some Arabic historical 
writers and this author is inclined to give greater weight to the other accounts. 
97 Dickson Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 139. 
98 Mubarak Al-Sabah to Resident, Gulf, 20 Shawwal 1319, enclosure in Resident, Gulf to 
Government of India, February 6 1902, Report 109, File 8218, Vo1. Il Part IV, p. 62 
99 Resident, Gulf to Government of India, February 17,1902, PRO FO 406/16 
F8218/E1/R126/IV. 
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himself in the kingdom of his ancestors remains to be seen. His ultimate 
defeat by Ibn Rashid would seem to be probable. "100 
However, Mubarak had in fact set an excellent example on how to 
consolidate power and the new Saudi regime was soon to call upon Britain 
for support. In a letter to the Resident, Abdul Rahman requested that 
Britain treat him as a British protege. 101 In return for financial support he 
offered to take the coastal region of al-Hasa away from Ottoman control. 102 
The letter included a tacit threat to turn to Russia if no response was 
forthcoming-103 The British Resident however, was reluctant to entertain 
the request. The Al-Saud had an uncertain and perhaps temporary hold on 
Riyadh. It was likely that Ibn Rashid would try to regain his lost territory 
and he was still considered the Amir of Najd. The Resident did not feel that 
such a request warranted a response. Kemball reported his doubts to the 
Government of India and they concurred: "The Government of India 
agree[s] with your view, that pending further developments, no 
encouragement should be given to Abdul-bin Feysal, and your action in 
abstaining from replying to his letter is approved. "104 
In keeping with Mubarak's strategy, the Al-Saud also sent pledges 
of loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan. But the Porte was now wary of possible 
Saudi designs on al-Hasa and dispatched a new governor along with 
reinforcements of 500 men and four large calibre mountain guns to the 
100 Resident, Gulf, February 19,1902, PRO FO 406/16, F8218/E1/R122/N. 
10, Abdul Rahman bin Feysal al Saud to Resident, Gulf, 5th Safar 1320 (May 14 1902), PRO 
FO 406/16: F8218/E9/R164/IV. 
1O2India Office Report, 'Note on Central Arabia' IOR L/P&S/18/B334. Russia had tried 
unsuccessfully in 1898 to establish a cooling station in Kuwait. Then in 1899 the Germans 
and the Ottomans made plans to make Kuwait the end station of the Baghdad railway line. 
These events made Britain concerned over the protection of Kuwait. See Troeller, The Birth 
of Saudi Arabia, pp. 21-22. 
103 In December 1901 while Abdul Rahman was in Kuwait he was approached by the 
Russian Consul in Bushire who offered Russian assistance and protection in the fight to 
regain Najd but Mubrak encouraged Abdul Rahman not to take up this offer but instead to 
ask the British for protection. Report of Senior Naval Officer, Perisan Gulf (Lt. Commander 
J. G. Armstrong) to Admiral Bosanquet, Admiralty, May 27 1902, PRO FO 406/16: F8218/ 
E1/R159/IV. 
104 Government of India to Resident, Gulf, June 23 1902, FO 406/16: F8218/E10/R164/IV. 
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region. 105 In a gesture designed to keep Ibn Rashid in play, the Porte 
awarded him with medals for loyalty and devotion to the Sultan. 106 
By this time it seemed clear to British officials that in fact Mubarak 
was "notoriously aiding and abetting Ibn Saoud, who could have done 
little without his help". 107 Abdul Aziz's successes in consolidating tribal 
support allowed him to take more towns and gain further pledges of 
support from local tribes. Through the summer of 1902 numerous 
skirmishes and raids took place with Ibn Rashid. There were small victories 
on both sides but Ibn Rashid also began to focus attacks on what he saw as 
the source of the Al-Saud's support-Kuwait. Tribes under Mubarak's 
protection were plundered as Ibn Rashid retaliated against the one he saw 
as the chief enemy. The Government of India became concerned that such 
hostilities would bring unwanted Ottoman intervention. The Secretary of 
State for India ordered that Mubarak should be warned "not to encourage 
any action likely to bring him into difficulties with Nejd (i. e. Ibn Rashid) or 
with Turkish authorities". 108 A warning was also issued to the Ottoman 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, that HMG wanted to respect the status quo in 
Kuwait but would not stand by if she was attacked. The Minister was 
urged to have the Wali of Basra put a stop to Ibn Rashid's raids on 
Mubarakl09 
From Mubarak's point of view, to cease aiding and abetting Ibn 
Saud would leave Ibn Rashid truly powerful and in a position to threaten 
Kuwait. He would manoeuvre around British objections and attempt to 
gain the most out of each foreign power. Mubarak ensured that he kept 
Abdul Aziz in play by introducing the young man to the Russian Consul 
and captain of the Russian ship Boyarin. Mubarak knew that the Consul 
105 Consul, Basra to Agent, Embassy Constantinople, July 3,1902, FO 406/16: 
F8218/E1/R170/IV p. 105-106. 
106 Ibn Rashid was granted the 'Order of Iftikhar'. See Agent, Embassy Constantinople to 
SSFA, July 16,1902, FO 406/16: F8218/R157/IV p. 96. 
107 Consl, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople, July 31,1902. FO 406/16: F8218/R174/IV. 
iosSSFI (Hamilton) to Government of India, September 22,1902, FO 
406/16: F8218/E1/R192/IV. 
109 Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA, November 20,1902, FO 406/16: F8218/R234/IV. 
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was keen on establishing patronage over an Arab sheikh. 110 He also 
arranged for the younger brother of Abdul Aziz, Muhammad Al-Saud to 
be sumptuously entertained by captain of the French cruiser Infernet. 
Subsequently, a meeting was arranged for Abdul Aziz with Commander 
Kemp of the British warship Sphinx on 8 March 1903 with Mubarak in 
attendance. It soon became clear what Mubarak had planned. A request 
was made for British support but Kemp was also told that the Russians had 
offered money and support for the fight against ibn Rashid. Perhaps as 
Mubarak expected, the British officer immediately tried to dissuade Abdul 
Aziz from taking up the Russian offer: 
I pointed out to Abdul Aziz that it was undesirable that 
foreign European countries should interfere in the affairs of 
Najd, and suggested that he should refuse any offers made to 
him on behalf of the Russian Government, and that, as Great 
Britain was the predominant power in the Persian Gulf , and 
intended to remain so , it would not, in the end, pay him to 
do anything of which she disapproved. "' 
Playing along with the plan Abdul Aziz complained that his enemy Ibn 
Rashid was receiving support form the Ottoman authorities and that he too 
required financial support in order to maintain his forces. Commander 
Kemp was anxious to prevent another power from bidding for Arab 
loyalty but he could not offer any assurances except that he would forward 
the request to higher authorities. 
In any case Abdul Aziz did not have much time in Kuwait to play 
political games with foreign powers. During his absence from Riyadh, Ibn 
Rashid launched an attack on the city. His father Abdul Rahman led a 
capable defence and the invaders were forced to retreat leaving their 
supplies and horses behind. 112 Abdul Aziz chased after the attackers and 
caught up with a band of ibn Rashid men, between al-Hasa and Kuwait to 
punish them for their assault. This was followed by a series of skirmishes 
110 Agent, Kuwait to Resident, Gulf, March 8,1903, FO 406/17: F8238/E3/R43/V. 
in Commander Kemp, (Sphinx) to Admiral Drury, Admiralty, March 14,1903, 
F8238/E1/R42/V. 
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throughout the spring and summer of 1903 between Saudi and Rashidi 
forces. In late July, the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Nicolas 
O'Connor, learned that Mubarak was rallying Sheikhs of the Anayza tribe 
to join the Al-Saud in another attack on Ibn Rashid. 113 O'Conor knew that 
he could expect another round of protests from the Ottoman Foreign 
Minister. It was a constant and tiresome exercise to calm Ottoman fears 
and then defend Britain's position. Kuwaiti support for the Al-Saud was 
complicating relations with the Porte. Despite repeated claims that he was 
not involved, it was clear that Mubarak was funding the Al-Saud against 
ibn Rashid. O'Conor wanted to reign in Mubarak's activities. He sent a 
request to the Foreign Office for a British Agent to be assigned to Kuwait to 
control Mubarak's ambitions. 114 
Although the Viceroy of India was supportive of the idea, the 
Government administration preferred to have the Consul at Mohammerah 
(on the Gulf) appointed responsible for Kuwait, but this was rejected by the 
Foreign Office. 115 As far as HMG was concerned Kuwait was officially part 
of the Ottoman empire. The subject of Kuwait's status as a semi- 
independent entity was never formally discussed. The Foreign Office had 
an understanding with the Porte. The appointment of an agent at Kuwait 
would be a departure from the status quo and the Foreign Office had no 
desire to go down that route. 116 
Britain and the Establishment of an Independent Saudi Entity 
In January 1904, Ibn Rashid would try again to make a decisive move 
against his Saudi-Kuwaiti foes. He marched to the outskirts of Kuwait and 
asked the Porte for permission to enter because Mubarak had "given proof 
112 Mubarak Al-Sabah to Resident, Gulf, April 14,1903, F8238/E2/R51/V. 
113These were Sheikhs who had taken refuge in Kuwait after being expelled by Ibn Rashid 
from their territory. Consul, Basra (Crow) to Ambassador, Constantinople, July 20,1903, 
F8238/R69/V. 
114 Lord Hamilton to Government India, July 21,1903, F8238/E1/R57/V. 
I's Foreign Office to India Office, August 13,1903, F8238/R65/V. The Government of India 
suggested that in the short term the Consul-General at Bushire should be made 
responsible for frequent visits to Kuwait. 
116 Foreign Office to India Office, November 25,1903 FO 406/17 F8238/R90/V 
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of his relations, with and subjection to, the English"117 The authorisation 
was slow to arrive, in fact it never did, and the party from Hail turned 
back. 118 Ironically, while Ibn Rashid was waiting for his reply from 
Constantinople, the British Ambassador in that city had cabled the British 
Foreign Secretary to complain of the Sheikh's duplicity: "The Sheikh of 
Kuwait readily assures us that he is the warm partisan and faithful subject 
of His Majesty's Government, but he gives equal, if not more fervent, 
assurances to the Sultan in a contrary sense". 119 
Meanwhile, Ibn Saud was preparing to move further into central 
Arabia. In March he entered al-Qassim and attacked a force of 400 strong 
Rashidi loyalists. One of Ibn Rashid's top lieutenants, Hussein Jarrad, was 
killed in the battle and over 150 camels and a money bag of 1000 silver 
riyals were captured. 120 Jarrad was a trusted leader who had been in charge 
of the defence of al-Qassim and his death was a severe blow to Al-Rashid. 
Ibn Saud now faced a much less well-led group. Emboldened by his 
success, he entered the town of Aneyza on March 22. The Rashidi 
appointed governor of the town was shot and killed and the houses of 
Rashidi loyalists plundered. 121 Thus, by the end of April, Ibn Saud had 
reached into central Arabia with Najd, al-Qassim and Aneyza under his 
control. 
Although flushed with success Ibn Saud soon received reports of 
Ottoman reinforcements being massed near Sammawa. 122 The Porte had 
not given Ibn Rashid permission to attack Kuwait, which would bring 
conflict with Britain, but had instead sent forces to aid Ibn Rashid take back 
117 Intercepted telegram from Ibn Rashid to Sultan dated January 4,1904 FO 406/18 
F8420/E1/R14/VI. 
I18 Ambassador, Constantinople, to SSFA, February 29,1904, FO 406/18 F8420/R23/VI. 
119 Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA, January 11,1904, FO 406/18 F8420/R2/VI. 
120 Consul, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople, March 15,1904 FO 406/18 
F8420/E1/R30/ VI. 
121 Letter of Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud to Sheikh Mubarak al Sabah, 10th Muharram 1322 (27 
March 1904) cited in Consul, Jeddah to Ambassador, Constantinople, April 22 1904, FO 
406/18 F8420/E3/R45/VI. 
122 Consul, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople, April 27,1904, FO 406/18 
F8420/R51/VI. 
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central Arabia. 123On May 2,1904 Ibn Saud sent an urgent request for 
British protection. 124 However, within a week the contingent of Ottoman 
troops with heavy artillery was already on the move. The force consisted of 
eight regiments of soldiers (totalling some 2400 men), artillery, guns, and 
money. lti They were joined by Ibn Rashid and tribal levies from the Harb, 
Utayba and Shammar. Ibn Saud was forced to meet the advancing army 
and a series of battles ensued in the area of Bukhayri; , near the town of ýf- 
Buraydah. 126 
Casualties were heavy on both sides but Ibn Saud suffered a serious 
personal wound during one of the battles. The heat and harsh desert 
environment also took its toll on Ottoman soldiers unaccustomed to such 
conditions. Many died of thirst and heat exhaustion. Reaching a stalemate 
both sides retired to rest and regroup. However, disagreements between 
Ibn Rashid and Ottoman officers on strategy and the lack of reinforcements 
further demoralised the Ottoman forces. 
The British Foreign Office had been viewing these events with a 
mixture of alarm and confusion. There was no clear consensus on what 
could be done. An October 1901 agreement was in place with the Ottoman 
Government which was drawn up to prevent hostilities between Ibn 
Rashid and Sheikh of Kuwait but no stipulation had been made that either 
Government should intervene between Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud. London 
felt that all that could be done was to instruct Mubarak not to get involved 
and to request the Porte also to not encourage anything that would 
exacerbate the "disturbed condition" of the area. 127The British ambassador 
had been forced on a number of occasions to explain that HMG had tried to 
123 Consul, Damascus to Ambassador, Constantinople, January 11 1905, FO 406/20 
F8472/I. 
124 Ibn Saud to Resident, Gulf, May 2 1904, cited in Government India to SSFA, May 20 
1904, FO 406/18 F8420/E1/R46/VI. 
lu See William Ochsenwald, Religion, Society and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz Under 
Ottoman Control 1840-1908, Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1984, p. 204. Also 
Government India to SSFI, April 28,1904 FO 406/18 F8420/E1/R37/VI. 
126 Political Intelligence Report, Consul, Baghdad to Government of India, 26 December 
1904, FO 406/20 F8472/E2/R55/I. 
127 SSFA to Ambassador, Constantinople, May 10,1904, FO 406/18 F8420/R42/VI. 
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restrain Mubarak and had expected the Porte to do the same with Ibn 
Rashid. 128 But O'Conor could not insist that the Ottomans refrain from 
supporting Ibn Rashid without looking like a supporter of Ibn Saud. The 
frustration of the British ambassador can be seen in the tone of his 
correspondence: 
It must be borne in mind that the Emir of Najd (Ibn Rashid) is 
the party attacked and I confess I cannot see with what 
arguments or on what grounds I can press the Ottoman 
Government from assisting him, without appearing to 
directly espouse the cause of Ibn Saud , 129 
There were certainly some in the Foreign Office that viewed the success of 
Ibn Saud as potentially harmful to British interests in Kuwait. A new 
Wahabbi dynasty in Arabia could threaten British influence which had, up 
till that time, been steadily growing year by year130 Yet this was not the 
view of the Government of India. The Viceroy, Lord Curzon believed that 
British influence over Mubarak had actually "increased concurrently with 
the success of his friend, Bin Saoud"131 Curzon worried that if Mubarak 
was prevented from helping Ibn Saud it would allow the Turks to gain 
supremacy in Najd. Ultimately, this would weaken Mubarak's position and 
might even lead to an attack on Kuwait-which would bring Britain into 
direct conflict with the Ottoman Empire. That was more objectionable than 
the re-establishment of a Wahabbi dynasty, which was seen as less fanatical 
than territorial. 132 Lord Curzon was keen to revive the idea of an Agent at 
Kuwait so that Mubarak could be kept in line and to ensure that central 
Arabian politics did not spill into the Gulf. 133 Relations between the 
Government of India and the Foreign Office were becoming strained over 
this issue. But the Foreign Office reluctantly gave in and Curzon appointed 
Captain S. G. Knox as the first Political Agent in Kuwait. Shortly thereafter, 
12BAmbassador, Constantinople to SSFA, May 16,1904, FO 406/18 F8420/R49(No. 373)/VI. 
129 Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA, May 23,1904 FO 406/18 F8420/R49(No. 93)/VI. 
130 Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA, May 16,1904, FO 406/18 F8420/R49/VI. 
131 Viceroy of India to SSFA, May 29,1904, FO 406/18 F8420/El/R54/VI. 
132 Viceroy of India to SSFA, May 29,1904, FO 406/18 F8420/E1/R54/VI. 
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Curzon selected Colonel Percy Cox to play the larger co-ordinating role of 
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. 134 , .} 
Following the battles near Bukhayr^ya there was little appetite for 
conflict during the scorching summer months. However, by August, Ibn 
Rashid was bolstered by further supplies and men from the Ottoman 
garrison and was looking for another chance to challenge his foe. Although 
he began another round of attacks, the effectiveness of his forces were 
hampered by disagreements with the Turkish soldiers, low morale and a 
lack of unit cohesion. Ibn Rashid was also known to be abusive to his 
soldiers and was particularly harsh with the Turkish regulars. 135 Food and 
rations were withheld to ensure obedience. He sought glory but did not 
wish to use own men in the front lines. On many occasions, Ibn Rashid 
ordered the Ottoman soldiers to march in front of his beduin forces. 
Generally reluctant Turkish officers were forced to comply and in one 
instance when a Turkish captain refused to march his men in front, Ibn 
Rashid shot and killed him in anger. 136 
On the night of September 27,1904, Ibn Rashid attacked the village 
of Shunayna near the oasis of Qasr ibn Uqayyil, where Ibn Saud was 
camped. 137 However, the Turkish soldiers reportedly fled the battle and Ibn 
Rashid retreated to chase after them. Ibn Saud pursued the party and 
completely routed the lot. Shunayna was a decisive battle. Among the 
Ottoman losses were two majors, six captains and four lieutenants as well 
13SViceroy of India, to SSFA, May 20 1904, FO 406/18 F8420/E1/R46/VI. See also Graves, 
The Life of Sir Percy Cox, p. 102. 
134 Foreign Office to India Office, July 23,1904, FO 406/18 F8420/R73/VI. And Howarth, 
The Desert King, p. 48. 
135 Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf, p. 156. 
136 Ibn Rashid then ordered the second in command to march the Ottoman troops in front 
of the Beduin. During the battle many of these soldiers were killed by 'friendly fire'. See 
Resident in Turkish Arabia (Newmarch) to Ambassador, Constantinople, August 10,1904, 
F8420/E1/R89/VI. The huge losses of ibn Rashid and the mass chaos of joint Rashid- 
Ottoman forces is detailed in the 10 August extract of the Diary of Political Resident of 
Turkish Arabia, 15 August 1904, FO 406/18 F8420/E1/R103/VI. 
137Political Agent, Kuwait to Resident, Gulf, October 17,1904 FO 406/19 
F8503/E2/R2/VII. For further details on this battle see also Goldrup, Saudi Arabia, p. 61; 
Goldberg, Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia p. 59; Al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis, 
pp. 156-157. 
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as over a thousand soldiers. 138 The Ottoman authorities tried to hide their 
defeat by spreading false rumours of Ibn Saud's demise and Turkish 
victory. 139 Attempts to placate its soldiers were made by announcing that 
all those who fought in Arabia would get medals while the officers would 
be promoted. However, the Porte could not hide the fact that Ibn Rashid 
had himself contributed to his own failure and that Saudi prestige had 
increased. It became obvious to the Porte that Ibn Saud was on the rise and 
the downfall of Ibn Rashid was a matter of time. Ibn Saud was fortunate 
that a revolt in Yemen reduced Constantinople's appetite for long 
entanglements in Central Arabia. 140 
The vali of Basra sent a message to Mubarak that if Ibn Saud were to 
give his allegiance to the Porte he would be left alone to rule Najd without 
interference from Constantinople. 141 This overture alarmed the ruler of 
Kuwait. The establishment of direct political relations with Ibn Saud would 
allow the Porte to absorb Najd completely. Kuwait's position would then 
become precarious and her independence threatened. 142 Mubarak did not 
rush to inform Ibn Saud of this opportunity but rather conveyed his 
concerns to the newly appointed British Agent in Kuwait, Captain Knox. In 
surprising candour Mubarak claimed that he could not trust Ibn Saud 
238 Acting Consul, Basra (Monahan) to Ambassador, Constantinople October 7,1904, FO 
406/18 F8420/R107/VI. 
139 Vice-Consul, Karbala to Resident, Turkish Arabia, Baghdad, August 25 1904, FO 406/18 
F8420/E2/R95/VI 
140 On 8 November 1904 the Ottoman Garrison in Hafash, Yemen was attacked by rebels 
lead by Imam Muhammad Yahya. This was the latest in a series of minor uprisings against 
Ottoman rule. This incident was a serious blow to Ottoman prestige because it resulted in 
the complete destruction of the fort and the loss of 400 soldiers. As rebellion spread, 
attacks increased in frequency, leading to the seizure of Sanaa the capital city. Between late 
November to early December, Ottoman resources and attention focused more on Yemen 
and shifted away from central Arabia. The Porte decided to mend relations with Ibn Saud 
and withdraw its support for the Al-Rashid. See 'Memorandum of Yemen Insurrection of 
1904-1905', Military Attache, Embassy, Constantinople March 14,1905, FO 406/21 
F8482/E1/R52/II. 
141 Nuri Pasha, the vali of Basra (1901-1904), hoped to send the message via Mubarak, 
knowing that Ibn Saud would certainly receive it. He still required the assistance of 
someone to pass the message to Kuwait, however, all three individuals who were 
approached declined to do so. Yet all three did subsequently relay the incident to 
Mubarak. Resident Kuwait (Knox) to Resident Gulf (Cox) September 3,1904, FO 406/18 
F8420/E/2/R127/VI. 
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linked to the Turks and feared his own political future could be 
jeopardised. 143 Mubarak sought the Agent's advice. It seemed that Ibn 
Saud's successes were straining relations with his old mentor. However, 
when the Government of India learned of the candid discussions that were 
taking place, alarm bells went off. Officials were furious that Knox was 
talking so freely and intimately with Mubarak about Najd. The Viceroy 
instructed Knox to "abstain from offering advice to Sheikh Mubarak on 
Nejd affairs". 144India wanted their man to talk sense into Mubarak and get 
him to stop "rocking the boat" but not to entertain discussions on policy. 
The political fallout however, had already begun. In London, the 
Turkish Ambassador complained to the Foreign Secretary about the 
presence of a British official at Mubarak's court. The Ambassador accused 
Knox of interfering in the administrative matters of Kuwait, fraternising 
with local notables and hoisting the Union Jack over his residence. These 
actions were seen as altering the status quo145 Making matters worse was 
anti-British propaganda by German agents in Turkey and by the press in 
Germany. Rumours circulating in Constantinople were that Britain 
orchestrated the revolt in Yemen as part of a scheme to gain supremacy in 
the Arabian Peninsula and would eventually proclaim a protectorate over 
Kuwait and central Arabia146 The Foreign Office had already been highly 
sensitive to criticism and quickly tried to diffuse the situation by ordering 
142Resident, Kuwait (Knox) to Resident, Gulf (Cox) September 3,1904, FO 406/18 
F8420/E/2/R127/VI. 
243 Salwa Alghanim, The Reign of Mubarak Al-Sabah, p. 123. Alghanim portrays Mubarak as 
fearful but it is also likely that he was using the incident to manoeuvre for greater British 
support. The fact that the Resident had recently been appointed to Kuwait clearly meant 
that Britain was taking a keen interest in this country. Mubarak had always boasted about 
his intimate relationship and sought to cement his ties allowing him to rely less on his 
protestations of loyalty to the Porte. 
144 Government of India to Resident, Gulf (Cox), October 9 1904, FO 406/18 
F8420/E5/R127/VI. 
145 SSFA to Councillor, British Embassy, Constantinople, November 2,1904, FO 406/18 
F8420/R111/VI. Also SSFA to Government of India November 18,1904 FO 406/18 
F8420/E1/R140/VI. 
1'6 Memorandum Respecting the State of Affairs in Arabia, prepared by General Staff, War 
Office for the Director of Military Operations, Foreign Office, May 23,1905, FO 
406/ 22/ F8548/ El/R57/ III. 
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the Government of India to withdraw their man from Kuwait 147 The 
Viceroy, Lord Curzon, refused and was displeased with the attitude of the 
Foreign Office. Inter-departmental tensions rose considerably and relations 
between the Government of India and the Foreign Office hit a low point. In 
a memo to the Foreign Secretary, Curzon complained bitterly against the 
policy. Couched in polite language that disguised his displeasure the 
Viceroy asserted that the Sheikh of Kuwait already had doubts about the 
value of Britain's friendship, and that withdrawing Knox would alienate 
Mubarak completely. Both Mubarak and Ibn Saud might then be forced to 
submit to Turkey providing the Ottomans a presence along the Gulf coast. 
148 Eventually this would also allow other powers, notably Germany, 
France and Russia, to gain long sought after access to the Gulf, which 
would in turn pose a threat to lines of communication to India. The British 
Agent in Kuwait was seen to perform a vital role, serving as point man in 
the Gulf, reporting on nefarious activity-whether gun running, piracy or 
slavery as well as keeping a watch on political activity. Withdrawing Knox 
would be extremely harmful for the security of the Gulf. 
After the Viceroy's strong protest the Foreign Office backtracked. 
Reassurances were given to India that the withdrawal was meant to be 
temporary. The Agent would not be removed suddenly or change his 
function in such a way as to imply any alteration in the British attitude to 
Kuwait. 149 However, officials in London were still perturbed by what was 
seen as the Indian Government's "complete misapprehension of the 
circumstances". 15° In any case the matter slowly died down. Months later 
the Foreign Secretary declared that he did "not consider that there would 
147 The Foreign Office had assumed the appointment of Knox was temporary and had 
expected that he would be withdrawn in any case. Foreign Office to India Office, October 
20,1904 FO 406/18 F8420/R101/VI. Also SSFA (Broderick) to Government of India, 
November 11,1904 FO 406/18 F8420/E1/R125/VI. 
148 Government of India to SSFI (Broderick), November 19,1904, FO 406/18 
F8420/E1/R129/VI. For more details of the row between India and the Foreign Office see 
Howarth The Desert King, p. 47. 
149 SSFA (Broderick) to Government of India November 21,1904 FO 406/18 
F8420/E1/R132/VI, Foreign Office to Government of India, November 25,1904, FO 
406/18 F8420/R136/VI. 
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be any advantage in further pursuing the discussion of the subject" 151 
Knox was never recalled but the incident marked one of the last times that 
the Foreign Office would defer to the Government of India over Kuwait. 
Saudi-Ottoman Political Relations 
Ibn Saud did not wish to rely on Mubarak as his only conduit for contacts 
with the Porte. He also tried to use the Sharif of Mecca, Awn al-Rafiq 
whom he addressed as the "recognised leader of Arab tribes and 
sheikhs". 152 Ibn Saud sought to make the Sharif "the channel of all 
correspondence between him and the Sublime Porte". Claiming that there 
had been a misunderstanding, Ibn Saud asserted that he had no intention 
of revolting against the Imperial Porte, nor of disobeying any order of the 
Sultan. He apologised for fighting Ottoman soldiers but claimed that this 
was in self-defence. Ibn Saud promised to return all the booty, including 
guns and rifles belonging to the Ottoman soldiers that were taken in battle. 
He had simply been defending his territory from the usurper Al-Rashid as 
the lawful ruler of Najd. Out of the desire to resolve matters Ibn Saud was 
willing to accept "any reasonable terms" imposed upon him by the 
Sultan. 153 Little however was achieved by this tactic because the Sharif had 
no intention of acting as an intermediary for Ibn Saud and rebuffed this 
approach. 
Refusing to give up, another appeal was made, this time by Abdul 
Rahman directly to the Ottoman Sultan. Submitting himself and his family 
Abdul Rahman claimed that the Al-Saud had always been vassals of the 
Ottoman Sultan: 
I am one of the faithful servants of the Shadow of God, whose 
family from father to son, has lavished its blood and treasure 
in the glorious service of the Caliphate. I have no thought or 
aspiration save that of meriting the approbation of my 
250 Foreign Office to India Office November 25,1904 FO 406/18 F8420/R136/VI. 
is, Foreign Office to India Office March 18.1905, FO 406/21 F8482/R48/II. 
152 Ibn Saud to Sharif of Mecca, December 1904. A copy of Ibn Saud's letter was obtained 
by the British Vice-Consul Jeddah and was reported to the Foreign Office. See Vice- 
Consul, Jeddah to SSFA, January 31905, FO 406/20 F8472/E1/R54/I. 
153 Ibid. 
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Sovereign... .1 am submissive to every order and command of 
the shadow of god. I neither follow instigations of any 
foreigner, nor am I the means of communication with any 
foreigners. In fact, under the protection of His Imperial 
Majesty there is no seditious agent or medium of foreigner in 
all these regions. 154 
He also accused the Al-Rashid of poisoning relations between themselves 
and the Porte. This request and the fact that the Al-Rashid had also asked 
for Ottoman mediation prompted the dispatch of 3000 men to prevent 
further escalation of hostilities in the area. 155 
Matters were suddenly complicated by an innocuous request to 
obtain travel permits for British officers. In late December 1904 the 
Government of India had requested the Embassy in Constantinople to 
arrange permits for a survey team to visit the vilayets of Basra and 
Baghdad. J. G. Lorimer, the famous compiler of the Gazetteer of the Persian 
Gulf, was to lead the team. The purpose of the mission was to collect data 
and other material for the Gazetteer. In an audience at the Porte on January 
5 1905, Embassy officials were shocked when they were accused of trying 
to organise an espionage mission. 156 
The source of the accusation was the new vali of Basra, Ahmad 
Mukhlis Pasha. He had urged the Porte to deny permission to Lorimer and 
Letter of Abdul Rahman Al-Saud to Ottoman Grand Vizier, 28 January 1905, enclosure 
in Ambassador Constantinople, to SSFA, January 31,1905, FO 406/20 F8472/E2/R71/I. It 
should be noted that while Philby, Saudi Arabia , p. 248, asserts that it was the Ottomans 
who made the offer to Abdul Rahman, other such as Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 79, 
McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, p. 30 and Safran, Saudi Arabia, p. 32 suggest that it was Abdul Aziz 
who made his father take the initiative. However, it seems clear from the record that 
British officers in the region knew the Porte was behind the whole incident and the vali of 
Basra was the chief instigator. It was the Ottoman official who sent messages through 
secondary channels to the Al-Saud suggesting that a submission be made to the Porte in 
order for matters to be resolved. See Resident, 
Gulf (Cox) to Government of India, 
September 5,1904, FO 406/18 F8420/E2/R103/VI. Also, Acting Consul, Basra, (Monahan) 
to Councillor (Townley), British Embassy, Constantinople, February 24,1905, FO 406/21 
F8482/R47/II. The Consul states that "I have no doubt that the first overtures came from 
the Acting Vali (Basra) Fakhri Pasha". 
iss Intercepted telegram from Ottoman Grand Vizier (Sultan) to Minister of Interior, 
October 17,1904, in Councillor, Embassy Constantinople, to SSFA, November, 8 1904, FO 
406/18 F8420/E1/R122/VI See also Goldrup, Saudi Arabia, p. 63. 
156 Memorandum, British Embassy Constantinople, January 5 1905, FO 406/20 
F8472/E1/R30/I 
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his team because on their previous visit to Kuwait they had conducted 
"suspicious operations". 157 Mukhlis believed that the real purpose of the 
mission was to meet Ibn Saud and encourage him to rebel against the 
Porte. Such an interpretation was likely the result of Ottoman frustration 
with the presence of Knox in Kuwait and with British interference in 
territory that the Porte considered its own. It took vehement denials and 
many attempts by the British Ambassador in Constantinople and the 
Foreign Secretary in London before the matter was finally smoothed 
over. 158 With tensions high, the Foreign Secretary also reiterated to the 
Government of India the need to ensure that Knox did not interfere in 
central Arabian politics: 
His Majesty's Government wish it to be clearly understood 
that their influence and interest are to be strictly confined to 
the coast-line of Eastern Arabia, and that nothing is to be said 
or done to connect them, even in an indirect way, with the 
fighting now going on in the interior. 159 
Nevertheless, this incident raised concerns among Ottoman officials about 
the extent of British interests in Arabia. It became imperative to settle the 
dispute between the Al-Rashid and the Al-Saud to avoid providing Britain 
with an opportunity to take advantage of the situation. A meeting was 
arranged between Mukhliss Pasha and Ibn Saud. Mubarak organised the 
venue so that he would not be left out of the discussions. The meeting was 
held in Safwan on the border between Kuwait territory and the Basra 
district. 160 Unsure of how events would unfold, Mubarak brought along a 
157 Secretary, Embassy Constantinople to SSFA, January 10,1905, FO 406/20 F8472/R30/I. 
Ahmad Mukhlis Pasha was vali of Basra from 1904-1906. 
158 The Ottoman Ambassador in London also made complaints to the British Foreign 
Secretary, see SSFA to Embassy Constantinople January 11,1905, FO 406/20 
F8472/R22/I. In the end Lorimer did not visit, Najd or Hasa. To avoid inciting Ottoman 
displeasure he confined his surveys to the Trucial Coast and Oman. Government of India 
to SSFI, Janaury 291905, FO 406/20 F8472/E1/R60/I. 
159 SSFA (Broderick) to Government of India December 30 1904, FO 406/19 
F8503/E1/R4/VII. 
16oCouncillor (Townley), Embassy Constantinople, to SSFA, January 24 1905, FO 406/20 
F8472/R56/I. 
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private escort of 1,000 men to provide security. 161 The British Resident, 
Percy Cox also took precautions. He made sure that a British warship, the 
Sphinx was in Kuwait harbour to provide Mubarak with protection. There 
were two meetings, on February 8 and 13. Ibn Saud did not attend but was 
represented by his father, Abdul Rahman. 162 During the meetings, 
Mukhliss Pasha indicated that he wag ut orised to offer Abdul Rahman 
the position of 'gaimaqam' (administrator) of Najd if he recognised 
Ottoman suzerainty. 163 Moreover, Ottoman forces would withdraw to the 
area of al-Qasim, which lay in between Najd and Hail, and act as a buffer 
between the two sides. Abdul Rahman had to seriously consider the 
proposal. He had no other choice. 164 However, before an agreement could 
be completed a revolt in Yemen overshadowed these discussions. The 
Porte was forced to reassess its presence in central Arabia and decided to 
bow out and reassigned its garrisons for duty in the south. 165 The Ottoman 
withdrawal greatly enhanced Ibn Saud's prestige and provided him with 
the freedom to consolidate his position. It also allowed him to return to 
court Britain actively for aid. 
David Howarth narrates an incident that occurred in 1905 which 
made an impression on the British officers in the Gulf. Ibn Saud sent two 
men to Bahrain. One arrived at the telegraph office where a long, expensive 
161 Government India to SSFI, January 23,1905, FO 406/19/F8503/E1/R7/VII. 
162 Acting Consul Basra, to Councillor, British Embassy, Constantinople, February 24 1905, 
FO 406/21 F8482/R47/11. See also Goldrup, Saudi Arabia p. 63. 
163 Report from Consul, Basra in Councillor (Townley), Embassy Constantinople, to SSFA, 
February 17,1905, FO 406/20 F8472/R96/I. It is clearly indicated in this report that Abdul 
Rahman accepted the terms of the vali. However, in contrast to this Goldrup writes that 
Abdul Rahman "did not accept these demands", but was proudly defiant and cleverly 
manoeuvred around the Ottoman conditions. See Goldrup, Saudi Arabia, p. 63. This 
discrepancy could be attributed to Goldrup's citation of a more romanticised version of 
events in Saud ibn Hidhlul, Tarikh Muluk al-Su'ud, Riyadh: Matabi al-Riyadh, 1961, p. 74. 
164 Lacey refers to this event as marking a "total reversal of his hitherto anti-Ottoman 
policy". However in fact Ibn Saud had not been anti-Ottoman as much as a political 
opportunist. While doctrinally he may have been against their conduct, he was politically 
indifferent to them so long as he was able to take over Najd. In fact his own family had 
survived the bleak years of exile in the 1890's upon the stipend provided to his father by 
the Ottoman Government. Lacey also mistakenly credits Abdul Aziz with accepting the 
Ottoman title, when in fact it was Abdul Rahman. Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 79. 
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telegram was sent to the Ottoman Sultan expressing Ibn Saud's loyalty and 
his wish to remain a faithful servant. The second man went to the British 
Political Agent with a telegram that offered Ibn Saud's submission to 
Britain. In it the Saudi ruler stressed that he was confident of his ability to 
defeat Ottoman forces. However, he sought a treaty with Britain that 
would protect him from an Ottoman counter attack launched from the Gulf 
coast. The British Political Agent dutifully transmitted the message but 
subsequently obtained a copy of the message sent to the Porte, and 
discovered the trickery. The Agent was highly amused. Howarth states 
that : "such whole hearted duplicity always seemed to delight the British 
officials in the Gulf; there was indeed something charming about it". It was 
an example of the "disarming innocence of the Arabs". 166 Officials at the 
Foreign Office were amused but did not take the request seriously and 
again the King was ignored. 
With finances and supplies running low, Ibn Saud looked eastwards 
to find some relief. In the history of the Al-Saud his ancestors had extracted 
tribute from the Sheikhs along the Trucial coast, not to mention from 
wealthy traders who possessed substantial taxable sums. With that in mind 
an expedition was launched towards the Trucial coast. It would also allow 
his men to show off the weapons and equipment captured from Ibn Rashid 
and the Ottomans. However, this movement of Saudi forces spread alarm 
across the coastal towns. Appeals were made to the British Resident, Percy 
Cox, to restrain the marauding Muwahhidun forces. Subsequently, a 
warning was issued to Ibn Saud that any attacks on Britain's Trucial 
protectorates would be viewed with displeasure. Saudi forces were told not 
to approach the Trucial states in the hope of extracting money, for that 
165'Memorandum of Yemen Insurrection of 1904-1905', Military Attache, Embassy, 
Constantinople March 14,1905, FO 406/21 F8482/E1/R52/II. Also Philby, Arabian Jubilee, 
p. 19. 
166Howarth, The Desert King, p. 54.; Lorimer, Gazetteer, Part I, Vol. II, Chapt. VII1, pp. 1157- 
1159. 
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would certainly provoke a British reaction. 167 Knowing when to extricate 
himself from complicated situations, Ibn Saud heeded the warning and his 
forces retreated. 
The End of a Rival 
It would become unnecessary for Ibn Saud to worry about the long term 
financing of his battles with Al-Rashid. In April 1906 his agents found 
Abdul Aziz Ibn Rashid's main camping ground at Rawdat al-Muhanna. 
Mustering his forces Ibn Saud led a dawn attack on an unsuspecting army. 
In the ensuing battle Ibn Rashid was shot and killed thus bringing to a 
close an era in the Saudi-Rashidi dispute 168 His successor, Mite'b, was a 
boy of eighteen and he quickly agreed a truce with Ibn Saud. 169 To 
strengthen his position Ibn Saud married the widow of his former foe. As 
Ibn Saud was triumphant the house of Al-Rashid descended into 
squabbling causing turmoil within the family for decades to come. 170 
By this time it was clear to the British Resident, Percy Cox, that Ibn 
Saud was an established force in central Arabia and a major player in Gulf 
politics. In the past Britain's dominance had been achieved through 
fostering rivalry among Arab leaders, tribal chiefs and the maintenance of 
the integrity of the Ottoman empire. However, with the emergence of a 
single powerful leader in central Arabia, Cox realised that British policy 
needed to adjust to realities on the ground. Formal relations would have to 
be established with Ibn Saud. With this in mind Cox sent ä detailed letter 
on September 16,1906 to the Government of India in which he advocated 
reaching an agreement with Ibn Saud: 
167 Resident, Gulf (Cox) to Agent, Kuwait (Knox), January 17,1906, FO 206/27. Knox was 
tasked with the job of reigning in the Saudi forces. See also Graves, The Life of Percy Cox., 
p. 104. 
168 al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis, p. 62, and Goldrup, Saudi Arabia, pp. 74-75. 
169 Agent, Kuwait to Resident, Gulf, October 13 1906, PRO FO 371/345 #10143, Enc. 9, 
p397. 
170The first successor was eldest son Mit'eb but he along with his two brothers were 
murdered by a rival for leadership. That man was also killed within a year by his own 
brothers in a dispute over power. Philby Saudi Arabia, pp. 250-251; Philby, Arabian jubilee, 
pp. 20-21. 
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I am at the same time aware that it has been a recognised principle 
of their (Foreign Office) policy not to allow themselves to become 
involved in the tempestuous politics of Central Arabia. 
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that we have principles and 
interests to consider other than the pursuit of the purely negative 
doctrine of aloofness above mentioned, and I cannot see that these 
are in any way served by our carrying that doctrine to an extreme 
point and by our treating the predominant Arab element in Najd 
with an active neglect which not only places us in an unnecessarily 
unfavourable position for safeguarding the other interests referred 
to but which, if persevered in, may be mistaken for hostility on our 
part and may engender a reciprocation of that sentiment on the part 
of the Wahhabi Chief. 171 
To continue to ignore Ibn Saud could turn him into an enemy and 
undermine stability in the area -whereas a treaty would make him an ally 
of Britain. With a treaty in hand other British allies such as the Sultan of 
Muscat and the Trucial chiefs would be less fearful of attacks from Najd. 
Britain might also be able to enlist help of Ibn Saud to reduce piracy in the 
northern Gulf. Cox warned that many tribes had united under the ruler of 
Najd and if Britain did not support him some other power might do so to 
the detriment of His Majesty's interests. 172 
To understand how the report of the Resident reached London 
requires some description of how British colonial administration was 
divided. Reports from eastern Arabia, the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia 
were sent to offices of the Government of India in Bombay and Calcutta 
with copies eventually making their way to the India Office in London. 173 
Policy decisions for these areas rested with the Secretary of State for India. 
However, the Hijaz and western Arabia, were considered to be under the 
jurisdiction of British officials in Egypt and Sudan who reported directly to 
the Foreign Office in London. British officials in Egypt were anxious to 
secure the sea routes between Europe through the Suez Canal and the Red 
17IResident, Gulf (Cox) to Government of India, September 16,1906, FO 371/345 
#10143/Enc. 2, p. 391. 
172Graves, Life of Sir Percy Cox, pp. 104-105. 
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Sea to the Indian Ocean. Policy decisions regarding this region were made 
by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in London. 174 Sir George 
Rendel was to comment: "It was hardly surprising that we should 
therefore find ourselves with one policy toward the Hashemite rulers of 
the Hijaz in Western Arabia, another toward the Saudis of Najd in the 
east. "175 
Inevitably it was a matter of some time before Percy Cox's report 
reached London. However, his comments were forwarded along with a 
thirteen point memo by his colleagues in the Government of India. 176 While 
the memo agreed with some of what Cox said in principle, it did not 
support his conclusions. The Government of India believed that Britain had 
the upper hand vis a vis Najd because Ibn Saud would always need her 
assistance. The Ottomans would certainly not be granting him total 
independence and he would never be satisfied being a vassal of the Porte. 
Moreover, it was anticipated that if left to their own devices the Ottomans 
would withdraw their forces from eastern Arabia. Only then would it be 
necessary to decide on what policy to maintain toward Ibn Saud. There 
appeared to be little risk of alienating him. Thus in contrast to Cox's urgent 
tone, this memo was quite relaxed. In any case the onus of decision was 
placed on the Foreign Office: 
The question is one primarily for decision by His Majesty's 
Government, and we hesitate to offer our advice in a mater in 
which India is only interested in a secondary degree and 
merely because a disturbance of the position on the Arabian 
coast might adversely affect Indian trade and our political 
arrangements in the Gulf. 177 
173 The Government of India took almost 5 months to forward Cox's report to London for 
consideration. A comprehensive memorandum with numerous enclosures was sent on 
February 211907. See PRO FO 371/345 #10143, pp. 384-388. 
174 Howarth Desert King, p. 42- 
175 George Rendel, The Sword and the Olive: Recollections of Diplomacy and the Foreign Service, 
1913-1954, London: John Muray, 1957, p. 57. Rendel was a career British Foreign Service 
official who rose to become head of the Eastern Department. 




The Government of India suggested that Ibn Saud be told of Britain's desire 
to maintain friendly relations with him, so long as he respected their 
interests and those of the Trucial chiefs. However, it was not deemed 
appropriate to enter into a treaty which might very well incite Ottoman 
moves against him. 178 
Yet even this was deemed too much by the Foreign Office. In their 
estimation, even if Ibn Saud was able to take over all of Najd and expel the 
Ottomans there was every possibility that the Ottoman empire would 
retake Arabia. Ibn Saud was still an Ottoman subject and the British could 
not enter into treaty relations with such a rebel. The supporters of the 
'Ottoman first' policy at both the Government of India and the Foreign 
Office forced the subject to be dropped. This view was also held by Sir 
Nicholas O'Conor, the British Ambassador to Constantinople, who was 
very much against any involvement with Ibn Saud. 179 This did not 
dissuade Cox. His persistence kept the issue circulating among officials 
both in India and Britain. Finally, the India office sent instructions to the 
Government of India: after consultation with the Foreign Office there was 
no need to give any reply or have any communication with Ibn Saud 18° 
This was another blow to Saudi hopes, but despite facing severe challenges 
to his authority from within he was to surprise the British by his initiatives. 
178 Viceroy to Foreign Office, February 15th 1907, PRO FO 371/345 #5937, p. 380. 
179Ambassador, Constantinople to Foreign Office April 1 1907, PRO FO 371/345 #11067, 
pp. 411-417. See correspondence between O'Conor and India Office, February 1904, in IOR 
L/P&S/18/B200. For details of other British officials opinions see H. V. F. Winstone, The 
Illicit Adventure: The Story of Political and Military Intelligence in the Middle East from 1898 to 
1926, Maryland: University Publications of America. 1987, pp. 13-15. And Graves, The Life 
of Sir Percy Cox, p. 107. 
180 India office to Government of India, May 3,1907, PRO FO 371/345 #14856, p. 423. 
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Chapter 3 
Rivals and Rebels: Ibn Saud and Sharif Hussein 
Following the 1841 Treaty of London, European powers stripped the 
Egyptian ruler, Muhammad Ali, of all territories he had conquered at the 
expense of Constantinople. As a result the western region of Arabia, 
known as the Hijaz, was returned to Ottoman jurisdiction. Separated from 
the interior of Arabia by a range of mountainous hills, the importance of 
Hijaz lay in the presence of the two holy cities of Islam; Mecca and 
Medina. 1 Once again the leadership of Hijaz was passed to the family of 
Banu Hashim which counted Prophet Muhammad among its descendants. 
In November 1908 Hussein ibn Ali was selected as the Grand Sharif of 
Mecca. 2 At one time it had been a tradition to send the young sons of the 
Sharifian family to live among the bedouin for a period of time. This 
experience was to promote strength and endurance as well as teach some 
degree of humility and an appreciation for simple desert life. Relations 
with their adoptive family would be lifelong, sometimes closer to those 
with their own consanguine family .3 
1 Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 121 & pp. 131-132; Troeller, Birth of Saudi 
Arabia, p. 38. Also Lawrence Goldrup, Saudi Arabia 1902-1932: The Development of a Wahhabi 
Society, Ph. D Thesis, UCLA, 1971 p. 110 
2Sharif Aoun al-Rafiq died in 1905 leaving no sons to succeed him. There were several 
contenders for the title of Sharif but Hussein was chosen with the help of well placed 
bribes. Hussein was descended from a branch of the family that would not have ordinarily 
been chosen for accession to the Sharifate One of the other candidates was Ali Haidar who 
was the great-grandson of Sharif Ghalib (1786-1815) and believed he was the rightful 
choice. A detailed account of the circumstances surrounding Hussein's appointment can 
be found in the diaries of All Haidar, published as George Stitt, ed., A Prince of Arabia: the 
Emir Shereef Ali Haidar, London: Allen & Unwin, 1948, pp. 92-110. This was the same year 
in which military officers under the name of the Committee for Union and Progress (or 
Young Turks) rose to challenge the authority of the Caliph. For a British perspective on the 
period see the autobiography of Sir Andrew Ryan The Last of the Dragomans, London: 
Geoffrey Bles, 1951, p. 259. The Young Turks were primarily students from the military 
and law colleges. Ryan gained wide experience of Ottoman politics when he served at the 
British Embassy in Constantinople, 1899-1914, and he later knew Ibn Saud when he served 
as British Minister in Jeddah, 1930-1936. 
3Swiss traveler, Charles Didier observed this custom being practised during the late 
1800's. Didier, Sojourn with the Grand Sharif of Makkah, p. 88. 
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Hussein had a different experience. He spent many years enjoying a 
life of self-indulgence and intrigue in the palaces of Constantinople. 4 
However, shortly after he assumed office in the Hijaz, a constitutional crisis 
in Constantinople arose which resulted in the Sultan reforming the 
government in a 'bloodless revolution'. With this Hussein sought to take 
advantage of the opportunity to broaden his powers in the Hijaz. 5 
Financing his ambitions would require more than the revenues he derived 
from the pilgrimage trade. He had no qualms about demanding increased 
taxes from the beduin tribes .6 
He also sought out new areas from which to 
extract wealth. 
Until 1910 there was little contact between Ibn Saud and Sharif 
Hussein. However, Hussein was eager to expand his own power-base and 
anxious to obtain tribute from surrounding tribal groups. Among these 
were the Utaybah, whose territory lay at the eastern frontier of Hijazi in the 
plains of al-Qassim. In 1910 Hussein sent men across the mountains into 
the dira (tribal territory) of the Utayba to add their tribute to his coffers. 
However, Utayba lands were also astride the Najd-Hijaz caravan routes 
which were strategically important to Ibn Saud. In fact, Ibn Saud 
considered the Utayba as his subjects. He had sent his brother Sa'ad to 
gather taxes and tribute for Najd. The men of Sharif Hussen arrested 
4George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938, p. 103. Also 
Gerald DeGaury, Rulers of Mecca London: Harrap, 1951, p. 264 
5 Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid was pressured by'Young Turks', primarily students from 
the military and law colleges to institue reforms and constitutional rule. This also saw the 
increase of Turkish identity or 'Turkification' among ruling elites. Ryan, The Last of the 
Dragomans, pp. 52-78 
'Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 
1908-1918, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, pp. 158-160. Despite being 
consumed by internal political intrigue the Ottoman government was very interested in 
maintaining influence in Arabia. In 1910 the city of Medina was promoted from being a 
sanjak of the Hijaz vilayet to an independent sanjak of its own. This extended the influence 
of Istanbul directly into Hijaz and maintained watch over important trade routes, the 
pilgrimage and activities of the Al-Rashid of Hail. Hussein felt this a threat to his authority 
and ability to act autonomously. He complained to Istanbul and argued that Ottoman 
officials sent for service in Hijaz were inexperienced and unfamiliar with local customs. 
There was admittedly a problem in finding qualified people that wanted to serve in the 
towns and outposts in Hijaz where living conditions were harsh and Hussein made life 
even more difficult for them with his frequent quarrels. Nevertheless, it was Istanbul's 
desire to watch Hussein rather than remove him, since his lineage was important. 
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Sa'aad and brought him back to Hijaz. Hussein demanded that Ibn Saud 
pay annual tribute to Hijaz if he wished his brother released. Though 
humiliated and embarrassed Ibn Saud agreed. But, as soon as his brother 
was safely returned the pledge was repudiated on the grounds of duress. 
He would have led a campaign against the Sharif himself had it not been 
for the sudden revolt from within his family. 7 
The revolt was led by Saud ibn Faisal, (the elder brother of Ibn 
Saud's father, Abdul Rahman) who was joined by several of his uncles and 
nephews. They were unhappy with the line of succession. Although Saud 
ibn Faisal had supported the struggle to regain 'ancestral lands', the 
prospect of forfeiting his own position of power and the denial of his sons 
and grandsons the chance of succession did not sit comfortably with him. 
Saud ibn Faisal and his sons along with disgruntled beduin (mainly from 
the Ajman tribe) left Riyadh to set up a rival power base south of the city 
where they found support among the Hazzani tribe .8 
This challenge to his authority could not go unpunished-Ibn Saud 
risked other tribes perceiving him as weak, lending a serious blow to his 
credibility. More immediate threats were emanating from Hail as the Al- 
Rashid were active once again. In fact it was not until over a year later that 
Abdul Aziz could divert his attention to subdue the rebels. Afterwards, the 
Hazzani chiefs who had supported the rebels were executed, but Saud ibn 
Faisal was offered the choice of exile or a pledge of loyalty. Choosing the 
latter, Saud was welcomed back into the fold and as a symbol of his re- 
entry he married Ibn Saud's sister, Noura. Not all the rebels surrendered 
however. Several brothers of Saud ibn Faisal and their sons refused to 
7These were the sons and grandsons of his paternal uncle, Saud ibn Faisal who sought to 
take power into their own line, a situation which was not fully resolved until 1916. 
Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, p. 38, McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, p. 32. 
BAlexander Bligh, From Prince To King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth 
Century, New York: NYU Press, 1984, p. 17. The Hazzani's main base was the town of 
Laiyla in south central Arabia. Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 27. 
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pledge loyalty and found refuge with Sharif Hussein in Hijaz where they 
were to continue their intrigues. 9 
It became increasingly clear that to rely solely on his sizeable family 
to provide the backbone of his forces had dangerous implications. The long 
distances involved and his frequent absences required trustworthy souls 
without ambitions of power for themselves. His own children were still too 
young, his eldest son, Turki born in 1900, was barely in his teens. Ibn Saud 
needed an independent force, with its own fierce determination and loyalty 
to his cause. Ibn Saud also needed to expand for economic reasons. Najd 
had no outlets to the sea and relied on bringing supplies in through 
Kuwaiti ports. Although Ibn Saud had benefited from the friendship of the 
ruler Mubarak Al-Sabah, taxes levied on imports were high. Other port 
cities along the Gulf also gained revenue by taxing imports. The Saudi 
polity had to establish access to Gulf waters for two important reasons. 
First, supply routes would be secured and would not be subjected to 
harassment and taxation from the shaykhs whose territory straddled 
caravan routes inland. Second, a presence on the shores of the Gulf would 
raise the stature of Najd in the eyes of Britain and would force her to deal 
with Ibn Saud as a major player on the Gulf coast. 10 
Due to the fact that Britain had close ties to the Sheikhs of the 
Trucial Coast, and had defence treaties with them, it would be have been 
fool hardy for Ibn Saud to attempt an assault there. Instead, he cast his eye 
upon the large portion of the Gulf coast bordering Najd known as al- 
Hasa. ll Though the region was under Ottoman control, military setbacks 
due to war with Italy and conflicts in the Balkans forced Ottoman forces to 
be recalled to reinforce troops nearer to Constantinople. Moreover, al-Hasa 
was not a vital region of the empire and contained just a few forts with 
9Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 258 and McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, pp. 32-33. 
1°George Linabury, The Creation of Saudi Arabia and the Erosion of Wahhabi 
Conservatism', Middle East Review Vol. XI, No. 1, Fall 1978, pp. 5-12. Also Goldrup, Saudi 
Arabiai, p. 135. u 
"Jubran Shamiyah, al-Saud: Madihim wa MustagbalAhum, London: Riad Rayyes, 1986, p. 119. 
Also Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia, pp. 81-82. 
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small garrisons. The area was poorly administered and the local tribes had 
no love for their rulers from Istanbul. 12 With the Ottoman hold weak Ibn 
Saud took the opportunity to strike. 
On the morning of May 9,1913, a band of men scaled the walls of 
Hofuf, the capital city of al-Hasa. Catching the Ottoman guards by surprise 
they were able to take control quickly forcing the garrison to retreat into 
the main mosque. With a guarantee of safe passage out of the area, the 
Ottoman commander agreed to surrender. 13 The departing soldiers left 
behind stocks of rifles, ammunition, several artillery guns and several 
thousand dollars worth of treasure. With the capture of the capital Ibn 
Saud effectively had control over the whole province and he quickly 
secured the port towns of Qatif and Ugair. 14 Within weeks he would 
enlarge his taxable population base, increase his revenues, and guarantee 
that his supplies of goods, arms and provisions would arrive without 
having to pay taxes to any local chieftain. The attack on Hofuf had utilised 
a combination of forces with the bulk consisting of townsmen with 
Bedouin forces acting as backup. It would be the last time a major 
engagement would be undertaken with such a force. Ibn Saud had begun 
the process of forming his own independent army which was to be known 
infamously as the'Ikhwan'. 
Mobilising New Forces: The Ikhwan 
Ibn Saud and his father, Abdul Rahman, spent much of the period from 
1902 up until the conquest of al-Hasa in a series of battles for territory and 
booty. Philby maintains that "in the rough and tumble of these fighting 
years there is little record of any special emphasis on the religious aspect of 
12 Ottoman forces had been recalled from Basra, Baghdad and Hofuf to reinforce troops 
nearer Constantinople. For a detailed study of this period see Jacob Goldberg, The 1913 
Saudi Occupation of Hasa Reconsidered' Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, January 
1982, pp. 21-29. 
23 Khair al-Din Zirkili, Shibh al-Jazira fi ahd al-Malik Abd al Aziz Beirut 1970, part 1, pp. 204- 
205. Shamiya, al-Saud pp. 108-109. 
14Arab Bureau Report, 'Relations with Ibn Saud', January 12,1917, IOR L/P&S/18/B251; 
Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, pp. 43-44. 
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their activities" 15 The members of the Saudi forces came from various 
tribal backgrounds but were composed mainly of townsmen. After 
successful campaigns the rise in territory that required administration put 
a strain on Ibn Saud's townsmen. They became increasingly reluctant to 
leave their homes, livestock, fields and commercial activities for long 
periods making it difficult to maintain a battle ready standing army. 16 
To switch to beduin forces was risky since they were known for 
their fickleness and had an almost mercenary like quality of being available 
to the highest bidder. The beduin lifestyle was fiercely independent. Eager 
to plunder and gain booty, they could turn and loot their own allies if the 
fight was not going in their favour, making them dangerous friends, as 
well as foes. The history of the Al 
saw 
particularly in the nineteenth century, 
was marked by several defeats when beduin forces switched allegiance. 17 
Ibn Saud nevertheless had to find a solution to this problem and it was this 
practical need that led to the formation of a new military force. 
Traditionally the beduin maintained their relationships on the 
premise of fear or prosperity, joining those forces that they feared or that 
promised them great booty and material gain. This was part of the survival 
of the fittest lifestyle which accounted for their mercenary like quality. By 
settling the beduin and placing their basic needs of shelter, food and 
clothing near to them and by forcing them to develop relationships and 
dependency on non-tribal members it would make them less likely to 
attack, raid and cause problems to other towns and to civil order 18 Ibn 
Saud would also have greater control over their movements and actions. 
Nor was it simply based on the premise that the beduin was primitive and 
unpredictable. 
1sPhilby, Saudi Arabia, p. 261. 
16 Turki al-Hamad, Political Order in Changing Societies, Saudi Arabia: Modernization in a 
Traditional Context, unpublished Ph. D thesis, University of Southern California, 1985, p. 77. 
17During the reign of Faisal many beduin defected or abandoned their positions in the face 
of the superior forces of the Egyptian army. Abdul Aziz ibn Saud had himself experienced 
beduin fickleness when trying to gather a force to assault Riyadh in 1901. 
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Using Muwahhldun principles Ibn Saud would weaken tribal 
allegiances and replace them with loyalty to God and the amir. He sought 
to expand each beduiri s sense of identity by extending tribal links and 
expanding social relations to integrate various tribes into a new communal 
identity of 'Ikhwan . Those commitments were 
"religious yet secular". 19 
Western observers like Howarth were awed by the ability of a man with no 
formal education living in harsh desert conditions to conceive of such 
ideas. Lacking worldly experience, or an education from one of the great 
seats of learning in Cairo or Baghdad, and studying only some religious 
texts and being confined to "fanatically narrow limits of Wahhabi 
(Muwahkidun) doctrine", it was considered amazing that the concept of 
creating an independent force could be conceived by Ibn Saud. He was 
considered a "genius"whose "spontaneous thoughts" revealed the 
methods for success. Yet Howarth was still surprised that a desert dweller 
like Ibn Saud came up with any system of government at all 20 
Much of the literature on Saudi Arabia assumes that the Ikhwan 
were solely the creation of Ibn Saud. However, the term 'Ikhwan' is a 
generic label, which in Arabic means 'brotherhood' and a group using this 
name was already in existence. This was certainly the view of British 
intelligence officer, Gilbert Clayton, who reported that the Ikhwan 
movement was started by Harb and Mutayr tribesmen in order to revive 
Wahhabi tenets and that it was Ibn Saud who chose to associate himself 
with them "and of which he later assumed the spiritual leadership. " 21 
is For a good Ikhwan vs. townsman comparison see Joseph Kostiner, The Ikhwan of Najd 
and the Emergence of the Saudi State', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, July 1985, pp. 
298-323. 
19Howarth, The Desert King, p. 68; also al-Hamad, Political Order in Changing Societies, Saudi 
Arabia: Modernization in a Traditional Context, pp. 78-80. 
20Howarth, The Desert King, p. 68. 
21G. F Clayton, An Arabian Diary, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969 p. 18. 
General Gilbert Clayton was a powerful and influential military intelligence officer. He 
served as Director of Military Intelligence and Agent in Sudan. His position put him into 
close contact with the most influential British officials in the Middle East. Clayton was a 
mentor to T. E. Lawrence and other intelligence officers. He was promoted to Chief 
Political Officer to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force by General Allenby and effectively 
administered Palestine after its capture in 1917 until April 1918 when Sir Arthur Money 
took over. Afterwards Clayton became advisor to the Egyptian Ministry of Interior tasked 
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H. V. F. Winstone also argued that the Ikhwan pre-existed Ibn Saud and 
that they "enlisted Ibn Saud to their cause" 22 
It was Philby, the closest western advisor to Abdul Aziz, who did 
the most to advocate the view that the Ikhwan were recruited and settled 
into fixed communities by Ibn Saud to give substance to his political and 
military ambitions? 3 Later writers picked up his argument, including 
Howarth and al-Yassini, who claim that it was Ibn Saud who had the idea 
of bringing beduin into fixed locations and involving them in agriculture, 
giving them a stake in a stable government and the need for a strong ruler. 
This was because, as Al-Yassini contends, that "Ibn Saud realised that no 
central authority and modern political structure could be established in an 
unstable tribal society". 24 
This author would contend that some semblance of the Ikhwan was 
already present in Najd. The strongest evidence is provided by research 
conducted by John Habib in the 1960's, when some of the original Ikhwan 
of Najd and al-Hasa were still alive25 Habib's interviews with survivors 
indicates that Ibn Saud had found the beginnings of the Ikhwan movement 
and used them as a means to "weld together many disruptive and hostile 
elements that had long existed in Najd". 26 Notions of religious reform and 
abandoning false practices are recurrent in Islamic history and traceable in 
the heritage of the Arabian Peninsula. 
British officers in the field at the time, such as H. R. Dickson, the 
Political Agent in Kuwait, were also hard pressed to find accurate 
information about the Ikhwan. Ibn Saud himself was not of help in that 
regard, often distancing himself from them when he spoke to British 
with curbing nationalism and anti-British sentiments. In 1925 he was appointed to lead a 
mission to Ibn Saud for the purpose of agreeing a settlement with the Saudi ruler. (note: 
the mission's secretary was George Antonius of the Education Department of Palestine 
Government who later wrote the book Arab Awakening). 
22H. V. F. Winston, Captain Shakespeare, London: Quartet, 1978, p. 151. 
23Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 298. 
24A1-Yassini, Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 51. 
2S Habib, The Ikhwan Movement of Najd: Its Rise, Development, and Decline, p. 35. 
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officials. V He preferred there to be uncertainty over the Ikhwan in an effort 
to conceal the extent of his relationship with them. Nevertheless there were 
practical considerations for Ibn Saud's support for the Ikhwan. Though he 
had managed to win battles with his band of townsmen, those forces 
would not be enough to extend conquests elsewhere. They had been 
supportive to Muwalih eaun ideals of religious reform and revivalism but 
were not prepared to give up their commercial and agricultural activities. 28 
Moreover, he had to be wary of his large extended family in which 
there were supporters as well as rivals to his authority. The rebellion of his 
uncle, Saud ibn'Faisal, in 1910 and the revolt of the Ajman the following 
year were indiciative of how family and tribal aspirations posed a threat. 
He also faced challenges from a belligerant Sharif Hussein who could, 
along with the Al-Rashid of Hail, field tremendous manpower. In addition, 
Hussein had the advantage of being able to obtain fresh supplies and 
equipment whenever he wished through the Damascus-Medina railway 
line. Thus for Ibn Saud it became important to establish a fighting force 
that was not tribally or family based and that could not be neutralised by 
Ottoman largesse. Such a force would be the key to greater expansion of 
the Saudi realm. Indeed the Ikhwan were to become an essential tool for 
preserving Ibn Saud's legitimacy and maintaining his political survival. 29 
Ikhwan Settlements 
The Ikhwan were those beduin who left their nomadic life for settled 
dwellings. This was known as hijra and mirrored the migration of the first 
Muslim community from Mecca to Medina. The settlements of the Ikhwan 
Z6Ibid. However, even in Habib's research it was clear that it was not possible to trace one 
infidel or defining moment that caused the Ikhwan to be launched. That was still "clouded 
in mystery, confusion and contradiction". 
27Dickson reported to London that Ibn Saud distanced himself from Ikhwan and little 
information could be gleaned about them. Report on the Operation of the Najd Mission, 
November 29,1918, PRO FO 371/4144/4390. See also Habib, p. 30. 
28 There was also the problem of the consistency and experience of the townsmen. Turki 
Al-Hamad, Political Order in Changing Societies, Saudi Arabia: Modernization in a Traditional 
Context, pp. 78-80. 
29 Goldberg. The 1913 Saudi Occupation of Hasa Reconsidered', pp. 21-29. 
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1 
were called hujjar. Inside life was devoted to religious study and worship 
as well as preparation for battle. Ibn Saud's long time advisor Harry 
Philby, commented that the settlement of the Ikhwan was: 
an attempt to reform the Badawin elements of the country 
and to bring them into line with the settled towns and 
villages, whose stake in the land assured their general loyalty 
to any central administration. This in turn involved a partial 
settlement of the Badawin on the land to give them a similar 
interest in peace, subject to the corollary that such settlement 
should be on a mixed rather than a tribal basis. 30 
However, the organisation and settlement of the Ikhwan communities 
came after most of Najd had already been subdued by forces composed 
mainly of men from towns and villages. It was the desire to expand the 
realm that brought about the creation of a standing army that was self 
sustaining and battle ready 31 Though Abdul Aziz had successfully 
employed his band of townsmen to throw out the Ottomans from al-Hasa 
there were problems in keeping his men mobilized. Townsfolk were tied to 
their property, business and family commitments and were anxious to 
return home after serving in battle. Abdul Aziz would have to rotate 
continually his forces to keep a balance of veteran and novice fighters. 
More importantly, the promise to spread Islam made by Ibn Saud 
upon his capture of Riyadh, had yet to be fully realized, even a decade 
later. The majority of beduin still needed to be educated and led away from 
their ignorant ways. ' Sending teachers, or ulema directly to tribal 
campgrounds would likely cause umbrage to the local chief's sense of 
authority and lead to a quick dispatch of the visitors. Nor could Ibn Saud 
effectively approach individual beduin with an offer of a stipend to join a 
conscripted force, because tribal animosities, blood feuds, and old quarrels 
made it impossible to put members of certain tribes together for very long. 
Ideas of tribal affiliation had to be broken and a unifying glue had to be 
30 Philby, Arabian jubilee, pp. 22-23. 
311t took several years to develop the Ikhwan in to a functioning fighting force. With the 
first settlements established in 1912-1913, they really came into play after 1916. See Joseph 
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found to bring various beduin together. This was the job of the Ikhwan 
hujjar. 
The first Ikhwan settlement was established at al-Artawiyya in 
December 1912.32 The earliest to arrive were members of the Mutayr tribe 
followed by a group of Harb. Known for their aggressive raiding, and their 
dislike of outsiders, the Mutayr were gradually taught the ways of the 
Ikhwan. Around two hundred hujjar were established, mostly in Najd, but 
with many located on the borders with Hijaz and Syria. Inside the 
settlements men from different tribes found themselves mixed together but 
still kept their tribal identity. Hujjar were often located in the tribal diras, 
grounds of the dominant tribe, with the chief selecting the area near good 
land and water. Many chiefs stayed in Riyadh as 'guests' where their 
presence symbolised their tribes fealty to Ibn Saud. In spite of this the 
period between 1913 and 1920 saw relatively few beduin joining hujjar. It 
was only after 1921 that steady numbers migrated and particularly from 
1925-1928 when the Ikhwan were at their peak. 33 
As he had done with the townsfolk, Ibn Saud would first meet with 
the tribal chiefs to try and bring them into the fold. Only then could groups 
of teachers and ulema be sent, having obtained the chief's promise of safe 
passage. In fact with the beduin tribes Ibn Saud summoned all the chiefs to 
Riyadh, inviting them to enroll in a school set up by the ulema where they 
could be correctly guided for the benefit of themselves and their people. 
Their stay was of course subsidized by their host. One of the most 
significant concepts taught to the chiefs was that of hijra, or migration. In 
Islam 'the Hijra' is known as the migration of Prophet Muhammad from 
Mecca to Medina, symbolizing the move from the land of unbelief to the 
land of Islam. With the invitation to become Ikhwan and true Muslims the 
Najd chiefs were told that they too had to make hijra from ignorance 
Kostiner, 'On Instruments and their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of 
the Saudi State' Middle Eastern Studies vol. 21 no. 3,1985, p. 299. 
32Ibid., pp. 298-323. Also Goldrup, Saudi Arabia, p. 136. 
33Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, pp. 136-137. 
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(jahiliyya) to the settled community life under the authority of Islam in the 
hujjar. M 
According to the recollections of surviving Ikhwan in the 1960's, 
their life as beduin was one of ignorance of the laws and practices of Islam. 
Ancient tribal customs were followed and few knew the proper method of 
Islamic prayer. Men spent their time in tribal feuds and raids. Upon arrival 
in the hujjar however, the new members were given a new identity as a 
'brother' or akh that substituted the tribal and family bonds of loyalty that, 
in many cases, they had left behind. In dress the Ikhwan distinguished 
themselves by tying a white cloth around the head instead of the usual igal 
(black cord headpiece) worn by the beduin. 35 For the Ikhwan this was a 
sign of a transition from nomadic life to the purity of a settled believer. 
Though the typical account has been to portray the Ikhwan as the most 
ferocious soldiers of Ibn Saud not all the Ikhwan were hardened warriors 
or intolerant of foreigners. As Rihani noted, he met Ikhwan whose 
"Wahhabism is older and therefore milder. They salaam the foreigner, 
smoke occasionally in secret, sing when they are in the desert and do not 
blame Ibn Sa'oud for befriending the infidel Ingliz". 36 That Rihani, a 
Christian, was able to live and travel among Ibn Saud's men shows the 
variety and complexity of the Ikhwan-a view which is less one 
dimensional than often portrayed. Rihani commented: 
Among the men with whom I have lived two months, in my journey 
from Ar-Riyadh to Al-Qasim and Kuwait, were represented three 
classes of Ikhwan. Indeed, I had with me the mad Brother, the 
sensible, and. the tolerant. Besides, one of the latter was a man of 
quips and gibes, who every time he lighted his pipe would take a 
puff and hand it to his neighbour saying: 'Smoke, ya Ikhwan! There 
is no smoke in al-Jannat. ' ... But in times of war there is no difference 
among them. Every one is a warrior of Unitarianism, a Brother of 
those who obey Allah. And in times of peace every one is a 
34 Philby, Arabian Jubilee, pp. 22-23. 
35The igal was a black cord used by the beduin to bind the feet of his camel to keep it from 
running off and - when not in use was kept on top of the head. Giving up the igal 
symbolized the giving up of nomadic life. See Habib, The Ikhwan Movement of Najd: Its 
Rise, Development, and Decline, pp. 54-56. 
36 Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud, p. 212. 
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philosopher of the simplest life; -a stoic in endurance and 
submission, in adversity and pain, in poverty and piety 37 
Rihani also points out that Ibn Saud used the different types of Ikhwan for 
different purposes: "the sensible are for service, tht--tolerant for commerce 
and foreign politics, the mad for battles of war. "38 Though the last class 
were difficult to keep under control, Ibn Saud enforced his authority 
through the withholding of subsidies. 
Problems of Subsidy 
Since moving to a h_u i rmeant the abandonment of maintaining herds of 
camels and goats, the Ikhwan were reliant on outside sources for 
provisions. Devoting themselves to studying religious texts and preparing 
for battle the Ikhwan could not engage in farming or trading. Thus they 
had to be supported for their livelihood, which Ibn Saud provided through 
four types of subsidy known as al-atO, at. 39 These were: 
1. al-Sharha: Which consisted of monetary help and, or, gifts given to 
NP ý . 14 
the chief of a tribe or the amir of ahr who would approach Ibn Saud 
when the need arose. Visitors would often dine with Ibn Saud and then 
sign their name in a special book. Afterwards Ibn Saud would decide on 
the type or amount of assistance to be given. 
2. al-Ca 'idah: Was an annual gift of money given to those 
individuals whose name was in Ibn Saud's register, meaning that they had 
fought in battle on his side. The pre-fixed amount would be received by the 
individual upon presenting himself to the treasury (bayt al-mal) to collect it. 
The payment would only be stopped by special order of Ibn Saud which 
could be done as a punishment or warning. Of these categories only al- 
Qaidah was reserved for the Ikhwan, but they took from the other three 
types as well. 
37 Ibid., p. 213. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Habib, The Ikhwan Movement of Najd, pp. 79-80. 
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3. al-Barwah: A gift of food; rice, tea, coffee, sugar, etc. which would 
be distributed by Ibn Saud's men in certain areas. Requests had to be made 
each year to Ibn Saud's office (diwan) in order to receive al-Barwah. 
4. al-Ma'awnah: This was financial help given to those who wished 
to get married, needed to buy livestock, horses, or help in paying back a 
loan. The individual would personally approach Ibn Saud in each instance 
and have to wait for his decision. 
Thus initially, the Ikhwan settlements devoted their time to religious 
study avoiding commerce, labour and farming as livelihood came from the 
subsidies of Ibn Saud. In reserving themselves for religious devotion they 
shunned worldly activities and concentrated on preparing for battle with 
the mushrikeen (polytheists) 40 By supporting the hüjjar, as well as several 
other towns, Ibn Saud placed much strain on his resources. Habib also 
reports that some townspeople were jealous and resentful of the Ikhwan 
because of what was seen as the latter's privileged status and pride in 
being the guardians and protectors of the Muwahhidun community 41 Ibn 
Saud had to balance the demands of the Ikhwan with those of village elite's 
and other ulema. At the same time he required self sufficient settlements 
that could sustain themselves without great external help and from which 
he could obtain well fed, motivated soldiers ready to fight. 
However, not all members of a tribe would join the Ikhwan. Many 
families were split apart as some members joined while others refused. The 
Subai and Duwasir tribes, for example, had few in the Ikhwan, and among 
+°When there was a revolt of the Ikhwan in 1929, it was led by tribal chiefs, not imams or 
ulema. The ulema had accepted Saudi rule to preventfitna-the chiefs however were upset 
at the absolute authority of Ibn Saud and decried their loss of power. The Ikhwan also 
believed that Ibn Saud had violated Islamic principles by allowing innovations like the 
telegraph and motorcar, and for seeking the aid of 'unbelievers'. Furthermore, the Ikhwan 
were angered by the restrictions put on tribal raiding (ghazw) especially within their 
traditional stomping grounds northwest and northeast of Najd which had come under 
Iraqi and Jordanian authority. Since raiding was their pastime, and as Ikhwan they raided 
in name of Islam, they could not understand why they had to stop. For Ibn Saud their 
raiding jeopardised the emerging Saudi state and strained relations with neighbouring 
territories as well as Britain. See Kostiner'On Instruments and their Designers' pp. 299-323. 
Also Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 512. 
41Habib, The Ikhwan Movement of Najd, p. 79. 
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the tribes of Qahtan, Utayba, Harb and Mutayr there were sections that 
joined and others that did not. This divided tribal families. 42 Those who 
joined would give an invitation to their remaining family members to leave 
the life of the mushrikeen and become a true mumm (believer). If after being 
given dawah (the call) and invited three times to the path of 'true Islam' 
they did not 'repent', then they were also considered mushrikeen and liable 
to be fought against.. 
Within the hujjar some Ikwhan ulema disagreed with the policies of 
encouraging commerce and farming. These were seen as dangerous 
worldly practices and they blocked Ibn Saud's initial attempts to make the 
hujjar self sufficient. There was also growing competition among the new 
members of Ikhwan to cast off their links to the past. From their clothing to 
language, they attempted to purge 'un-Islamic' influences. Many gave up 
their livestock in the belief that they had to concentrate on religious study. 
Tensions with townspeople increased as the Ikhwan acted arrogantly and 
were condescending to those that did not join them. Ikhwan would not eat 
the food of non-Ikhwan nor would they return their greetings. The 
problem was, as Hafiz Wahba articulated: "The people [Ikwhan] had 
absorbed only a small amount of religious education and principle but they 
come to think that this alone constituted the whole of religion and that 
everything else is heresy"43 
Ibn Saud had not supported the Ikhwan so that they could become 
an army of spiritual devotees that renounced the world and were a drain 
on his precious resources. With conflict between the Ikhwan and non- 
Ikhwan growing critical in 1916, Ibn Saud moved to address the problem 
from its root. He started by removing those ulema from the hujjar who 
disagreed with his policies. He then replaced them with new religious 
'Philby, Heart of Arabia, Vol. 1, p. 300, and Habib, The Ikhwan Movement of Najd: Its Rise, 
Development, and Decline, pp. 67-68. 
43Hafiz Wahba, Arabian Days, London: Arthur Baker Ltd., 1964, p. 126-127. Wahba was one 
of Ibn Saud's close advisors. Of Egyptian origin Wahba was used to a somewhat more 




instructors who would also encourage the pursuit of commerce. They were 
to teach that tilling the earth and earning wealth were also virtuous 
pursuits 44 
Ibn Saud attempted to bolster his influence by appointing the 
descendants of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab as qadis (judges) in 
the hujjar. 45 Expanding this tactic throughout Najd, Ibn Saud ensured that 
there was at least one scholar or alim, in each district. The city of Riyadh 
had ýix while the provinces of al-Qassim and al-Hasa each had three. In all 
about twenty ulema were under Ibn Saud's direct authority 46 The teachings 
of the founder of the Muwahhldun movement were virtually 
institutionalised. 
Ibn Saud also created a consultative council or majlis al-shoura made 
up of ulema, chiefs and men from influential families to bring a semblance 
of participatory rule. While in fact each hujjar was effectively run by the 
hakim (coordinator) and the'amir (leader) who were directly responsible to 
Ibn Saud. The environment of the hujjar channelled the traditional beduin 
activities such as tribal raiding or 'ghazw' into attacks on the mushrikeen, 
which were often, in the early days of the Ikhwan, simply other beduin that 
had refused the da'wah (call) to the fold of Islam. Tribal affiliation gradually 
became less of a determinant of friend and foe. In the hujjar at least the 
Ikhwan succeeded in "substituting the brotherhood of common faith for 
that of a common ancestry". 47 Although Ibn Saud had managed to 
institutionalise the Ikhwan and create his own private army, he was still 
under financial strain and turned more actively to seek the support and 
protection of Great Britain. 
*4mid,. 
45Habib, The Ikhwan Movement of Najd, p. 61. 
46Philby, Heart of Arabia, Vol. 1, p. 297 and Habib, The Ikhwan Movement of Najd, p. 117. 
+7Philby, Heart of Arabia, Vol. 1, p. 297. 
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Chapter 4 
Ibn Saud and Britain's 'Ottoman First' Policy 
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Despite his unsteady relationship with Britain, Ibn Saud was in great need 
of her support. Following his conquest of al-Hasa in May 1913 he was 
eager to formalise relations and obtain financial and security guarantees. ' 
However, Britain was sensitive about engaging in relations with the ruler 
of Najd. More than two years had been invested by the Foreign Office in 
lengthy negotiations with the Porte. Issues included the delineation of 
Ottoman and British interests in Persia, the completion of the Baghdad 
Railway and Ottoman customs duties. London did not want to jeopardise 
its hard won positions by developing formal relations with Ibn Saud so 
soon after the amir had forced out the Ottoman garrison from al-Hasa as 
that might sour the agreements with Constantinople? 
However, Britain could not ignore the fact that Ibn Saud's successful 
challenge to Ottoman power had made rulers of the Trucial states 
extremely nervous. The Government of India came under pressure from its 
Arab allies to provide protection guarantees against Saudi encroachment. 
Reluctantly, two agents were dispatched to meet with Ibn Saud. The British 
Political Agent, Kuwait, Captain William Shakespeare and the Political 
Agent, Bahrain, Major A. P. Trevor arranged to meet with the Saudi ruler in 
the town of Uqair on the Gulf coast. Their task was to determine: 
precisely in what way he [Ibn Saud] wanted the assistance of the 
British Government, seeing that he was aware of the friendly 
relations between the British and Turkish Governments, and of the 
neutrality of the former in respect of the differences between him 
and the latter. 3 
1 G. F. Clayton, An Arabian Diary Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, pp. 19-20, 
and Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 267-268. 
2 The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Edward Grey and Ottoman Envoy in London, 
Hakki Pasha would sign a provisional agreement on July 29 1913. Although al-Hasa was 
not specifically mentioned in the agreement it was deemed to be still part of the Ottoman 
Empire. B. C. Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs: 1914-1921, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1971, p. 231-232. Also Harry Philby, Arabian Jubilee, London: Robert Hale, 
Ltd., 1952, p. 36. 
3 'Memorandum of interview with Bin Saud', December 15 & 16,1913, Political Agent, 
Bahrain to Political Resident, Gulf, December 20,1913; part of India Office to Foreign 
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The two officers found him extremely congenial. After a warm welcome a 
large banquet was prepared in their honour. Performances of traditional 
beduin dance were given by local tribesmen. It was only much later, after 
the festivities had ended that Ibn Saud raised his concerns with the two 
British agents. 
He spoke of his concern over the "preservation of his ancestral 
rights" and the desire to "renew and maintain the ancient friendship 
between his family and the British Government and to have his position 
secured" .4 In 
fact Ibn Saud was quite clear about his intentions. He wanted 
a treaty with Britain that recognised him as 'de facto' ruler of al-Hasa and 
for British ships to maintain the peace along the al-Hasa shore-just as they 
did along the rest of the Gulf coast. 
Ibn Saud also made it known that the Ottomans were also interested 
in establishing treaty relations with him-which naturally would affect 
Britain's position in the Gulf. Although Ibn Saud stated that he would 
prefer not to be involved with the Ottomans nor any other power, he 
would nevertheless have to conclude an agreement with them if he had no 
other means of support. The Political agents, though surprised at the 
frankness of the ruler, could not respond to his request. Shakespeare was 
noncommittal-pointing out that it was highly unlikely that Britain would 
enter into negotiations with Najd and risk jeopardising Anglo-Ottoman 
relations. 
Refusing to be put off, Ibn Saud tried to provoke a response by 
providing details of his negotiations with the Ottomans. He pointed out 
that the Porte would most likely prohibit him from having contacts with 
other foreign representatives. This veiled threat to British political interests 
was not lost on the Agents. Shakespeare informed the amir that: 
Office dispatch of papers relating to Ibn Saud, February 9,1914, PRO FO 371/2123 
F#6117/E4/R1, pp. 260-262. 
4'Memorandum of interview with Bin Saud', December 15 & 16,1913, Political Agent, 
Bahrain to Political Resident, Gulf, December 20,1913; part of India Office to Foreign 
Office dispatch of papers relating to Ibn Saud, February 9,1914, PRO FO 371/2123, 
F#6117/E4/R1, pp. 260-262. 
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if he [Ibn Saud] continues to be the de facto ruler of the Hasa 
coast, it would be absolutely necessary for the local British 
authorities to have direct communication with him and his 
local officers for the settlement of various commercial, 
pearling and other disputes, which constantly arise, not to 
mention the apprehension of fugitive offenders and 
absconding divers. The British Government, therefore, would 
in all probability have to take up the question of the prejudice 
to their rights and interests which the existence of any clause 
excluding their representatives and subjects would entail. 5 
If these statements reassured Ibn Saud it did not deter him from making 
further veiled threats. In a surprise move Ibn Saud raised the subject of 
Qatar and Oman: 
In the course of his remarks Bin Saud pointed out that, 
though he claimed the Trucial Oman and Katar (Qatar) as 
part of his ancestral dominions and could make his power felt 
there, he was quite willing to meet the wishes of Government 
in regard to them. He hinted that the only reason which 
restrained him from overrunning Katar (Qatar), and possibly 
Trucial Oman, after he had occupied Hasa and Katif, was his 
desire not to alienate the sympathy of the British 
Government. 6 
Ibn Saud was also careful to make it clear to the British Agents that he 
would take action against any of his enemies who took refuge in those 
territories. It is apparent from his negotiating style that Ibn Saud alternated 
his tactics. On the one hand he gave the impression of being 
accommodating. According to Shakespeare, Ibn Saud "seemed very much 
in earnest and most anxious to do whatever he could to meet the wishes of 
the (British) Government and to obtain their support. " He indicated "on 
more than one occasion" his preference for relations with Britain, as "he 
had no faith in the permanency of any arrangement made directly with 
51bid. 
6The discussion was detailed in a confidential memorandum sent separately from the 
previous reports but is found along with the 'Memorandum of Interview with Bin 
Saud', December 15 & 16,1913, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Gulf, 
December 20,1913; part of India Office to Foreign Office dispatch of papers relating to Ibn 
Saud, February 9,1914, FO 371/2123, F#6117/E4/R1, pp. 260-262. 
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that Turkish government. "7 At one point he even claimed that he "would 
be willing to consult [with] the British Government in all important 
matters" if he could obtain its assurance of protection. 8 While, on the other 
hand, the amir had a persistent and sometimes intimidating demeanour. 
Agent Trevor noted that despite the friendly manner in which the 
discussions were conducted, Ibn Saud was frank about his ability to project 
force and implied threats to British interests if he was hindered in his goal 
to secure his 'ancestral dominions'. 9 
In their reports, the British agents noted that despite his 
protestations of British friendship, Ibn Saud would "probably accept 
autonomy" under Ottoman suzerainty, and even pay a nominal tribute to 
Istanbul if pressured to do so. Their analysis of the Najdi ruler impressed 
the Government of India. An opportunity was seen to strengthen British 
interests in the Gulf. If better relations could be established with Ibn Saud 
"a valuable point would have been gained by us". 10 Impressed by the 
possibilities the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, cabled London: 
We think advantage should be taken of Bin Saud's present 
friendly attitude which is doubtless due to his precarious 
position, to post native agent at once to Katif. This will not 
only secure us desired foothold on this coast, but will enable 
us to render our good offices to Turkish Government in 
dealing with Bin Saud should they require them. " 
As a result, it was decided that Captain Shakespeare should remain with 
Ibn Saud in order to gather intelligence on the growing Najdi polity and 
improve Anglo-Saudi relations. 
Shakespeare and Ibn Saud 
7Major A. P. Trevor, Political Resident, Bahrain to Political Resident, Gulf, December 20, 
1913 in FO 371/2123, F#6117/E4/Rl, pp. 259-260. 
81bid. 
91bid. See also 'Relations with Ibn Saud', Report by Arab Bureau, January 12,1917, IOR 
L/P&S/B251. 
loOfficiating Political Resident, Gulf to Government of India, January 4,1914, FO 371/2123 
F#6117/E3/R1, pp. 2258-259. 
"Viceroy to India Office, report entitled 'Foreign Secret', February 27,1914 FO 371/2124 
#48437 
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Shakespeare spent five months from February to June 1914 with the Najdi 
ruler, sending reports back to London which were exceedingly favourable 
towards Ibn Saud. The Captain praised Ibn Saud's ability to rally beduin 
forces and supplies from across Arabia 12 Shakespeare reported how on one 
occasion Ibn Saud managed to rally a force of 5,000-7,000 men within a 150 
mile radius of Riyadh. In another, he was able to send a thousand men to 
the port towns of al-Hasa, in order to deter the Ottoman Navy from 
launching an attack on the shore. 
Throughout this period Shakespeare would note the alternating 
tactics of Ibn Saud - from reassurance to implied threats. Ibn Saud made it 
clear to Shakespeare that the longer Britain delayed in her support, the 
sooner he would have to "make his own arrangements" with the Porte. In 
such a case, Ibn Saud claimed, Istanbul would certainly insist on restoring 
former garrisons in al-Hasa and demand the exclusion of all foreigners 
from the area to the detriment of Britain, although he "had no intention of 
committing himself definitely to the Turks so long as he had any chance of 
arriving at an arrangement with the British Government. "13 Unfortunately, 
Shakespeare could not promise anything, nor could he indicate what His 
Majesty's Government would do. He was there to observe and report. 
Shakespeare, however, did try to encourage a change in policy 
towards Arabia. He provided a detailed critique of British policy vis-a-vis 
the Porte, particularly the freedom granted to the Porte in dealing with 
Arabian issues. Istanbul was accused of largely neglecting Arabia-content 
simply to pit various tribes against each other while granting support to 
one faction, then another. Ottoman leadership had been ineffectual and the 
court weakened by corruption and intrigue. Moreover, the losses in the 
12 This was remarkable in light of the fact that Ibn Rashid was being supplied by Istanbul 
via the Hejaz Railway line. Reports of mid-February 1914, indicated that a shipment of 
30,000 rifles, hundreds of boxes of ammunition and several artillery pieces was sent for Ibn 
Rashid's men. See Shakespeare to Arthur Hirtzel, Undersecretary, India Office, 'Notes on 
Situation in C. Arabia and Bin Saud', June 26,1914. FO 371/2124 #28966. This is a lengthy 
and detailed report on Shakespeare's impressions and experiences during his Feb-June, 




Balkans and defeat at Tripoli had lowered Ottoman power in the eyes of 
many of her Arab subjects. Shakespeare had remarked on the impact this 
had on local opinion; "Throughout the country I was struck by the 
contempt with which the Arabs all regarded the Turkish Government, its 
troops, and its civil officials. "14 
Shakespeare recommended that in order to create a strong Turkey, 
the Porte had to be encouraged to change "however unpalatable the 
process may be". Arabia could no longer be ruled by coercion and the 
Foreign Office needed to realise that the Turkish Government had "no 
conception of its own weakness in Arabia". 15 Shakespeare was convinced 
that the prevailing Turkish policy would "end in disaster" and he hoped 
that London would undertake a more pro-active policy. 16 
However, it also became apparent that Shakespeare's opinion of Ibn 
Saud had been influenced by his stay in Najd. In his report Shakespeare 
claimed that Ibn Saud was a leader who "stands head and shoulders above 
the rest and in whose star all have implicit faith". 17 If Ottoman policy was 
not altered it was likely that Ibn Saud would lead a charge for an 
"independent Arabia"; and rule the peninsula through a confederation of 
tribes. This would, in all likelihood pave the way for interference from 
outside powers large and small, throwing the region into turmoil. 
Despite Shakespeare's exhortations the Foreign Office had different 
concerns and would not be rushed into action, choosing instead to proceed 
cautiously. This was partly due to the terms of the Anglo-Turkish 
Convention of March, 1914, in which Najd was acknowledged as a sanjak 
la'Notes on Situation in C. Arabia and Bin Saud' report by Captain William Shakespeare to 
Arthur Hirtzel, Under-secretary, India Office, June 26,1914, FO 371/2124 #28966. 
15Ibid. Shakespeare believed that the capture of al-Hasa in May 1913 was a feat that Ibn 
Saud could have achieved as early as 1908 if he had not been involved elsewhere and that 
the Saudi leader was poised to be a major player in Arabia. 
16 Ibid. For more on Arab dissatisfaction with Ottoman rule see also Elizabeth Monroe, 
Philby of Arabia, London: Faber and Faber, 1973, pp. 47-48 and Bruce Westrate The Arab 
Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916-1920, University Park: Penn State Press, 1992, 
pp. 12-13. 
17lbid. Shakespeare also noted that despite the failures of the Porte most Arabian amirs 
would probably still accept Ottoman suzerainty-"so long as it is in name only and does 
not import meddling in their affairs". 
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(district) of the Ottoman empire. To deal openly with Ibn Saud, might lead 
to accusations that Britain was interfering in internal Ottoman matters 18 
The Porte attached great importance to British recognition of Ottoman 
authority over Najd. Foreign Office officials had already received 
complaints from suspicious Turkish officials who viewed British relations 
with Ibn Saud as a conspiracy to divide Ottoman territory. 19 It was possible 
that such suspicion would lead to an assault on the Najdi ruler in order to 
curb his ambitions-thus throwing Arabia's political balance into turmoil. 
To pacify Ottoman concerns, reassurances were given to the Ottoman 
Minister in London, Hakki Pasha, that British approaches towards Ibn 
Saud were a matter of political expediency. To ignore him would only 
antagonise the Najdi ruler and threaten the security of tribes under British 
protection in the Trucial states. 20 
In fact the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was not overly 
concerned about Ibn Saud, believing that the Porte would eventually 
accept the occupation of al-Hasa as a fait accompli and appoint Ibn Saud as 
an Ottoman official. Grey's imperative was to ensure that peace was 
maintained in the interim and to discourage hostilities towards Ibn Saud 
that might lead to further conflict and instability in the region. 21 
Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, did not share this 
optimism. He saw a danger in a resolution of Ottoman-Saudi differences 
without British involvement. 22Negotiations would be better supervised if 
they took place in London between Hakki Pasha and a Saudi 
representative. This would allow both Foreign Office and India Office 
officials to participate in the process. Ibn Saud might even feel more 
18 Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand, pp. 35-36. 
39 Parker, minute, March 7 1914, PRO FO 371/2123 F#10244/El/R1, pp. 273-274. 
20 Ibid. 
n Sir Edward Grey (SSFA) to Sir Louis Mallet (Ambassador in Constantinople), March 26, 
1914, FO 371/2123 F#13135/R1, p. 298. However, it was also indicated that the Porte 
should not impose conditions on Ibn Saud that would exclude Britain from dealing with 
him. Grey was reassured by Mallet that a settlement between the Saudi-Ottoman parties 
would be concluded and it was unlikely hostilities would break out, Sir Louis Mallet to 
Edward Grey, March 27 1914, FO 371/2123 F#13604/R1, p. 302. 
22 India Office to Foreign Office April 4,1914, FO 371/2123 F#15203/R1, p. 313. 
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indebted to Britain for her intervention. If however, the Najdi ruler was left 
on his own to strike a deal it was likely the Porte would try to force harsh 
conditions and ruin any chances for a lasting agreement. A rise in Saudi- 
Ottoman tensions would only complicate Anglo-Ottoman relations. 
Crewe's hopes were dashed when discussions with Hakki Pasha 
failed to get off the ground. 23 The Porte would now negotiate directly with 
Ibn Saud. Lord Crewe however, did not give up and insisted that the 
Sheikh of Kuwait participate so that 'British interests' would be 
represented. The Foreign Office reassured Crewe that the British position 
had been communicated to the Porte and that his concerns were 
groundless. Crewe had no choice but to relent. He gave instructions for the 
Resident in the Gulf that "Bin Saud may be informed that we have put 
Porte in possession of our views, and he is free to negotiate direct with the 
Turks". 24 
There were others who differed with Lord Crewe's views- 
including Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India-23 He was among those who 
opposed any British involvement in Saudi-Ottoman affairs. Supporting Ibn 
Saud's position, even indirectly, was deemed to risk the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire. Lord Hardinge believed that Turkey albeit "friendly and 
reformed", was essential to the security of India: 
It is our strong opinion, therefore, that every effort should be made 
to avoid action likely to lead to the partition, either now or in the 
future, of Turkey's Asiatic possessions, and that His Majesty's 
Government should pursue consistently the policy of maintaining 
the Turkish empire while reforming and strengthening it 26 
23Ibid. 
24Marquess of Crewe, to Government of India, April 7,1914, FO 371/2123, F#16801E1/R1, 
p. 325 
25 Crewe, as the Secretary of State for India, outranked the Viceroy and could have 
instructed Hardinge to back his position, but he did not. For further details on the 
prevalent attitudes of Whitehall ministers see Roger. Adelson, The Formation of British Policy 
Towards the Middle East: 1914-1918, Ph. D Thesis, Washington University, 1972, Ann Arbor: 
University Microfilms. 
26 Viceroy of India to Foreign Office, September 13,1913, cited in Foreign Office to India 
Office April 1,1914, FO 371/2123 F#12320/R1, p. 285. 
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The British Ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Louis Mallet, was also opposed to 
the position of Lord Crewe. 27 In his estimation, Ibn Saud's control may not 
be "permanent or indeed more than temporary". 28 Therefore, openly siding 
with the Najdi ruler was premature. 
In a detailed memorandum to the Foreign Office, Mallet called for a 
reaffirmation of 'traditional' British policy towards Najd which was limited 
to three concerns. First to "secure to British subjects free access to, and 
proper treatment in, Najd, and more specifically in the coastal regions. " 
Second, to "avert developments" that hindered British objectives or 
affected the stability of the region. Third, and most profound was "to 
prevent or at least postpone anything that might lead to a general Arab 
outbreak and so endanger the integrity of the Turkish dominions in 
Asia"29 
Mallet urged the Foreign Office to distance itself from "Bin Saood" 
and any attempts to involve Britain in Saudi negotiations with the Porte. 
Coming to the aide of an Imperial subject would only fuel speculation of 
Britain's "hidden agenda". Nor did there appear to be any particular 
advantage for Britain in having Ibn Saud rule al-Hasa. There was no clear 
indication that British subjects would receive better treatment at the hands 
of the Saudi authorities. In any case the Porte had recognised Britain's 
'special position in the Gulf'. His Majesty's interests would be far better 
served if al-Hasa was under Ottoman jurisdiction. Ibn Saud's ascendancy 
would only facilitate an Arab upheaval and lead to further instability 
within the Ottoman empire. Mallet urged the Foreign Office to adopt a 
policy of "refraining from further intervention of any kind for the 
present" 30 
27 SSFI (Crewe) to Viceroy of India (Hardinge), April 23,1914, FO 371/2123 F#18128/R1, 
p. 355. 
28 Memorandum from Sir Louis Mallet to Sir Edward Grey, entitled 'Relations of His 
Majesty's Government with Nejd from Turkish View', May 18,1914 in PRO FO 371/2124 




Diverging views from the Foreign Office and the Government of 
India reflected their overlapping and often competing spheres of influence. 
The failure to comprehend the extent of Ottoman weaknesses, and 
conflicting departmental views, prevented a unified British policy to 
emerge. The very policies that Captain Shakespeare advocated to stabilise 
the Ottoman presence in Arabia were deemed to be an invitation to 
turmoil. As a result Ibn Saud . turned towards the Porte, as he had 
threatened, in order to 'make his own arrangements'. A meeting was 
uzt- A CLV1 b 
arranged with the Ottoman representative, ISyed Talib., in the town 
of Subaiyhiya, near Kuwait to secure the future of the, fledgling Saudi 
kingdom. 31 
Ottoman-Saudi Treaty 
Although excluded from the discussions, the Foreign Office was still 
anxious to know details of the Saudi-Ottoman proceedings. Since 
Shakespeare was on assignment in Egypt, the Acting Political Agent in 
Kuwait, Colonel W. Grey, was tasked with gathering information on the 
progress of the negotiations. Throughout April and May of 1914, Grey 
gathered intelligence from local Arab sources. 32 Although Ibn Saud was 
granted free reign in collecting taxes and raising revenue for himself, from 
quite early on the discussions became strained. The demands by the Porte 
for the repositioning of garrisons in the towns of Qatif and Uqair as well as 
the surrender of all canon and artillery guns made Ibn Saud uneasy. 33 
31 Zirkili, Shibh al Jazira, fi ahd al Malik Abd al-Aziz, part 1, pp. 212-214. Also Shamiya, al. 
Saud: Madihum wa Mustaqbalhum, p. 109. 
32Although his reports were culled from various informants Grey cites Sheikh Mubarak of 
Kuwait as his main source. This should indicate that the information received was biased 
to some degree. Mubarak had developed jealousy and suspicion of Ibn Saud. See Lt. 
CoLW. Grey, Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Resident, Gulf, May 6,1914. FO 371/2124 
#26063, pp. 63-64 and Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Resident, Gulf, April 2& April 7, 
1914 in FO 371/2123 F#21167, p. 402 and p. 404. 
33 Ibid. The Porte tried to sweeten the deal with a surprising offer to grant verbal, but not 
written, consent, to enter Qatar and Oman if Ibn Saud so desired. Ibn Saud was unmoved. 
However, it should be noted that in Grey's reports Mubarak can be seen to play up the 
references to Qatar and Oman-perhaps to cause the British anxiety and disrupt relations 
between Britain and his former protege. 
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Ibn Saud approached Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait looking for 
another way forward. He told Mubarak that he sought the same status as 
Kuwait, "autonomy with British protection under Turkish sovereignty" 34 
Mubarak passed on this information to Grey but did not have anything 
concrete to offer. Ibn Saud too went directly to Grey. He reiterated his 
reluctance to make an agreement with the Porte 35 Although uncertain 
about the veracity of such claims Grey's intelligence sources indicated that 
Ibn Saud had already sent a letter to Syed Thalib Pasha stating that he 
could not enter into an agreement. 36 
However, His Majesty's Government had not changed its position. 
With the Porte refusing British participation, the matter was not pursued. 
Ibn Saud was dejected at this news. He subsequently asked whether, if he 
stalled the Porte, His Majesty's Government would come to terms with him 
at a later date. Grey could not offer any such encouragement. Finally, Ibn 
Saud asked for Britain to at least guarantee that the Turks would "never be 
allowed to take hostile action by sea". 37 Again, Grey could offer nothing in 
the way of commitment. In fact, he said that in light of the circumstance he 
would not be surprised if Ibn Saud signed an agreement which he knew 
would cause the British to object. 
Indeed on May 29,1914 Ibn Saud did enter into an agreement with 
the Porte. In accepting Ottoman suzerainty he retained control over Najd Gvve-r., c, 
and al-Hasa. Taking the title of wall () he was to deal directly 
with the Interior Ministry in Istanbul bypassing the wali's of Basra or 
Baghdad. As a result of the treaty the Ottoman flag was to be flown at his 
forts and during time of war he could be asked to field a military force for 
service in the Ottoman ranks. Ibn Saud lost the right to grant concessions 
34 Ibn Saud to Mubarak cited in Agent, Kuwait to Resident, Gulf, April 7 1914, FO 
371/2123 F#21167, p. 404. 
ss Meeting between Ibn Saud and Colonel Grey on 28 April 1914. Agent, Kuwait to 
Resident, Gulf, April 29 1914, FO 371/2124 F#24823, pp 45-46. 
36 Agent, Kuwait to Resident, Gulf, April 29 1914, FO 371/2124 F#24823, pp 45-46. 
37 Ibid. 
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or conclude treaties with foreign powers. He was also to channel his 
foreign policy dealings through the Porte 38 
Previous authors on this subject have presented differing opinions 
on the Saudi-Ottoman treaty. John Wilkinson asserts in Arabia's Frontiers, 
that the treaty between Ibn Saud and the Porte was secret and that Britain 
had no knowledge of it until November 22,1914 when British troops 
entered Basra and found the document in Ottoman files 39 Jacob Goldberg 
also asserts this in his book The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia 1902-1918.40 
Robert Lacey, while citing the meetings between Trevor, Shakespeare and 
Ibn Saud during December 1913, goes on to write that it was not until "two 
years later.... [that] this secret agreement was unearthed. "41 McLoughlin 
insists that Philby denied the existence of a treaty 42 Philby, writing in 1952, 
doubted the existence of the treaty because "the archives of Saudi Arabia 
have no record of any such formal agreement" 43 
Yet this author's research in Foreign Office records has shown that 
both Captain Shakespeare and Major Trevor had known about the Treaty 
and had been shown drafts of the Ottoman proposal by Ibn Saud in 1913. 
In the words of Trevor: "Bin Saud volunteered to show us in confidence the 
conditions which had been proposed by the Turkish Government and 
himself as a basis for the settlement of his future position". 44 
The Agents were shown a document containing "eleven articles, five 
of which had been suggested by Ibn Saud himself and the other six by the 
38 Sir Louis Mallet to Edward Grey, June 23,1914, FO 371/2124 F#28368, p. 79. Also Sir 
Edward Grey to Louis Mallet, July 11,1914, FO 371/2124F#31123, p. 107. For Arabic 
sources on this agreement see Zirkili, Shibh al Jazira, 
fi ahd al Malik Abd al-Aziz, part 1, pp. 
213-214 and Shamiya, al-Saud: Madihum wa Mustaqbalhum, pp. 109-110. It is interesting to 
note that these Arabic sources claim Sheikh 
Mubarak of Kuwait participated in the 
negotiations. Meanwhile according to 
Colonel Grey, Sheikh Mubarak was not involved 
and surprised at the conclusion of the 
Saudi-Ottoman agreement. See Agent, Kuwait to 
Resident, Gulf, June 26 1914, FO 371/2124 F#34347, pp. 116-117. 
$9John Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, London: I. B. Taurus, 1991, pp. 125-130. 
Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia, Chapter 4. 
41Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 113, 
42McLoughlin, Ibn Saud p. 45. It should be noted that Philby did not arrive in Najd until 
1917 and was not a first hand witness to these events. 
43 Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 37. 
4 Major Trevor to Political Resident in the Gulf, December 20,1913; PRO F0371/2123, 
F#6117/E4/R1, pp. 260-262. 
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Turkish Government". As a result of their conversations with Ibn Saud 
Major Trevor concluded that Ibn Saud "would probably accept autonomy 
under the suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan" 45 A Foreign 
Office memorandum of March 9,1914, indicates that His Majesty's 
Government knew in detail the nature of the discussion between the Porte 
and Ibn Saud 46 Another confidential telegram from Louis Mallet to 
Edward Grey sent at the end of March also indicates that it was known that 
Ibn Saud was in treaty discussion with the Porte 47 News of the Saudi- 
Ottoman agreement was also leaked by the father of one of Ibn Saud's 
wives to the Political Agent Bahrain 48 As such it cannot be claimed that 
that Britain was unaware of a treaty between the Porte and Ibn Saud before 
November 1914. British officials had been intimately aware of the details of 
the Saudi-Ottoman discussions from at least a year earlier. 
Much of the literature about this time is focused on the period 
following the outbreak of the First World War. Even Philby, who has 
written much on Saudi Arabia, does not delve deeply into the pre-war 
tensions between Ibn Saud, the Porte and Britain. 49 The fact that 
Shakespeare first established his links with Ibn Saud in late 1913 is 
overshadowed by the attention given to the period after Britain declared 
war on the Porte in November 1914.50 
Outbreak of World War 
With the launch of British wartime activities in Mesopotamia and the Gulf, 
attention turned to bringing Arab rulers into the British war effort. The 
possibility of using Arab forces to distract Ottoman resources from Europe 
43mid. 
46 Foreign Office Memorandum March 9,1914 FO 371/2123, F#10569/Ripp. 277-278. 
47 Sir Louid Mallet to Sir Edward Grey, March 31,1914, FO 371/2123 F#14280/R1, p. 305. 
48 Agent Kuwait to Resident Gulf, July 28 1914, FO 371/2124 F#34347, p. 119-120 
49 Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 270-272. 
50 The Declaration of War, signed by King George on November 5,1914, can be found in 
PRO 371/2145. The political background leading up to Britain's declaration of war on the 
Porte has been discussed elsewhere. See Adelson, Roger. The Formation of British Policy 
Towards the Middle East 1914-1918', Ph. D. thesis, Washington University, 1972. 
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to Arabia brought a renewed interest in Ibn Saud 51 With support from 
local rulers Ottoman resources could be diverted to Arabia and this would 
relieve pressure on British forces elsewhere 52 Moreover, the position of the 
Najdi ruler would enable him to secure overland communications with 
Iraq as well as keep in check pro-Ottoman sheikhs on the Gulf coast. It was 
also important that he did not become an active agent of the Porte. 53 
However, the British official who seemed to know Ibn Saud best was 
back in England. Captain William Shakespeare had returned home in early 
1914 and was busy training new recruits to join the battle in the trenches of 
Europe. He was quickly reassigned to the Middle East and given the job of 
bringing Ibn Saud to the Allied side and to "prevent, if possible, the 
outbreak of unrest in the interior". If war broke out he was to make sure 
that no aid was given to Turkey. 54 
London's 'Ottoman first' policy makers in the Foreign Office had 
not changed; they simply saw the usefulness of a central Arabian ally, 
keeping Ottoman forces engaged in Arabia that would otherwise be used 
against Allied armies. Shakespeare rejoined Ibn Saud just as campaigns 
were mounted against the Al-Rashid. Ibn Saud however, would not 
entertain an alliance with Britain without assurances and guarantees in 
writing. Shakespeare drew up a draft treaty that would allow the 
establishment of formal relations. This included a promise of support- 
provided that Ibn Saud had no relations with other powers without British 
consent. But Ibn Saud was not impressed at this last minute offer of 
51See 'Relations with Ibn Saud' Arab Bureau Report, January 12,1917, IOR 
L/P&S/18/B251. The new Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener was more interested 
in Sharif Hussein because of his position in the Hijaz near Ottoman strongholds and the 
fact that he was Sharif of Mecca and commanded prestige in the Muslim world. See 
Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 130-133. Zirkili, Shibh al-jazira fi ahd al-Malik Abd al Aziz, 
pp. 219-220 
52 There was a concern that Ottoman propaganda could incite a jihad (holy war) against the 
British in the Middle East. To counter that possibility it was thought wise to strengthen 
British relations with Arab rulers. See Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs: 1914-1921, p. 8. 
53 Silverfarb, Daniel, The Anglo-Najd Treaty of 1915', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3, 
Oct. 1980. See also Philby, Arabian Jubilee, pp. 42-43. 
54'Relations with Ibn Saud', Arab Bureau Report, January 12,1917, IOR L/ P&S/ 18/ B251. 
See also Winstone, Captain Shakespeare, pp. 193-194. According to George Antonius, 
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assistance and was unsure of the seriousness with which the offer was 
made. An alliance had already been agreed with the Porte and Ibn Saud 
was wary of taking this uncertain offer of British friendship. 
Despite the lack of agreement, Shakespeare remained with Ibn Saud 
as an observer. 55 Though he was reputed to be the most travelled official in 
Arabia at the time and an expert on the tribes of central and eastern Arabia, 
it is not clear how well Shakespeare understood the people he was 
reported to know. A case in point was his belief that it was possible for the 
various political and tribal interests in the Arabian peninsula to be 
unified-in a "confederation or alliance". This group would consist of Ibn 
Saud, Imam Yahya and Sheikh Idriss of Yemen, Sharif Hussein of Mecca 
and ibn Sha'alan of the northwest Hijaz. It is surprising that such a well- 
travelled official could actually believe that such an alliance could be 
created. A Foreign Office official who reviewed the Captain's report 
commented that despite Shakespeare's reputed "experience and authority" 
on Arabian matters, the official was sceptical that any such union could 
conceivably take place. s6 
It was clear that the Captain admired Ibn Saud. But he did not know 
any other beduin chief nearly as well. His relationships with other Arab 
leaders were not as extensive nor as personal. Shakespeare was made to 
believe that he was privy to Ibn Saud's deepest thoughts and concerns. 
Indeed the Saudi ruler revealed to him confidential correspondence with 
the Porte and other Arab rulers. In time, the Captain came to identify the 
objectives of British foreign policy with the success of Ibn Saud and 
requiring the overhaul of Ottoman policies in Arabia 57 
Even though for much of the his stay in Arabia, Britain rarely if ever 
came through with Ibn Saud's requests, the relationship between the two 
men endured. Shakespeare was one of the few 'foreigners' who had earned 
Shakespeare was sent "to try and secure his [Ibn Saud's] cooperation in the cause of the 
Allies". Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 161. 
w Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 40. 
56See handwritten minutes of Foreign Office officials attached to the dispatch of 
Shakespeare to Hirtzel, 26 June 1914, FO 371/2124 #28966, p. 80. 
ABEDIN-FOUR 123 
his way into the close circle around the Saudi amir. He travelled, ate and 
joked with Ibn Saud and his men; proffering advice, information and 
understanding about the outside world, particularly Europe. 58 Often after 
the end of a meal, the Captain was asked to stay behind, along with 
Abdullah ibn Jiluwi, the amir's cousin, and the three of them would discuss 
the most pressing issues in private. Yet there was another side to this 
closeness as well. By taking Shakespeare into confidence Ibn Saud hoped to 
gain Shakespeare's trust, and through him Britain's respect and assistance. 
Ibn Saud once remarked in friendly exuberance "my trust is first in God 
and then you, 0 Shakespeare" 59 
In return, Shakespeare held Ibn Saud in high regard. The Najdi ruler 
was praised for his hospitality and openness-which was deemed to 
indicate the respect with which Ibn Saud held Britain. Shakespeare hoped 
that his superiors would provide assistance to Najd and thus see British 
policy objectives achieved. In the Captain's assessment Ibn Saud simply 
sought the right to rule his ancestral lands, to be left alone and administer 
Islamic law "in the old time honoured way". If fully recognised as the ruler 
of Najd, Shakespeare was sure of Ibn Saud's contentment, seeing in him no 
desire to become Caliph or ruler of Arabia. The Captain assured His 
Majesty's Government that: "I do not think that he (Ibn Saud) would ever 
embark on a campaign to set himself up as Sultan of all Arabia" . 60 
Robert Lacey argues that Shakespeare and Ibn Saud had the 
"makings of a fine team", one that could have gone on to greater conquests 
for Britain. 61 Shakespeare's own understanding of Arabia seems to have 
been influenced by his perception of the nobility of desert life which stood 
in marked contrast to the opulence and corrupt intrigue in the Ottoman 
court. Ibn Saud's desire to re-claim his hereditary rights seemed perfectly 
respectable and legitimate goals to the English Captain. Shakespeare's 
57 Shakespeare to Hirtzel, 26 June 1914, FO 371/2124 #28966, pp. 80-82. 
S8Born on October 29,1878 Shakespeare was also around the same age as Abdul Aziz Ibn 
Saud whose year of birth has been variously stated as between 1876 to 1880. 
S9Comment by Ibn Saud cited in Winstone, Captain Shakespeare pp. 20-21. 
60 Shakespeare to Hirtzel, June 27,1914, PRO FO 371/2124 #28966. 
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assessment of Ottoman military deficiency and his estimate of the need for 
at least two divisions to maintain order in central Arabia was perhaps more 
accurate than his assertion that Ibn Saud did not have large territorial 
ambitions. However, the durability of the relationship between the two 
men could not be tested. Shakespeare was killed at Jarrab in January 1915 
during a battle between Ibn Saud's forces and the Al-Rashid 62 
Several authors have noted the closeness of the British agent and the 
Najdi ruler-making the point that no other British official was as trusted 
by Ibn Saud as Shakespeare and none was sent to replace him. Philby 
noted that after the death of Shakespeare, Najdi forces largely withdrew 
from open engagements and that Ibn Saud was left to sulk in his tents, 
while developments in other parts of Arabia reduced him to a position of 
relative insignificance as a factor in Arabian politics" 63 According to 
Gilbert Clayton, this retreat was seen as a sign of weakness. Ibn Saud was 
accused of having "abandoned all attempts to support the Allied campaign 
against the Turks". 64 However, later in this chapter it will be shown that in 
fact Ibn Saud maintained an active role and that British officials were still 
keen to maintain the relationship. 
The period following Shakespeare's death was extremely 
challenging. The Ajman tribesman, who had cost Ibn Saud the battle of 
Jarrab, joined forces with the al-Murrah and with cousins of Ibn Saud (the 
same group that rebelled against him in 1910) in open revolt, casting al- 
61 Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 118 
62Shakespeare was killed when supposed allies of Ibn Saud, the Ajman tribe, abandoned 
their positions. This exposed a vulnerable flank to the attacking Al-Rashid. Readily 
distinguishable in his English Captain's uniform, Shakespeare was an easy target. The 
Ajman were a weak link. Though at one time supporters of Ibn Saud, since the take over of 
al-Hasa in 1913 there were many discontented elements among the tribe. Heavy taxes 
were levied upon them and they had been prohibited from extracting tolls from passing 
caravans as had been their custom. The Ajman's rocky relationship with Ibn Saud is 
detailed by A. S. Al-Uthaiymeen, in Tarikh al-Mamlakah al-Arabiya al-Suudiyyah, (the History 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) Vol. II, Riyadh: Dar al-Obaykan, 1416 (1996), p. 151. Also 
Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 271-272. Robert Lacey provides details of Shakespeare's death, 
based on interviews conducted in 1979, with survivors of the battle. See Lacey, The 
Kingdom, pp. 116-117. 
63 Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 272. Although Philby himself later noted that Ibn Saud "lost no 
time in asking for the appointment of another officer to take Shakespeare's place", Philby, 
Arabian jubilee, pp. 41-42. 
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Hasa once again into turmoil 65 This succeeded in placing a severe strain on 
the resources and energy of Ibn Saud. Despite the death of Shakespeare, 
Percy Cox, still felt it necessary to pursue an agreement with Ibn Saud. He 
arranged to meet Ibn Saud himself in December 1915 at the port of Darin. 
Anglo-Saudi Alliance: The 1915 Treaty of Darin 
Percy Cox met with Ibn Saud at Darin on the island of Tarut in the Gulf, on 
26 December, 1915.66 Cox had specific concerns over the type of British 
guarantees that Ibn Saud would request-particularly in the long term. 
There was also uncertainty over the durability of the Saudi dynasty. With 
the ever-changing political situation in Arabia, Cox could not allow Britain 
to become committed to defending any existing and future territory that 
Ibn Saud might claim as his. Although neighbouring Kuwait and Bahrain 
had long established their independence, along the rest of the Gulf coast 
things were not as clear. Defining the exact demarcations of Saudi territory 
would take some negotiation and was unlikely to be reached quickly. 
Ibn Saud for his part, hoped for an indication of Britain's level of 
commitment to his protection. More specifically, he desired Britain to 
recognise territories that he hoped to include in his empire in the future- 
territory that he intended to capture by force. He did not wish to be limited 
to a static area that was imposed upon him. Ironically, this led to a 
situation where neither Cox nor Ibn Saud desired a final border settlement. 
In the end, Britain simply chose to acknowledge those territories which Ibn 
Saud held at the time; Najd, al-Hasa, Qatif and Jubail. The issue of other 
areas which Ibn Saud hoped to include would be resolved later. Thus 
Article I of the Treaty of Darin stated: 
'4Clayton, An Arabian Diary, p. 23 
65 Though this was partly a response to the harsh rule of the amir of the province, Abdullah 
ibn Jiluwi, and partly the anger of local chiefs at having to relinquish their authority to the 
ever expanding Saudi polity. 'Relations with Ibn Saud' Arab Bureau Report, January 12, 
1917, IOR L/P&S/18/B251. 
66 Report on Anglo-Saudi Treaty, December 26,1915, PRO FO 371/2769 #38086. For Saudi 
perspective see Zirkili, Shibh al-jazira fi ahd al-Malik Abd al Aziz, p. 285. 
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The British Government do acknowledge and admit that 
Najd, Al-Hasa, Qatif and Jubail, and their dependencies and 
territories, which will be discussed and determined hereafter 
and their ports on the shores of the Persian Gulf are the 
countries of Bin Saud and of his fathers before him, and do 
hereby recognise the said Bin Saud as the independent Ruler 
thereof and absolute chief of their tribes, and after him his 
son and descendants by inheritance; but the selection of the 
individual shall be in accordance with the nomination (i. e., by 
the living Ruler) of his successor; but with the proviso that he 
shall not be a person antagonistic to the British Government 
in any respect 67 
However, this was not the most contentious issue. Article II of the treaty 
created more difficulty. Britain wanted to come to Saudi aid only if there 
was an unprovoked attack by a foreign power-which was intended to 
mean other European powers. However, Ibn Saud, sought a more liberal 
definition of 'foreign power' to include his local rivals like Sharif Hussein. 
Cox would not agree. Since there was no third party to the Treaty of 
Darin-they could interpret it in their own way. Indeed Britain could claim 
that it would respond in the manner it "may consider most effective". 
Furthermore, Cox was determined to restrict Ibn Saud's 
encroachment upon his neighbours in the Gulf. Article VI specifically 
prohibited Ibn Saud from "aggression on, or interference with, the 
territories of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman Coast, or other tribes and 
Chiefs who are under the protection of the British Government, and the 
limits of whose territories shall be hereafter determined". 68 This only 
served to annoy Ibn Saud who regarded many of the Trucial chiefs as 
rulers of mere towns not sovereigns of separate political entities. In fact Ibn 
Saud suggested an alternative wording to reflect his views. He claimed a 
great part of the eastern shores of the Gulf on the basis of ancestral rule. By 
changing the wording to deny the existence of fixed territories Ibn Saud 
could at least satisfy his own feelings that the importance of Gulf rulers 
was diminished. 
67Article I, Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Darin, December 26,1915, in PRO FO 371/2769 #38086. 
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Cox agreed to the alteration of Article VI which stated that Ibn Saud 
was prohibited from "all aggression on, or interference with, the territories 
of Kuwait, Bahrain and of the Sheikhs of Qatar and Oman Coast, who are 
under the protection of the British Government and the limits of their 
territories shall be hereafter determined. "69 The changes prohibited attacks 
on individual rulers without forcing Ibn Saud to concede any claims to 
Qatar or Oman. On the issue of succession, Ibn Saud stated that he would 
either appoint a successor himself or have a semi-public selection process. 
Cox preferred an inherited kingship which would reduce the 
unpredictability of an elected leader. 70 No doubt Ibn Saud appreciated this 
decision since it guaranteed his sons a role in future power. 
The agreement with Great Britain provided Ibn Saud with some 
insurance against an Ottoman attack. But also he also required financial 
and material aid in order to repel the Ottoman-backed forces of the Al- 
Rashid. With Rashidi encouragement the Ajman had stepped up their 
attacks on Saudi forces. Under the terms of the Treaty of Darin Ibn Saud 
was to be loaned £20,000 and receive 1000 rifles and 200,000 rounds of 
ammunition. The arms were put to immediate use and throughout the 
winter of 1915-1916 clashes with the Al-Rashid and Ajman were fierce. At 
one point Ibn Saud was himself wounded, which Cox reported as a "slight 
flesh wound". But in the same battle Ibn Saud lost his full brother, Sa'ad 
who was younger than him. n To complicate matters further, relations with 
Kuwait worsened following the death of his old mentor, Mubarak al-Sabah 
in December 1915. The new ruler gave refuge to the rebellious Ajman and 
refused to expel them when asked to do so by Ibn Saud. 72 
8Draft of Article VI of Anglo-Saudi Treaty, cited in Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, p. 138. 
69Final version of Article VI, Anglo Saudi Treaty, in PRO FO 371/2769 #38086 
"Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, January 10,1916, PRO FO 371/2769 
#41504. 
7lIbid. Cox also showed the concern that British officials had over attitudes of Arabian 
chieftains towards the Caliphate issue. 
He confidently reported that in Arabia "the 
question of the Caliphate has no serious interest 
for the tribes or their chiefs". 
nThough it would have been against desert tradition to force out those that had sought 
protection, mistrust and envy fuelled the 
decision to allow the Ajman to remain in Kuwait. 
See Abu-Hakima, The Modern History of Kuwait: 1750-1965, pp. 132-133. Although Abu 
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British Intelligence and Ibn Saud 
The revolt of the Ajman and the successes of the Al-Rashid raised concerns 
about the permanence of Ibn Saud's regime. The War Office, in particular, 
wished to evaluate the usefulness of Ibn Saud in the war effort. John Keyes, 
a Military Intelligence officer, was sent to report on the Najdi ruler. As with 
Shakespeare and Cox before him Keyes was impressed by Ibn Saud's 
"loathing of the Turk" and his intense "patriotism" which drove his 
conquests. Keyes was quick to realise that it was the anti-Ottoman 
sentiment that was "the only cause of his having anything to do with us". 73 
Keyes spent a much shorter period with Ibn Saud than Shakespeare 
and was not particularly impressed by the reported skills of Saudi forces: 
I don't think he [Ibn Saud] has much power of military 
organisation or much capacity in the field. His tribesmen are 
a ruly independent lot; and in both his recent defeats, being 
the party of law and order, their hearts were not in it, while 
the enemy on both occasions had their women with them, 
which, with Arabs means that they were all out 74 
This was in marked contrast to the favourable reports Shakespeare used to 
send to London. Keyes was sceptical of Ibn Saud's supposed great 
leadership and military skill. In reports Keyes obtained from local sources 
little stock was given to the Najdi dynasty. 75 
In direct meetings with Ibn Saud, Keyes found the amir a man of 
"extraordinary patience and kindness". But he did not let the amir's charm 
and hospitality alter his analysis. Keyes realised that Ibn Saud "would play 
the game with us" because it was only with British help that Ottoman 
Hakima claims that it was Salim al-Sabah that granted the Ajman refuge it was actually 
Jabir, the elder son, who did so. See also Al-Uthaiymeen, Tarikh al-Mamlakah al-Arabiya 
alSuudiyyah, Vol-II, p. 152. The general situation around the 1915 Treaty is discussed in 
Silverfarb, 'The Anglo-Najd Treaty of 1915', p. 152. 
73 Report of Director of Military Intelligence, in War Office to Foreign Office, January 10, 
1916, PRO FO 371/2769 #38981; includes report from J. Keyes to Lt. Colonel Mark Sykes of 
Military Intelligence. 
74 Ibid. 
75Report of Director of Military Intelligence, in War Office to Foreign Office, January 10, 
1916, PRO FO 371/2769 #38981; includes report from J. Keyes to Lt. Colonel Mark Sykes of 
Military Intelligence. 
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domination could be ended. The fact was not lost upon the British officer 
that if it became beneficial to the amir's interest to discard his relations 
with Britain he would do so. While Keyes saw the tactic of "flirting with 
the Sharif and punching Bin Rashid wherever he can get at him" as 
understandable, he plainly did not consider Ibn Saud a great leader in the 
same vein as Najdi rulers of years past. Keyes was one of the rare British 
officials who travelled through Arabia who did not let the hospitality of 
Ibn Saud deflect his ability to criticise Saudi capabilities. He differentiated 
between the charming and sociable host and the rag tag capabilities of the 
loosely knit fighting forces at the amir's disposal. 76 
Keyes' reports were important in reinforcing the view that Hussein 
was the one to back, and that other Arab leaders, despite being lively 
characters, were small time operators, involved in tribal squabbles and 
alliances of convenience. Only Hussein was viewed as having the religious 
pedigree and the military capability to offer significant assistance to the 
war effort. Ibn Saud was the leader of a small sect of puritans with limited 
appeal in the wider Muslim world. 77 
While Keyes gathered reports for London on his Arabian travels, 
Percy Cox did the same for his immediate superior, General Maude, the 
British Army Commander for Mesopotamia. Cox had to procure 
interpreters and informers, debrief spies and interview prisoners. The time 
Cox spent in meetings with tribal chiefs and notables was for the purpose 
of gathering intelligence on, and understanding of, local rivalries and tribal 
histories. This latter role was extremely important to British interests, as 
there was an acknowledged lack of understanding about such matters. 78 
With his energies strained Cox sent a request in July 1916, to the Foreign 
76 Ibid. 
77 There were differences of opinion among officials as to who was the more useful leader 
for British interests. FO and Egyptian Govt. officials felt that Hussein had the better 
lineage and prestige, while Ibn Saud was considered to be lower in nobility and influence. 
To Indian officials Ibn Saud was a threat to the Gulf coast and Iraqi security and had to be 
dealt with. But they believed it prudent to steer clear of Hijazi politics and not upset 
Muslim subjects. See Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East: 1914-1971, 
London: Chatto & Windus, 1981, pp. 33-35 and Westrate, The Arab Bureau, p. 116. 
78 Graves, Life of Sir Percy Cox, p. 225. 
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Department of the Government of India, to dispatch an assistant who could 
also function as a temporary financial officer. The man who was to be sent 
was Harry St. John Philby. 
The attempts that were being made by Keyes, Cox and other British 
Government officials to asses the role leaders such as Ibn Saud could play 
in the war effort, were partly the result of pressure mounted following the 
fateful campaigns in Gallipoli and Mesopotamia. It was hoped that 
involving Arab rulers would divert Ottoman resources away from British 
lines as well as maintain stability in Arabia by playing off Arab chiefs 
against each other. Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in 
Egypt entered into correspondence with Sharif Hussein of Mecca between 
July 1915 and February 1916 in order to obtain the latter's co-operation in 
the fight against the 'Turks'. Hussein was manoeuvring to obtain his own 
independence and unlike Ibn Saud had openly declared an interest in 
being the ruler of all Arabs. 
McMahon however, did not wish to be too specific about British 
support for Hussein after the war. Negotiations with France about the 
nature of Anglo-French co-operation were ongoing and there was no desire 
to prejudice those discussions by making early promises to Hussein. At the 
same time, there was a military need for a diversion in Arabia to take 
pressure off soldiers in Gallipoli. McMahon gave pledges of British support 
for Hussein in return for his assistance in the fight against Istanbul. Yet 
since that time there has been controversy over the nature of those 
assurances and interpretations of McMahons letters. 79 However it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in the discussion of the Hussein- 
McMahon correspondence. 80 
79 Matters were complicated, argues Lawrence Graffety-Smith, because the original Arabic 
version of one of McMahon's most controversial 
letters to Hussein could not be found in 
either Cairo or Jeddah making it difficult to disabuse the Sharif's misinterpretations at the 
time. See McMahon-Hussein letter of October 24,1915, cited and commented on by 
Lawrence Graffety-Smith. At the time the 24 year old Graffety-Smith was a newly 
appointed official at the British Agency in Jeddah. See Lawrence Graffety-Smith, Bright 
Levant, London: John Murray, 1970, pp. 154-156. 
so This author has only briefly touched on the correspondence but for a more in depth 
study see Elie Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence 
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In any case, no official agreement between McMahon and Hussein 
occurred. This did not prevent the Sharif from having grandiose ambitions 
and dreams of becoming ruler of all the Arabs-with British help. Indeed 
financial and material encouragement came from the Foreign Office and 
the 'Arab Bureau' based in Cairo. 81 However, McMahon's deputy Ronald 
Storrs did not believe Hussein exerted as much influence in the Arab world 
as the Sharif thought. Who in North Africa, Egypt, Yemen or Eastern Arabia 
would recognise Hussein as their 'king' -let alone as leader of all the Arabs?. 82 
Nevertheless, British officials in Egypt with encouragement from London 
felt they had to support Hussein as much as possible. When they started in 
November 1914 it could not have been realised how much money, and 
weaponry, or how many promises would have to be poured into Hussein's 
cause. 
In June 1916 Hussein organised an uprising against the Ottoman 
administration-that came to be called the 'Great Arab Revolt'. 83 Having 
and its Interpretations 1914-1939, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1976. Also Antonius, 
The Arab Awakeneing, especially Chapter 9; and Isaiah Friedman, Palestine: A Twice Promised 
Land?, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000. 
81 The purpose of the Bureau was to gather and analyse intelligence on the Arabs and to 
keep the various British agencies "simultaneously informed on the general tendency of 
German and Turkish policy" regarding the region, 'Report of Committee of Imperial 
Defence', January 7,1916, PRO FO 882/2, ARB/16/4, cited by Westrate, The Arab Bureau, 
p. 31, fn 42. 
87, Storrs wrote: "When in addition we reflected that 90 per cent of the Moslem World must 
call Husain a renegade and traitor to the Vicar of God we could not conceal from ourselves 
(and with difficulty from him) that his pretensions bordered upon the tragi-comic. " Ronald 
Storrs, The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs, New York: G. P. Putnam, 1937, p. 168. This is the 
American version of his famed book Orientations. Storrs also commented on the problems 
of translations and language: "Our Arabic correspondence with Mecca was prepared by 
Ruhi, a fair though not profound Arabist (and a better agent than scholar); and checked, 
often under high pressure by myself. I had no Deputy, Staff or office, so that during my 
absence on mission the work was carried on (better perhaps) by others but the continuity 
was lost. Husain's letters on the other hand were written in an obscure and tortuous prose 
in which the purity of the Hejaz Arabic was overlaid and tainted with Turkish idioms and 
syntax". Storrs, The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs, p. 168. 
93 Many works already cover in detail the ambitions and motivations behind Hussein's 
'Arab Revolt' of 1916; See Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: the Struggle for 
Mastery in the Middle East 1789-1923, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, 
especially chapter 13; Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, 'Myth in the Desert, or Not the Great 
Arab Revolt' in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, no. 2, (April 1997), pp. 267-312; and Elie 
Kedourie, England and the Middle East: the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1921, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1987, p. 35. Also Sylvia Haim, Arab Nationalism, Los Angeles: 
UCLA Press, 1962, pp. 34-53; Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism, New York: St. Martins Press, 
1990, p. 21; George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 184-200; Winstone, The Illicit 
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successfully taken over Mecca, he was unable to project his power beyond 
the city. Ottoman forces were quickly reinforced through the Damascus- 
Medina railway. The speed of the Ottoman reaction threatened to end 
Hussein 's challenge. The Arab Bureau Chief, David Hogarth, was forced to 
plough more supplies and money into Hussein's venture. Hogarth's 
protege the famous T. E. Lawrence helped train the Hijazi rebels to fight an 
irregular war against Ottoman forces-a strategy that went against the 
tactics traditionally used by British forces. Using money, gold and weapons 
Lawrence was able to entice, cajole and purchase beduin loyalties. 
At the same time Hogarth did not want Hussein to become too 
powerful. It was important to maintain a balance of power in Arabia 
between Hussein, Ibn Saud and the Al-Rashid. Hogarth preferred to see 
each leader "in such a position as to have a wholesome respect for the 
other". r For the essence of controlling Arabia was to prevent the coming 
together of the various Arab leaders against Britain. This was also the view 
of Hogarth's superior, Sir Reginald Wingate, the Governor-General of the 
Sudan. Wingate was keen to channel all support to Hussein and avoid 
providing any encouragement to Ibn Saud. 85 He also believed British 
interests were best served by preserving Hussein as the custodian of the 
Hijaz and the holy cities. 
This was seemingly consistent with the policy advocated by the 
Secretary of State for India, Lord Crewe: 
What we want is not a United Arabia; but a weak and 
disunited Arabia, split up into little principalities so far as 
Adventure, pp. 256-268; Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, pp. 31-37 and Storrs, 
Memoirs of Ronald Storrs, pp. 177-201. For, an Ottoman perspective on the Revolt and 
Turkish-Hijaz relations see Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and 
Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, Los Angeles: UCLA Press, 1997, pp. 196-200. 
84 Hogarth note, December 31,1917, PRO FO 882/8. IS/17/34, in Westrate Arab Bureau, 
p. 119 
85Report of Reginald Wingate to FO, December 28,1917, PRO, 
FO/371/3056/244770/99430. Wingate believed that Ibn Saud exaggerated the threat 
posed by the Al-Rashid. Not only 
had Wingate supported Hussein and his revolt but he 
also looked for other supporters against the 
Ottomans. Major Reilly was dispatched to the 
region of Asir in southern Arabia with £25,000 to entice the local ruler Sheikh Idriss to join 
the revolt against the Turks. See 'Report of Major Reilly Visit to Sheikh Idriss, PRO FO 
371/3056/238536. 
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possible under our suzerainty-but incapable of coordinated 
action against us, forming a buffer against powers in the 
west. 86 
However, the Indian Government was deeply disturbed by the cavalier 
attitude with which the Arab Bureau (backed by the Foreign Office) 
conducted Arabian policy. Cairo officials seemed to have no regard for the 
adverse effects of its policies on Indian political interests. The 
encouragement of Hussein to revolt against his Muslim suzerain would 
only cause hostility and suspicion among the millions of Muslim subjects in 
India. Massive unrest in the towns and villages could result. The Indian 
Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, was concerned that Arab Bureau support for 
Sharif Hussein would be detrimental to the morale and affect the loyalty of 
Muslim troops serving in the British Indian Army. 87 
This tension between Indian and Egyptian officials was due to the 
absence of co-ordinated policy among various British administrations and 
the lack of information sharing. Officials in Cairo did not realise the extent 
of support India was giving to Ibn Saud nor did they consider the effects of 
Hijaz-Najd conflict on British interests in the Persian Gulf. Ronald Storrs 
noted that: 
So far as we were concerned it seemed to be nobody's 
business to harmonise the various views and policies of the 
Foreign Office, the India Office, the Admiralty, the War 
Office, the Government of India and the Residency in 
Egypt. 88 
Ibn Saud meanwhile saw British support for Hussein's revolt as 
prejudicing his own position, and felt that Britain might expect him to 
submit to the Sharif's authority in future. He had spent much energy in 
putting down his own revolt of the Ajman tribe. Now, he sought 
clarification from Cox as to his position in relation to the British 
86 Crewe private telegram to Hardinge, Viceroy of India, November 12,1914, cited in 
Busch Britain, India and the Arabs: 1914-1921, p. 62. 
$7Chelsmford succeeded Hardinge as Viceroy of India in 1916, see Graves, Life of Percy Cox, 
p. 205. and Westrate The Arab Bureau, pp. 80-81,117. 
ABEDIN-FOUR 134 
Government. A meeting was arranged for the two in November in the port 
town of Uqair. The amir explained to Cox the strain on his resources and 
that the trade of his people had suffered as a result of fighting the Al- 
Rashid. Although Cox gave assurances of British support he could not give 
him honest advice. Cox hoped Ibn Saud would be more active in battle so 
that his superiors would be convinced of the Saudi leaders' value. He could 
not encourage this because the Government of India was averse to 
financing Ibn Saud's adventures nor did they want to encourage the Saudi 
leader out of fear of him making aggressive moves on Hejaz. Also Hogarth 
and Wingate at the Arab Bureau had philosophical aversions to 
Wahhabism and did not want to see it spread. 89 
Cox attempted to placate the amir by presenting him with the order 
of the Knights Cross of the Indian Empire (KCIE). It seemed to have the 
desired effect since in his speech after receiving the award, Ibn Saud 
praised Britain for trying to unite the Arabs and denounced the Porte for 
its efforts to weaken and divide. He even managed to pay tribute to Sharif 
Hussein for his part in the fight against the Ottoman oppressors. Ibn Saud's 
final act was to pledge to cooperate with the Allied war effort. 90 
Harry St. John Philby 
By late 1917, the British position in the war was uncertain. Russia had 
undergone great internal change that year with the overthrow of the czar 
and the Bolshevik revolution, which made her commitment to the war 
precarious. The Arab revolt had not been a resounding success, the 
Ottomans were still in Medina and relations between Ibn Saud and 
Hussein were at a stage which could lead to hostilities breaking out. The 
request Cox had made for an assistant brought Harry St. John Philby to the 
88 Storrs, The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs, p. 168. 
89'Relations with Ibn Saud' Arab Bureau Report, January 12,1917, IOR L/P&S/18/B251. 
90 See Graves, Life of Percy Cox, pp. 213-214; Westrate, The Arab Bureau, p. 118-119; Busch, 
Britain, India and the Arabs, p. 245. 
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Gulf. Cox entrusted Philby to lead a mission to Ibn Saud in order to 
encourage the amir to take a more active role against Ibn Rashid. 91 
The meeting between these two men was to start a relationship that 
would span three decades. Cambridge educated Philby had, according to 
Howarth, a "heightened sense of his own opinion". 92 Indeed Philby 
quarrelled furiously with superiors and subordinates alike (his 
disagreement with his deputy, Colonel Hamilton, was so great that the 
latter left Riyadh within a week after arrival). Yet Philby had developed a 
deep interest in the Saudi amir. Whether it was Ibn Saud's personality, or 
beduin hospitality, Philby believed he had found a far more capable leader 
and one who was more connected to his people, than Sharif Hussein. 
Philby also found great interest in the genealogy of tribes, particularly of 
the Al-Saud family. He spent hours with the amir, learning about the 
exploits of Saudi predecessors and the history of the Arabian peninsula 93 
This was the beginning of Philby's indulgence in his personal 
interests which often came at the expense of his instructions from Cox- 
instructions that called for action. It was important at that stage in the war 
for Ibn Rashid to be distracted from the right flank of Lawrence and the 
troops of Hussein who were fighting their way up the Hijaz. The Al-Rashid 
had been a nuisance in Mesopotamia and were involved in the smuggling 
of arms into Ottoman territory, reducing the effectiveness of the British 
blockade. Philby was instructed to offer Ibn Saud £20,000 to purchase 
camels, 1,000 rifles and four field guns so that an assault could be launched 
on Hail, the Rashidi capital. 94 
The final deal was to be negotiated by Sir Ronald Storrs who was to 
journey to Riyadh from Hijaz. 95 Sharif Hussein however, not wishing to see 
91The experiences were later published by Philby as, Heart of Arabia, Vols. 1&2, London: 
Constable & Co. 1922, and also Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis, London: Frank Cass 1977. 
92Howarth, The Desert King, p. 102. Also McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, p. 54 
93 Monroe, Philby of Arabia, London: Faber and Faber, 1973. 
94 'Relations with Ibn Saud', Arab Bureau Report, January 12,1917, IOR L/P&S/18/B251. 
See also Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs: 1914-1921, pp. 250-255. 
95 Storrs was to be appointed as the replacement for the deceased Captain Shakespeare. He 
had already tried to take up the post in May but had suffered heatstroke and was forced to 
turn back. Storrs returned to England and offered to make the trip again in October 
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any benefits go to his Saudi rival, refused to let Storrs go, claiming that he 
could not guaranty safety from the 'Wahhabi fanatics of Ibn Saud 96 It was 
another attempt to frustrate British attempts to get Ibn Saud more involved 
in the war effort. Philby saw this as an opportunity to explore the desert 
interior of Arabia for himself and to make a historic trip from one end of 
the Arabian peninsula to the other. 
He managed to convince Ibn Saud that he should be allowed to 
venture to Hijaz and bring back Storrs, proving the Sharif wrong. 
However, Philby was leaving Riyadh with a vital agreement between 
Britain and Ibn Saud unsigned. With escorts provided by the amir, Philby 
reached the Hijaz without incident. His safe arrival humiliated the Sharif. 
Incensed, Hussein forbade Philby, let alone Storrs, from returning via the 
desert. This forced Philby to take a long fortuitous route by ship first to 
Cairo then all the way to Bombay where he had to travel back to the Gulf 
and then overland to Riyadh. It was a journey that took more than four 
months to complete. 
Philby's absence meant that Riyadh was without a British official to 
conclude the agreement with Ibn Saud. Cox and the Indian Government 
had been observing the direction of Hijazi campaigns and had not followed 
up with Ibn Saud. They did not send anyone to Riyadh in Philby's absence. 
Meanwhile Hussein 's forces had achieved successes in their campaign's in 
northern Hijaz, proving that Ibn Saud was neither needed nor effective. 97 
The offer of money and guns for Najd was withdrawn, much to the 
embarrassment of Philby and to the anger of Ibn Saud. Contemplating an 
because no appointment had yet been made to the court of Ibn Saud, but he was not sent. 
Correspondence between Cox and the SSI regarding this period can be found in IOR 
L/P&S/10/2182. Also Busch Britain, India and the Arabs: 1914-1921, p. 248. 
% Ibid, p. 261. Philby's self righteousness annoyed officials at the Arab Bureau like Hogarth 
and Wingate and in return Philby disliked the Arab Bureau for he saw them as inimical to 
the interests of Ibn Saud, Westrate, The Arab Bureau, pp. 120-121. 
97Minutes of Middle East Committee, January 191918, IOR L/P&S/18/B280/P337 
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offensive against Hussein, Ibn Saud was restrained by Philby who sent the 
amir some gold to deter an assault on Hijaz. 98 
Meanwhile, in London, Sharif Hussein had emerged with a positive 
record of supporting the Allies, while Ibn Saud appeared uncommitted and 
less important to British objectives: 
As between Hussein and Saud, the choice for our military 
policy is simple, and our greatest effort must be to support 
the Sherif ...... Ibn Saud on the other hand has secured us 
little definite military advantage beyond the moral influence 
of his alliance. 99 
It was sentiments such as these that boosted Hussein's hopes for obtaining 
independence and an empire of his own. This was much to the annoyance 
of the Government of India, which was concerned that the promotion of 
Arab nationalism by the Arab Bureau would inspire similar desires among 
its Indian Muslim subjects. 100 
However as the outcome of the war appeared to favour the Allies 
the future of the Arabs was being decided in Europe. British negotiations 
with France and Russia were well underway to create mandates in the 
territories taken from Ottoman control. Both Lawrence in the west, and 
Cox, in the east were occupied by the regional considerations of their 
respective departments and would not have been aware of the deals being 
arranged at the time. In fact Cox was not informed of the Sykes-Picot 
agreement until almost a year later, despite the fact that it would directly 
affect his position as Chief Political Officer in Basra. 101 
The Ikhwan and Sharif Hussein 
98'Report of Philby Mission to Bin Saud', Philby to Political Agent, Baghdad, December 9, 
1917, IOR R/15/2/38. Philby used gold from a special allotment that he had at his 
discretion, Howarth, The Desert King, p. 104. 
99'Report on Ibn Saud', War Office, January 21,1918, IOR L/P&S/18/B270/P337. 
100 Fierce disagreements raged within the Arab Bureau as well as between Bureau and the 
Indian Government. Philby was a major annoyance to all because he refused to bring Ibn 
Saud into line with what Hogarth wanted, which was to prevent attacks on the Al-Rashid 
of Hail. Ironically Hogarth wanted to keep the Al-Rashid as counter-weights to both Ibn 
Saud and Hussein, so that no one leader would become all powerful. For further 
discussion of these points see Westrate, The Arab Bureau, pp. 123-133. 
ABEDIN-FOUR 138 
Sharif Hussein ruled with a firm, autocratic hand. A workaholic 
even in his seventies, Hussein was unwilling to admit that he could not 
achieve everything he set out to do. Practicality was secondary to the 
satisfaction of his whims. 102 He taxed pilgrim visitors excessively and 
though responsible for their safety left them to be fleeced further by local 
merchants and tribesmen. Hussein ran kickback scams at the medical 
clinics treating pilgrims and at one time decided to change the entire 
currency system overnight, replacing the Ottoman currency with his own 
coinage, which was diluted metal, and threatened to hang anyone who 
complained 103 He tried to starve the local beduin into obedience rather 
than pay out vast subsidies by passing a law that prohibited the export of 
more than six bushels of grain from the towns to the countryside on any 
one day. This was far less than the minimum required for daily 
consumption by the tribes and settlements outside the town walls 104 
Paranoid about dissent, Hussein had spies throughout Jeddah and 
Mecca. He brought great distress to foreign consuls by his flippant 
treatment of treaties and agreements - not hesitating to abrogate parts that 
he suddenly found unsuitable. He was "damnably despotic". In describing 
Hussein's personality Reader Bullard, the British consul called him: 
a cunning, lying, credulous, suspicious, obstinate, vain, 
conceited, ignorant, greedy, cruel Arab sheikh suddenly 
thrust into a position where he has to deal with all sorts of 
questions he doesn't understand and where there is no power 
to restrain him, and you have a picture of King Hussein 105 
1OMonroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, p. 36. 
102 For more on the personality of Hussein see Randall Baker, King Hussein and the Kingdom 
of Hejaz. New York: Oleander Press, 1979. 
1O313ullard, Two Kings, p. 11 & pp. 43-45. 
204Bullard, Letter of November 18,1923 cited in Bullard, Two Kings, p. 24. 
1OSBullard to Andrew Ryan, Levant Consular Service, 5 October 1923, Bullard Papers, St. 
Anthony's College, Oxford, Box VI, File 5, cited in Lacey The Kingdom, p. 182. However, 
this letter was not included in the compilation of Bullard correspondence, official and 
private, published in Two Kings in Arabia. One reason may have been the belief of the 
editor, E. C. Hodgkin, that such candid views were part of Bullard's personal attempts to 
"let off steam" given the harsh conditions and many frustrations faced in Jeddah. Thus 
Hodgkin did not retain some of the more colourful language used by Bullard to describe 
certain events involving Sharif Hussain when 
"on occasions the steam did come near 
boiling point" because Hodgkin felt "it would be unfair to Bullard's memory to let it curl 
up these pages". See Two Kings, Introduction, p. xiii. Also p. 66 and p. 28. 
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The inhabitants of Hijaz had numerous national backgrounds; Afghans, 
Indians, Javanese, Malays, Nigerians, Syrians and Turks were among the 
many who came for the pilgrimage and stayed behind. Yet Hussein was 
not content with what he could squeeze from the pilgrims and sought more 
taxes from the outlying tribes. Among those he was to make demands on 
were the Utayba of al-Qassim, in the area wedged in between Hijaz and 
Najd. 
This strategic region was to play an important role in the careers of 
Arabian rulers. Straddling both the interior of Najd and the western Hijaz, 
al-Qassim was a valuable staging ground for attacks into either region. 
Important caravan routes between Hijaz and Kuwait and the Gulf Coast 
also passed through this region. Of particular importance were the 
settlements of Khurma and Turaba, made up of several oases, and 
inhabited by members of the Utayba, Subay, Buqum and Shakwa tribes, 
with the Subay and Utayba being the most prominent. In the nineteenth 
century Saudi conquests of western Arabia had brought many locals into 
contact with Muwahkldun ideals. 106 
Philby was however "astonished and bewildered" at the differences 
between the local inhabitants and the rest of Najd. He was amazed at the 
"open handed hospitality of its people and of its complete freedom from 
any kind of religious or sectarian bigotry. . . it seemed to me that I had 
stepped suddenly out of barbarism into a highly civilised and even 
cultured society. "107 
After being re-taken by Ottoman/ Egyptian forces, al-Qassim, 
though nominally independent, was claimed by the Sharif of Mecca. By 
providing subsidies and appointing several judges and other officials to the 
area Hussein hoped to strengthen his position. The most significant 
appointment was that of Khalid ibn Luayy, as the amir of Khurma. With his 
men in place, Hussein felt it was his right to claim taxes and tribute from 
106'Note on Centreal Arabia', no date, IOR L/P&S/18/B334. 
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the town. However, when Ibn Saud began subsidising local Ikhwan 
settlements, 'teachers' were sent to al-Qassim to instruct people in 
Muwahfddun principles. Many in Khurma were won over, among them 
Khalid ibn Luayy. However, shrewdly, Luayy played it safe and kept his 
ties to Hussein. 108 Nevertheless, the Sharif learned of the mutinous events 
in Kurman and launched an attack on the town to regain his authority. The 
attack was repulsed and Luayy finally broke with Hussein declaring his 
allegiance, and that of the townspeople, to Ibn Saud. Though the assault 
failed it embittered Hussein ever more against the Najdi ruler. The stage 
was set for another battle between Ibn Saud and Hussein. 
Though Hussein would never meet Ibn Saud, the Sharif did not 
have much regard for tribal peoples and considered the Najdi amir a lowly 
servant rather than a capable ruler in his own right. British Consul Bullard 
who interacted with both men was to remark that Ibn Saud "could have 
completely overthrown Hussein in politics and probably equalled him in 
theology, which occupied much of his reading and conversation". 109 
Hussein was further incited against Ibn Saud for being embarrassed in 
Medina. The city was the only Ottoman stronghold which Hussein had 
been unable to capture and had been placed under siege. Hoping to starve 
the town into surrender Hussein was sure that supplies were being 
smuggled through from Najd and Kuwait, via al-Qassim and that Ibn 
Saud's eldest son, Turki who was in command of the forces that were to 
maintain the blockade from the east, was the cause. 110 Also bothering 
Hussein were the many traders involved in blockade busting who were 
from towns such as Khurma and Turaba. 
Several attempts were made by Hussein during the war to occupy 
Khurma and Turaba which had been thwarted by locals who obtained the 
assistance of the Ikhwan. Once the war ended Hussein was able to call 
107 Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis, p. 161 
l08 Luayy himself was related to the Sharifian family. See Kostiner, 'On Instruments and 
their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of the Saudi State' pp. 301-302. 
1O9Reader Bullard, The Camels Must Go: An Autobiography, London, 1961, p. 137. 
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upon the full complement of his forces that had previously been tied up in 
Syria and Medina. Led by Hussein 's son Abdullah, a force of four to five 
thousand men equipped with artillery and machine guns took the 
settlement of Turaba? 11Proud and confident as a result of his victory, 
Abdullah boasted that he would move on to take all of Qassim, then Najd 
and reach the Gulf coast. "We did not come to Turabah for the sake of 
Turabah and Khurma only". 112 
Abdullah's jubilation was short lived for his boasts ignited the anger 
of the tribesmen especially Khalid ibn Luayy. A counter-attack was 
mounted and Abdullah was caught by surprise early in the morning of 
May 26,1919, his men were cut down, and he himself fled in his sleeping 
attire. In one stroke the balance of power in the area shifted from Hussein 
to Ibn Saud. With Abdullah's army routed there was nothing to hold back 
a dash for the heart of Hijaz. The opportunity to take Mecca and cleanse it 
of 'innovation' must have been a dream of the Ikhwan and a valued prize 
for Ibn Saud. Yet the amir refrained from pursuing this campaign further. 
British concerns were raised over the future of their 'Hussein' policy 
and they did not wish to have the Hijaz suddenly overrun by Ibn Saud and 
Ikhwan. Yet at the Versailles Peace conference, British officials from 
London and Egypt dominated; "They regarded Ibn Saud as little more than 
a desert chieftain remotely situated in the centre of Arabia far from the 
strategic peripheral areas where contradictory claims jeopardised British 
interests". 113 Had Ibn Saud chosen to stake his claim at that point he could 
have done so. Charging into Hijaz and capturing key cities would have 
proved to Britain that they had backed the wrong horse. Some authors 
have praised Ibn Saud for proving his "statesmanship by his moderation" 
11oPhilby, 'Najd Report' IOR L/P&S/10/2182. See also Troeller, Birth of Saudi Arabia,. 
p. 103. 
111Safran claims 10,000 beduin were also with Hussain's men, bringing the total figure to 
14-15,000 soldiers. Given that most accounts assert the near annihilation of the Sharifs 
forces this large number of dead would have been noted in communications or by eye 
witness accounts, but this is not the case. 
It would seem that a figure of 4-5000 men is a 
more reasonable figure. See 
Safran Saudi Arabia, p. 42. 
112Habib, The Ikhwan Movement of Najd, pp. 92-93. 
113 Clayton, An Arabian Diary p. 28. 
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in his response. 114 Yet his restraint in not taking Hijaz was perhaps due 
more to practicality. 
His lines of supply would have been stretched even further and the 
task of holding and maintaining order would have been made difficult by 
heightened anxiety in the world Muslim community over the fate of the 
holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Groups were active in India and Egypt 
voicing concerns and opinions regarding the fate and status of those cities. 
Ibn Saud was wary of Muslim public opinion and sought some 
endorsement, or at the least, legitimisation from the community at large. 
Furthermore, it was not certain that Britain would support his holding on 
to Hijaz and Ibn Saud preferred to wait until he had a better chance. 
Furthermore, he was still fully funding Ikhwan settlements and could not 
sustain the additional burdens of disbursing subsidies and gifts in Hijaz 
which would be required to maintain order. Sharif Hussein had been quite 
willing to deceive the tribes in his subsidies to them and as a result many 
dissatisfied beduin raided pilgrim caravans or the Sharif's men, to extract 
what was their due. 115 
The skirmishes over Khurma took place several times and involved 
many different parties. The defeat inflicted upon Abdullah's forces in May 
1919 is perhaps the most contentious. Kostiner asserts that Khalid bin 
Luayy" was operating independently and had no allegiance to any side. 
Ironically Luayy had been appointed by Sharif Hussein as governor of 
Khurma but afterwards Luayy rebelled and either adopted Ikwhan beliefs 
114 Ibid. 
llSBullard, Two Kings, pp. 17-18. Meanwhile Kostiner expends some effort in challenging 
the idea that the evepts at Khurma and Turaba were the "turning point constituting Ibn 
Saud's first significant attempt at expansion". Kostiner asserts that the people of both 
settlements were not Ikhwan, since their environment did not fit the description of Ikhwan 
hujjar and Ibn Saud was not trying implement plans to expand his empire at that point If 
Kosther relies on Helms, Philby or Troeller for this period this opinion is possible because 
the distinctions were not made clear by those authors. Helms for example, uses the term 
Ikwhan liberally which could cause misunderstanding. She does not give a breakdown of 
the composition of forces which attacked Abdullah, calling all of them Ikhwan when in 
fact they were mixture of townsfolk and other tribesmen. See Kostiner, MOSA, pp. 34-43 
and Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, p. 200-202. McLoughlin and Lacey both mention 
that Ikhwan were from the settlement of Ghot-ghot, 300 miles away while Safran and 
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of his own accord or saw political advantages in siding with Ibn Saud-this 
is not clear. 116 Yet in the fight with Abdullah's men Luayy was supposedly 
victorious without the help of Ikhwan. Thus Kostiner concludes that Ibn 
Saud was involved only "indirectly and to a limited extent" and that 
"neither the people of Khurma nor those of Turaba can be defined as 
members of the Ikhwan'. 117 While Kostiner's assertion that none of the 
people of Khurma or Turaba were Ikhwan, is technically accurate, it 
overlooks the fact that many people from those towns joined the Ikhwan 
and that the other tribes in the area had close ties with the Utayba, and 
would have been anxious to defend the two towns from domination from 
Hussein. The most significant point Kostiner makes is that Khalid ibn 
Luayy instigated hostilities with Hussein without Ibn Saud's involvement. 
That said, Ikhwan did become involved and the defeat of Abdullah, 
whether by Luayy's men or Ibn Saud's men, provided an opportunity for a 
Saudi move against the heart of Hijaz-an opportunity which Ibn Saud did 
not take. 
British officials in India were sceptical of the permanence of Ibn 
Saud's regime and of the wisdom in backing Hussein. Meanwhile 
Cairo/London officials didn't want Ibn Saud at all. 118 According to Rendel, 
doubts about Hussein began only during the course of the war. After the 
disasters at Khurma and Turaba it became clear to London that Hussein 
was inefficient, and that Ibn Saud was the one they should support: "We 
believed that he (Ibn Saud) was in fact the only authority able to bring 
McLoughlin indicate that the Ikhwan that took part came from other areas. See Safran, 
Saudi Arabia., p. 42, McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, p. 61-62, Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 149. 
116 Various authors have written about Khalid Ibn Luayy and attribute the problems at 
Khurma to a 'dispute' with Hussain. The exact nature of the dispute is not clear. See 
Winstone, The Illicit Adventure, p. 339, Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs, p. 257, Westrate, 
The Arab Bureau, p. 121. Kostiner offers a more informative view by indicating that tension 
dated back to the battle for Medina when Luayy had an argument with Hussein's son 
Abdullah. Later Hussein sought to remove Luayy for a more loyal chief but was 
unsuccessful. See Kostiner, 'On Instruments and their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and 
the Emergence of the Saudi State' p. 301. 
117 See Kostiner, MOSA, p. 31 and p. 35. Kostiner is extremely detailed where previous 
authors have given broader and more generalised descriptions of that period and it is in 
this respect that his work is so important. 
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order out of chaos in Arabia and to create a stable and on the whole 
effectively administered state". 119 
The events in al-Qassim were a turning point in Britain's 
commitment to multiple powers in Arabia. The disastrous performance of 
Hussein 's forces and his persistent obnoxious attitude led to Britain's 
abandonment of the pro-Hussein policy. One official was to comment that 
"If the Sharif is not strong enough to maintain himself against the 
Wahhabis he will have to go under and the sooner we make up our minds 
to it the better. "120 However, the switch occurred gradually and had to be 
pushed through with the strong backing of Cox and Harry Philby. 
Engaged in what could be termed 'camelback-diplomacy', Harry 
St. John Philby spent much of 1918-1919 travelling between Hussein, Cox 
and Ibn Saud to ensure what he thought was the proper resolution to the 
Hijaz-Najd conflict. It was during this period that Philby's displeasure with 
the attitude of London towards Ibn Saud, while indulging Hussein, came 
to a head. Philby, was very much inspired by the legend of Captain 
William Shakespeare and sought to be like him, perhaps envying the 
closeness and affection Ibn Saud had with the latter. Shakespeare's name 
was "remembered and held in high honour in Arabia by all he came into 
contact" with and Philby wanted to make a similar impression himself. 121 
Philby was also influenced by the sympathy that his superior, Percy 
Cox, had for Ibn Saud. Cox was perhaps the only senior British official to 
be so concerned. It should be understood though that Cox, unlike Philby 
who was developing a deep fascination with the amir and Arabian life, was 
thinking more in strategic terms. Cox's responsibility for the eastern 
Arabian peninsula and the Gulf made him acutely aware of the damage a 
hostile Saudi amir could do to British interests in the east. He was also not 
impressed with Hussein 's irascible character. Yet British policy was again 
ue'Memorandum on British Commitments to Ibn Saud', Political Intelligence Department, 
Foreign Office, IOR L/P&S/18/B295. 
119George Rendel, The Sword and the Olive, p. 58. 
120J. E. Shuckburgh Minute July 8,1919, IOR L/P&S/10/390: P3827/1919. Shuckburgh was 
the Assistant Secretary, Political Department, India Office. 
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looking from the myopic perspective of the Arab Bureau in Cairo and 
officials in London. The centre of that policy was maintaining a strong 
Hussein who could, if necessary, at some later point come to an 
understanding with Ibn Saud. Percy Cox however, had said that "any 
permanent understanding or peace between the two is out of the 
question"122 A few British officials had recognised that Hussein had been 
trying to "to cause a rift between Ibn Saud and His Majesty's 
Government". They believed that not alienating Ibn Saud was important: 
"After all he appears to be the one chief in Arabia thoroughly with us". 123 
Reports from the field were also full of praise for Ibn Saud. The 
Political Agent in Bahrain, Harold Dickson, declared that Ibn Saud was 
"without rival throughout Arabia..... His bluff, candid and open-hearted 
manner serve to act as cover for one of the astutest brains that can be 
found. "124 Dickson observed that most Arabian sheikhs and tribal leaders 
survived by playing powerful neighbours off against weaker ones: "The 
Arab way is to exist by putting his powerful neighbours against each other. 
At the same time, if he cannot do this, he must have a strong protecting 
power to fall back on". 125 Ibn Saud had been effectively using this method 
to rule central Arabia. 
However, Dickson noticed that the nearby rulers on the Gulf coast 
were employing similar tactics to undermine Ibn Saud 126 The ruler of 
Kuwait, Sheikh Salem was using financial incentives to entice certain tribes, 
inPhilby to Wilson, November 2,1918, FO 371/4144/4370, cited in Kostiner, MOSA, p. 20. 
I22Cited in Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921, p. 255. 
123 Marrs Minute, October 12,1920 IOR L/P&S/10/936/P7439. 
124 Report of Political Agent, Bahrain August 12,1920 (H. R. P. Dickson) IOR 
L/P&S/10/936/B349. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ibid. Dickson also believed that Ibn Saud was being fed a lot of rubbish stories from his 
advisors about British intentions and world events; "cut off from the world by post and 
telegraph, and getting as he does, daily exaggerated and false stories from all sides he 
cannot be blamed if he gets suspicious of our actions. " Yet Dickson himself admitted that 
his own sources of information were questionable. Beduin and various major and minor 
sheikhs would often pander to British fears or have hidden agendas. Dickson mentioned in 
his dispatches that the information he was obtaining may not be 100% true and that he 
was having to judge or guess whether his informant was telling the truth, but that this was 
the nature of intelligence gathering. Report of Political Agent, Bahrain August 12,1920 in 
IOR L/P&S/10/936. 
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as well as the Sheikh of Bahrain, to switch loyalties and turn away from Ibn 
Saud. The chief of the Ajman tribe, Ibn Hithlain, refused a bribe and 
informed Ibn Saud of Kuwaiti intentions. Dickson attributed this activity to 
the uncertain position Ibn Saud had with Britain which was allowing the 
small states to intrigue against him. The Political Agent recommended that 
Britain indicate its firm support for Ibn Saud and allow him to emerge as 
the strong force in Arabia. This would place all the other states in greater 
need of Britain's help and thus make them much more obedient and 
amenable to instructions from London. 
An Invitation to London 
Foreign Office officials wished to invite Ibn Saud to London to extend 
hospitality to him and the amir of Kuwait and to hear their views. For the 
invitees it provided an opportunity to lodge their complaints and 
grievances with London. Anxious to have that opportunity but busy with 
maintaining the integrity of his territories Ibn Saud decided to send his 
eldest son, Turki, already distinguished in battlefield commands. Yet Turki, 
contracted the influenza virus and died before he had a chance to leave 127 
The young man left behind a son and three daughters of his own. The 
influenza epidemic of 1919 was devastating on the Al-Saud. At least two 
other young sons of Ibn Saud and one of his wives also died in the 
outbreak. 
Turki had been the one most likely to succeed his father. Next in 
seniority was Saud, and he was also being groomed for leadership; taught 
the ways of the desert including raiding and falconry. Yet Saud was also 
the full brother of Turki and it is perhaps understandable that there was a 
reluctance to send him away so soon after Turki's death. So it fell upon the 
shoulders of the third son, Faisal, a boy of just thirteen to represent Ibn 
Saud in London. 128 
127 Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 277. 
128 Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 61. 
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Faisal had distinguished maternal family connections of his own. 
His mother, Tarfah was from the family of Al Al-Sheikh, and a direct 
descendent of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. Tarfah died when 
Faisal was just five or six, and he was sent to live with his maternal 
grandfather, Sheikh Abdullah ibn Abdul Latif, far away from the royal 
court. Faisal was a sickly child but was drilled in religious principles, 
Islamic jurisprudence and classical Arabic. He had no full brothers of his 
own nor any half-brothers of his age. Several years separated him from 
those younger and older than him. Faisal had a somewhat lonely 
childhood. 
Though sheltered from the responsibilities and busy pace of his 
father's majlis, Faisal was better educated and maturer than many of his 
brothers. He also gained the tools to be a critical thinker, which would help 
him in later life. 129 He developed a fondness for poetry, especially lilting 
beduin verse which he spent long nights of his youth by the campfire 
listening to and reciting. Faisal's curiosity and eagerness to learn gave him 
an intellectual edge over his siblings. Thus when Faisal became amir of 
Hijaz and later King of Saudi Arabia he was capable of diffusing religious 
opposition to his policies by engaging the ulema in debates citing judicial 
texts to successfully defend his positions. 130 
Faisal's mission to London was somewhat symbolic since he would 
not be the main negotiator in meetings with British officials. 
Accompanying him were two escorts, Abdullah al-Qosaibi, a prominent al- 
Hasa merchant and Ahmad Thunayan a relative from the Thunayan 
branch of the family. Ahmad had spent most of his life in Turkey, returning 
to Riyadh only after Ibn Saud had captured the city in his first conquest. 
Speaking both Turkish and French it was Thunayan's role to advise young 
Faisal on how to deal with 'foreigners' and he was to take up the issue of 
l29Alexander Bligh, From Prince To King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the 
Twentieth Century, New York: New York University Press, 1984, p. 20. 
13OVincent Sheean, Faisal: The King and his Kingdom, Tavistock, UK: University Press of 
Arabia, 1975, p. 79. 
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Hussein and disputes in al-Qassim with British officials.. 131 Abdullah al- 
Qosaibi was entrusted in obtaining needed supplies and equipment from 
Europe. 
It was the first time a member of the Al-Saud was to travel to 
Europe. The teenage son of the amir of Najd met King George V at 
Buckingham Palace; toured the House of Commons and Lords; saw 
Cambridge University; met Harry Philby's young son Kim (who was later 
to become a famous Soviet spy), and visited over a dozen battlefields in 
northern France. Faisal spent much of his time, experiencing and exploring 
the sights of Europe while his escorts fulfilled their missions. Al-Qosaibi 
busied himself in procuring various equipment and supplies to take back 
to Riyadh. In talks with British officials in Paris, Ahmad Thunayan who 
was being pressed to realise the need for moderation in Saudi-Hussein 
relations, stated "I give you my word on behalf of my master, Ibn Saud, 
that no matter what the provocation, there shall be no war for three 
years". 132 Ahmad Thunayan also had a meeting with Faisal ibn Hussein, 
one of the Sharif's other sons. This was arranged by British officials in an 
attempt to resolve some of the conflicts over al-Qassim towns like Khurma 
and Turaba. The meeting nearly led to blows as both sides traded insults 
instead of working out any agreement 133 
When the group returned to Najd in February, 1920, Ibn Saud was 
pleased at the hospitality given to his son but distressed at the reports form 
Ahmad Thunayan. He was outraged hearing that British officials still 
thought more highly of Hussein than of himself and that they expected the 
amir to work with the Sharif. Ibn Saud complained of this to Percy Cox 
whom he met while the latter was on his way to take on the post of High 
Commissioner in Iraq. 134More infuriating were the suggestions that Faisal 
ibn Hussein would be made King of Iraq. Cox assured the amir that he 
personally did not approve of such a measure, but Cox was unaware that 
131Gerald De Gaury, Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia, London: Arthur Barker, 1966, p. 22. 
l32lbid. pp. 29-30. 
133McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, pp. 62-63. 
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back in London officials were about to inaugurate a new era in British 
policy. 
Reorganising British Administration 
In February 1921, Winston Churchill became Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. He was to launch a major re-evaluation of British policy towards 
the Middle East. A month after taking office Churchill convened a 
conference in Cairo, where he gathered together experts on the Middle East 
from various government departments. 135 One of the objectives was reduce 
the inefficiency of British administration caused by competing 
responsibilities of the various authorities in London, Cairo and Delhi. 
Churchill sought to bring central control to the Colonial Office. More 
importantly he looked to cut down financial expenditures in order to avoid 
"demanding further sacrifices from the British taxpayer. "136 As a result of 
the Cairo conference the overlapping jurisdictions were dissolved in favour 
of one administrative entity, the Middle East Department. Churchill felt 
strongly about the need to co-ordinate policy stating that: 
The Arab problem is all one, and any attempt to divide it will 
only reintroduce the same paralysis and confusion of action 
which has done so much harm during the last two 
years...... Feisal or Abdullah, whether in Mesopotamia or 
Mecca; King Hussein at Mecca; Bin Saud at Najd; Bin Rashid 
at Hail; the Sheikh of Kuweit; and King Samuel at Jerusalem 
are all inextricably interwoven and no conceivable policy can 
have any chance which does not pull all the strings affecting 
them. 137 
l34Clayton, An Arabian Diary, p. 28. 
13sIndia Office, Department Minute, March 3,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/938/P989 outlines the 
purpose of the Cairo conference of 1921. See also Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914- 
1921, p. 467 
Winston Churchill, speech on 'Middle East Government Policy' in the House of 
Commons, June 14,1921. Text reprinted in Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 
1897-1963, Vol. III, ed. Robert James, London: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974. p. 3096. 
137Letter from Churchill to the Prime Minister from Nice, 12 January, 1921 cited in Aaron 
Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921, 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 
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The Middle East Department was to enable policy making to be centralised 
in London where it was based. This meant that issues between His 
Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud were to be handled by the new 
department and involve only the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and 
not the India Office. 138 However, since the Political Resident in the Persian 
Gulf was also responsible for the local administrative issues of the Arabian 
littoral (Trucial states) he would still consult regularly with the 
Government of India. But in matters relating to a political nature the 
Political Resident was to have the prior approval of the Colonial Office. 139 
Churchill proudly told the House of Commons that as a result of his 
re-organisation, "within the whole of the Arabian Peninsula, and 
throughout the whole of that great area, we have a single clear policy upon 
which all the authorities, military and civil, are at the present time 
agreed". 140 
The work of the Middle East Department was to take on added 
complications by the new territorial jurisdictions created at the end of the 
First World War. The former Ottoman territories of the Middle East had 
been divided amongst the Allied powers at Versailles. Britain was formally 
granted the mandates over Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq by the Council 
of the League of Nations in July 1922. Syria and Lebanon were given to 
France. Sharif Hussein was retained as ruler of Hijaz while his sons 
r -t ers 
Abdullah and Faisal were made Yskgs- of Transjordan and Iraq 
respectively. 141 Faisal ibn Hussein was appointed r 
K; ^ t of Iraq and his 
brother Abdullah was given Transjordan. The Hashemite family now had 
centres of power in Amman, Baghdad, and Mecca. Trapped in central 
Arabia Ibn Saud lamented that for all his efforts to support Britain, she had 
"surrounded me with enemies". 142 British policy had been summed up by 
138Busch Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921 p. 442-443. 
139 India Office Departmental Minute, March 3,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/938/P989. 
140, Winston Churchill, speech on 'Middle East Government Policy' in the House of 
Commons, June 14,1921. Text reprinted in Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 
1897-1963, Vol. III, ed. Robert James, London: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974. p. 3096. 
141 Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921, p. 473. 
142 Rihani, Ameen. Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia, London: Constable and Co. 1928, p. 65. 
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the Foreign Office, Middle East Committee: "keep Ibn Saud in play, by 
small doles of money, pending developments in the military situation, but 
not to supply him except very sparingly with arms, ammunition, and 
military instructors" 143 
In fact Ibn Saud was practically ignored. To his alarm Britain had 
rewarded his Hashemite enemies with territory and money. Was Ibn Saud 
to believe that he was considered not much more than just another desert 
chief. He clearly did not accept this. His family had been rulers of Najd, 
and at times much of Arabia, in preceding centuries. On August 22,1921, 
Ibn Saud proclaimed himself 'Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies' (sultan 
najd wa malhagatiha)144This elevated him over other tribal chiefs and also 
gave him at least equal stature to Sharif Hussein of Mecca. His new title did 
not reduce the political and financial strain. In fact Ibn Saud learned that 
Faisal of Iraq was making overtures to the Al-Rashid of Hail which 
threatened to further encircle the Najdi polity. Ibn Saud was forced into 
action. 145 
Though Hail was four hundred miles north-west of Riyadh in the 
region of Jebel Shammar, it was strategically located so that caravans 
travelling between Najd and Syria, as well as from Egypt to Kuwait, passed 
through her territory. Great revenues could be gained from taxes and 
tribute. Fortunately for Ibn Saud there was a great deal of turmoil within 
the Al-Rashid family itself in the year 1920-1921.146 Rivalry and internal 
divisions had led to the assassination of the ruling amir and the succession 
of Abdullah ibn Miteb Al-Rashid, an inexperienced boy of eighteen. King 
Faisal was trying to use the situation to his advantage and extend Iraqi 
influence into Hail. However, Ibn Saud decided to launch a pre-emptive 
strike against the Al-Rashid before the Hashemites could establish strong 
143 Minutes of Middle East Committee Meeting, January 19,1918, IOR 
L/P&S/18/B280/P337. 
144 Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 281. 
145 Philby, Arabian jubilee, pp. 66-67. 
146 Howarth, The Desert King, p. 109. 
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links there. Not only would this enhance Najdi security but it would 
enlarge the tribes from whom taxes could be drawn. 147 
The town of Hail had solid fortifications. Taking it by force would be 
costly in men and resources. Ibn Saud chose to lay in siege hoping to force 
a surrender. While initially holding out, the young amir of Hail, sent an 
envoy to meet Ibn Saud in order to negotiate. Ibn Saud agreed to a peaceful 
settlement if certain conditions were met; that control over foreign relations 
would be relinquished; all matters of dispute should be submitted to Ibn 
Saud for arbitration; and though they would have the right to manage their 
internal affairs, Ibn Saud would have the final decision on any issue. 148 The 
terms were harsh and not all of the Al-Rashid agreed and were particularly 
galled at the idea of being subservient to their arch rivals in Najd. 
Another series of skirmishes took place. None of them were 
decisive. Ibn Saud tightened the siege around Hail. With few supplies 
allowed inside the beleaguered capital, the inhabitants drifted into 
starvation. Some relief came from smuggled goods which Ibn Saud 
suspected Sharif Hussein of having a hand in. For this Ibn Saud 
complained vociferously to the British Political Agent in Bahrain. He 
blamed the Sharif for complicating matters and prolonging the siege by 
raising the hopes of the towns people. 
Finally, with conditions unbearable in the city, the Al-Rashid 
capitulated. On November 4,1921 Ibn Saud entered Hail and met with the 
defeated Abdul Aziz Al-Rashid. The amir was certain he was to be 
executed. Instead, to his surprise, he was told that himself and three other 
senior male members of the Al-Rashid family would be taken to Riyadh 
where they would be treated well and 'looked after'. A move that would 
147 Clive Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925-1939: The Imperial Oasis, London: Frank 
Cass, 1983, p. 31, f. note 48. See also Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, p. 67. 
148 These conditions were remarkably similar to the ones that the Ottomans and the British 
had made on Ibn Saud. See Ibn Saud to Political Agent, Bahrain, May 8,1920, IOR 
R/15/2/40. Also Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 67 and Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, 
pp. 167-170. 
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later prove to have effectively placed them under house arrest 149 The 
townspeople who had feared being plundered were surprised at the 
restraint of Saudi forces. Ibn Saud had forbid his men from taking booty 
and instead provided food to the starving inhabitants. In a move which 
upset some of the Ikhwan, orders were also given to spare the Shia 
minority from harassment. 15° 
The capture of Hail brought the whole of north-west Arabia into Ibn 
Saud's hands. 151 Now he claimed all land the Al-Rashid ruled or had ruled 
in the past which brought him right up to the Syrian, Trans-Jordanian and 
Iraqi borders. This included the strategically important area of Wadi Sirhan 
which lay between Central Arabia and Syria. Serving as a corridor between 
Transjordan and Iraq, Wadi Sirhan acted as a buffer between two 
Hashemite territories. It was also an area where Britain had hoped to place 
rail and pipeline links. Britain would now have to recognise him as a major 
force. The expansion also meant that Ibn Saud was increasingly relying on 
the Ikhwan to secure his position and that reliance would prove dangerous 
as the Ikhwan became rebellious and challenged Ibn Saud's leadership. In 
the next chapter we shall see how the relationship between Ibn Saud and 
the Ikhwan deteriorated into mutual distrust and animosity. 152 
149 al-Rashid, Politics in an Arabian Oasis, pp. 245-249. See also Troeller, Birth of Saudi Arabia, 
pp. 168-169 and Clayton, An Arabian Diary, p. 29. 
15o Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis, p. 102 
151 In contrast to this account, Leslie McLoughlin in Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom, p. 65 
attributes the fall of the city to a secret deal with the 
deputy governor of Hail who was to 
have opened the gates of the town and let in Ibn Saud's men. McLoughlin is not clear 
about the source of this information 
but it does not correlate with accounts in the India 
Office Records nor with the accounts of Al-Rashid family history as told by Madawi al- 
Rashid in Politics of an Arabian Oasis, p. 245-246 as well as Robert Lacey's The Kingdom. The 
omission is despite the fact that McLoughlin's work (1993) is more recent than Madawi al- 
Rashid (1991) or indeed Lacey's (1981). 
152 Almana, Arabia Unified: A Portrait of Ibn Saud, pp. 120-143. 
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Chapter 5 
From Conquest to Rebellion: the Ikhwan Warriors of Ibn Saud 1921-1930 
Expansion into the northwest of Arabia brought new tribal groups under 
the jurisdiction of Ibn Saud. However, this was not, a welcome prospect for 
many tribes. Unwilling to conform to strict Muwahtoidun rules, wary of 
high taxes and the strong-arm tactics of Ikhwan, sections of the Anaizah 
and Shammar tribes crossed the porous and ill defined borders into Iraq. 
They hoped to continue their traditional patterns of seasonal migration and 
had no desire to be under the rule of a central government. From their new 
bases in Iraq these tribes raided the settlements that the Ikhwan had taken 
over. ' This launched a series of raids and counter raids, completely 
disrupting trade and tribal migratory patterns? 
A key leader of Ikhwan raids was Faisal al-Duwish, a member of the 
Mutayr tribe. British officials believed that Ibn Saud was sanctioning the 
raids by al-Duwish. Ibn Saud denied this, but defended the Ikhwan's 
actions, claiming that they were acting in self defence and trying to retrieve 
livestock taken by Iraqi raiders. He argued that Mutayri tribesmen like al- 
Düwish had always migrated freely from one region to another throughout 
the year and would not accept restrictions to their traditional lifestyle .3 On 
March 11,1922, Faisal al-Duwish launched a major raid, with over a 
thousand Ikhwan, deep inside Iraqi territory. Casualties were high and 
included a unit of the Iraqi Camel Corps, the local desert police. The 
Government of Iraq protested loudly and requested that the High 
Commissioner authorise Royal Air Force units to hunt down and bomb the 
attackers. 4 
The High Commissioner of Iraq knew Ibn Saud well. Percy Cox had 
been appointed to the position following the assumption of the British 
1 Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam, p. 124; Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 62 
2Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, p. 174. 
31bn Saud to High Commissioner Iraq, July 14 1921, PRO FO 371/7711/E2566. 
4High Commissioner Iraq to SOSCO, March 13,1922, PRO FO 371/7711/E28971. Also 
Clayton, An Arabian Diary, p. 31. 
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mandate there. 5 Cox did not authorise the RAF attack but realised steps 
needed to be taken to resolve the situation. He was concerned that relations 
between Najd and Iraq should be repaired and that border demarcations be 
agreed. Cox called a meeting in the town of Mohammera on May 5 1922 in 
order to discuss boundary issues. Ibn Saud agreed tö send a representative 
but did not attend himself. 
During the discussions Cox suggested tribal water wells and grazing 
pastures be used to identify areas in which specific tribes could graze, the 
details of which were to be decided on a later date. A committee of experts 
was tasked with the job of deciding which tribes would be considered to be 
under Iraq and Saudi jurisdiction. The decision would be binding on both 
the governments of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi's were amenable to 
this, so was Ibn Saud's representative. Yet when the committee of experts 
decided that the tribes of Muntafiq, Amarat and Dhafir should be under 
Iraqi jurisdiction Ibn Saud refused to ratify the agreement claiming that his 
agent had given too many concessions. 6 
Following the failure of the Mohamemra meeting Ikhwan raids on 
Transjordan increased. At one point, the raiders boldly came within fifteen 
miles of Amman. British troops in armoured cars and Royal Air Force 
planes were sent out to chase the attackers away.? Ibn Saud's reaction to 
the Ikhwan raids was two-fold. In response to British protests he defended 
the action, claiming that it was provoked, but at the same time he sent 
secret messages, admonishing the Ikhwan for unauthorised raids. At other 
times, when it suited his political ends, he would express his satisfaction at 
them. 8 
Controlling the Ikhwan was a delicate balancing act. Their 
determination and zeal was useful for unsettling the Hashemite powers. 
5Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914-1921, p. 420. 
61bn Saud's main objection was the refusal to hand over individuals and tribes that had 
'defected' to the Iraqi side. Ibn Saud wanted to punish them as criminals, but Cox would 
not agree to that. See Troeller, The Birth of 
Saudi Arabia, p. 175. 
7Clayton, An Arabian Diary, p. 33 
8 Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam, p. 126 
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More importantly, Ikhwan conquests provided economic benefits by 
bringing more tribes under Ibn Saud's authority which in turn increased 
his tax base. Raids were another matter. They were not always efficient 
providers of resources, and at times inconvenient-occurring just when a 
deal was being struck with British or other local rulers. His chief advisor 
Hafiz Wahba described Ibn Saud's attitude: 
But in spite of the Ikhwan's excesses, rashness, impetuosity 
and defiance of the Government, Abdul Aziz treated them 
with forbearance hitherto unknown in an Arab king, on 
grounds that whatever excesses, they were a great deal better 
than they had been before and that in the fullness of time this 
phase of harsh intolerance would be softened. 9 
For Percy Cox the continued Ikhwan raids were causing a nuisance and 
hampering efforts to create a stable government in Iraq. It was imperative 
that the vague boundaries between Iraq, Najd and Kuwait were clearly 
identified. 10 Cox renewed his invitation to leaders from Iraq, Kuwait and 
Najd to try to hammer out some form of frontier treaty. This time however, 
Cox insisted that Ibn Saud himself be present. 
A new meeting was called on November 21,1922 at Uqair, a town 
on the eastern al-Hasa coast. " Present were Percy Cox, Colonel Harold 
Dickson, Political Agent in Bahrain, Sabih Beg, Minister of 
Communications and Public Works, representing King Faisal of Iraq, and 
Major J. C. More, the Political Agent in Kuwait, who was deputised to 
represent the Al-Sabah family. Ibn Saud represented himself. Also present 
was the famous Lebanese-American traveller Ameen Rihani. He served as 
an observer, ad hoc translator and commentator for Ibn Saud. 12 
9 Hafiz Wahba, Arabian Days, London: Arthur Baker, 1964, p. 131. 
10 Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925-1939, p. 27. 
1IHRP, Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, London: Allen & Unwin, 1956, pp. 270-278; 
Philby, Arabian jubilee pp. 65-71. Dickson and Philby are consistently the most commonly 
cited references for this period. Goldrup (Saudi Arabia, pp. 357-358, fn15) writing in 1970's 
and Vassiliev writing in the 1990's (The History of 
Saudi Arabia, p. 257 fn28. ) rely primarily 
on these works. This is also the case in the following works as well; Helms, The Cohesion of 
Saudi Arabia, pp. 209, fnl9&20; Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, pp. 179, fn87 and 
Kostiner, The Making of Saudi Arabia, p. 86, fn79. 
12 Clayton, Arabian Diary, p. 34. 
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However, during the five day period of discussions there were 
frequent disagreements between Ibn Saud and Sabih Beg over territory and 
history. At one point Sabih Beg claimed that Iraqi territory extended as far 
as Medina in the Hijaz. Ibn Saud retorted that his family had ruled up to 
Aleppo in Syria and Basra in Iraq. Neither side was willing to accept the 
other's argument, for to do so would prejudice their position when it came 
to the final deal. No matter what each man actually believed, each sought 
to squeeze as much out of the occasion as possible. 13 
The agenda that Cox hoped to pursue was over tribal allegiances 
and border delineation. 14 The High Commissioner was particularly 
concerned with the Dhafir and Amarat tribes that wandered between Najd 
and Iraq. According to Rihani, Ibn Saud was unaware of the agenda Cox 
had planned. The Saudi amir had not come to Uqair to discuss border 
issues, or the Amarat and Dhafir. He had complaints of his own to raise 
against the British-for surrounding him with his old enemies the 
Hashemites. Had he known that Cox would be conspiring with the Iraqi 
regime to fix his borders, he would not have come. 15 Tensions were not 
eased by the fact that Cox kept the amir and his party waiting for several 
days in the humid climate of Uqair, making all present quite irascible. 
Once the session began, Cox introduced the parties and left it to the 
Saudi and Iraqi representatives to work out the details of the agreement. 
Ibn Saud made it clear from the outset that he was opposed to fixed and 
arbitrary borders. The tribes under his authority, especially the Ikhwan, 
13 Zirkili, Shibh al Jazira, fi ahd al Malik Abd al-Aziz, part 1, pp. 288-289. 
14 During the Uqair meetings Percy Cox realised that Ibn Saud considered all of Qatar as 
part of al-Hasa and therefore subject to his taxes and rules. Cox reminded the king sharply 
that Qatar was not part of his territory and Ibn Saud did not press the point. An official at 
the India office who later read Cox's report was of the opinion that it would have been a 
better sign if the king had argued the point bitterly and fiercely. Giving in so swiftly 
seemed suspicious, Simpson Minute, March 2,1923, IOR L/P&S/11/222/ P731/23. 
Indeed the Saudi amir of al-Hasa frequently gave refuge to Qatari insurgents and also 
supported rebellious elements of the Qatari ruling 
family that crossed over into Saudi 
territory. Eventually, the amir of Qatar was forced to pay Ibn Saud tribute of 100,000 
rupees a year for stability in his country. 
See also R. S. Zahlan, The Creation of Qatar, 
London: Routledge, 1979, pp. 81-83. 
is Rihani, Ibn S 'aoud of Arabia, pp. 59-60. 
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would not agree to being restricted by invisible lines in the sand. 
Moreover, accepting fixed borders would crystallise the power of the 
Hashemites. If boundaries had to be discussed Ibn Saud suggested that 
they be based on tribal lines and not borders that would split tribal diras 
through the middle. Therefore, entire tribes should belong either on the 
Iraqi or Saudi side. This was also better for security. Along with this 
demand Ibn Saud sought to have the entire Dhafir tribe placed under his 
jurisdiction and since their grazing ground extended up to the Euphrates 
he claimed his borders should reflect that. Percy Cox thought this idea 
"ridiculous" and did not allow it to be pursued. 16 
Ibn Saud was emphatic that tribes like the Dhafir were originally 
from Najd and were therefore to be considered Najdi subjects. The Amarat 
tribe also came from Najd, and more importantly, was a branch of Ibn 
Saud's own tribe, the Anaizah. Therefore the Amarat were his 'cousins- 
naturally naturally his authority extended over them as well. Thus Ibn Saud 
expected the Iraqi authorities to turn over all renegade tribesmen to Najd 
and to extract back taxes owed to Najd from all those tribal groups that had 
left for sanctuary in Iraq. 17 However, both tribes had moved to Iraq 
precisely to avoid Najdi taxation and harassment from the Ikhwan and 
King Faisal firmly opposed his rival's efforts. 
Trying another approach, Ibn Saud proposed to have known wells 
and tribal grazing grounds determine the borders. Since each tribe would 
know which areas were historically theirs and which were not, this would 
be a relatively simple solution. Any locations claimed by more than one 
tribe, would be made neutral. However, Ibn Saud still pressed for Najdi 
merchants access to market towns around the Euphrates. Sabih Beg, who 
insisted that Iraq's borders be not less than two hundred miles south of the 
Euphrates, rejected this. 18 
16 Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 274. 
17 Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, p. 179 
18 Clayton, An Arabian Diary, p. 34. 
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As negotiations stalled, and with no agreement in sight, a frustrated 
Percy Cox decided to intervene. During a break in the conference he took 
Dickson to Ibn Saud's tent for a serious discussion. Cox reprimanded the 
arnir for his "childish" tribal boundary idea. Cox declared that he would 
himself decide on "the type and general line of the frontier". According to 
Dickson, Ibn Saud broke down weeping and declared that "Sir Percy was 
his father and mother, who had made him and raised him from nothing to 
the position which he held and that he would surrender half his kingdom, 
nay the whole, if Sir Percy ordered. " 19 
This exchange seemed to have the desired effect. When the 
conference re-convened Ibn Saud remained quiet and let Cox take the lead. 
Using a red pencil Cox drew a line from the Gulf coast to Jabal Anaizah, 
close to the Trans-Jordan frontier. This area would be granted to Iraq. In 
one stroke a large portion of the territory claimed by Najd had been given 
to King Feisal. To forestall Ibn Saud's complaints Cox cut the territory 
allotted to Kuwait by two-thirds and placed that under Najdi jurisdiction. 
In addition Cox created a Kuwait Neutral Zone and an Iraq Neutral Zone 
which would ostensibly serve to provide areas where tribes could graze 
and obtain water without problems relating to border crossings and 
customs procedures. 
Following the boundary drawing episode Ibn Saud asked for a 
private meeting with Percy Cox (Dickson was also present). Ibn Saud 
protested at the way in which he had been treated stating; "My friend, you 
have deprived me of half my kingdom. Better take it all and let me go into 
retirement" and then according to Dickson, Ibn Saud "burst out into sobs". 
Cox replied, with tears also rolling down his cheeks; "My friend I know 
19Despite Lacey's assertion that Cox was an'excellent Arabist' and drafted all his own 
Arabic correspondence, Dickson claims that Cox's Arabic was "not too good" and that he 
had to do the translating for Cox. See Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 80 and Dickson, Kuwait and 
Her Neighbours, p. 274. Even Kostiner's detailed work The Making of Saudi Arabia, does not 
cite any official report to corroborate this 
incident but relies on Dickson's account. Also 
Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, p. 181. We do not know if a similar reprimand was 
issued to the Iraqi delegates. 
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exactly how you feel, and for this reason I give you two thirds of Kuwait 
territory I don't know how Ibn Sabah will take the blow" 20 Dickson 
observed this display of emotion and could not help but be suspicious. He 
knew of Ibn Saud's reputation as a shrewd negotiator and remarked, that 
in matters of diplomacy Ibn Saud was "without rival throughout 
Arabia..... His bluff, candid and open-hearted manner serve to act as cover 
for one of the astutest brains that can be found. "21 
Unfortunately for Kuwait, Major Moore, who was entrusted with 
the task of looking out for her interests, said little throughout the 
conference. Percy Cox had clearly dominated him. As a result, Ahmad Jabir 
Al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti amir, received a shock. He had been in power for 
barely a year and within a few days lost a sizeable portion of territory 
without a shot fired or battle waged. When Cox later arrived in Kuwait to 
get the amir's signature on the Uqair accords he had to placate a very upset 
ruler. Cox insisted that what had been done was necessary to satisfy a 
powerful neighbour who would have taken the land anyway by force. 
Ahmad Al-Sabah was still reluctant to sign an agreement about which he 
had not been consulted, but he could not refuse. Although he gave his 
signature, Al-Sabah demanded to know if after Ibn Saud's death the British 
Government would object to him denouncing the agreement and 
reclaiming his lost territory. Cox's bemused reply was "No.... and God bless 
your efforts"? 2 
This was a watershed event for the tribes of Najd. For centuries they 
had been free to travel northwards for trade and supplies. New frontiers 
meant that they would be forced to change their patterns of life, relying on 
the somewhat under developed Saudi ports of Qatif and Uqair instead. 
Dickson himself did not approve of Cox's methods, believing that an 
2ODickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 274, and Troeller, the Birth of Saudi Arabia, p. 181. 
21 Dickson was very much in favour of Ibn Saud being a strong player in Arabia so that 
other chiefs would turn to Britain 
for help. See Dickson's insightful memo, Political Agent 
Bahrain, August 12,1920, IOR L/P&S/10/936/B349. 
22Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 279. 
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arbitrary western type of boundary was a "serious error"23 Many tribal 
chiefs could not understand the logic of the agreements and the fact that 
the restrictions were imposed by a foreign power only heightened their 
disapproval. The Mutayr tribe was particularly affected by the frontier 
agreements. One member of their tribe, the notorious Ikhwan raider, Faisal 
al-Duwish, became determined to thwart the accords. 
There could also have been another factor Cox was considering- 
mineral resources. The subject came up during the negotiations when one 
of Ibn Sau'd advisors, Abdul Latif al-Mandil, urged Cox not to create a 
Neutral Zone with Kuwait. He wanted the territory to stay with Najd. Cox 
insisted that it was necessary but al-Mandil pressed his point. When Cox 
wanted to know why it was so important for that area to stay in Najd, al- 
Mandil's reply was "because we think oil exists there". Unfazed Cox 
responded that was "exactly why I have made it a neutral zone. Each side 
shall have half a share". 24 
There was another individual also interested in oil-Major Frank 
Holmes-a New Zealand prospector, mining engineer and businessman 
who had served in the Royal Marines. He represented the Eastern and 
General Syndicate, a small company with big ambitions. Holmes sought an 
audience with Ibn Saud in order to put in a bid for oil concessions. As the 
negotiations between the Iraqis and the Saudis dragged on Holmes waited 
for five days in the company of another colourful character, Ameen Rihani. 
The Lebanese-American traveller had helped Holmes prepare his 
application for a concession and advised him on how to proceed. 25 
Percy Cox however, was not disposed to allowing the New 
Zealander meet Ibn Saud. He pressured Ibn Saud not to entertain Holmes' 
requests, arguing that Eastern and General was not an oil company and 
would seek to sell its concessions to other parties. Ibn Saud was interested 
23Ibid p. 276. 
24Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 274-275 and Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, 
p. 211. 
25 Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia, pp. 78-79. 
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in pursuing the matter, but Cox wanted none of it. He went so far as to 
draft a letter of rejection for Ibn Saud to sign but the amir did not agree to 
do so. Cox was insistent that the New Zealander be rebuffed. Ibn Saud 
tried several times to refuse but then finally gave in. Britain's £60,000 
subsidy was a heavy weapon effectively wielded by Cox. It is perhaps this 
incident which contributed to Ibn Saud's subsequent decision to negotiate 
with American oil companies for oil concessions. He would be much less 
constrained with them and they would not have the same power as Cox 
had over him. 
Major Holmes never had his meeting with Ibn Saud. Instead, he was 
to learn from Percy Cox that his request had been turned down. The time 
was not ripe for oil concessions in Arabia and the British Government 
would not be able to provide protection for such operations. 26 It seemed 
clear to Dickson that Cox did not like Holmes because an independent 
operator would be "inimical to His Majesty's interests" 27 However, Cox 
had ulterior motives. He had already been in touch with a close friend and 
former deputy, Arnold Wilson, who worked for the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (APOC) with the idea of approaching Ibn Saud for a concession. 
Apparently a letter was written by Wilson and sent to Ibn Saud but the 
issue had not developed further. Anglo-Persians major shareholder was 
the British Government and Cox was keen to keep out competitors from 
the region. 28 By creating neutral zones Cox prevented any one country 
from claiming exclusive drilling rights should oil be discovered there. 
Britain would then be able to enter the area without having to apply for 
concessions or face restrictions imposed by one particular local ruler. 
The Uqair conference ended on December 2,1922 with the signing of 
Najd-Iraq and Najd-Kuwait frontier protocols. Though Cox had known Ibn 
Saud for many years and had developed a personal relationship with the 
amir as High Commissioner of Iraq, he was looking out for the interests of 
Z6Philby, Arabian jubilee, pp. 68-69; Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 276-277. 
27Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 278. 
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King Faisal as well as Britain. The accords signed at Uqair seemed a great 
achievement for Cox. He had obtained Ibn Saud's agreement to a fixed 
frontier and had refused to grant free access to Najdi tribes to the interior 
of Iraq which bode well for Iraqi security concerns. 29 Yet this would also 
set the stage for further clashes between Ikhwan and the tribes of Arabia. 
Cox had focused on- the security of Iraq without solving the disputes 
between Ibn Saud and Sharif Hussein. Neither were the tribes of northern 
Najd being taken into consideration in the delineation of borders. There 
were no discussions or involvement of, the chiefs in the conference 
proceedings and the terms of the new agreement were simply to be passed 
down to them. Ibn Saud nevertheless, gained recognition from Britain and 
Iraq of his eastern borders and he proceeded to secure more advantages in 
the west. 30 
Ikhwan Raids and the Northwest Frontier 
Having taken the city of Hail, Ibn Saud looked north-west, sending the 
Ikhwan to attack and take the towns of al-lauf and Skaka in the oasis of 
Wadi Sirhan. 31 Several tribes, including the Bani Sakhr tribe of Transjordan 
used the oasis for animal pasture. These were important economic and 
strategic areas. Al-lauf was famous for its salt production and an important 
point along the trade route to Syria. Previously the Al-Rashid of Hail had 
controlled the area. Taking Wadi Sirhan would break the continuity of the 
Transjordan-Iraqi borders, providing a buffer zone to the Hashemite 
territories 32 Holding this area also enabled Ibn Saud to increase his tax 
base. 
During one particular incident in August 1922 the Ikhwan raided 
within twenty-four miles of Amman. Hashemite complaints to London 
2sDepartmental Minute, Colonial Office, July 26,1923, PRO CO 727/ 7#37402. 
29 Clayton, Arabian Diary, p. 34.; Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 70 
30 Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 70 
31Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud, p. 79. 
32Joseph, Kostiner, 'Britain and the Northern Frontier of the Saudi State, 1922-1925" in The 
Great Powers in the Middle East, Uriel Dann, ed., New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988 p. 38. 
ABEDIN-FIVE 164 
were vociferous. It also became apparent that the boundaries with 
Transjordan had to be fixed by treaty as well 33 Ibn Saud was less inclined 
to prevent the attacks since he knew that all subsidies paid to Arab chiefs 
would be terminated in March 1924. Cox then attempted to get Ibn Saud to 
meet with Hashemite leaders, this time in Kuwait, to settle frontiers with 
Transjordan. But Ibn Saud's reaction was lukewarm as there was little 
incentive to conclude a treaty that might benefit his rivals 34 
Nevertheless, Ibn Saud did send a representative to Kuwait, to 
attend a series of meetings in November 1923.35 Again arguments 
characterised much of the proceedings. The delegates from Iraq, and 
Transjordan were united in opposition to Ibn Saud. The British Political 
Agent, S. G. Knox, who was mediating noted that the Hashemite delegates 
were making unreasonable demands and statements designed to inflame 
Ibn Saud. However, he was confident that the Najdi delegation could be 
forced to accept an agreement. Knox cabled the Secretary of State that "Bin 
Saud can be easily coerced should His Majesty's Government so decide" 36 
However, Knox was overly optimistic. In fact the Saudi delegates 
were particularly upset that Iraq granted a refuge to tribes from Najd. 
Many of the Shammar tribesman who did not wish to remain in Hail after 
the defeat of the Al-Rashid dynasty and the subsequent establishment of 
Saudi authority had crossed into Iraq. This denied Ibn Saud much needed 
revenue from taxes and was also a blow to his prestige. 37 Inflaming matters 
was the fact that the Shammar had turned around and begun raiding into 
Najd from Iraqi territory. Thus Najdi negotiators at the Conference were 
instructed to obtain the return of such tribes to Ibn Saud's authority so that 
they could be punished. Iraqi delegates however, refused and were 
33 Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, pp. 214-215. 
34Clayton, An Arabian Diary,, p. 37. 
35'Report of the Kuwait Conference', Political Agent Kuwait (Knox) to SOSCO, March 30, 
1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1034/P1992. 
36 Agent Kuwait (Knox) to SOSCO, December 5,1923, PRO CO 727/7 #59291. 
37 Kostiner, 'On Instruments and their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence 
of the Saudi State' pp. 298-323. 
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adamant in their opposition to anything the Najdi's proposed. Moreover 
the Transjordanian representatives wanted Wadi Sirhan returned and the 
Hijazi's asked for a buffer zone to be established. 38 
The conference dragged on from December 1923 to April 1924 and 
was adjourned twice in between due to high tensions. 39 Ibn Saud laid the 
blame squarely on the Iraqis who he called "grasping and 
adamant.... wanting everything their own way" 40 Matters were further 
strained when Faisal al-Duwish and his Mutayr tribesman raided into Iraq 
in the second week of March 1924 while the negotiations were yet to be 
completed. Reports of the battle indicated a brutal assault. Casualty figures 
varied but were estimated at above 250. Livestock lost numbered over 
10,000. No prisoners were taken. Men and boys that were wounded were 
reportedly killed. The occurrence of such a raid while discussions were 
ongoing disturbed many British officials. Knox the Kuwait Political agent 
sent this report: "There is no doubt that the Sultan of Najd is a most 
unpleasant person, an inveterate intriguer, and his myrmidons, the Ikhwan 
even worse. The tales I hear of their conduct during their forays are 
revolting in the extreme. " 41 
Other British reports of the raid which noted that women were 
"treated well" and that the Ikhwan gave them food, water, and in some 
cases animals for transport, elicited surprise 42 Nevertheless, because of the 
raid Hashemite officials believed that they had an overwhelmingly strong 
38Agent Kuwait (Knox) to SOSCO December 21,1923, dispatch contained in Report on the 
Kuwait Conference December 27,1923, PRO CO 727/7 #62577; Helms, The Cohesion of 
Saudi Arabia, p. 215. 
39Agent Kuwait (Knox) to SOSCO, December 27,1923, PRO CO 727/7 #62424. One of the 
most contentious demands made by the Iraqi's was that Ibn Saud should first make peace 
with Sharif Hussein before any final agreements could be made with Baghdad. Ibn Saud 
refused to be told what to do by Iraq. 'Report of the Kuwait Conference', Agent Kuwait 
(Knox) to SOSCO, March 30,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1034/P1992. 
Letter from Ibn Saud to Political Resident, Gulf, May 2,1924, IOR 
L/P&S/10/1034/P2785. On March 7,1924 Sharif Hussein unilaterally proclaimed himself 
Khalifa (Caliph) and this incensed the Ikhwan, something Ibn Saud was able to use to his 
advantage. 
41 Agent Kuwait (Knox) to SOSCO, Report of Kuwait Conference, March 30,1924, IOR 
L/P&S/10/1034/1`1992 
'u'Report on Ikhwan Attack' by Captain Driver, April 5,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1034/P2065 
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case against Najd. They demanded payment of reparations and an apology 
before any further discussions could continue. By being uncompromising 
the Hashemites believed that they would eventually get their way 43 This 
hard-line attitude did not endear them to Knox : 
At the same time..... I cannot refrain from contrasting the 
scrupulously correct attitude, on the surface, of the Sultan of 
Najd and his delegates, their apparently earnest desire for 
peace and the sacrifices that they are prepared to submit to 
secure it with the childish and uncompromising attitude of 
the Hashemites. And the more Najd shows its desire for 
peace, the more the Hashemites harden their hearts. 44 
Despite further disruption the conference finally ended in April. Ibn Saud 
had been loath to apologise or to pay reparations. He absolved himself of 
responsibility claiming that the raid had been a reaction to attacks made by 
tribes based in Iraq. He asserted that al-Duwish "had no intention of 
attacking Iraq or her subjects.... but merely of following the marauders who 
have fled Najd. "45 In a letter to the High Commissioner of Iraq, Ibn Saud 
stressed that he had tried to restrain his people, promising them that 
Britain would provide justice, but their patience had run out. If he had not 
been restraining his subjects, even more raids would have been conducted 
and it was with great difficulty that he was maintaining calm among his 
tribesmen. 46 
In fact Ibn Saud was financially and politically drained by 
conflicting demands; to face the challenge of the Hashemites; to reassure 
the British; and to satisfy the Ikhwan. Although they were an effective tool 
in bringing Britain to the negotiating table, the Ikhwan were unpredictable. 
Despite defending al-Duwish, Ibn Saud was troubled by the lack of control 
that he had over him and other Ikhwan. This was partially of his own 
43 Agent Kuwait (Knox) to SOSCO, December 5,1923, PRO CO 727/7 #59291. Knox 
reported that instructions had been sent from Sharif Hussein to the delegates at the 
conference to hold their position. 
44 Ibid, 
45 Letter to HCI in Ibn Saud to Political Resident, Gulf, May 2,1924, IOR 
L/P&S/10/1034/P2785 
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making since he had increased the levies and taxes imposed upon them. 
Some tribes fled to Iraq to escape the financial burden. However, the rise in 
levies had been necessary to offset the loss of income caused by the end of 
the British subsidy in March 1924.47 Ibn Saud also forced the diversion of 
caravan traffic to ports of Jubail and al-Qatif and away from Kuwait in 
order to gain revenue from customs dues and port fees. This again hit tribal 
livelihood; the transport and smuggling of goods from Kuwait into Najd 48 
The financial troubles of Ibn Saud was good news to Major Frank 
Holmes. Hearing of the end of the British subsidy the New Zealand 
prospector made his way back to see Ibn Saud in the hopes that he might 
be successful in securing an oil concession for his Eastern and General 
Syndicate. Holmes was offering an annual payment for the concession 
rights and believed that Ibn Saud would now be more amenable to deal 
with him. This time, Ibn Saud agreed to Holmes' proposal despite Percy 
Cox's earlier warning. Cox was right about one thing. The Eastern and 
General Syndicate did try to sell the rights to other companies, but since it 
could find no other companies interested, and not having the resources to 
explore the for oil itself, the concession was left undeveloped. Holmes 
became involved in what seemed to be more promising oil exploration 
around the island nation of Bahrain and let the annual payment to Riyadh 
lapse thus suspending his concessionary rights. Had Anglo-Persian beaten 
Holmes to the concession they would have had much better resources with 
which to search for oil and it is more likely that they would have been the 
first to discover 'black gold'. This in turn would have meant greater British 
attempts at controlling Ibn Saud and would have left little room for 
46 Ibid. 
47 Joseph, Kostiner, The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical 
State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986 p. 92. Hereafter cited as MOSA. 
48 Report on Ibn Saud, Barrett, Political Resident, Bahrain, March 3,1928, IOR R/15/5/90, 
cited by Kostiner, MOSA, p. 81. Note: This author searched India Office record 
#R/15/5/90 but could not locate this report. 
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American oil companies to enter as they did in the 1930's. 49 This was an 
example of Ibn Saud's willingness to snub Britain. He agreed to grant the 
oil concession to Holmes despite Cox's demands that he not do so. 
The Issue of the Caliphate 
By March 1924, much more significant events had occurred which were to 
change the shape of the Arab and Islamic world. Kemal Atturk, the new 
Turkish leader, abolished the Caliphate and declared Turkey a secular 
republic. As Dutch explorer Van Der Meulen pointed out; "since the death 
of the Prophet, Islam had never been without a Khalifa". 50 The Caliph was 
the spiritual, as well as the political head of the Islamic nation (ummah). 
Though weakened through the centuries, the institution of the Caliphate 
had been in existence since the beginning of Islam. This was the final end of 
the Ottoman empire and the ushering in of the age of Kemalism. 51 
Hussein saw this as a great opportunity to ascend to an even higher 
position than Sharif of Mecca or King of Hijaz. Asserting his descent from 
the family of the Prophet and the guardian of the Holy Cities of Islam, 
Mecca and Medina, Hussein soughEthe title of Caliph. Yet his reputation as 
a miser and a ruthless ruler meant there was not much chance that, either 
the locals, or the international Muslim community would support his 
claim. Hussein sought the aid of his son Abdullah who the British had 
ensconced in Trans-Jordan as the Amir. A campaign was launched in the 
49 Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 172. November 1923 also saw the arrival in Jeddah of Charles 
Crane-a curious American who had played a small part in the post war settlements of the 
Middle East. Crane was a former U. S. ambassador, millionaire and contributor to the 
Democratic party. He was part of the King-Crane Commission set up by the Supreme 
Council at Versailles to look into the aspirations of the people in the Arab provinces taken 
from the ottoman empire after the First World War. Crane had travelled through Lebanon 
and Syria where he developed a dislike for the French. In this trip he visited Sharif 
Hussein but would later be a great friend to Ibn Saud and benefactor of the oil industry in 
Saudi Arabia. See Bullard, Two Kings, p. 23. George Antonius dedicated his famous book 
The Arab Awakening, to Charles Crane. 
50Daniel, Van Der Meulen, The Wells of Ibn Saud, London, John Murray, pp. 90-91 
51 Thomas, Arnold, The Caliphate, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, pp. 189-200. Arnold 
provides insight into European conceptions of the Caliphate. The Ottoman Empire fell 
gradually. By the 19th and early 20th centuries with loss of territory, prestige, and 
economic problems many Muslims had "lost sight of its true significance and most 
Westerners had never understood it", Van Der Muelen, The Wells of Ibn Saud, p. 90-91 
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local press to support Hussein for the Caliphate. From Amman he also 
worked to build up his image in Syria and Iraq where his son Faisal, was 
king. 
After launching a bogus media campaign Hussein declared on 
March 14,1924, that he had been asked by the ummah to become Caliph. It 
was ironic that Sharif Hussein could claim his pure Islamic intentions when 
he had needed the help of a Christian power to maintain his control of the 
holy cities. 52 Nevertheless, Hijazi newspapers printed dozens of dubious 
congratulatory telegrams supposedly from around the Muslim world. Lists 
of pilgrims from India and Indonesia were presented as evidence of the 
support for Hussein as Caliph, although Muslims made no public 
declarations in those countries. Young religious students from Malaya who 
were studying in Mecca, and who gave oaths of allegiance to Hussein were 
hailed as proof that the five million strong Muslims of the Malay Peninsula 
had accepted Hussein as Caliph. The British Minister in Jeddah, Reader 
Bullard noted Hussein s trickery: 
his newspapers, written either by him or under his 
supervision, lavish on him in every other line the title he 
loves; and when pilgrims come to Mecca from countries 
where he is not recognised they are not in a position to 
oppose him; and as likely as not he will get out of them 
something which he will call recognition and which they will 
have much difficulty in disclaiming afterwards. He is an 
extraordinarily clever old bird, and he knows as well as 
anyone the value of the fait accompli. His newspapers are full 
of alleged oaths of allegiance, and though many of them are 
known not to be genuine it would be hard to disprove them 
and they may be taken at their face value in some of the 
places to which copies of the papers are sent as propaganda 53 
S7The date when Hussein announced his ascension to the Caliphate varies. Lacey (p. 185) 
and McLoughlin (p. 77) and Troeller (p. 209) assert the date was March 5,1924 while Van 
der Meulen, p. 92 asserts it was March 14,1924. Troeller also claims that Hussein was 
reluctant to take over the role and that Abdullah pushed him into it. This does not seem 
consistent with other accounts. 
SSBullard, Monthly Report to Foreign Office, January 1924, cited in Bullard, Two Kings, pp. 
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Much of the Muslim world was surprised by these developments; first, the 
abolition of the Ottoman dynasty and then Hussein's bid for the Caliphate. 
Many who had been on pilgrimage to Mecca experienced the harshness of 
the Sharif's corrupt system. In fact, the large Muslim population of India 
was critical of Hussein, believing him to have been installed as part of a 
British conspiracy to hijack the Caliphate 54 Even more incensed were the 
Ikhwan of Najd. They were ready to take Hijaz and remove Hussein but 
were restrained by Ibn Saud. Rumblings of dissent grew within their ranks. 
In June 1924, Ibn Saud held a conference of ulema and tribal chiefs to 
obtain a consensus on the type of response to employ against Hussein. 55 
Instead of chairing the meeting himself, - Ibn Saud gave his ageing father, 
Abdul Rahmar the honour, knowing that the elderly Sheikh would 
command greater respect and be able to maintain order amongst the angry 
gathering. Ibn Saud could also have been distancing himself in case the 
meeting did not go in his favour. 
The conference resulted in a decision to send a message to the 
Muslim community at large detailing Hussein's crimes and declaring him 
unfit for the position of Khalifa (Caliph). It was announced that the people 
of Najd would remove Hussein on behalf of the larger Muslim ummah. But 
again, Ibn Saud was careful to place the name of his second son Faisal as 
the author of the message. Many of the seventy million strong Muslim 
community of India responded enthusiastically to the Najdi proposal. This 
endorsement coupled with that of the chiefs and ulema of Najd gave Ibn 
Saud the support he required to move against Hussein. 
The Conquest of Hijaz 
The relationship between Ibn Saud and Sharif Hussein had always been 
stormy. Hussein was resentful of the fact that Britain had subsidised Ibn 
54 Viceroy, India to SOSFI, September 25,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1124/P3890. 
55Troeller states that it was Abdul Rahman who called the meeting. However, it was 
merely a formality and Ibn Saud was the real instigator of the event. See Troeller, Saudi 
Arabia, p. 216. Van der Meulen supports the view that it was Ibn Saud who organised the 
gathering, Van der Meulen, The Wells of Ibn Saud, p. 93. 
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Saud and had abandoned commitments he thought had been made to him, 
for an independent Arab state. The Sharif was arrogant and condescending 
towards Ibn Saud in a deliberate attempt to be insulting. 56 He considered 
the King of Najd little more than an ambitious desert chieftain and did 
much to humiliate and harass Ibn Saud; he tried to starve tribes outside 
Hejaz who were under Ibn Saud's protection; and for several years refused 
to allow Najdi's to make the pilgrimage. While Ibn Saud would send 
respectful letters to Hussein, referring to him as King of Hijaz, Hussein 
would respond discourteously and deliberately tried to cause offence. 57 
Ibn Saud, while believing in his family's hereditary rights to Najd, 
was very much cognisant of Britain's control over who rose and fell in 
Arabia. He did not want to risk openly breaking with Hussein in case that 
strengthened British support for the Sharif. Though more cautious and 
diplomatic than his rival, he often found Hussein meddling in his affairs. 
This included attempts to bribe tribal chiefs to revolt against Najd. 
Complaints that Ibn Saud addressed to London seemed to be ignored. It 
became clear that he would have to act himself to eliminate the Sharifian 
threat 58 Ibn Saud knew that Britain's subsidy to Hussein would end on 
March 31,1924 but he was not sure what security guarantees had been 
given to the Sharif. 59 If he launched an assault on Hijaz would Britain rush 
to Hussein s aide?. 
The possibility of a move on Hijaz was not lost on the British 
administration in India. It was feared that Indian Muslims would react 
56 Letter from Ibn Saud to Political Resident, Gulf, September 23,1924, 
L/P&S/10/1124/P4617; Also Randall, Baker, King Hussein and the Kingdom of Hejaz, New 
York: Oleander Press, 1979, pp. 200-201. 
57 Bullard to Ramsay Macdonald (FO), September 21,1924 L/P&S/10/1124/P4232. 
so Letter from Ibn Saud to Political Resident, Gulf, September 23,1924, 
L/P&S/10/1124/P4617 and also Bullard to MacDonald, September 21,1924, IOR 
L/P&S/10/1124/P4232. Observations by various British officials noted that Hussein and 
Hashemite representatives often displayed openly their contempt for those of beduin 
background. Centuries of being the ruling class of Hejaz had created a superiority complex 
which did not always endear them locally. See Hafiz, Wahba, Arabian Days, pp. 79-81. See 
also Knox to SOSCO, March 30,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1034/P1992. 
" Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 72. 
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strongly against such a move. His Majesty's Government could be blamed 
for any fall of the Holy Cities: 
The failure of a Muslim power to protect the Holy Places 
against a Wahabi invader might have rent Islam in twain, but 
it would have meant merely a schism within Islam itself. The 
failure of a Christian Power to protect the Holy Places 
against the Wahabis .... would be fraught with consequences 
difficult to exaggerate 60 
In order to assess the extent of British support Ibn Saud moved gradually. 
His first objective was against the Hijazi summer capital, Taif, which was 
several miles outside Mecca. 61 To distract attention from the real plan, 
three groups of Ikhwan fighting forces were assembled in late August 1924. 
One was to attack Iraq, the other, Transjordan, while the main force would 
hit Taif. Unable to agree as to whether Faisal or Saud (the elder sons of Ibn 
Saud) should lead the Taif attack neither was sent. Leadership was split 
among Khalid ibn Luayy, and Sultan ibn Humayd, both amirs of Ikhwan 
settlements. 62 
On the first day of September the Ikhwan forces fought and defeated 
a unit of Hussein's army led by his son, Ali outside the Taff fortress. Ali 
and his remaining men retreated into the walled city and prevented 
inhabitants from leaving while the Ikhwan lay siege to the city. Three days 
later they themselves sneaked out under the cover of darkness leaving Taif 
undefended. They fled without their supplies, guns and ammunition. 
According to most accounts, the Ikhwan forces rampaged through the 
town, killing 'disbelievers' and destroying property. Reports circulated 
that the Ikhwan charged into the city killing and looting indiscriminately. 
When news of Taif's fall reached Jeddah panic ensued. The British 
Minister, Reader Bullard, was neither surprised nor disappointed: 
60 Letter from Government of India to SOSI, July 5,1923, IOR L/P&S/10/938/P2733 
(, 'Baker, King Hussein and the Kingdom of Hejaz. p. 201. Also Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi 
Arabia, pp. 215-216, and Troeller, Birth of Saudi Arabia, p. 216 
62 Joseph, Kostiner, 'On Instruments and their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the 
Emergence of the Saudi State' pp. 298-323. 
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It looks as though the Wahabis..... have pushed King Hussein out 
of Taif..... Serves him right. He has made no attempt to come to 
an agreement with the Wahabi leader, Bin Saud, and as you 
know has not troubled to keep the loyalty of his own people. The 
towns people detest him and .... he has alienated the tribes. It 
would serve him right if he were pushed out altogether. The 
Wahabis are very rigid Moslems-don't allow smoking, insist on 
regular attendance at the mosque, and so on; but the Hijaz 
people are so sick of King Hussein that they would welcome 
almost any change. 63 
In his own report to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Ibn Saud 
claimed that Hussein's men had instigated matters by attacking the Ikhwan 
outside Taff. His men had defended themselves and routed the Sharif's 
forces. " When challenged with reports of Ikhwan atrocities, Ibn Saud 
asserted that the Ikhwan had "safeguarded to their utmost the lives and 
property of the people". 65 
By defending his position and accusing Hussein of treachery, the 
Saudi leader sought to deflect British criticism. He was particularly 
concerned lest he be found guilty of violating the 1915 Treaty of Darin in 
which he had agreed not to attack Britain s allies. He sought to plead self 
defence and convince British officials that Hussein posed a threat to him. In 
fact, Ibn Saud was perhaps too concerned, for Hussein had fallen 
considerably in British eyes. The Sharif had stubbornly refused to sign the 
Treaty of Versailles, probably out of anger over the lack of support for his 
pan-Arab ambitions. Thus, Hussein had no solid agreements or treaties 
with Britain. An Anglo-Hijazi Treaty did exist but Hussein had quarrelled 
over its details and had never signed it. 66 Ibn Saud however, was not aware 
63Bullard to FO, Letter of September 9,1924, cited in Bullard, Two Kings p. 56. 
64 Ibn Saud to Political Resident, Gulf, September 27,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1124/ P4617. 
In the 1124 file series, there is much correspondence devoted to arguments of whether or 
not the few Indians killed in Taif were British subjects, and if they were, how should His 
Majesty's Government react. Hussein's losses and the implications of the defeat to 
Hussein's position did not warrant as much attention. 
65 Ibn Saud to Pol-Res. PG, October 4,1924. L/P&S/10/1124/P4617. 
"Under the provisions of the treaty Hussein would have to forfeit all claims to Syria, 
Lebanon and Palestine and give up any hope that they would be granted to a Hashemite 
ruler. Under Article 4 of the treaty Britain would mediate in case of a dispute between 
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of these issues and was still wary. He was in no rush to test the British, so 
his forces took Taff and stopped there. 
Meanwhile at the Colonial Office, officials were reluctant to pin the 
blame for the attack on Ibn Saud. Since they could not establish the extent 
that he was personally involved, there was no advantage in threatening 
him; unless His Majesty's Government was actually prepared to act upon 
it. The Colonial Office informed the Indian Government: "It is in the 
opinion of the Secretary of State, out of the question that His Majesty's 
Government should in any case embark upon hostile action against Ibn 
Saud, whether direct or indirect, in defence of the Holy Places. " 67 
This left the people of Hijaz caught in a stand-off between Sharif 
Hussein and Ibn Saud. A waiting game ensued. Reader Bullard criticised 
local notables for not acting to end the tension. They came "snivelling 
round to me wanting H. M. G. to pull them out of the mess" 68 Hussein had 
tried unsuccessfully to get some of the beduin tribes of Hijaz to go out and 
fight against Ibn Saud but they were not interested, as for years Hussein 
had forced the tribes to live on meagre rations and false promises and no 
tribesmen wanted to die for Hussein. 
Finally, a group of townsmen acted to end the stalemate. A 
delegation led by Abdullah Alireza, a prominent merchant, approached 
Hussein on October 3,1924, and urged him to abdicate in favour of his son 
Ali 69 It was hoped that Ali would not incite the anger of Ibn Saud and 
perhaps could negotiate to keep the Najdi forces from attacking. Yet in 
Bullard's dispatches it was reported that Ali himself called the prominent 
men of Jeddah and Mecca to meet with him whereupon he informed them 
that the Sharif was willing to step down in his favour if that would help the 
Hejaz and Najd. As Ibn Saud gained more influence Hussein became willing to sign but by 
then Britain was not interested; L/P&S/10/1124/P4274, Naji al-Assil (Governor of Hijaz) 
to SSFA 15 October 1924; See Helms, Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, p. 216; Peter Mansfield, A 
History of the Middle East, New York: Viking Penguin, 1991 p. 184. 
67 Colonial office to India Office, September 23,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1124/3855. 
6$Letter of 5 October, 1924, cited in Bullard, Two Kings, p. 63. 
69 McLoughlin, Ibn Saud. p. 78. 
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situation. The group agreed and then spoke to Hussein via telephone after 
which Hussein agreed to abdicate. 7° Ali in the meantime tried to negotiate 
with Ibn Saud, sending several letters to the Saudi leader. However, each 
messenger was arrested upon arrival and the letters torn up, unread. 71 
Despite Ali 's statement, Hussein was reluctant to give up power. It 
took much pressure from his son before he acquiesced and agreed to leave 
Hijaz for Transjordan. On the steamer that came to take him away were 
containers loaded with gold-the takings from years of fleecing pilgrims, 
local merchants and skimming from British payments to finance the Arab 
Revolt. 72 Although Hussein wanted to stay with his son Abdullah in 
Transjordan, Britain was concerned that the Sharif's presence there could 
incite an Ikhwan attack on the mandate. Instead Hussein was sent to Aqaba 
on the northern tip of the Red Sea. British policy was in a quandary. With 
the weakening of the Hashemite family there was a reluctance to openly 
continue its support. 
One issue was the possible backlash from Indian Muslims. They had 
not been in favour of Hussein's revolt against the Ottoman Sultan and were 
further incensed by his claim to being Caliph. Moreover, many Indian 
pilgrims had over the years suffered under Hussein's extortion schemes 
and profiteering from the pilgrimage. The Indian Caliphate Committee had 
warned British authorities to stay out of the problem. His Majesty's 
Government was informed that: "in no case can British or other non- 
Muslim intervention in the sanctuary of Islam be tolerated by Muslims of 
India and of the world. " 73 No other issue, whether safety of pilgrim routes 
or of British Indian subjects in Hijaz, could be more important than the 
70 Bullard to Ramsay MacDonald, 'Report on Taff' October 11,1924, IOR 
L/ P&S/ 10/ 1124/ P4421. 
n Ibid. 
72 Bullard to MacDonald, 'Report for Oct. 11-20,19241, IOR L/P&S/10/1124/P4481. See 
also McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, p. 78, and Van Der Meulen, The Wells of Ibn Saud, p. 95. 
73 Telegram from Shaukat Ali, President of Caliphate Committee, Delhi to British Prime 
Minister, 10 Downing St., London, 4 October 1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1125/ P4080. This 
created a flurry of exchanges between the Indian Government and London urging extreme 
caution in dealing with Hejaz. 
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"supreme importance of keeping Holy Land of Islam free from non- 
Muslim interference in any shape or under any pretext. " If any one from 
outside the Muslim world were to interfere, it would be regarded as "an 
act of hostility towards Islam". 74 Anxious officials at the Foreign Office felt 
it prudent for Britain to remain neutral and to wait and see what would 
happen in the Najd-Hijaz conflict. It was deemed to be an internal Muslim 
religious issue in which London wanted no part 75 
Thus, Ibn Saud's forces entered Mecca on October 16,1924 and met 
no resistance. Much of the population fearing a repeat of the Taif assault 
had fled. However, Ibn Saud waited almost two months before arriving in 
the city. He was cautiously surveying reactions to his capture of Islam's 
holiest city. From India the reports were favourable, and the British found 
that the Indian Khilafat Committee supported Ibn Saud's taking of Mecca, 
albeit because of their "deep seated hostility" towards Hussein. 76 
Meanwhile, the people of Jeddah were still uneasy. Although 
Hussein had been removed his son, Ali remained ensconced in the city 
where he still had a sizeable force. The British Consul wrote: "The local 
people, I think, prefer Ali to the Wahabis, as being less primitive and less 
strict in religious matters, but they don't intend to fight for him; and as 
they have failed to bring about the surrender of Jeddah they are running 
77 away. 
In an attempt to forestall panic Ibn Saud issued a proclamation to 
the inhabitants of the city reassuring them that their lives and property 
were safe; that he would not appoint a governor that they disliked and that 
they would be respected and not treated unjustly: 
We do not want to occupy your country or to exercise 
sovereignty over you, nor is there any hostility between us. 
You are the inhabitants of the Holy Places and have a right to 
74 Ibid. 
l5Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, pp. 37-38. 
7'Viceroy, India to SOSFI (Secretary of State for India) September 25,1924, IOR 
L/ p&S/ 10/ 1124/ p3890. 
77Letter of October 30,1924, cited in Bullard, Two Kings, p. 69. 
AaEDu r-FIVE 177 
our respect and reverence. We absolutely refuse to agree that 
either Hussein or any of his sons should exercise sovereignty 
over the Hedjaz; the method of administration of the country 
will be left for settlement by the Moslem world, whose 
decision shall be final. 78 
The port of Jeddah was still the primary source for much of the supplies 
and food for the holy city of Mecca. Ali planned to starve out Ibn Saud's 
forces by restricting the transport of grain into Mecca. 79 However many in 
Jeddah feared an assault by the Ikhwan in reprisal and were concerned at 
the possible starvation of family and friends in the holy city. The 
townspeople of Jeddah and local beduin found themselves caught in the 
middle and with little choice but to play each side of the conflict. Groups of 
Hijazi notables and beduin leaders would approach Ibn Saud hoping to 
secure their positions in case the Muwahhidun decisively took over. Then 
the same people would go and visit Ali promising their support to him in 
the event that he survived in power. 
Suspiciöus of the loyalties of people in Jeddah, All had caravans 
travelling to Mecca from Jeddah raided in order to obtain the mail bags 
and ascertain what letters were being written to Ibn Saud 80 The main tribe 
of the area, the Harb, numbered more than 20,000 and should have been a 
decisive force in the struggle for Hijaz. But the Harb were not united and 
some factions supported Ali in exchange for much-needed supplies. The 
Ikhwan had labelled them their enemies and whenever the Harb fought 
them they suffered severe defeats. Gradually the Harb tribesmen, although 
they supported Ali, lost any appetite for taking on the Najdi warriors. 81 
Ibn Saud waited in Mecca and had no desire to rush an assault on 
Jeddah. He was uncertain of what his Ikhwan soldiers might do in the 
73 Ibn Saud's Proclamation to People of Jeddah: 7th Rabi al-Awwal, 1343 (October 16, 
1924), in Bullard to Chamberlain, November 8,1924 IOR L/P&S/10/1124 P4893. 
79 Bullard to MacDonald, Report for October 11-20,1924 L/P&S/10/1124/P4481. See also 
Letter of October 19,1924, cited in Bullard, Two Kings, p. 66. 
8OBullard, Two Kings, p. 69. 
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'liberal' town. Particular care would have to be taken due to the presence of 
many foreigners and diplomatic missions in the city. He was also 
disappointed that no other community, besides some from among Indian 
Muslims, was paying any attention to his call for an international Muslim 
conference to discuss the issue of the holy cities. Ibn Saud had hoped to 
obtain support form the broader Muslim community. The Indian Caliphate 
Committee was favourable to Ibn Saud only because it desired the 
independence of Hijaz. It saw Hussein as British agent who would 
incorporate Hijaz into the British Empire. Yet much of the rest of the 
Muslim community at large was embroiled in their own domestic political 
and social struggles and were not willing or able to come out to support 
him. The Javanese and Malay Muslims were silent and no significant leader 
in the Arab world came forth to endorse him. 82 
The siege of Jeddah lasted a year. Ibn Saud had wanted to avoid the 
risk of any casualties among foreign nationals that might elicit the 
intervention of other governments. Orders were issued to his soldiers not 
to attack main cities that were held by Ali, such as Jeddah, Medina, and 
Yanbu. 83 The siege strategy did involve sporadic shelling of Ali's troops, 
using Ottoman canon that the Ikhwan had captured in their various battles. 
The siege ended with Ali bankrupt and with little choice but to retire north 
to Transjordan where his father and brothers were ensconced. 
By December 25,1925, Ibn Saud had taken Jeddah, the last major 
city in Hijaz, putting an end to the Najd-Hijaz conflict. The citizens of 
Jeddah made it easier by agreeing to open the city gates so long as the 
Ikhwan did not enter into the town. With Hijaz under his control Ibn Saud 
appointed his second son, Faisal, as governor. Faisal's travels had given 
him broader insights into foreign ways and the Hijaz was 'foreign' in many 
al Bullard to Chamberlain, Report for Oct. 31-Nov. 8, November 8,1924, IOR 
L/P&S/10/1124 P4893. Also Letter of November 18,1924, cited in Bullard, Two Kings,. 
p. 73. 
82 Viceroy, India to SOSFI, September 25,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1124/P3890 
83 Goldrup, Saudi Arabia, pp. 382-383. 
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respects. For the people of Hijaz Faisal's ability to converse in polished 
Classical Arabic as well as Beduin dialect made him easier to understand. 
His maternal grandfather's tutoring was paying off and foreign diplomats 
were relieved that they could communicate freely with the new amir of 
Hijaz M It was observed by those not familiar with the beduin slang of 
Central Arabia that Ibn Saud was "very difficult to understand... especially 
as he speaks fast and clips his words". 85 
Administering Hijaz 
Ibn Saud had successfully taken over the major towns of Hijaz without 
significant casualties. 86 He started working to convince the local people of 
his good will by a combination of appeasement and force. He brought the 
ulema of Najd and Hijaz together in order to settle their differences and 
create an amicable relationship. The ulema of Hijaz were practical in their 
outlook towards the change in political leadership and pledged allegiance 
to Ibn Saud. A consultative council or majlis al-shura made up of merchants, 
ulema and notables of Mecca was also created. The majlis was a means for 
the locals to have direct access to the new ruler and a convenient tool for 
Ibn Saud to implement rulings. 87 
In light of his expanded realm Ibn Saud declared himself malik al- 
hijaz wa sultan najd wa mulhaqatihah: King of Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and 
its dependencies. 88 This immediately alarmed the India Office and the 
Government of India. The Viceroy sent a telegram to London expressing 
8Sheean, Faisal: The King and his Kingdom, p. 81. 
8SClayton, An Arabian Diary, p. 128. 
86 Wahba Arabian Days, p. 154. 
87 The Hijazi ulema were quick to pledge their allegiance to the new ruler just as the Najd 
ulema had done to Ibn Saud over a decade earlier. This was in keeping with principles of 
Ibn Taymiya and the justification of preventingfitna. Ibn Saud however, did not appoint 
any Ikhwan to positions of power in Hijaz. See Bligh, From Prince to King, p. 23; Lacey, The 
Kingdom, p. 194 and Chapter 1 of this work. 
a The reasons for Ibn Saud's use of the title 'King' are unclear. Perhaps he sought to 
minimize the use of an Islamic term because he did not want to be identified as having 
pretensions for pan-Arab or Islamic leadership. Thus avoiding Muslim political feuds and 
complicating his relationship with the British. McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, p. 84; Leatherdale, 
Britain and Saudi Arabia, p. 59. 
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his serious distress over Ibn Saud's moves into Hijaz and proclamations of 
being ruler. As far as he was concerned Ibn Saud could speak; 
merely as the ruler of Nejd and not as the holder, 
permanently or temporarily, of the Hedjaz. His possession of 
the Hedjaz has clearly brought about a completely different 
situation.... What was then appropriate is no longer 
appropriate when applied to Moslem Holy Land ... 89 
The Indian Government was worried about the reaction of Muslims in 
India, fearing the perception that Britain was again meddling in the affairs 
of Muslims and was trying to take over Muslim holy cities. In London 
Foreign Office officials viewed the Viceroy's concern as unnecessary panic 
and believed that: "the Government of India are as timid as usual". The 
Colonial Office, however, took matters more seriously and called an 
interdepartmental meeting so that officers from the Foreign Office, 
Colonial Office and India Office could meet and decide how to deal with 
events in Hijaz. Foreign Office officials such as Louis Mallet and Oliphant 
wanted to postpone the meeting until Clayton came back from Arabia. 
However, Clayton would be spending time in Yemen and it would be 
another month before he returned. Shuckburgh at the Colonial office did 
not wish to wait so long and was annoyed at the Foreign Office's relaxed 
attitude. 
Because of the overlap that existed in departmental jurisdictions the 
Foreign Office and Colonial Office had to co-operate. This was not always 
conducive to smooth policy making. On one occasion the Foreign Office 
sent the Colonial office a copy of a telegram which it planned to send to 
convey HMG's appreciation to Ibn Saud. The Colonial Office did not 
respond for several weeks and this frustrated Foreign Office figures like 
Oliphant who remarked: 
It is really very difficult to conduct affairs properly with Bin 
Saoud when we have to consult I. O. or C. O. In this case it has 
89 Viceroy, Foreign and Political Department, Government of India, to SOSI (Secretary of 
State for India) January 5,1926, PRO FO 371/11437 E/180/180/91. 
90 Shuckburgh Minute FO 371/11437 E/322/180. 
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required three weeks to obtain C. O. concurrence in a short 
draft telegram. Such delay must inevitably diminish the good 
effects of our attitude on an Arab Chieftain who has not had 
experience of a multitude of government offices. 91 
Meanwhile having heard no reply from London or indication as to when 
things would be resolved Ibn Saud acted to enhance his position as best he 
could. Keeping in contact with the new British Consul, Stanley Jordan in 
Jeddah, he sought to provide the British with more incentives to support 
him. Ibn Saud casually mentioned in conversation to Jordan the increase in 
Communist activity in the region. Russia was supplying a great deal of 
money and arms to the revolt in Syria. In fact, Ibn Saud told the Consul, he 
himself had been approached several times to provide assistance, but had 
refrained from getting involved out of respect for Britain. Ibn Saud 
reassured Jordan that he "intended to follow British policy in all respects as 
regards that part of the world". 92 With even greater flair and drama Ibn 
Saud provided a sensitive piece of information which he told the consul 
was a great secret, obtained from reliable sources, and for the British 
government only -that the headquarters of the Bolshevik organisation was 
located in the Persian consulate in Damascus. This information and the 
attitude of Ibn Saud surprised the Consul: 
He expressed great concern for Trans-Jordan and Palestine, 
and earnestly wishes to warn the British Government of 
danger from that quarter where, he stated, Bolshevik money 
and influence were gaining ground. He several times 
reiterated this warning and appeared most sincere. 93 
Having recently made conquests deep into Hijaz, which bordered 
Transjordan Ibn Saud was clearly concerned about calming British fears 
and securing their assistance. He assured Jordan of his friendship towards 
Britain and of the accuracy of his information. Perhaps he was also hoping 
In Oliphant Minute, 10 February, 1926, in PRO FO 371/11437 E/902/180. 
92 Acting Consul, Jordan, British Agency (Jeddah) to Chamberlain SSFA (Sec. State for 
Foreign Affairs). December 29,1925. PRO FO 371/11437 E/364/180. 
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to involve himself in northern affairs. He told Stanley Jordan he was 
confident that Iraq would see few problems, "no trouble was to be feared 
there". Jordan was surprised when the King offered assistance in case 
trouble broke out in Transjordan. However, Ibn Saud kept the most 
alarming news for last-that a Bolshevik envoy had approached the Saudi 
amir with a surprisingly generous offer of money, arms, ammunition and 
even aircraft. When Ibn Saud inquired about what he would have to do in 
return, the envoy simply stated "to make trouble with the British" 94 
This confirmed existing suspicions among officials in London that 
Russian-sponsored activity in Hijaz was increasing. It was feared that the 
King might fall "under the sway of anti-British propaganda" unless there 
was a British official at the court in Riyadh-93 The problem was that such an 
officer would have to be senior enough to command the respect of Ibn 
Saud. Yet which senior officer would be able to live in harsh conditions in 
the Najdi capital. Moreover, there were disagreements over which 
department would finance the posting of an official to the King's court. 96 
This incident was a prime example of Ibn Saud's diplomacy. He had 
proclaimed his loyalty to Britain and hinted at enticements from Russia. It 
was designed to elicit greater British interest and it proved a successful 
strategy in regard to Foreign Office officials. Louis Mallet found Ibn Saud's 
attitude "surprisingly frank for an Arab" and "evidently strongly anti- 
Bolshevik". Mallet believed that: "it was most advantageous that we 
should now be in personal touch with ibn Saud through S. Jordan..... I 
submit that it is entirely in our own interest to keep on the most friendly 
terms with him [Ibn Saud]". 97 
93 Ibid. 
94 Consul Jeddah, Jordan, to SSFA, December 29,1925, PRO FO 371/11437 E/364/180. 
95 CO to FO April 30,1925, IOR L/P&S/10/938/P1339. 
% Disagreements between 10, CO, FO, in 10 Department Minute, March 3,1924 IOR 
L/P&S/10/938/P989. 
97 Mallet's Minute, in Dispatch from CO to FO, December 16,1925, PRO FO 371/11437 
E/322/180. 
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The fact that Ibn Saud appeared to be cooperating in attempts to 
settle the boundary issues of Iraq and Transjordan increased his credibility. 
But in reality Ibn Saud hoped to push Britain out of its position of 
neutrality in the Najd-Hejaz conflict to one that would provide positive 
support for him. It was strategy that worked -Foreign Office official D. G. 
Osborne commented: "we should exploit Mr. Saud's friendly disposition to 
the utmost. There is every indication that he will be a more reliable and 
valuable friend than Hussein"98 
Mallet, Osborne, and others were pleased at the friendly attitude 
and helpfulness of Ibn Saud. The fact that this display of affection for 
Britain came shortly after Ibn Saud made requests for a new treaty, arms 
and financial support, upon which the Foreign Office was still at that time 
debating, did not raise eyebrows. Even Louis Mallet whose Foreign Office 
minutes were frequently sarcastic and pessimistic, took Ibn Saud at face 
value 99 
With it apparent that Ibn Saud was now in de facto control of Hijaz, 
it became time to repair relations before his confidence encouraged him to 
expand even further. Gilbert Clayton was selected to lead a mission to Ibn 
Saud10° When Clayton arrived in December 1925, the King himself was 
anxious to update his status. Under the terms of the previous 1915 Treaty 
of Darin, Ibn Saud was to refrain from correspondence or entering into 
treaty relations with any foreign power other than Britain. He was unable 
to cede, sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise dispose of any of his territories to 
a foreign power without British consent. 101 Ibn Saud now argued that this 
agreement was made during the height of the First World War when the 
Osborne Minute, commenting on Jordan to SSFA report of December 29,1925, PRO FO 
371/11437 E/364/180/91. 
99 Clive Leatherdale notes that British officials could at times be patronising or 
condescending towards Arabs and their mentality. See Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi 
Arabia, p. 96. This reinforces the point of this work that British officials often failed to 
appreciate the guile which Arab leaders like Ibn Saud employed to their advantage. 
100 Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914-1921, p. 72. Clayton had been the Director of 
Military Intelligence, British Army, Egypt, during WWI. 
101 Mallet, Memorandum, March 8,1926, PRO FO 371/11437 E/1738/180/91. 
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situation was vastly different. Though he was "sincerely anxious for 
complete understanding and co-operation with Great Britain" Ibn Saud 
required a more "sound" agreement with His Majesty's Government 102 
Clayton was obliging and inquired about the areas that the King wished to 
have revised in the treaty. 
Ibn Saud made three points. First, he sought to, have Najd formally 
recognised as an independent state. This would involve removing the 
clauses that prevented relations with other powers and from ceding, selling 
or giving concessions to foreign governments. Second, the right to import 
arms because weapons were an important part of desert life. Finally, he 
made a request for financial assistance. This was needed to compensate the 
tribes that had been ordered to stop raiding into neighbouring states. They 
had to be compensated for the loss of their traditional means of livelihood. 
Ibn Saud was also concerned about Hashemite intrigue against him and 
sought firm commitments from Britain. Already, during the previous 
summer, the Hashemite ruler in Transjordan had annexed the important 
cities of Maan and Akaba in the north-west of Hijaz. 
In London the reaction to these requests was mixed. The Foreign 
Office was agreeable to the recognition of Najd's independent status but 
was not enthusiastic about the other two requests. In the case of supplying 
arms, there was uncertainty as to the extent to which Ibn Saud exercised 
control over the tribes. A Foreign Office minute expressed the concern that 
"there is no regular Najdian army, and the tribes will be armed by Ibn 
Saud and may then get out of hand and raid into British mandated 
territories". 103 On the issue of financial assistance, it was not considered 
appropriate to begin another subsidy policy, as with the capture of the 
102 CO dispatch to FO, including Clayton report to CO dated December 16,1925, FO 
371/11437 E/322/180. 
103 Mallet, Minute in Dispatch from CO to FO, December 16,1925, PRO FO 371/11437 
E/322/180. 
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Holy cities Ibn Saud should gain enough revenue from pilgrimage and as 
such "he may be in less need of money". 104 
This was far from the truth. Ibn Saud had spent a great deal of his 
resources in laying siege to Hijazi cities and providing largesse to the local 
tribes. The pilgrim traffic had slowed due to the uncertain political 
situation. These factors were not at the forefront of Foreign Office 
considerations. 105 Nevertheless, Clayton found accommodation with Ibn 
Saud and reached a new agreement known as the Treaty of Jeddah. Under 
this treaty, signed on May 20,1927, Britain recognised the "complete and 
absolute independence of the dominions of his majesty the King of Hijaz 
and of Najd and its Dependencies". 106 There would be a state of "peace and 
friendship" between Ibn Saud and Britain. However, the pledge to come to 
the defence of Ibn Saud in case of attack was withdrawn. This was still a 
triumph for Ibn Saud. Not only had he expanded his empire at the expense 
of the Hashemites, but he had also obtained British recognition as an 
independent ruler. This achievement however, would bring him into 
conflict with his own men-the Ikhwan. 
The Ikhwan Revolt 
Following the conquest of Hijaz, Ibn Saud spent more than 18 months 
consolidating his position. He appointed judges from the Najdi ulema, 
governors from his extended family and gave senior positions to loyal 
Hijazi notables in town councils and local administrations. Yet the Ikhwan 
chiefs did not get any positions of authority. They were thanked for their 
services, given gifts of cloth, livestock and food and sent back to their hijras 
in the interior-107 For those who had given up their traditional beduin life in 
the cause of Ikhwan beliefs and had vowed to spread the faith this was a 
frustrating anti-climax. Not only had their jihad been halted but the 
io+Ibid. 
105 Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia p. 216. 
106 Article 1, Treaty of Jeddah, May 20,1927, text in IOR L/P&S/10/1166/P4518. 
107 See Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 90 and Howarth, The Desert King, p. 154. 
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" innovations of the disbelivers were still present. In fact some of the 
'innovations', such as the motorcar, telephone, and telegraph, system that 
were in already used in the Hijaz were incorporated by Ibn Saud into his 
new administrative structure and he expanded the network of telegraph 
lines to Najd as well. 
These inventions topped the list of complaints of the Ikhwan. A 
petition of grievances, whose chief signatory was none other than Faisal al- 
Duwish, was sent to Ibn Saud. Besides the complaints of foreign inventions 
I 
such as automobiles, telegraph and telephones, taxes were too high and the 
disbelieving tribes of Iraq and Transjordan were permitted to graze their 
herds in Ikhwan territory. 108 In an attempt to pacify the situation Ibn Saud 
defended his position by stating that the ulema had not found anything 
wrong with the devices. However, this was not a satisfactory response and 
several incidents occurred where telephone wires were cut and 
automobiles smashed. 
Dissatisfaction with the response of the King led al-Duwish to 
increase his raids into Iraqi and Transjordanian territory to defy the treaties 
made with the 'disbelievers'. In Iraq he attacked settlements of the Zayyad, 
Yajeeb and Beni Salama tribes. From Hail, al-Duwish raided into 
Transjordan and terrorised the local Ruwalla tribe. While he did not always 
lead the attacks, members of his tribe, the Mutayr, were actively involved. 
The frequency of the raids led Abdullah, ruler of Transjordan to note with 
alarm that many of his beduin were on the verge of joining the Ikhwan 
simply to protect themselves from attack. 109 Although he desperately 
wished to counter attack, Abdullah was instructed to restrain his men. The 
Colonial Office did not want to provide Ibn Saud with any justification for 
launching more attacks into Transjordan or Iraqi territory. 11o 
308 Wahba, Arabian Days, p. 133; Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 93. 
109 Amir Abdullah to HC (High Commissioner), Amman, February 1925, IOR 
L/P&S/1125/P768. 
no SOSCO to High Commissioner, Palestine, February 25,1925, JOR 
L/P&S/10/1125/P585. 
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Lieutenant John Bagot Glubb was the 'Special Service Officer- 
Ikhwan Defence' on the Iraqi frontier. He witnessed the aftermath of the 
raids: 
Along the whole length of the Nejed frontier from Basra to 
near Nejef the shattered and terrified remains of the Iraq 
sheperd tribes arrived back in panic and confusion on the 
banks of the Euphrates.... several hundred Iraqis had been 
massacred and many thousands of sheep had been looted, 
not to mention donkeys, tents, clothing, food utensils, and 
money. It was a devastating blow. "' 
With the loss of so many men, families were left in desperation. Women 
and children were "orphaned, widowed, half naked and utterly destitute. 
The Ikhwan despoiled women of their outer garments and jewellery. "112 
Yet there seemed to be little sympathy from Baghdad since: "The Iraq 
government regarded tribes and tribal raiding with aversion and 
resentment. They disliked their own beduin almost as much as they did 
those of Ibn Saud, and desired a plague on all their houses". 113 
As a result of these raids Iraqi tribes became disillusioned with the 
British and Iraqi governments and sceptical of their promises of protection. 
Some tribesmen decided that the best course was to appeal directly to 
Saudi authorities for help against attack, since it was assumed that Riyadh 
was orchestrating al-Duwish's raids. Finding a sympathetic listener in the 
amir of Hail, who was also a cousin of Ibn Saud, the Iraqi tribes were 
offered immunity from Ikhwan raids in return for the payment of tax to 
Saudi coffers. Other Iraqi tribes chose instead to engage in counter-attacks 
of their own which escalated hostilities and led to counter raids. Lt. Glubb 
and other British officials were sceptical of Ibn Saud's claims that al- 
Düwish and other Ikhwan were operating contrary to orders, especially 
of `ter immunity was granted to some Iraqi tribes in return for taxation. 114 
Ilijohn Bagot Glubb, War in the Desert, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1960, pp. 136-138. 
132Ibid. Glubb did not report receiving any complaints of rape or assault on women which 
surprised him. 
113Ibid., p. 142. 
114Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 140. 
ABEDIN-FIVE 188 
Ibn Saud's response was to claim that Iraqi raids into Najd territory 
had compelled the Ikhwan to respond in the manner which they did. In 
fact he consistently maintained that it was attacks by tribes based in Iraq 
and Transjordan that was the true aggression, raiding his territories, killing 
dozens of people and capturing thousands of camels. Ikhwan raids were 
the result of the injustices committed against them and because Britain did 
nothing to prevent the attacks. Ibn Saud had tried restraint but he was not 
at fault if his people were angry and could wait no longer, their intention 
being only to recover their property 115 
Ibn Saud had successfully used the Ikhwan on the battlefield to 
defeat Sharif Hussein and his family. Having created the Kingdom of Hijaz 
and Najd Ibn Saud wanted the Ikhwan to settle down and lead a lead a 
sedentary life. The conquest of Hijaz however, gave Faisal al-Duwish no 
incentive to retire. Victory only increased his wish to settle the score 
against the British supported Iraqi and Transjordan regimes. Britain had 
created arbitrary borders which had disrupted traditional tribal migratory 
patterns. Yet Iraqi tribes had the ability to raid into Najd, flee across 
invisible borders and claim sanctuary under the Hashemite regime, with 
the added protection of the Royal Air Force (RAF). This was insulting to al- 
Duwish who felt that having humiliated the Hashemites and run them out 
of Hijaz there was no reason to be tolerant and respectful of their 'borders' 
in Iraq and Transjordan. Other Ikhwan chiefs such as Ibn Humayd of the 
Utayba and Dhaidan Ibn Hithlain of the Ajman supported him. 116 
Faisal al-Düwish believed that he was being treated unjustly. 117 He 
had fought many battles and led the sieges of Hail and Medina. Months 
Its Ibn Saud to Political Resident, Gulf, September 17,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1124/P4617. 
116 Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 88; Howarth, The Desert King p. 155. 
117 Letter of Faisal al-Düwish to Amir Saud, Riyadh, June 6,1929, text in IOR R/15/2/92 
Duwish complained about the prohibition on raiding and noted that he had left everything 
to'fight for Ibn Saud. Meanwhile, Britain's every wish was being fulfilled. Ibn Saud was 
accused of preventing the Ikhwan from keeping with "both our religion and worldly 
concerns". The livelihood of many tribes had suffered because of the restrictive policies 
upon them. In the letter al-Duwish stated that if the Ikhwan were allowed to raid and had 
their past forgiven, he would renew his pledge of loyalty to Ibn Saud. 
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had been spent lying patiently in wait without raiding as ordered by Ibn 
Saud. Yet despite his successes Faisal was not rewarded with a position of 
power. He remained as before, chief of the small settlement of Artawiya. 
Now in the face of provocation by the British and tribes under Iraqi 
protection, he was still under orders to stand fast. A proud chief of the 
Mutayr tribe, Faisal could claim just as noble a descent as Ibn Saud. It 
1? ecame more and more difficult for him to accept that Ibn Saud had a right 
over him. al-Duwish was joined by other Ikhwan leaders with similar 
grievances against Ibn Saud, but not all of them were motivated by the 
same resentment and desire for power. Ibn Humayd of the Utayba was a 
devout Ikhwan follower who saw a dilution of Ikhwan ideals. He was 
critical of the leniency shown to the people and customs of Hijaz. Dhaidan 
Ibn Hithlain chief of the Ajman had a personal grudge against Ibn Saud. 
His tribe had been forced to join Ibn Saud because they were defeated in 
battle and he was always looking to free himself from subservience to 
Najd. 118 
These leaders and their tribes were at the forefront of the rebellion 
against Ibn Saud. Among the Ikhwan generally there was also the feeling 
that too much favour had been shown to the disbelieving 'Ingleezi' 
(English) the introduction of innovations such as the automobile and 
telegraph had been allowed. All signs that their leader was being swayed 
by the mushrikeen. 
Tensions came to a head when in late September 1927, the Iraqi 
Border Police started to build a police post near Busaiya wells. It was the 
first of a series of posts that Baghdad wanted to build in order to extend 
the range of police patrols and deter Ikhwan raids from Najd. 119 Although 
the post was 115 kilometres inside Iraqi territory, Faisal al-Duwish saw 
this as a flagrant insult and an attempt by the 'unbelievers' to solidify their 
position in territory that was part of Mutayri tribal grounds. On November 
1's Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam, p. 127. 
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5, al-Duwish led an attack, destroying the police post and killing everyone 
there. 'Iraq and Britain made loud protests. Ibn Saud denied that he had 
authorised the raid, but claimed that Iraq had no right to build the fort in 
the first place. Its construction violated agreements made at Uqair which 
prohibited the establishment of military posts near the border. Supporters 
of al-Duwish came to Ibn Saud and urged that a campaign against Iraq be 
initiated. Though this was refused, the stipends of al-Duwish and the other 
Ikhwan involved in the raid were withheld. Orders were also issued that 
they remain in the settlement of Artawiya and prohibited them from 
leaving Najd. This did not stop the raids, as other Ikhwan took up the 
cause. The opportunity to inflict punishment on Iraqi tribes and gather 
booty for themselves were motivating factors. 120 
Meanwhile reports reached Baghdad that Ikhwan raids on Shammar 
tribesmen inside Iraqi territory were inflicting heavy casualties. The British 
High Commission was flooded with complaints and reports indicating that 
"all the desert tribes in Iraq are in a state of extreme panic" 121 This placed 
British officers in Iraq in a "most humiliating position", as many of the 
tribesmen were critical of Britain's inability to protect them. Some chiefs 
were pledging to join the Ikhwan purely to prevent attacks on them. Also 
suspicions in ruling Iraqi circles were growing that Britain may be letting 
the Ikhwan raids occur to "remind Iraq of her dependence on the 
British". 122 For their part British officials felt that Ibn Saud's inability to 
control the Ikhwan was "merely a pretence" and that "he may, in fact, be 
conniving at these raids whilst at the same time he expresses his 
disapproval of them"? 23 
119 Iraq Police Report of November 7,1927 on Busaiyah raid, PRO FO 
371/12241/E5228/56/91. 
120 Colonial Office to FO, December 6,1927, PRO FO 371/12241/E5228/56/91. Also Asad, 
The Road to Mecca, pp. 224-225. Asad was with Ibn Saud during these troubles; Philby, 
Arabian jubilee, p. 93; Howarth, The Desert King, p. 159. 
12iHCI to SOSCO, December 29,1927, PRO FO 371/12241/ E5615/56/91. 
122Ibid. 
123 The problem was that the raids took place in a territory stretching over 600 miles and it 
was difficult to acquire up to date information about latest raids. In addition, officials were 
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Realising that he needed to diffuse tension with the British and put 
some restraints on Ikhwan activity, Ibn Saud called a conference in Riyadh. 
He invited chiefs, ulema and amirs of towns from across Arabia. Faisal al- 
: 4. 
Duwish refused to attend as did Ibn Humayd of the Utayba and Hithlain of 
I 
the Ajman. This was a carefully organised event, tactfully designed to 
reinforce Ibn Saud's position. He would seek consensus and approval for 
his rule and satisfy the British that he was doing something about the 
Ikhwan. Those who attended were all reliant to a varying degree on the 
largesse extended to them by Ibn Saud. The subsidies of food, clothing and 
supplies provided by Ibn Saud enabled them to maintain loyalties within 
their own tribal areas. 
In a grand gesture Ibn Saud declared that he would step down as 
ruler because he would not lead if they did not want him. This was of 
course, soundly opposed. 124 Ibn Saud was no fool and he would not have 
made such a move if he were not certain of the outcome. The gathered 
chiefs claimed that they did not want to hear of Ibn Saud's resignation but 
rather clarification from the ulema about the innovations' of the motor car, 
telegraph, and telephone. They also wanted an answer as to why there 
were forts being built in Iraq which were obstructing beduin migration and 
depriving access to water wells. 
The ulema present were ready to answer in defence of the 
'innovations' declaring that there was no prohibition to these inventions in 
Islam. They were being used for the benefit of people and therefore were 
lawful. As for the issue of the forts Ibn Saud pledged to get them removed 
over time. With the questions answered the Ikhwan leaders reaffirmed 
concerned about the Anaizah tribal grazing ground which extended from Trans-Jordan to 
Baghdad -a distance of some 800 miles and "though formerly peaceful and well disposed 
towards us, have within the past 6 or 9 months shown signs of coquetting with the Mutair 
tribe and of transferring their allegiance to Ibn Saud. " If that occurred then this was a 
serious security threat. Because the loss of the Anaizah to the Ikhwan side would make it 
"impossible to maintain the trans desert route and the line of communications for 
reinforcements from Egypt, which is the whole 
basis of our power in Iraq. " Trenchard 
Minute (Sir Hugh Trenchard), PRO FO 371/12241 E5615/56. See also HCI to SOSCO, 
January 17,1925 IOR L/P&S/10/1125/P194. 
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their allegiance to Ibn Saud and declared that they would fight against al- 
Duwish who had unlawfully rebelled against his amir. 125 The meeting 
successfully provided Ibn Saud with a reaffirmation of his leadership and 
the condemnation of al-Duwish. It would now be safe to move against him. 
Ibn Saud began raising a new force recruiting heavily from towns 
instead of Ikhwan settlements. He also provided motorised transport to 
give improved mobility that allowed him to take the battle to al-Duwish's 
own backyard-the field of Sabilah, just outside the settlement of 
Artawiya. 126 The advance of this new mobile force did not appear to faze 
Faisal al-Duwish. It had been years since Ibn Saud had fought on the 
battlefield and may have assumed that the large force was for show, and 
the King would negotiate his way out. 
Since Ibn Saud had not previously moved against him, Duwish did 
not believe the King had the stomach for battle. However, Ibn Saud was 
determined to eliminate all threats to the stability of his young kingdom. 
He set up an ambush for the rebel forces and lured them into a crossfire of 
machine guns, slaughtering many of them before they fired a shot. When 
Ibn Saud sent his cavalry in to finish off the survivors the Ikhwan fled into 
the desert. Ibn Humayd managed to survive and flee the battlefield, but al- 
Duwish was badly wounded with a bullet in the stomach and was 
captured. 127 
Brought before Ibn Saud on a stretcher Faisal al-Duwish was in 
critical condition. The King's physician examined al-Duwish but did not 
give him more than a week to live. Feeling merciful Ibn Saud pardoned al- 
Duwish, allowing him to return to Artawiyah to die. 128 Hearing of the 
I 
King's leniency, Ibn Humayd came out of hiding to surrender as well. 
However, in this case Ibn Saud decided to set an example. Ibn Humayd 
124 Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia p. 254. 
125 Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam, pp. 121-135. 
126 Howarth, The Desert King, pp. 168-169; Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 93. 
127 These accounts are told by a young Saudi official Mohammad Almana in Arabia Unified: 
A Portrait of Ibn Saud, London: 1980, pp. 106-112. See also Asad, The Road to Mecca, p. 225. 
12S Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 93. 
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was arrested and thrown into a Riyadh jail where he later died. Orders 
were issued for Ibn Humayd's settlement of Ghot Ghot to be razed as an 
example of how firm, as well as merciful, Ibn Saud could be. 
Afterwards the King met with his men in the presence of the ulema 
where he reminded them that the religious scholars should make the 
rulings in matters of religion only. There was no room for the individual 
interpretation of religious texts. He was their ruler and they must obey 
him. The ulema where there for guidance and he would not tolerate any 
further attempts to call for jihad or revolt against the ruler. 129 Having 
removed the threat of rebellion, a relieved Ibn Saud went on a tour of the 
towns that had sent men to fight on his side in order to give thanks and 
distribute largesse. Then he headed back to Hijaz to be near the holy cities. 
With the Ikhwan revolt defeated there was one remaining rebel 
leader. Dhaidan Ibn Hithlain of the Ajman, had remained in al-Hasa and 
had not been involved in Sabilah. 130 Realising that he was now alone he 
sought to make peace with Ibn Saud. Instead of going directly to the King, 
Dhaidan approached Fahd ibn Jiluwi, whose father Abdullah, was 
governor of al-Hasa and a cousin of the King, in the hope of negotiating a 
truce. However, the meeting went sour and Dhaidan was arrested. He 
warned that if he was not released his men would attack the camp. In 
response, Fahd ordered his men to execute Hithlain if any Ajman 
tribesmen approached. Not hearing from their chief and fearing the worst 
the Ajman tribesmen mounted their assault. In a ferocious attack the entire 
camp was overwhelmed. Fahd Ibn Jiluwi was killed along with over 1000 
of his men. 131 Dhaidan Ibn Hithlain was also killed and this incident was a 
229 Jakins to Chamberlain, May 25,1929, IOR L/P&S/10/1240/P3908, cited in Kostiner, 
MOSA, p. 137. 
130 Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours p. 304-305, and Habib, Ikhwan Movement of Najd, 
pp. 268-270. 
131 The Political Agent in Kuwait was alarmed at the heavy losses reporting that the al- 
Hasa forces were "completely routed". Political Agent, Kuwait to Resident, Gulf, May 4, 
1929, IOR R/15/2/92. See also, McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, p. 108. 
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serious blow to Ibn Saud's position in al-Hasa, while its governor, 
Abdullah Ibn Jiluwi, was devastated by the loss of his son. 
To complicate matters further, Ibn Saud learned that Faisal al- 
Duwish had not died from his wounds but had in fact recovered and had 
returned to his marauding ways. Faisal had joined with the now leaderless 
Ajman to form a Mutayr-Ajman alliance that attacked caravans and tribes 
loyal to Ibn Saud. They were joined by sections of Utayba who had been 
followers of the now deceased Ibn Humayd. 132 
The raids were characterised by a fierce brutality that was unlike the 
traditional beduin ghazw - where the emphasis was on booty and livestock. 
These raids were frenzied attacks. No quarter was given. All who were 
found were slaughtered and their bodies often mutilated 133 The object was 
revenge, spreading fear and panic. Ironically, al-Duwish employed the 
same hit and run tactics that had been used by Iraqi tribes on him. He 
would attack and then cross into either Iraq where he could hide in the 
desert, or more often into Kuwait, where he could get supplies. 
Ibn Saud discovered the Kuwaiti connection and was certain that the 
amir of Kuwait was encouraging the rebels. He complained to the British 
Agent that either his loyal forces be allowed the right of pursuit or the 
British should allocate forces to prevent entry into Kuwait 134 The High 
Commissioner of Iraq was inclined to let Ibn Saud have his way and 
believed that there were grounds to justify permission to cross borders in 
pursuit. 135 But there was a danger in allowing free access across borders 
that had taken so long to be recognised. That might open the floodgates for 
other tribes to cross at will. Ibn Saud would be seen to gain prestige at the 
expense of Britain. The Resident in the Gulf thought it detrimental to 
132 political Agent, Jeddah to SOSCO, September 10,1929, IOR R/15/2/92. Also reports 
that Utayba and sections of the Harb had also rebelled and attacked government property. 
1 Howarth, The Desert King, p. 158. For a detailed look at beduin raiding etiquette see 
Dickson, Arab of the Desert, p. 118-132 and Goldrup, Saudi Arabia, pp. 271-273. 
134 Political Agent, Jeddah to FO, June 6,1929, IOR R/15/2/92. 
1s HCI to SOSCO June 9,1929, R/15/2/92. 
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British interests for Ibn Saud to be granted permission. To the Resident it 
was clear that Ibn Saud was: 
seeking opportunities either openly or secretly to interfere in 
the Gulf principalities and the news that he has invaded 
Kuwait territory with the permission of His Majesty's 
Government because we were too weak to protect it would 
have extremely bad effect on our position throughout the 
Gulf. We may be sure that Nejd propaganda would stress 
Bin Saud's strength and our weakness. 136 
However, the Resident was under the authority of the Government of India 
whose concern was with the stability of the whole of eastern Arabia and 
the Persian Gulf and who worried about maintaining the independence of 
the Gulf Sheikhdoms. Foreign Office officials were more willing to give Ibn 
Saud the benefit of the doubt and believed a strong Saudi presence would 
maintain peace in Najd and Hijaz. The British in the Iraqi Government 
wanted to prevent raids on their tribes and to curtail Ibn Saud's power, 
fearing that an aggressive Saudi state would interfere in the mandated 
territories. At the same time the rebellion of al-Duwish was a real threat to 
stability in the whole area. The Air Ministry proposed using Royal Air 
Force planes to bomb the rebels. The RAF was agreeable but officers on the 
ground in Iraq warned about the difficulties of distinguishing between 
rebel forces and friendly Kuwaiti or Iraqi tribes from the air. Moreover, it 
could become a dangerous extension of British military power which might 
draw out the conflict rather than reduce it. 137 
Nevertheless, despite differing opinions over the extent to which 
Britain should become involved, it was agreed to provide Ibn Saud with 
weapons and ammunition so that he could attempt to put down the 
rebellion himself. This would allow the King to arm the increasing number 
of townspeople that he was recruiting into his forces and improve his 
chances of success against the rebels. Ibn Saud already had the advantage 
of being able to deploy trucks and motor cars, some mounted with 
136 Political Resident, Gulf to SOSCO June 11,1929, IOR R/15/2/92. 
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machine guns. Communications had also improved between the various 
towns loyal to the king. Using the telegraph Ibn Saud was able to keep 
abreast of movements and sightings of rebel forces. In this way the King 
was able to follow the progress of a group of rebel forces moving north of 
Najd in the direction of Hail. 
The offending party was led by al-Duwish's son, Abdul Aziz, with a 
large contingent of Mutayri tribesmen on a mission to gather booty. 
Though they were initially successful in their attacks around Hail, on their 
return they were intercepted by Ibn Saud's forces. Caught by surprise and 
exhausted from days of travelling the Mutayri's fought hand to hand in the 
blistering desert sun. The Saudi forces were fresh and outnumbered the 
rebels. The battle was a complete rout. Not only was it a huge defeat for 
Faisal al-Duwish but he was overcome with grief at the news that his son 
was killed in the fighting. 138 
Flush with success Ibn Saud went on the offensive. War parties were 
sent out from al-Hasa and Hail. Travelling in trucks the forces created a 
pincer movement on the rebel forces. The Saudi forces stalked al-Duwish, 
chasing him from oases to oases. Sensing that his time was running out 
Faisal al-Duwish, the once proud Mutayri chief, Ikhwan commander, and 
inveterate opponent of the British sought refuge with Harold Dickson, 
Political Agent, Kuwait. Al-Duwish claimed that his concern was for the 
fate of large numbers of women and children, numbering around 5000 as 
well as 9000 camels and 30,000 sheep. 139 He asked that the British 
Government grant protection to his women and children while he made off 
for Riyadh. The British reply was firm: 
It should be made clear that His Majesty's government are 
not prepared to enter into any further discussions with 
Dawish who should be warned that if he himself or any of his 
emissaries cross Kuwait frontier again they will be liable to 
137 HCI to SOSCO, June 20,1929, IOR R/15/2/92. 
Lu Howarth, The Desert King, p. 167. 
139 Political Agent, Kuwait to Resident, Gulf, August 30,1920, IOR R/15/2/92. Also Habib, 
Ikhwan Movement of Najd, p. 280. 
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arrest or any other action that may be considered 
necessary. 140 
British resources were committed to assist Ibn Saud in quelling the 
rebellion. RAF planes had orders to chase out any of the rebels that crossed 
the borders. This allowed Ibn Saud to squeeze al-Duwish towards the 
British lines. 141 The rebels were rapidly running out of places to hide. al- 
Duwish gathered his remaining men and told them that no help was 
forthcoming from Iraq or Kuwait and that they should move westwards 
towards Syria. However, his men were tired and fearful of a future on the 
run. Many opted to surrender to Ibn Saud rather than flee with their 
leader. 142 
al-Duwish also decided to follow suit. Rather than attempt to 
approach the King directly he risked crossing into Kuwait on January 10, 
1930 and begged the Political Agent Harold Dickson to accept his 
surrender. According to Saudi historian Mohammad al-Mana, Dickson was 
reluctant to accept the surrender but al-Duwish was adamant 143 However, 
Hogarth asserts the opposite; that Dickson had to persuade a reluctant 
Faisal to surrender to the British in order to spare his family and forces 
from the men of Ibn Saud. 144 
Secret Funding of the Ikhwan 
Ibn Saud suspected that there was a secret source of funding for the 
Ikhwan rebellion as al-Duwish always seemed to have plentiful supplies, 
arms and ammunition, and wondered whether it was possible that al- 
Düwish's attacks were being funded by another power. 145 Ibn Saud sent an 
emissary, Muhammad Asad, into Kuwait to investigate the possible 
sources of al-Duwish's funding. Asad discovered that al-Duwish was 
140 SOSCO to Resident, Gulf, November 6,1929, IOR R/15/2/92. 
141 Howarth, The Desert King, p. 172. 
142 HCI to Resident, Gulf, November 19,1929, IOR R/15/2/92. 
143 Almana, Arabia Unified, p. 132. 
144 Howarth, The Desert King, p. 175. 
14.5 Political Resident, Gulf to SOSCO, March 13,1928, IOR L/ P&S/ 10/ 1235/ P1436. 
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receiving guns, ammunition and cases of money that were brought in 
through Kuwaiti ports. But he was unable to ascertain from whom the 
supplies were actually coming. McLoughlin argues that it was the British 
that had a hand in supplying arms to al-Duwish-based on some of Asad's 
observations and Ibn Saud's suspicions. 146 
However, the true financier of the Ikhwan rebellion was more likely 
King Feisal of Iraq. British officers serving in the Iraqi Government 
suspected that some third party might be giving support to al-Duwish as a 
means of getting back at Ibn Saud. In a meeting with the British High 
Commissioner, Francis Humphrys, Feisal admitted supporting the Ikhwan 
rebellion. 147 He claimed that it was necessary to cause divisiveness in 
central Arabia. As long as Ibn Saud was in power he remained a threat to 
Iraq because "the effective union of fanatical tribes of central Arabia can 
only be maintained by the policy of constant aggression against 
neighbouring states. " The target of that aggression was, and would 
continue to be, Iraq. If however, the tribes of central Arabia became 
disunited and left to their traditional ways "the tribes would expend their 
energies on local disputes". 148 Thus by encouraging the Ikhwan rebellion 
Faisal could keep the tribes of Ibn Saud fighting amongst each other and 
they would cease to be a threat to Iraq. 
However, al-Duwish did not rely only on Hashemite largesse and 
also approached the Sheikh of Kuwait for support, pledging in return to 
bring his tribe under Kuwaiti authority. al-Duwish knew that the Sheikh 
might be tempted, because if Ibn Saud was weakened, Kuwait stood a 
chance of regaining territory lost to Najd at the Uqair conference. Trade 
restrictions imposed on the use of Kuwaiti ports meant a huge loss in 
146 Asad, The Road to Mecca, p. 244, McLoughlin Ibn Saud, p. 109. McLoughlin argues that al- 
Duwish was trying to set up an independent state in the north east but his reference is 
Asad. There was an attempt by Farhan Ibn Mashur of the Ruwalla tribe who sought to use 
al-Duwish's rebellion as means carve out territory for himself in the north. 
147 Meeting with King Faisal reported in HCI to SOSCO October 6,1929, IOR R/15/2/92. 
148 Ibid. 
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revenue which hurt the Sheikhs income. 149 Although al-Duwish did not 
receive the blanket support he required he was allowed free passage in and 
out of the territory. In fact, despite the common assumption that the 
Ikhwan rebellion was a reaction to their suppression and loss of power, 
there is also the possibility that al-Duwish had ambitions to create his own 
independent kingdom using the Ikhwan to fuel his own political 
ambitions. Howarth remarked that the "urge to kill or convert the 
unfaithful could never be satisfied" since there were always more 
unfaithful to be conquered. 150 
Aftermath of Rebellion 
The Ikhwan rebellion was a costly affair for Ibn Saud. Large quantities of 
supplies (petrol, food, and money) had been spent to raise, feed, arm and 
compensate an army. Taxes had been levied on both beduin and 
townsmen leaving many in difficult financial situations. Ibn Saud's 
expenditure was still greater than his income, and the world-wide effects of 
the Great Depression included the curtailment of the numbers of pilgrims 
which now more than ever were needed to bring in revenues. 
Attempts to obtain a subsidy from Britain were rejected. Even a 
request for help to set up a British bank was met with indifference. His 
Majesty's Government did not get involved in what went on between 
British banks and foreign governments. Neither the Hijazi or Najdi 
administrations could get British bank credit. In fact when Ibn Saud 
wanted to travel from Hijaz to Najd, his administration in Mecca had to 
negotiate a long term loan with the Soviet Union to obtain enough fuel for 
the King's entourage of over 100 cars and trucks. The Government of India 
was owed £30,000 for arms supplied to put down the Ikhwan rebellion. 151 
149 Political Resident, Gulf to SOSCO, June 13,1929 and July 17,1929, IOR R/15/2/92. 
150 Howarth, The Desert King, p. 159. See also F. A. Shaker Modernization of the Developing 
Nations: A Case Study of Saudi Arabia, P. h. D. Thesis Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 
1972, pp. 114-152. 
151 In addition the Post Office Department owed the Eastern Telegraph company 2,000 
pounds. Political Agent, Jeddah to SSFA, Intelligence Reports for July-August, Oct. 9, 
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Meanwhile many of the Hijazi officials had not received salaries for 
months. Merchants suffered under dwindling sales and high import duties 
and customs fees. 
On top of that, the King's finance man, Abdullah Sulayman, would 
have to demand loans from merchants and other wealthy families in order 
to meet daily government expenditures. The urban populations were 
greatly under pressure: 
At Medina there was acute distress almost to famine 
conditions. At Mecca people were beginning to go hungry. In 
Jedda the populace was in a poor way, while the landlord 
and merchant classes were exasperated almost beyond 
measure by the extortions of Abdullah Suleyman. But there 
was neither leader nor the courage to rebel 152 
To prevent people escaping to Transjordan the King ordered the Banu 
Atiyya tribe to police the northern frontier and bolster troops already there. 
However, the Banu Atiyya faced great hardship themselves and used their 
position to raid into Transjordan and neighbouring tribes. Garrison 
commanders could do little to prevent them. Shortages of petrol meant that 
few vehicles were useable. Moreover, pay was in arrears and there were 
problems with discipline and low morale among the troops. Fearing 
mutiny if they ordered an attack on their beduin brethren the local amirs 
could do little but wait until the difficulties passed. 
It was disappointing to the King that Britain was not being 
supportive in his time of need. Britain's ability to fund Ibn Saud was also 
limited by the economic strain of the Great Depression. London had 
assumed that pilgrimage revenues were enough to sustain the needs of the 
regime, as they had Sharif Hussein. However, Britain did not fully consider 
the higher levels of expenditures as a result of the combined territories of 
Najd and al-Hasa. Pilgrimage revenue now had to stretch across the 
1931 IOR R/15/2/295. See also Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 175-176. Philby described the 
King "despondent and gloomy" and seriously worried about the financial situation. 
u2 political Agent, Jeddah to SSFA, Intelligence Report for September and October, 
December 1,1931, IOR R/15/2/295. 
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peninsula. Had the British known at the time about the vast mineral 
resources waiting to be developed beneath the desert, Ibn Saud's financial 
worries would not have been so great. However, Ibn Saud was in dire need 
of financial aid and he lamented "if anyone would offer me a million 
pounds, I would give him all the concessions he wanted" 153 
It would take a small American oil company to discover the secret 
of eternal wealth and subsequently cause the United States to overshadow 
Britain as Ibn Saud's closest ally and benefactor. 
153 Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 176. 
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Chapter 6 
America Arrives in Arabia 
202 
In the period following the First World War the United States had very few 
political interests in the Middle East. Unlike the European powers, 
Washington had no special responsibilities in regard to the Mandates, nor 
did they have an imperial lifeline (such as the Suez Canal) or strategic 
possessions to protect. ' The Middle East was considered the traditional 
domain of European colonial powers and did not rank high on the list of 
American concerns. Few officials had experience in the region, fewer still 
had language training in Arabic or knowledge of Arab culture and history. 
The one department that was interested in the region consisted of a small 
group of foreign service officers in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 
(NEA) at the State Department? 
The NEA was a relatively new creation itself, having only been 
established in 1909. With a staff of thirteen it had responsibility for 
overseeing a vast geographical area, from the coast of North Africa 
stretching across to the Levant, Turkey, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Persia and 
India. As such a key factor in deciding a country's importance to the United 
States was the level of economic activity involving American interests. 
Much of the geographical areas that came under NEA's supervision had 
relatively few commercial ties to the United States .3 Often a single officer 
I Kermit Roosevelt, Arabs, Oil and History: the Story of the Middle East, New York: Kennikat 
Press 1949, p. 225 and Aaron Miller, Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American 
Foreign Policy 1939-1949, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980, p. 22. For 
more on America's role in the Middle East see Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle 
East: 1941-1947, London: Frank Cass, 1980. 
2 For the State Department's role in the Middle East see Phillip Baram, The Department of 
State in the Middle East, 1919-1945, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978, pp. 67-72, and 
John DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1919-1939, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1963, especially pp. 121-127. 
3There was a modest amount of American commerce with the region but it was mainly 
concerned with food products like, raisins, figs, and dates and in oriental carpets. See John 
DeNovo, "The U. S. and the Middle East, 1919-1939" pp. 225-237 and Barry Rubin, 
"America as junior Partner: Anglo-American Relations in the Middle East, 1919-1939", 
pp. 238- 251, in The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1919-1939, ed. Uriel Dann, New York: 
Holmes&Meier, 1988. 
ABEDIN-SIX 203 
would have the task of monitoring developments in over a dozen 
countries, usually without the help of a secretary or assistant .4 
In the 1920's there were virtually no American commercial interests 
operating in the Arabian peninsula .5 The U. S. Government had consular 
officers there but the nearest was based in Aden to the south. The Division 
of Near Eastern Affairs observed the politics of the Arabian Peninsula with 
mild curiosity. Britain, which had been traditionally dominant, was left to 
deal with the rivalry between Sharif Hussein and Ibn Saud. Outside of the 
division little was known about the two leaders or their historical conflict 
but some American officials realised that developments in the Hijaz should 
be given particular attention. A State Department memo noted: 
If we are desirous of following closely events in the 
Mohammedan world we cannot afford to leave out the 
Hedjaz. Islam is probably today more virile and fanatic in 
Arabia than anywhere else, and the developments of the next 
few years may be decisive in shaping its future elsewhere as 
well. 6 
It was accepted by the Division of Near Eastern Affairs that the United 
States was too "entirely dependent" on Britain for information about this 
area and its leaders. To remedy this a proposal was put forward for the 
dispatch of a consular officer to Jeddah on a survey mission which would 
help determine, among other things, whether further diplomatic contact 
was warranted. However, the financial cost of such a mission and the lack 
of motivation at senior levels of the State Department meant that nothing 
4 The State Department, unlike the British Foreign Office, generally referred to the 
countries of the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula as the Near East. The thirteen staff 
included clerical workers so the actual number of foreign service officers was far less than 
that. The countries under the responsibility of the NEA were: Afghanistan, Burma, India, 
Greece, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, all 
the Gulf states, all of Africa except Algeria and South Africa. 
s Miller, Search for Security, p. 22 and Barara, The Department of State in the Middle East, 
pp. 34-35. From 1927 onwards the American Standard Oil Company sold kerosene and 
gasoline to merchants in Jeddah. However, it used a middle man for the task and had no 
company offices or representatives on the ground. 
6 Memorandum, Engert to Bliss, November 16,1922, Records of the Department of State 
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Asia: -Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, 1910-1929, Microfilm 
Record #M722, Reel 17, U. S. National Archives, Washington, D. C. Hereafter cited as 
RDOS M722JR17. 
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came of it .7 Instead 
individual Americans who had travelled in the Middle 
East were consulted to keep abreast of developments in the area. 8 
- The State Department would not 
have to wait long to learn more 
about Arabia. Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud was himself interested in establishing 
relations with the United States. 9 After establishing his reign in Hijaz the 
King found that domestic troubles and parsimonious British assistance 
created the need for additional friends and generous donors. It was in that 
respect that on September 29,1928, Washington received notification that 
the 'King of the Hijaz and Najd and its Dependencies' sought the formal 
recognition of the United States Government. 10 The King's approach caught 
the State Department off guard and officials were uncertain as to how to 
respond. Despite the fact that Ibn Saud had been recognised by Britain 
there was still uncertainty about the stability of the regime and even the 
exact borders of the Kingdom. More importantly, the lack of American 
interests in Najd or Hijaz made it difficult to justify recognition of such a 
ruler. A Departmental memo of the time reported that: 
His (Ibn Saud's) country is of little commercial importance 
and one in which the United States has few interests; it is 
improbable that our relations with the Hijaz will increase to a 
noticeable extent; and it may be argued that recognition 
would lead to more unpleasant entanglements than real 
benefits. 11 
In an effort to learn more about the King, the Division of Near Eastern 
Affairs turned to several private citizens familiar with the region for their 
7 Ibid. 
e This included Ameen Rihani, the Lebanese-American writer, and Dr. Samuel Zwemer, 
noted American missionary. See Barry Rubin, Secrets of State: The State Department and the 
Struggle Over U. S. Foreign Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, Chapter 1. 
9 This was a stressful time for Ibn Saud. For most of 1928 he had to deal with disgruntled 
Ikhwan fighters and handle delicate negotiations with the Iraqis and British over a number 
of issues including boundary disputes. Sir Gilbert Clayton had been sent by London to 
help put an end to the problems. The difficulties of the period can be seen in Clayton's 
report on his mission, IOR L/P&S/10/1237, June 18,1928 as well as in his An Arabian 
Diary and McLoughlin, Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom, pp. 88-89. 
10 Acting Foreign Minister, Fuad Hamza to Secretary of State, September 29,1928, RDOS, 
M722/R17, US-National Archives. 
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analysis and views. One of the first to be consulted was Dr. Samuel 
Zwemer, a Christian missionary with many years experience in the Middle 
East. Zwemer was very encouraging and supportive of establishing a 
greater American presence in the Hijaz and Najd. He indicated his own 
strong personal interest in expanding missionary activity in the Muslim 
heartland. American missionaries had set up numerous schools and 
medical missions across the Levant and along the Persian Gulf. 12 Zwemer 
hoped to establish the first mission school in Jeddah and he believed that: 
"Through quiet unostentatious work over a period of years, an American 
missionary organisation as notable as that now existing in Egypt might 
quite conceivably be built in Arabia. "13 
Aware of the prohibitions on non-Muslims entering the holy cities of 
Hijaz, Zwemer nevertheless saw little reason why he could not operate in 
other parts of the peninsula: "I do not think that there is any religious or 
legal authority for claiming the whole of Hijaz as sacred territory in the 
sense that a Christian missionary is prevented from carrying on his work as 
such" 14 
Zwemer, had known colleagues who had travelled around Hijaz 
without hindrance during the Ottoman and Sharifian reigns and he 
recalled that there was a representative from the British and Foreign Bible 
Society in Jeddah during 1914. This interest by an American missionary 
was seen as sufficient evidence of a significant American interest and the 
Division was inclined to put forward the case for granting formal 
recognition of Ibn Saud on that basis. 
11 Report on Ibn Saud, State Department Memorandum, October 25,1928, Ibid, US-National 
Archives. 
22 American and British missionaries had also set up several successful medical clinics 
along the Gulf and did much to popularise modern medical treatment among the Bedouin. 
Wahba, Arabian Days, p. 38. Also activities of American missionaries in the fields of 
education and philanthropy had been quite pronounced in Palestine, Lebanon and Syria. 
For more on this aspect see Robert Daniel, American Philanthropy in the Near East 1829-1960, 
Athens: Ohio University Press, 1970. 
13 Memorandum from Dr. Samuel Zwemer to the State Department entitled 'Sacredness of 
Hijaz', enclosed in dispatch from Cairo to Secretary of State, December 17,1928, RDOS 
M722/R17. 
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However, American diplomatic posts in the area advised caution. 
The legation in Cairo was particularly concerned over the idea of the 
government supporting missionary goals in the Hijaz. Washington was 
reminded that the Hijaz was the heartland of Islam and the Government of 
Hijaz and Najd had a clearly established policy towards missionaries-it 
would "never permit for any reasons which have to do with the safety of 
the country, anyone to use the sacred lands of the Hedjaz as a field for the 
teachings of Christianity". 15 In the view of the legation, the local authorities 
in Hijaz were "puritanical and zealous in its beliefs, shunning modem 
conventions and suppressing anything that was regarded as an 
innovation". They had created tensions with other members of the same 
faith and this was best illustrated by an incident during the pilgrimage 
season of 1928 involving Egyptian pilgrims. 
Traditionally there was quite an active flow of human and 
commercial traffic between Egypt and the Hijaz. Egypt had a varied and 
rich Islamic cultural heritage. Among the contributions to the faith was the 
manufacturing of the black cloth-the kiswah, that adorns the Ka'ba in 
Mecca. A new cloth was sent every year with a caravan of Egyptian 
pilgrims and was usually accompanied by revellers singing, dancing and 
playing musical instruments. 16 In that year the caravan procession was set 
upon by an angry mob of Ikhwan incensed by the spectacle. The attackers 
attempted to destroy the instruments and beat the singers but were 
prevented from doing serious damage by the intervention of the King's 
close advisors and the local community. Nevertheless, many were injured 
in the scuffle prompting the Egyptian Government to issue a stern 
complaint to the Hijaz authorities. Much to Cairo's surprise the response 
was to impose a ban on Egyptians from the pilgrimage ceremonies-while 
14 Ibid. 
u Fuad Hamza, Minister, Government of Hijaz to U. S. Legation, Cairo, December 18,1927, 
RDOS M722/R17. 
16 Laurence Grafftey-Smith, Bright Levant, London: John Murray, 1970, p. 177. Grafftey- 
Smith served as Vice-Consul in Jeddah from 1920-1924 and then again as Minister from 
1945-1947. Also Philby, Arabian Jubilee, pp. 89-90. 
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the attackers escaped without punishment. Feeling bitter and bruised the 
Egyptian Government suspended its relations with the Hijaz and this affair 
soured Saudi-Egyptian relations considerably. 17 
To Washington the lack of tolerance over religious differences was 
cause for concern and it reinforced the view that American missionaries 
would be denied access by the Hijaz authorities. Some in the NEA believed 
that "the apparent unwillingness of that Government to admit within its 
jurisdiction American Christian Missionaries" was reason enough for the 
United States to refrain from according recognition to Ibn Saud? 8 But 
. 
others in the Division took a broader view and favoured establishing closer 
relations with a major Arab leader, regardless of the possible prohibitions 
on missionary activity. They were impressed by the views of Ameen 
Rihani, the American writer of Lebanese descent who called Ibn Saud "the 
most powerful unifying force in Arabia since the Prophet Muhammad". 19 
Rihani painted a picture of the King as a noble and generous leader who 
was engaged in a struggle to unify his country. In fact it was Rihani who 
provided evidence that led some in the Department to believe that Ibn 
Saud was "not as strict a Wahhabi as he is sometimes pictured". 20 
Rihani reported that, contrary to common belief, modern technology 
was welcomed by Ibn Saud. Telegraph and telephone equipment were 
present and use of the motor car was widely visible. In addition, reports 
from the American Consul in Aden told of Saudi interest in setting up 
1 F. M. Gunther, Minister, Cairo to Secretary of State, November 9,1928, RDOS M722/R17. 
The Ikhwan saw singing and dancing and other rituals of the Egyptian pilgrims as signs of 
apostasy and felt justified in their attack. In addition, the American legation pointed out 
that the Egyptian Government had accorded Ibn Saud de facto recognition, not de jure, 
which indicated that the King was not fully accepted as ruler of Hijaz by all Arab 
governments. 
1sWadsworth, U. S. Legation Cairo to Secretary of State, December 17,1928, RDOS 
M722/R17. 
19 State Department Memo: Report on Ibn Saud, October 25,1928, Ibid., Rihani was 
indicated as a source for this memo. It gives insight into the various opinions held within 
the Department both for and against recognition of Ibn Saud. See also Rihani's own work 
on the King, Ibn Sa'oud, pp. 130-140. 
20 Ibid. 
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radio transmitters with American help and gaining access to other 
technologies. The Consul dismissed the idea that the King was anything 
but open to outside assistance: "Ibn Saud, in spite of his severe religious 
tenets appears to have surprisingly progressive ideas and an eager desire 
to secure for the Hedjaz the advantages offered by Western civilisation". 21 
Given such a climate, it seemed that opportunities for American 
businesses certainly did exist and an increase in official American ties 
could be justified. Moreover, the United States had already recognised the 
rulers of Albania and Oman, who were less notable than Ibn Saud and with 
whom America had just as little involvement. It became clear to them that 
the "factors in favour of recognition outweigh the contrary arguments". 22 
However, before the issue of recognition could be fully resolved, 
news reached Washington of a fully fledged revolt among the Ikhwan. 
Details were sketchy and officials were desperate for more information. 
Consular reports of the time show American diplomats at Aden, Cairo and 
Jerusalem, engaged in the frustrating task of attempting to gain accurate 
information on events inside Arabia. Few reliable sources were available, 
forcing most officials to sift through newspaper articles or conversations 
with local notables and even seeking out street gossip. The result was that 
Washington was sent a mass of confusing and contradictory reports, 
including false claims of Ibn Saud's demise. 23 Though British officials in the 
region were better informed, no system of co-operation with the Americans 
was in place. The little information that did get passed on was not very 
encouraging. The American Consul in Jerusalem learned from his British 
counterpart that the Ikhwan rebels had the upper hand. Ibn Saud's position 
was reportedly "extremely precarious" and it was argued that there was 
n Aldridge, Vice-Consul, Aden to Secretary of State, January 23,1928, RDOS M722/R17. 
22 Ibid. Also State Department Memo: Report on Ibn Saud. 
23 See cables from U. S. diplomatic posts in Aden, Cairo, and Jerusalem to Secretary of 
State, October -December 1929 in RDOS M722/R17. 
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only a "fifty-fifty chance" that the King would be able to subdue the 
rebellion. 24 
As shown in the previous chapter, Ibn Saud was ultimately 
successful in quelling the Ikhwan revolt25 With that accomplished he 
turned attention to improving relations with the United States, and 
especially, gaining formal recognition. Though the King had many 
admirers in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, pragmatism and caution 
reigned in the upper echelons of the State Department. The Middle East 
was still regarded as the domain of Europe and despite the general 
American antipathy towards colonial powers there was a reluctance to 
become entangled in the region. As a result Secretary of State, Frank 
Kellogg, did not believe that formal diplomatic recognition of Saudi Arabia 
was warranted at that time. However, being sensitive to the possibility of 
causing offence, the Secretary instructed the American Minister in Egypt 
not to send the response in an official letter but rather to inform the Saudi 
authorities verbally. Thus the King's representative in Cairo was invited to 
the legation where he was informed that the request for American 
recognition was "one to which the Secretary of State finds it impracticable 
to reply definitely at the present time". 26 
Despite this set-back Ibn Saud was undeterred. He was well versed 
in dealing with powers reluctant to support him. His agent in Cairo kept 
the issue of recognition alive by regularly approaching the American 
legation to inquire whether American policy had changed. Meanwhile, his 
admirers in the NEA, particularly the Division chief Wallace Murray, 
believed that since other nations such as Turkey, Germany and Persia had 
already extended recognition to Ibn Saud, the United States should move 
to do the same. The fact that the State Department was considering 
u Knabenshue, Consul Jerusalem to Secretary of State, October 24,1929, RDOS M722/R17. 
u For further insight into this period see the account of Muhammad Asad, The Road to 
Mecca, 1980, pp. 222-231. Asad was an Austrian Jew who converted to Islam and travelled 
widely through Arabia in the 1920's and 1930's. 
26 Secretary of State to Legation Cairo, January 7,1929, RDOS M722/R17. 
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granting recognition to Iraq and Yemen at that time also made a 
compelling case for Saudi Arabia. The Secretary of State agreed but was 
reluctant to let the NEA handle the negotiations on their own and 
preferred to have more experienced professionals involved-specifically the 
British. 
The Secretary of State instructed the Ambassador in London to 
approach the Foreign Office for its counsel. The Secretary was particularly 
interested to know whether there was any classified information that might 
have a bearing on the recognition of Ibn Saud's government. 27 Negotiations 
proceeded amicably with no indications from the Foreign Office that there 
was any classified information that would preclude the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States. 28 
On May 1,1931, the United States formally recognised the Kingdom 
of Hijaz and Najd and its Dependencies. 29Steps were taken to finalise most 
favoured nation status as well as trade and navigation treaties by which 
time Ibn Saud had formally unified Hijaz and Najd into one administrative 
region and changed the name of his realm to the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. 30 
A variety of factors led to the successful conclusion of this first small 
step in the history of American-Saudi relations; the input of American 
travellers to the area, such as Ameen Rihani; Ibn Saud's success in 
27 Secretary of State to Ambassador, London, February 10 , 1931, FR US 1931: I1, pp. 547-550. 
The Saudi envoy in London, Hafiz Wahba represented Ibn Saud. 
2SIbn Saud made public statements to reassure Britain that he had no plans for further 
expansion and was content as a ruler rather than harbouring hopes of being the spiritual 
leader of the entire Islamic world. Ibn Saud publicly declared after the pilgrimage and Eid 
celebrations of 1931 that he had no desire to be the Caliph (Khalifa) of the Muslim ummah. 
Rather, he sought to be left alone to manage his realm as he saw fit and without critical 
inspection of the greater Arab and Muslim world. Ibn Saud speech at Khuzam Palace, 
Jeddah, March 31,1933, in Intelligence Report, April 1933, IOR R/15/2/295. British 
officials greeted this with much relief as can be seen in several Departmental memos in 
PRO FO 371/22004/1714. These include memos from the Eastern Department of the 
Foreign office and an article from the journal Britain and the East entitled 'Islam Does Not 
Need Another Caliph'. 
29 Secretary of State to Ambassador, London, May 1,1931, FRUS 193111, pp. 551-552. The 
American Minister in Cairo was accredited to the court of Ibn Saud as well. 
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suppressing the Ikhwan rebellion and his control over the holy cities of 
Islam; the support of NEA officials, and the move by the State Department 
to recognise more countries in the Middle East. For Ibn Saud it was an 
important step in his effort to move beyond the reliance on Britain for 
financial and political support. For the United States however, extending 
recognition to Saudi Arabia was of minor consequence. Washington did 
not establish a diplomatic post in the Kingdom, arguing that it was not 
financially viable. It was left to an eccentric American businessman named 
Charles Crane to sow the seeds of future relations between the United 
States and Saudi Arabia. 
On the Path to Oil 
Charles Crane was the son of a wealthy industrialist and heir to the Crane 
Bathroom Manufacturing Company. This successful business provided 
Crane with time and money to indulge his esoteric pursuits 31 Among his 
hobbies were the cultivation of dates in California and breeding Arabian 
horses. Crane's most avid interest however, was in the culture and history 
of the Middle East. His philanthropic interests included a genuine desire to 
assist new states in the region to progress. Crane funded a number of 
agricultural and development projects in Egypt and Yemen and was fond 
of travelling in the region. 
In fact it was during one of many trips to Cairo that he came to the 
attention of Ibn Saud. Word reached Riyadh of this charismatic American 
traveller who was seeking to assist local communities with American 
'know how'. The King sent an invitation for Crane to come to Jeddah. 
Intrigued, the American millionaire arrived in the port city on February 25, 
1931. A lavish feast was laid out for him. Ibn Saud was typically 
3o The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was officially proclaimed on September 23,1923. See also 
Kostiner, The Making of Saudi Arabia, pp. 163-164. 
31 Crane had contributed to Woodrow Wildson's Presidential campaign and later served as 
half of the King-Crane Commission which reported on Syria and Palestine. For 
background on Crane see Lacey, The Kingdom, pp. 225-226, and McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, pp. 
121-122. 
ABEDIN-SIX 212 
generous -but especially as this was the first American the King had ever 
met. In short time Crane had offered the King any assistance he may 
require. He proposed that a geological survey of the country be mounted 
to look for mineral deposits 32 Though Ibn Saud did not believe that there 
could be much of value beneath the barren desert he was interested in 
discovering the location of water wells. Crane was eager to oblige and at 
his own expense commissioned a mining engineer named Karl Twitchell, 
to survey the country. 
Twitchell spent the better part of a year conducting a detailed 1500 
mile survey but found only a few signs of underground water wells. 
However, he was excited to find geological evidence indicating the 
possible presence of oil deposits in the eastern region of al-Hasa 33 Officials 
at the British Legation in Jeddah had observed Twitchell's movements with 
much scepticism. They had confidently reported to London that "nothing 
much will result from Mr. Twitchell's investigations" 34 
In fact the Foreign Office was hoping that oil would not be 
discovered in Saudi Arabia. British petroleum interests in the Middle East, 
as well as elsewhere in the world, had seen record developments in oil 
production capacity in the 1920's. Concerns over an oil glut and drop in 
prices led a consortium of international oil companies to come to an 
understanding over production quotas, transportation, and the pricing of 
oil in what was called the 'Red Line Agreement'. 35 Under the conditions of 
32 Harry Philby, claimed credit for introducing the idea to the King and arranging Crane's 
visit. Philby had resigned from British service and set up an import business in Jeddah. 
Subsequently he converted to Islam whereupon he was appointed advisor at the court if 
Ibn Saud. See Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 177 and Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 163. An alternative 
view is given by Ibn Saud's chief translator and court interpreter, Mohammad Almana 
who notes that it was Crane himself who persisted in trying to contact the King and that it 
was through the King's agent in Cairo that the meeting was arranged. See Almana, Arabia 
Unified: A Portrait of Ibn Saud, pp. 217-221. 
33 For Twitchell's account of his experiences see Karl Twitchell, Saudi Arabia, Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1953, esp. pp. 148-150. See also Jane Grutz, Prelude to Discovery, in 
'Saudi Arabia's Centennial', ARAMCO WORLD, Houston: Aramco Services Corp., 
January-February 1998, pp. 30-34. 
34 Foreign Office Minute, April 20,193Z PRO FO 371/ 16021, E1896/412/25. 
35 David Painter, Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of U. S. Foreign Oil 
Policy, 1941-1954, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986, pp. 4-6, and Miller, The 
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this agreement, the development of oil inside the boundaries of the old 
Ottoman empire would be regulated so that better control over the oil 
market could be maintained. Several British companies were a party to this 
consortium, which operated under the name of the Iraq Petroleum 
Company (IPC) and the possibility of oil being discovered in Arabia 
seemed unlikely to their geologists. Twitchell's suspicions, if true, would 
complicate the IPC's carefully worked out agreements. It was in the 
interest of the Iraq Petroleum Company to prevent more oil from being 
brought onto the market, especially by one of its competitors 36 
However, on the nearby island of Bahrain, exactly one such 
competitor, the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL), did strike 
oil on May 31,1932. SOCAL was relatively small American oil company 
and was not part of the IPC consortium. It did not have large foreign 
production fields nor did it have an established marketing position in 
Europe. During the 1920's the company had lost almost $50 million in 
unsuccessful foreign oil ventures 37 The company sought to expand 
operations, increase profits and become a larger international player. The 
discovery in Bahrain excited the company but it also made them realise the 
potential that lay just a few miles across the water on the Saudi mainland. 
The similar geology of eastern Arabia was indicative of the possible 
presence of oil. 38 
Standard Oil rapidly sought out contacts with the Saudi government 
in order to secure an oil concession. Enquiries led them to Harry St. John 
Search for Security, pp. 12-14. For the British perspective see Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi 
Arabia 1925-1939, pp. 188-219. 
36 Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925-1939, p. 200. A comparison of Britsh and 
American oil interests can also be found in Rubin, 'America as junior Partner', pp. 238- 
251. See also Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 178. 
37 Painter, Oil and the American Century, p. 8. Also Grutz, Prelude to Discovery, pp. 30-34. 
38 Twitchell did ask other oil companies such as Texas Oil, Jersey, Socony-Vacuum, and 
Gulf if they were interested in Saudi oil but at that time the major players had more oil 
than they could handle coming from existing concessions and were not interested, 
Twitchell, Saudi Arabia, pp. 148-150. For background on the Bahrain oil concession see 
Yossef Bilovich, 'The Quest for Oil in Bahrain, 1923-1930: A Study in British and American 
Policy', in The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1919-1939, ed. Uriel Dann, New York: 
Holmes&Meier, 1988, pp. 252-268. 
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Philby who was in London doing business on behalf of the King. Standard 
Oil sent company Vice-President, Francis B. Loomis to meet with Philby for 
talks. The company was seeking an advantage over other possible bidders 
and looked to Philby to provide them with the best negotiating strategy. 
The former British official advised that neither the type of contract nor its 
intricacies would interest the Saudis as much as the amount of money the 
company was offering up front. Philby suggested that a large cash offer, 
which would inject life into Ibn Saud's ailing coffers, would be the most 
likely to gain the winning concession. 39 What Loomis did not know was 
that the almost any substantial offer would have been entertained. Saudi 
finances were poor and Philby had been in London to obtain a loan of 
£500,000 pounds in gold from the Bank of England which had been turned 
down. The Bank frankly stated that it did not believe such funds could be 
raised from any source in London. 40 
Though certainly interested in making a bid for the concession, 
Standard Oil needed to find out more about Saudi Arabia. The company 
knew little about the nature of the government or how stable it was and it 
was essential to get more information about the country and its ruler 
before proceeding further. Loomis turned to the State Department and 
inquired about the treaties that existed between the United States and 
Saudi Arabia. He was particularly interested in knowing what protection 
Washington would provide to company operations if the regime in Saudi 
Arabia was overthrown. In addition, there was the question of British 
influence on Ibn Saud-would the company have to gain permission from 
London prior to making an offer to Ibn Saud? 41 
A prompt reply came from William Murray, of the Division of Near 
Eastern Affairs, to the effect that although recognition had been granted to 
39 Philby, Arabian Oil Ventures, pp. 77-78, Monroe, Philby of Arabia, p. 203. 
4° Ryan to Simpson, Report for May-June 1932, July 17,1932, IOR R/15/2/295. 
41 Loomis to Secretary of State, October 25,1932, Records of the Department of State 
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Saudi Arabia 1930-1944, T1179, Reel 1, US-National 
Archives. Hereafter cited as T1179/R1, RDOS-SA. 
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the government of Saudi Arabia, relations between the two countries were 
still in their infancy. Commercial and navigation treaties had yet to be fully 
implemented. Moreover, the establishment of diplomatic offices was not 
being contemplated at that time and future moves in that direction 
depended on the level of American interests in the country 42 Murray did 
however, reassure Loomis that the company could negotiate directly with 
Ibn Saud and that London did not control the granting of oil concessions in 
Saudi Arabia. It was recommend however, that SOCAL retain the services 
of Karl Twitchell, the engineer who had surveyed the area, since Murray 
believed that it was far better to have an American citizen on the company 
payroll, than to rely on the uncertain loyalties of Harry Philby. 43 
Driven by the need to expand its overseas sources of production and 
gain a larger share of the world oil market Standard Oil decided to press 
ahead with the concessions despite the undeveloped nature of the 
American-Saudi relationship and the lack of an official U. S. Government 
presence. It was in this endeavour that in early February 1933, Karl 
Twitchell arrived in Jeddah accompanied by Mr. Lloyd Hamilton, 
SOCAL's legal advisor, to begin negotiations with the King. 
For his part Ibn Saud was facing a difficult situation- the effects of 
the Depression of 1929-1930 had hit the country hard, starving it of trade, 
discouraging pilgrim visitors and crippling revenues. With stipends, 
subsidies and largesse to dole out, the King needed an infusion of funds to 
maintain his delicately balanced subvention system. Although he could not 
rely on the sale of one concession to solve his financial woes, times were 
desperate. Even the American Consul in Aden knew of the strain: 
A succession of poor pilgrimages, culminating in the present 
disastrous one, seems to have forced Ibn Saud's 
hand.... neither he nor his government could be expected to 
last much longer without money. He is pandering to 
42 Murray to F. Loomis, October 27,1932, T1179/R1, RDOS-SA, US-National Archives. 
43 Following that advice Twitchell was added to the company payroll. Memorandum of 
Conversation, Murray and Loomis, December 1,1932, T1179/R1, RDOS-SA, US-National 
Archives. 
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foreigners, offering anything upon which his hand may fall, 
in return for funds 44 
Despite these conditions, the negotiations between the oil company and Ibn 
Saud did not proceed without delay. Hamilton, the SOCAL legal 
representative, was naturally expecting to go formally through the contract 
discussing each point in detail. But the King's advisors found this tedious. 
There was also Saudi disappointment when the company offered a small 
deposit up front and tried to sell the King and his advisors on the idea of 
waiting for future profits. However, Harry Philby stepped in and urged 
Hamilton to forego the abstract explanations of contractual language, 
which the Saudis would not comprehend, and come up with a sizeable 
deposit up front 45 It would not be the type of contract that was important 
but the financial incentives it offered. Philby's close relationship with Ibn 
Saud has been noted earlier and he worked hard in this instance to get the 
best deal for the King. It is highly likely that after the initial discussions 
with Hamilton, Philby either on his own initiative, or on instructions from 
the King, leaked information about the proceedings to the Iraq Petroleum 
Company (IPC) in anticipation that a bidding war might start. 46 
In the middle of the Saudi-SOCAL negotiations a representative of 
IPC, Stephen Longrigg, appeared in Jeddah to place his company's bid for 
the concessions. The arrival of Longrigg made Hamilton very nervous 
because SOCAL was no longer the sole company in the running. There was 
also uncertainty as to what pressures the British controlled IPC might bring 
to bear on the King. In fact, Hamilton need not have worried about the Iraq 
Petroleum Company, since its bid for the concession had been a modest 
£10,000-intended more to hinder SOCAL's entry into the region than 
** Consulate Aden to Secretary of State, Washington, April 12,1933, T1179/R1, RDOS-SA, 
Ibid. 
as Monroe, Philby of Arabia, p. 203. 
46 IPC had found out about the American bid through Philby who had hoped to start a 
bidding war and make commissions for himself in the process, Monroe, Philby of Arabia, 
p. 203. See Philby's own account in 
Arabian Oil Ventures, pp. 73-116. 
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actually acquire the concession for itself. 47 Nevertheless, fearing that his 
company would be at a disadvantage, Hamilton quietly hired Philby as his 
advisor, with a retainer of £1,000 pounds a month to 'guarantee' a 
favourable outcome. 48 
The proposal that Standard Oil finally offered included a deposit of 
£50,000 pounds with the first instalment of £35,000, paid in gold 
sovereigns, due at signing. The remaining portion would be paid eighteen 
months later. SOCAL would also pay an annual rent of £5,000 pounds until 
oil was discovered. Thereupon £100,000 pounds would be due within one 
year of discovery. Royalties were set at 4 shillings per ton. In addition, the 
Saudi Government was to be provided with 200,000 gallons of gasoline and 
100,000 gallons of kerosene annually, free of charge. When news of the 
American offer reached IPC directors, it was far more than anything they 
were prepared to offer. On May 5,1933 the company directors decided to 
pull out of the running. 49 
Final agreements for the American concession, which was to have a 
sixty year duration were signed on May 29,193350 A new corporate entity, 
the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) was created to 
operate the concession. This marked the establishment of a permanent 
+7 Minister Jeddah (Ryan) to SOSFA, 'Monthly Report-March 1933', IOR R/15/2/295. 
43 That Philby was able to take on conflicting roles was never quite understood by others in 
the court. When Philby was hired by SOCAL he also took over as translator for the 
negotiations between the King and the Americans, replacing Mohammad Almana. This 
allowed Philby to be more intimately involved and filter what other court officials would 
know of the progress of the negotiations. See Almana, Arabia Unified, p. 225. Philby does 
not mention that he was hired as a paid consultant for SOCAL. He innocently claims that 
he was approached by the oil company "about the possibility of seeking an oil concession 
from the Saudi Arabian Government" , see Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 177. IPC's interest in 
the concession can be seen in the'Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1933', Minister 
Jeddah, Ryan to SOSFA, PRO FO 371/17941/E3126/3126/25. 
49 Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, New York: Council for 
Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959, p. 299. 
50'Concession Agreement Between the Saudi Arab Government and the Arabian American 
Oil Company, May 291933, printed in Annexe 1, Memorial of American Arabian Oil 
Company: Documents on the Arbitration Between the Government of Saudi Arabia and 
ARAMCO, New York: ARAMCO, 1955. Note: The Arabian American Oil Company 
(ARAMCO) became the successor to CASOC on January 31,1944. See also Roy Lebkicher, 
ARAMCO and World Oil, New York: Russel Moore Inc., 1952, pp. 23-28. 
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American presence in Saudi Arabia that would last throughout the 20th 
Century. 51 
The Politics of Oil: 1935-1940 
American foreign policy in the inter war period was largely based on the 
"Open Door" principle which, in its simplest form, meant the equality of 
commercial opportunity for nationals of all countries in all parts of the 
world 52 The United States opposed the negotiation of secret agreements, 
restrictions and cartels in favour of principles of free trade and open 
markets. The belief that America had better intentions, and a more noble 
cause, than the European powers was widely held by many in the State 
Department. Free trade and the 'open door' were part of a strong anti- 
colonial creed. 53 Thus the activities of American corporations abroad were 
seen as promoting the ideals of capitalism and democracy. A successful 
American bid for concession rights in Saudi Arabia was seen as a victory of 
free market forces. 
Despite the promise of great wealth, the first few years of CASOC 
oil operations were not very successful. Most of the wells drilled produced 
just a few thousand barrels before drying up. The company had not found 
a large, commercially viable field and after four long years of prospecting 
there were concerns for the future. 54 The King was also anxious. The 
sl Irvine Anderson, Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of 
Foreign Oil Policy 1933-1950, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981, p. 25. Also Roy 
Lebkicher, et al, ARAMCO Handbook, Netherlands: Arabian American Oil Company, 1960, 
pp. 134-136. IPC could have got the concession had they been seriously interested and 
offered more money. The King did however give the British company something-on July 
91936 he signed a concession granting IPC rights for the Western region of Hejaz. See 
Raymond Mikesell and Chenery Hollis, Arabian Oil: America's Stake in the Middle East, 
Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1949, p. 53, and Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil 
and the Great Powers, p. 299. 
52 Anderson, Aramco, The United States and Saudi Arabia, p. 15. Also see Gabriel Kolko, The 
Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose, Boston: Beacon Press, 
1969. 
53 Baram, The Department of State in the Middle East, pp. 3-7. 
54 SOCAL was having better luck in Bahrain where its subsidiary BAPCO was producing 
substantial amounts of crude. This enticed the Texas Oil Company which had a large 
international marketing and distribution network to purchase half an interest in BAPCO. 
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Americans had provided hope but he had little to show from the 
concession. The £5,000 pounds which the company paid in annual 'rent' 
was insignificant in comparison to his expenses. Moreover, the political 
costs of their presence was becoming greater. The sight of American 
geologists and engineers wandering through their desert domains had 
upset many tribesmen. The fact that they were accompanied by the King's 
men and enjoyed royal protection only inflamed matters. Ibn Saud was 
used to dealing with disgruntled tribesmen but he felt great unease with 
the American Government when he found that it was taking a position that 
he very much opposed on the issue of Palestine 55 
In Washington, particularly in Congress, there was considerable 
support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine 56 Public 
pronouncements and State Department press releases indicated that the 
Roosevelt Administration also supported the partition of Palestine 57 Oil 
company officials however, worried that the position of the Government 
would prejudice their relationship with Ibn Saud and could ultimately cost 
them the concession. The President of SOCAL, James Moffet, articulated 
the company's concerns to Wallace Murray, at the Division of Near Eastern 
Affairs. Moffet indicated that a change in attitude of Ibn Saud towards the 
Americans had been detected and he felt this was the result of the U. S. 
Government's policy towards Palestine. The conclusion of Moffet and other 
In December 1936, the Texas Co. also purchased a half interest in CASOC in anticipation of 
future healthy production figures. See Michael Stoff, Oil, War and American Security: The 
Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941-1947, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1980, p. 
36. See also Bilovich, The Quest for Oil in Bahrain, 1923-1930' pp. 252-268. 
ss gor the view of Saudi court officials on Palestine, see Almana, Arabia Unified, pp. 154- 
158,244246. Ibn Saud's views on Palestine have also been articulated in Philby, Saudi 
Arabia, pp. 335-337; Van Der Meulen, The Wells of Ibn Saud, p. 134; Lacey, The Kingdom, 
p. 271; McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, pp. 164-165. 
56 Tension in the British Mandate of Palestine had spilled over into rebellion during 1936. 
This topic has already been extensively covered by other authors and is only briefly 
mentioned here. One extensive source of material 
is William Roger Louis, The British 
Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 383-569. 
57 State Department press release of October 14,1938, FRUS 1938: II, pp. 953-956. For 
Roosevelt's views on Palestine see Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Rendezvous with 
Destiny, Boston: Little, Brown, 1990, p. 594 and Jim Bishop, FDR's Last Year., April 1944- 
April 1945, London: Hart-Davis, MacGregor, 1974, pp. 444-445. 
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"competent officials" at CASOC was that if the United States Government 
supported Jewish claims in Palestine it would have "serious repercussions 
on American oil interests in Saudi Arabia and might even result in their 
expulsion" 58 It was SOCAL's desire that Washington take the King's 
attitude seriously and, as a first step, establish a diplomatic post in Saudi 
Arabia as a sign of America's interest in his country. 
Wallace Murray was well aware of Ibn Saud's opinion. The King 
had not hesitated in urging the United States to resist the attempts of 
'outside forces' to influence its foreign policy. In a letter to the White House 
Ibn Saud claimed that the Arabs were owed the right to self determination 
in Palestine: 
Mr. President the Arabs of Palestine and behind them the rest 
of the Arabs, or rather the rest of the Islamic world -demand 
their rights, and they defend their lands against those who 
intrude upon them and their territories. 59 
Ibn Saud's letter was the first communication from an Arab head of state 
complaining of American policy on the issue of Palestine. Though many 
individuals and organisations had come forward, no one of the 'stature' of 
Ibn Saud had done so. The State Department felt that the President should 
take this complaint seriously. The King was considered an "outstanding 
Arab ruler and as the person most qualified to speak on behalf of the Arab 
people" 60 Roosevelt however, made no special attempt to placate the King. 
The White House sent a polite reply along with a copy of a State 
Department communique regarding American policy towards Palestine- 
which Ibn Saud already had, but made no reference to the President's own 
opinion on the matter. 
58 Wallace Murray Memorandum, NEA, July 12,1937, FR US 1937: 11 pp. 893-894. 
59 Ibn Saud to President Roosevelt, November 29,1938, FRUS 1938: II, pp. 994-8. The King's 
letter to Roosevelt was also reprinted by his Chief Translator, Almana in Arabia Unified, 
Appendix 7, pp. 286-292. Raising the voice of protest was nothing new to Ibn Saud. Years 
of experience in dealing with parsimonious British officials had allowed the king to 
develop some political savvy. He had to deal with British support for his mortal enemies- 
the Hashemites and had grown wise in the way of making demands and issuing veiled 
threats. 
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Murray could not take any further steps. An internal State 
Department report concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to 
indicate a permanent long term American interest in Saudi Arabia and as a 
result "did not warrant the establishment of any sort of official 
representation". 61 Though sympathetic to CASOC's concerns the State 
Department would not establish diplomatic links with a country based on 
the needs of a single private company. Saudi Arabia was still in a state of 
political and economic development. There had not been a serious effort by 
oil experts to determine the size and rate the importance of Saudi oil 
reserves in the world market. Yet events of March 1938 would mean that 
Saudi oil was to take on totally new dimension. 
In that month, after several unproductive wells had been drilled, in 
a new field, named Dammam No. 7, CASOC engineers struck oil at a depth 
of more that 4,000 feet-deeper than had ever been previously drilled. 62 
Subsequently, engineers were able to locate several other large oil deposits 
at even greater depths. Suddenly, the promise of great oil wealth was a 
reality again. Eager to maximise their search area CASOC management 
successfully lobbied Ibn Saud to expand their original concession by 80,000 
square miles. This brought the total concession area to 440,000 sq. Miles, 
giving CASOC the largest exclusive concession in the world and paved the 
way for greater American Government interest in Saudi Arabian oil. 63 
With new discoveries and an expanded concession the California oil 
company believed they had enough proof that American interests in Saudi 
Arabia were indeed long term. The company boasted that the King had 
granted an American firm the concessions, 
favouring them over his 
60 Welles to President Roosevelt, Jan. 9,1939, FRUS 1939: N, p. 695. 
61 In a desire to resolve the issue and respond to oil company urgings the State Department 
dispatched Leland Morris, the U. S. Consul in Cairo, on a mission to Saudi Arabia to assess 
American interests there. See Morris' Report, cited in Fish to Secretary of State, June 21, 
1939, FR US 1939: N, pp. 826-827. 
62 Charles Hamilton, Americans and Oil in the Middle East, Houston: Gulf Publishing, 1962, 
p. 148-149. 
63 Mikesell and Hollis, Arabian Oil: America's Stake in the Middle East, pp. 53-54, and Stoff, 
Oil, War and American Security, p. 39. 
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traditional ally - Britain. However, with the expansion came greater 
concerns over the security of their investment and fears of the interference 
of other powers. Reports of Axis attempts to gain footholds in Saudi Arabia 
caused alarm at CASOC headquarters. Japanese and German companies 
were reportedly offering large fees for smaller oil concessions while the 
British minister in Jeddah was said to be still fishing for deals on behalf of 
British companies. 64Such endeavours were being conducted with the full 
support of the respective governments and had the assistance of diplomatic 
missions in Saudi Arabia. 
More pressure was put on the State Department to establish 
diplomatic representation. It was of the "utmost importance to the 
California Company that a legation be established so that the interests of 
the Company be safeguarded". 65 It should be noted however, that the Axis 
threat to the American concessions was exaggerated. Although Axis 
representatives had visited Saudi Arabia, neither the Japanese nor 
Germans had diplomatic missions inside the country. Nor was their access 
to the King or their influence on him as great as CASOC made it seem as 
the oil company continued to demand that the U. S. Government take 
formal and concrete steps to raise the American presence in the Kingdom. 
By the summer of 1939 the persistence of the oilmen paid off. 66 The 
State Department agreed to approach President Roosevelt for permission 
to establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. In his memo to FDR, 
the Secretary of State emphasised the fact that the Germans and the 
Japanese had already gone to Saudi Arabia to prospect for oil concessions. 
In an attempt to make the proposal more appealing the Secretary proposed 
64 The CASOC representative in Saudi Arabia, William Lenahan, was feeding information 
to the American Minister in Cairo. Lenahan fuelled fears of Axis activities by stating that 
the German Minister to Iraq, Fritz Grobba had arrived in Saudi Arabia to attempt to gain 
favourable treatment for Axis companies and obtain valuable concessions. Minister Egypt 
(Fish) to Secretary of State, June 21,1939, FR US 1939: W, p. 824. 
65 Minister Cairo, (Fish) to Secretary of State, Washington, June 21,1939, FR US 1939: IV p. 
826. 
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that the American Minister in Cairo have his accreditation expanded to 
include Saudi Arabia. This would allow American representation without 
incurring significant additional expense. President Roosevelt noted his 
approval of this measure by scribbling "excellent idea-OK FDR" on the 
Secretary's proposal. 67 As a result, Bert Fish, the residing American 
Minister in Cairo, became the first American Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary accredited to the Government of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia 68 
Even though Ibn Saud probably had little understanding of the 
complexities of American politics, he obtained greater American 
involvement by virtue of CASOC's fear of losing their investment. It was a 
pattern that would repeat itself on numerous occasions. Whether the King 
accepted SOCAL's bid because of the perception that America had no 
imperial intentions or because of the sheer size of the American down 
payment is open to conjecture. But the latter argument seems to be the 
more favourable. SOCAL officials certainly rated themselves as having 
better motives than the British and their deposit of gold provided a timely 
injection of funds precisely when the King was in urgent need of it. The 
American presence was ensured and it would steadily grow. However, Ibn 
Saud would always be able to play on American naivete and inexperience 
in the Middle East to his advantage. 
Oil Company Pressure Grows: 1940-1943 
Two months after Washington appointed Bert Fish as the first American 
envoy to Saudi Arabia, war broke out in Europe. In the first months of the 
Second World War, Axis armies made considerable headway advancing 
66 The American Minister in Cairo and the Minister in Baghdad both strongly endorsed the 
establishment of relations-no less due to the lobbying of the oil company. See Minister 
Iraq (Knabenshue), to Secretary of State, June 211939, FRUS 1939: W p. 827. 
67 Secretary of State to President Roosevelt June 30,1939, FR US, 19391V p. 827-828. 
68 Secretary of State to Minister Egypt, July 12,1939, FRUS 1939: 11, p. 829. The American 
Minister to Saudi Arabia officially presented his credentials to Ibn Saud on February 4, 
1940. 
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across Europe through the Balkans, Greece and Yugoslavia. In North 
Africa the unrelenting success of the Afrika Corps sent British forces 
retreating into Egypt, in turn placing the security of the Middle East in 
jeopardy. With communications to her Eastern Empire threatened, Britain 
saw the need to have as many friendly Arab rulers in power as possible. 
London decided to reintroduce the subsidy programme to encourage Arab 
loyalty. 69 In the short term this was great news for Ibn Saud. He found 
himself almost £400,000 pounds richer in 1940.7° Though this was still far 
short of the amount that was required to cover his expenditures. Wartime 
conditions had severely curtailed his regimes main income earner-the 
pilgrimage. In 1938 approximately 60,000 worshipers had come to the holy 
cities. The following year that figure had dropped by half. 71 Moreover, the 
reduction in shipping curtailed imports and led to shortages of foodstuffs. 
Revenues from taxes, fees and customs duties evaporated. This translated 
into a substantial drop in earnings for the King and affected the livelihood 
of many merchants and traders, particularly in Hijaz. 
Despite British aid the King found it difficult to maintain his 
subsidies to the tribal chiefs or to manage burgeoning government 
expenses. The American legation in Cairo forecast that it "will undoubtedly 
be a lean year financially for Ibn Saud and it would not be surprising to 
hear of his casting about for a loan". 72 In fact Ibn Saud turned to the one 
source which he could put pressure on-the oil company and the King 
asked them to advance money against future royalties. He asked for the 
69 Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951, p. 189. 
70 In 1940 Ibn Saud received £396,582 from the British subsidy. This was raised in 1941 to 
£1,111,375 pounds. By 1942 the figure had more than doubled to £2,945,550 pounds. At the 
end of 1943 the King had received a total of £8,294,343 pounds. Figures cited in Baxter 
Minute, March 16,1944, Report on Future of Saudi Arabia, PRO FO 
371/40265/E1775/128/25. 
71 Bert Fish, American Legation, Cairo to Secretary of State, Washington, November 11, 
1940; reported that in 1938 59,627 pilgrims came but in 1939 only 32,288 arrived with 1940 
figures expected to be lower than that. RDOS-SA, T1179/R3, US-National Archives. See 
also Stoff, Oil, War and American Security, pp. 41-45. 
n Fish to Secretary of State, November 11,1940, RDOS-SA, T1179/R3, US-National 
Archives. 
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immediate advancement of $750,000.73 Company officials in Dhahran 
recommended to headquarters that the full amount be provided and also 
warned to be prepared to advance another $3 million over the course of the 
year. However, company directors in California were amazed. CASOC 
was facing major strains in production and distribution due to the war. 
Production cut backs due to tanker shortages meant that less oil was 
available to transport and sell and it did not want to be in the position of 
supporting the day to day economic needs of the Saudi government. 
Senior company officials were determined to resist the pressures put 
on them to increase payments. Fred A. Davies, President of CASOC and 
Lloyd Hamilton (the legal advisor who had negotiated the concession in 
1933) travelled to Jeddah in January 1941 to try and reason with the King. 
However, Davies found the King ready to argue his point and demanded 
an advance on royalties of $6 million for that year alone. Davies calculated 
that the company was being asked to supply 60% of the total budget of the 
country outright. 74 The King reassured the oil men that he was not being 
overly demanding on them since he intended to obtain the remaining 40% 
from the British Government. 
Nevertheless, $6 million was almost double of what CASOC had 
paid in royalty advances the year before, and three times that paid in 
193975 Davies and Hamilton were shocked at this massive increase. At the 
same time they were desperately afraid of refusing the King's request. It 
seemed extortionate but the two men agreed that they had to work 
something out. Davies proposed to the King that the company would pay 
an initial amount of $3 million (in $500,000 instalments). Thereafter, the 
73 Political Agent Bahrain to Resident Gulf, January 4,1940, FO 371/24588 E 305/205/25 
p. 131. 
74 Ibn Saud estimated his budget to be $10 Million, testimony of Fred Davies at U. S. Senate 
Hearings, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program; Petroleum 
Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, 80th Congress (First Session), Part 41. Washington D. C.: 
Government Printing Office 1948, (Hereafter U. S. Senate Hearings: Petroleum 
Arrangements with Saudi Arabia) p. 25051. 
75 In 1939 CASOC advanced $1.7 million above and beyond royalty payments and in 1940 
that rose to $3.5 million, Ibid. 
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company would endeavour to raise another $3 million during the course of 
the year to make up the $6 million total. 76 This method of payment seemed 
to satisfy the King. Relieved at having the matter settled the two oil men 
flew back to California. However, the finance department of CASOC was 
in no hurry to make payments. While the King anxiously waited for the 
first instalment of $500,000, the paperwork at company headquarters kept 
the funds tied up. After two months had passed Fred Davies received a 
sharp reminder that Ibn Saud could play games as well. 
Davies received an urgent cable from the CASOC representative in 
Jeddah, William Lenahan, stating that the Saudi Government was 
demanding an additional $1.5 million on top of the overdue instalment of 
$500,000. ' The Saudi Government had also ordered 10 million riyals to be 
minted at HM Treasury in London and to Davies surprise, the British 
expected CASOC to pay for it. Obviously the American oil company was 
viewed as a wealthy corporation which had great financial resources at its 
disposal. London already contributed £400,000 for 1941 and there was 
"absolutely no hope of any other sums being advanced this year". 78 The 
company was thus expected to supply any additional funds for the King. 
When Lenahan tried to object at being forced to pay the bills of the Saudi 
Government he was informed that HM Treasury had already issued the 
order for minting and payment would have to be made. 
These tactics exasperated Lenahan who cabled this message to 
Davies at company headquarters in California: 
you will realise were we to grant this present request it 
would be but a matter of a few days before we should be 
approached for another loan for ordinary running expenses 
76 Davies to Ohliger, January 7,1941, CASOC correspondence in U. S. Senate, Ibid., 
p. 25389. 
77 Lenahan to Davies, March 31,1941, CASOC cable in U. S. Senate, Ibid., p. 25390 
78 British Minister Stanley Jordan cited in Lenahan to Davies, March 31,1941, CASOC 
correspondence published in U. S. Senate, Ibid., p. 25390. In actuality the total amount of 
aid for the whole year 1941 would come to 1.4 million pounds, see Baxter Minute, 
February 9 1942, FO 371/31451 E607/157/25. 
ABEDIN-SDC 227 
of the Government and that such requests for this purpose 
would be made throughout the year. 79 
Yet the general inexperience and insecurity of company men in dealing 
with the King was ultimately to serve to Ibn Saud's advantage. The King 
had benefited from the uncertainties of Anglo-American policy. By 
pressing the British for more funds he got the Americans to pay for it. 
Through pressure on the oil company he received official diplomatic ties 
with Washington and the possibility of an American Government grant 
could not have been far from his mind. 
It was clear to Davies and Lenahan that CASOC had to come up 
with a more stable and long-term solution to the problem of Saudi Arabian 
financing. Lenahan hoped to avoid provoking "another crises in 
Government-Company relations" but Davies was shocked at the turn of 
events. 80 First the additional $1.5 million and then the demand by the 
British Minister that CASOC pay for the minting of 10 million riyals. In 
Davies opinion this was "completely out of order". 81 In his own way 
Lenahan hoped to remedy the situation by suggesting that the King and 
the company agree on a fixed amount of funds to be provided for the year. 
After that any further demands would not be tolerated. However, the 
relationship between the oil company and Ibn Saud, unlike the British 
Minister, did not afford them the ability to pressure Ibn Saud. 
Jordan, had the British Government, Treasury and military forces 
behind him and despite the fiscally conservative nature of Britain's own 
policies the King was encouraged to treat the oil company as a bank. 
Finding itself in a difficult position CASOC felt that it could not refuse the 
King without jeopardising its investment in the concession. Moreover, the 
huge sums of aid that the monarch sought could eventually push him into 
the hands of other powers, even the Axis. It was the judgement of Davies 
79 Lenahan to Davies, April 1,1941, CASOC cable printed in U. S. Senate Hearings: 
petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, p. 25391. 
80 Ibid. 
In Davies to Lenahan, April 2,1941, CASOC cable published in U. S. Senate, Ibid., p. 25391. 
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and other senior CASOC officials that the United States government would 
have to be brought into the situation if the security of their concession was 
to be maintained and the fiscal solvency of Ibn Saud was ever to be 
achieved. 82 
'Cash for Oil'-Lobbying for Aid to Ibn Saud 
Securing the greater involvement of Washington would require backing 
from senior administration officials. Davies got in touch with fellow oil 
executive James Moffet, who served on the boards of two of CASOC's 
affiliates, and was a well known figure in Washington. 83 Moffet was also a 
close personal friend of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and it was no 
surprise that Davies hoped to get support directly from the 
administration. 84 In a meeting on April 8,1941, at CASOC's headquarters 
in San Francisco Moffet was briefed on the situation in Saudi Arabia 85 He 
understood the difficulty in dealing with Gulf monarchs but was amazed at 
the huge sum that was being demanded as an advance. Davies hoped that 
with the passage of the Lend Lease Act in March, funds could be made 
available to support the Saudi treasury and avoid further depletion of 
CASOC resources. 86 Moffet readily agreed and approached the White 
82 Davies to Ohliger (General Manager of CASOC in Eastern Saudi Arabia) April 2,1941, 
in U. S. Senate Hearings: Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, p. 25392. See also Miller, 
Search for Security, p. 37. 
s3 Moffet was on the board of the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) and the 
California Texas Co. (CALTEX), both of which along with CASOC were subsidiaries of 
Texas Oil Co. and SOCAL. Many oil industry executives went to work for the Government 
during and after the war often on loan or for fixed periods of time; See Kolko, The Roots of 
American Foreign Policy, p. 25. 
s4 Hoffet had worked with Roosevelt during the First World War when the future 
president was Secretary of the Navy and in charge of oil purchases. 
is CASOC correspondence, U. S. Senate Hearings: Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, 
pp. 25393-97. Also Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, p. 303. 
86 The Lend Lease Act was part of a programme formulated by President Roosevelt to 
allow Britain to receive loans, war materiel and supplies from the United States. Previous 
legislation (the Neutrality Act of 1937) prohibited the granting of loans to parties engaged 
in war and required cash payments for all munitions sold. Roosevelt pushed for reform of 
the Neutrality Act and worked around these restrictions by allowing Britain to borrow 
from the United States and lease war supplies. For further details on Roosevelt's efforts 
see Robert Dallek, Franklin D Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 255-261. Also see Warren Kimball, The Most Unsordid 
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House for an appointment to see the President. He obtained one the very 
next day. 87 
Moffet began his briefing of the President by focusing on the war 
not oil. He portrayed Saudi Arabia as a friendly nation in need of help. 
Axis propaganda was looking to foment discontent among the Arab 
peoples and Ibn Saud was a major Arab leader with strong pro-Ally 
sympathies: "No other man in the Arab countries, nor among Moslems the 
world over, commands prestige equal to his" 88 The King's support would 
be important to maintain sympathy for the Allied cause in the Arab world. 
While Saudi Arabia was traditionally in the British sphere of influence, 
America was helping the Saudi people to develop their oil resources 
through the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) which 
had 160,000 American shareholders. The CASOC concession encompassed 
the entire territory of the states of California and Oregon. It was also the 
only American oil company in the region which had sole rights to what 
could prove to be one of the largest fields in the world. Yet the continued 
American character of that concession and the support of Saudi Arabia to 
the Allied cause depended on the stability of Ibn Saud's regime. 
Moffet then gradually introduced the issue of the oil company. 
Severe financial crises, drought, war and lack of pilgrimage revenue 
plagued the King and the oil company had been informed that unless the 
company provided the necessary financial assistance the stability of his 
Act: Lend Lease, 1939-1941, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969, Chapters 1-3 
and Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the 
Coming of the War, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1948, pp. 159-172. 
97 According to Miller, Search for Security, p. 38 it took a week for a meeting to be arranged. 
However, after checking records at the National Archives, Washington D. C., this author 
discovered that Moffet was much swifter and managed to secure an appointment with 
President Roosevelt the very next day (April 9), This is indicative of the urgency with 
which the oilmen and Moffet regarded the matter. 
The meeting was a private and informal 
one. No substantive records of the conversations 
during that meeting have been found but 
Moffet did send his proposal in writing to the President a few days later. Davies had a lot 
of input in the drafting of the memo. 
as Moffet to President Roosevelt, April 16,1941, Records of the Office of Near Eastern 
Affairs (Hereafter cited as RONEA), Department of State, Lot File 57D 298 (Box 6), US- 
National Archives. 
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regime would be in grave danger. Overall the King required $10 million a 
year to meet his expenses. He was expecting the British to provide around 
$4 million but sought the remaining $6 million from the oil company in the 
form of royalty advances. 89 However, CASOC had already invested large 
sums in Saudi Arabia. The development of the oil concessions had cost 
$27.5 million and since 1939 the company had advanced Ibn Saud $6.8 
million. With new demands for advances the figure could reach $30 
million over the following five years-CASOC felt unable to handle the 
situation alone. Moffet asserted: "It has now come to a point where it is 
impossible for the company to continue the growing burden and 
responsibility of financing an independent country, particularly under 
present abnormal conditions. " 90 
The company was not only uneasy about further cash advances but 
also felt that despite its assistance to the King the company had negligible 
impact due, in part, to the strong historical influence of Britain. It would be 
an important sign of American interest in Saudi Arabia if the United States 
government was to step in and grant assistance to, the King: 
I sincerely trust that some way may be found under existing 
legislation to provide King Ibn Saud financial assistance, 
which he so desperately needs in order to maintain his 
government in a stable condition. We believe that unless this 
is done, and soon, this independent kingdom, and perhaps 
with it the entire Arab world, will be thrown into chaos. 91 
Moffet suggested that Ibn Saud's requirements were "moderate" and a 
"minimum figure for essential expenditures"92. He proposed to Roosevelt 
that if the United States government were to loan Ibn Saud $6 million 
annually for the next five years, CASOC could deliver the equivalent 
amount of petroleum products to the US Government at below the market 
89 Anderson, Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, pp. 30-31. 
90 Moffet to President Roosevelt, April 16,1941, RONEA, Department of State, Lot File 57D 




rate. In essence it was a cash for oil transaction. The oil company was also 
hopeful that the deal would give the impression to Ibn Saud that 
Washington was taking direct interest in Saudi Arabia and that this would 
bolster CASOC's bargaining power with the King. Moffet also thought that 
the British should be urged to give more assistance themselves, but should 
not be allowed to obtain any oil from the concession. In fact Moffet wanted 
Washington to get a commitment that Britain would not "directly or 
indirectly" take any action that would threaten the American character of 
the concession-93 
The President listened to Moffet's presentation but did not enter into 
detailed discussions about Saudi oil. He had agreed to the meeting to 
accommodate an old friend. The issues would be left for others to resolve. 
The 'cash for oil' proposal was forwarded to the State and Navy 
Department's for comment. He also had his assistant Harry Hopkins 
inquire from the Federal Loan Administrator, Jesse Jones, whether a loan to 
Saudi Arabia could be arranged. Ironically, Hopkins did not believe that 
Saudi oil revenues would be enough collateral for the loan and he 
suggested that "instead of using his royalties on oil as collateral we could 
use his royalties on the tips he will get in future on the pilgrims to 
Mecca. "94 
Meanwhile, as Davies waited in the San Francisco offices of CASOC 
for news on the loan, a cable from the company representative in Saudi 
Arabia, William Lenahan, brought renewed anxiety. Apparently, Ibn Saud 
was furious that Davies had asked the U. S. Government to grant financial 
support to Saudi Arabia. The message from the King was "more angry in 
tone and terminology than any other communication" CASOC had 
received thus far. 95 The King rebuked the company for its deception. 
93 Moffet testimony in U. S. Senate Hearings: Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, pp. 
24838-39. 
94 Hopkins to Jones , April 14,1941, cable re-printed 
in Ibid., p. 25415. 
95 Ibn Saud's letter of rebuke was summarised in Lenahan's cable to Davies, April 19,1941, 
CASOC cable re-printed in Ibid. p. 25393. 
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Davies had promised him personally that the company itself would 
provide the $6 million so why had the American government been 
approached. Ibn Saud stated that he 
could borrow money from the United States Government if 
he so wished and that if he did so wish he would do so 
directly and not through the company and that furthermore 
he would not restrict himself to requesting such an 
inadequate sum. 96 
If the company needed money to pay what it owed Saudi Arabia then it 
should borrow from the US government itself and not involve his country. 
He accused CASOC of breaking its word and its written agreement on 
financial assistance. 
No doubt, Ibn Saud was upset by these events. However, this 
display of anger may actually have been due to the fear that the company's 
actions would have undermined his own plans to approach Washington 
for aid. Ibn Saud was well aware that the oil company would be unable to 
provide the funds he requested. In fact he said as much to British Minister, 
Stonehower-Bird. 97 The King had approached Bird in order to ascertain 
whether Britain would have any objections to him asking Washington for 
financial aid. When Bird reported this to the Foreign Office considerable 
discussion ensued. The report was also circulated to the Treasury for 
comment. The Treasury official who responded argued that Ibn Saud 
should be discouraged from approaching the Americans as they were 
unlikely to grant him any aid. Moreover, the King should be told to 
manage with whatever resources he had available. 98 Fortunately for Ibn 
Saud, the Foreign Office disagreed with that view and had no objections to 
the King contacting Washington. 
% mid. 
97 British Minister, Jeddah (Stonehower-Bird) to FO, April 22,1941, PRO FO 
371/27265/E2414/155 
981bid. These were handwritten comments made by Mr. Grant of the Treasury Office on 
the above report. 
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Meanwhile CASOC was taking Ibn Saud's anger seriously. The 
company pressed William Lenahan into the job of smoothing things over. 
Lenahan first went to Prince Faisal, the King's second son and Foreign 
Minister in order to make him understand the company position. He 
reassured the prince that the company had acted in the best interests of his 
father. CASOC was truly unable to come up with the funds itself and was 
not allowed under American law to borrow from the Government. With 
Lenahan's persuasion Faisal eventually endorsed the CASOC plan. As 
Lenahan hoped, Faisal went to the King and was able to smooth matters 
over. Soon afterwards Ibn Saud sent his own cable directly to the State 
Department requesting that a loan be granted to his government. 99 
At the State Department, Wallace Murray, the head of the Division 
of Near Eastern Affairs responded favourably to the Moffet proposal. He 
concurred with the analysis that Saudi Arabia's income from its pilgrim 
traffic and customs revenues "had been effectively dried up". Furthermore, 
the $10 million annual budget that Ibn Saud requested appeared "to be 
reasonable" and since Ibn Saud was "fundamentally anti-Axis" and his 
"influence is great in the Arab world" Murray believed that the Moffet 
proposal should be given approval. 100 Others in the State Department, such 
as Max Thornburg, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, were 
not so sure. Thornburg pointed out that the King might in any case turn to 
the Axis powers for help: "Certainly he would probably have to do so 
unless funds were forthcoming". 101 
Though officials at the NEA were optimistic about the political and 
economic benefits of the loan to Saudi Arabia, reports from the military on 
the practical utility of Saudi oil were not so favourable. The Secretary of the 
Navy, Frank Knox, reported that an analysis by Navy engineers showed 
Saudi crude had low octane and high sulphur content which fell below the 
99 Abdul Aziz Al-Saud to Secretary of State, June 26,1941, FRUS 1941: 111, p. 631, fn-23a. 
200 Murray to Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, April 21,1941, FR US 1941: 111 pp. 627-629. 
10, Memorandum of Conversation, Thornburg with Asst. Chief of Division of NEA, FRUS 
1941: III, pp. 629-631. 
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minimum standards required by Navy vessels and aircraft. Saudi crude 
was thus unsuitable for Navy use. 102 This was followed by a note from the 
office of the Federal Loan Administrator, Jesse Jones, which stated that 
there was no legal justification for allowing federal funds to be made 
available to the Government of Saudi Arabia. 103 These reports made it 
difficult for the White House to proceed. President Roosevelt, although 
interested in following Moffets' proposal, was left with few options. He did 
not have the means to force its implementation. Moreover, it was still 
apparent that Saudi Arabia was more in the British sphere and that London 
would ultimately have to deal with the issue. Roosevelt sent word to his 
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull to "tell the British I hope that they can take 
care of the King of Saudi Arabia. This is a little far afield for us". 104 
Instructions were sent to the American Minister in Cairo, Alexander 
Kirk, that the King should be should be informed that while the highest 
regard was held for his country it was necessary for the United States 
Government to concentrate on assisting those nations which were directly 
involved in the war. It was also understood that Britain had already 
provided assistance to Saudi Arabia from the considerable amount of aid 
that the United States had granted HM Government. 105 However, Kirk was 
unhappy with the state of affairs. It was unwise to leave it to the British to 
provide aid to the King because "the United States would appear to be 
102 Secretary of the Navy, Knox to President Roosevelt, May 20,1941, FR US 1941: 111 
pp. 635-636. See Anderson, Aramco, the United States and Saudi Arabia, p. 31, fn 90. 
103 Federal Loan Administrator, Jones to Secretary of State, Hull, August 6,1941, FR US 
1941: 111 p. 643. Among the provisions of eligibility for lend lease was that the recipient 
nation should be democratic. It would be difficult for the Roosevelt administration to 
justify aid to a distant desert monarchy given isolationist sentiments in the US Congress 
were still very high. See also Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, pp. 159- 
172. 
104 Roosevelt Memo to Federal Loan Administrator, Jones, July 18,1941, FRUS 1941: 111, 
p. 643. The British Ambassador to Washington was asked if Britain could make available 
funds to help out Saudi Arabia from the $425 million loan that the United States had 
recently granted His Majesty's Government. See Jones to Hopkins, July 22,1941, PSF 
Diplomatic Box, Folder: Saudi Arabia, Roosevelt Papers, cited in Miller, Search for Security, 
p. 45. 
i05 Minster Egypt (Kirk) to Secretary of State (Hull), August 21,1941, FR US 1941: 111, pp. 
640-643. 
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resigning to the British all initiative in the Near East generally and in Saudi 
Arabia in particular. "106 From Washington came a firm reply-'the matter 
had been given much thought and the President himself had come to this 
decision'. Kirk was reprimanded for his naivety and for not considering the 
possibility that the King may have been exaggerating to involve the United 
States as a counter weight to Britain and in the process gain greater 
financial assistance. However, the Secretary of State was confident that 
Britain, rather that the United States, was more susceptible to this tactic 
because Saudi Arabia was "of more political and strategic importance to 
the British Empire than this country". 107 
Others in the State Department, particularly Wallace Murray and his 
colleagues at NEA, were inclined to agree with Kirk. They were strongly 
motivated to help Ibn Saud, believing him to be the most important Arab 
leader of the time. Murray did not like the prospect of disappointing the 
King and letting him feel 'abandoned' by the United States. Having served 
in the U. S. Mission in Tehran during the 1920's Murray had a greater 
experience in the Middle East and had also developed a strong anti-British 
bias. 108 Undaunted by the White House decision, Murray came up with 
another proposal to assist the King. It involved the dispatch of an 
agricultural mission to help in the exploration of Saudi water resources and 
in the cultivation of crops. This would at least indicate some official interest 
on the part of Washington. 109 To avoid the lengthy delays that a 
congressional committee would entail, to authorise funds, it was proposed 
that the President use his discretionary, Emergency Fund for this purpose. 
However, this too came to no avail as the proposal remained in the White 
House for months without action. The Roosevelt administration was still 
smarting from criticism from the 'isolationist' Congress over its perceived 
106 Minster Egypt to Secretary of State, August 30,1941, FRUS 1941: III, pp. 647-648. 
107 Secretary of State to Minister Egypt, September 10,1941, FR US 1941: 111, pp. 648-649. 
108 Stoff, Oil, War and American Security, p. 51 
209 Alling Memo (Acting Head of NEA) to Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, 
September 27,1941, FRUS 1941: 111, pp. 650-651. At the time that Murray's proposal was 
finalised, Paul Ailing was temporary head of NEA. 
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activist foreign policy. There was little desire to face more criticism over 
granting aid to a neutral country which played no direct part in the war 
effort. 
Then on December 7,1941 aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Navy 
launched a surprise attack on the U. S. Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbour, 
Hawaii. America was propelled into the Second World War. Within days 
the climate in Washington had changed. Murray realised that there was a 
new opportunity to bring up the case of Saudi Arabia. Couching his 
proposal in light of the war effort, Murray reintroduced his 
recommendation for an agricultural mission. This time however, with the 
added purpose of providing cover for War Department logistics officers 
who wished to locate possible sites for military facilities in Saudi Arabia 
since "It is entirely possible that as a result of military deployments in the 
Middle East it will be necessary for our armed services to obtain sooner, or 
later rather extensive facilities from the King of Saudi Arabia"110 
This reformulated request was taken up remarkably quickly and 
approval from the White House arrived within days. 111 There seemed to be 
no obstacles in the President's way to authorise assistance in this case. For 
Murray and his colleagues at the NEA it was a small victory but the 
incident served to prove the reluctance with which the Administration 
became involved in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom's rich mineral resources 
were yet to be seen as a strategic asset vital to the national security of the 
United States. 
However, in Riyadh the news of the American agricultural mission 
was not greeted with much enthusiasm. Ibn Saud had placed many 
requests for American aid and had hoped for concrete assistance. Instead 
he was being sent more advisors, whom he would have to feed and protect. 
210 Murray's proposal was forwarded to the President by Under Secretary of State, Sumner 
Welles. See Under Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, February 12,1942, FRLIS 
1942: IV, pp. 562-563. 
111 Under Secretary of State, Welles to Minister Egypt, Kirk, February 26,1942, FRLIS 
1942: IV, p. 564. 
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Meanwhile the Americans and the British did manage to put together an 
additional £1 million which made an impression on the King. 112 It was far 
more substantial than the agricultural mission that the Americans offered, 
though it was only a fraction of the £10 million that Ibn Saud actually 
hoped for. It seemed inevitable that he would have to resume his pressure 
on the oil company to supply his financial needs. 
In January 1942, CASOC was asked for $500,000 to pay for motor 
cars that the Saudi Government had ordered and for buying sovereigns in 
India. CASOC did not have access to dollars. 113 CASOC wanted Britain to 
allow the King to have access to rupees as this would alleviate the Saudi 
need for dollars. Britain agreed to increase the subsidy by a large margin 
from £250,000 to £3,000,000 pounds. However the Foreign Office did not 
want Ibn Saud to know that they had agreed to go so high out of fear that 
Britain would be asked for the whole sum up front. Therefore, the Consul 
in Jeddah was instructed only to say that Britain would be providing a 
further £250,000 (making total 1St quarter of 1942 contributions to £750,000) 
and would consider the question of further assistance afterwards. 114 With 
such large financial contributions being made the Foreign Office was also 
considering establishing a state bank "which might assure some measure 
over the Saudi Arabian finances". 115 
However, Ibn Saud's financial situation was desperate. He needed to 
know the total amount of aid coming from Britain so that he could plan 
ahead and he put pressure on the British Legation. In an urgent memo on 
February 11,1942 the British Minister in Jeddah reported that the Saudi 
Government had asked for at least 200,000 gold sovereigns within two 
U2 The oil company knew that the British had sent the £1 million in June 1941 and it made 
them more anxious to get Washington to provide aid. Davies worried that the King would 
not realise that it was through constant pressure form the oil company and the State 
Department that Britain sent more aid. See Davies to Ohliger (al-Khobar Office) June 9, 
1941, CASOC correspondence submitted to the U. S. Senate Hearings: Petroleum 
Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, p. 25422. 
113 U. S. Embassy London to Foreign Office January 25,1942 FO 371/31451/E570/157/25 
114Foreign Office to Consul Jeddah, February 6 1942, FO 371/31451/E607/157/25 
ABEDIN-SIX 238 
weeks. The Saudi treasury had no riyals and no gold with which to buy 
them. The Consul agreed that the situation was urgent but in his cable to 
London reported that he thought 100,000 sovereigns would suffice. 116 The 
urgency of the situation arose out of the fact that despite assistance from 
Britain it came in the form of bank deposits not in coinage. So there was no 
coins to pay salaries and tribal subsidies. Thus it was difficult to circulate 
money into the economy. Also the subsidy in sterling did not allow the 
purchase of goods from outside the sterling area, i. e. from the United 
States. 117 
While Ibn Saud attempted to maintain the stability of his domestic 
environment CASOC was becoming increasingly concerned about the 
physical security of its concession. The company manager in Arabia, Floyd 
Ohliger was worried about the repercussions of an airborne attack on oil 
installations in Dhahran and Ras Tanura and wanted to ensure the ability 
of oil to reach refineries. The company had plugged with cement those 
wells that were not essential to maintain daily production needs. The 
remaining wells were equipped with 'velocity chokes'. These were valves 
that would prevent serious damage to the well if the surface equipment 
was bombed. Concrete walls and sand bags had been placed around other 
equipment at the oil facilities. However, there was still no protection from 
air attacks. CASOC's own security assessment pointed out that the whole 
installation could be wiped out with a single bombing run: 
The oil and gas separating and collecting facilities in Dhahran 
are the most vulnerable as well as the most essential part of 
lu Foreign Office (Baxter Memo) to HM Treasury, February 5 1942, FO 
371/31451/E739/157/25 
116Legation Jeddah (Bird) to Foreign Office February 111942, FO 371/31451/E981/157/25 
117 Foreign Office officials were also frustrated that Ibn Saud refused to accept the paper 
currency without silver to back it up. He would not go against religious principles which 
required paper money to have actual coinage to back it up. Foreign Office to Jeddah, 
March 9 1942, FO 371/31451/E1393/157/25. Despite all the difficulties of 1942 Ibn Saud 
also managed to find the finances to appoint the first Saudi consul to Jerusalem. This 
period also saw the removal of the Italian legation from Jeddah, the consul was a man that 
annoyed Ibn Saud and he refused the replacement that Rome provided, choosing instead 
to ask them to leave. Legation, Jeddah to Foreign Office Annual Report for 1941, July 22, 
1942, FO 371/31460 E4326/4326/25. 
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the whole producing and shipping system. If these facilities 
were destroyed, the entire Arabian production would be lost 
to the war effort until such time as the equipment could be 
replaced. The specialized nature of this equipment makes it 
unlikely that it could be replaced in much less than eight 
months and thus no crude oil could be shipped or utilized in 
the interim. This particular system which is the heart of all 
our producing operations, could be destroyed with about 
three fairly well placed medium sized bombs 118 
CASOC approached the US military for the installation of anti-aircraft guns 
for its facilities. The company felt that it was "essential" that the guns be 
provided, claiming that despite the precautions taken, the facilities were 
still vulnerable to air attack which could shut down the entire Saudi 
operation. More importantly the company wanted Americans to man the 
guns because the "American is the most popular foreigner in Saudi Arabia, 
and it is a certainty that he will get more cooperation from the local 
population than anyone else. "119 
Ohliger emphasised that what was needed was anti-aircraft guns, 
not ground troops. The company wanted to avoid a situation where the 
Saudi Arabian Government might step in to supply ground troops as a 
solution. The last thing the company wanted was Saudi soldiers involved 
in their operations. "The subject therefore must be presented to the Saudi 
Arabian Government in a manner that they will not volunteer or insist on 
moving in several hundred Arab soldiers". 120 The request of CASOC was 
sent to the Joint Planning Staff Committee (JPC) of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Unfamiliar with the region, the JPC requested the input of their 
counterparts on the British Joint Staff and whether Britain might supply the 
necessary defences. 
us Report of Floyd Ohliger, CASOC, to US Joint Chiefs of Staff, no date, enclosure in 
Memorandum, Admiral King, Chief of U. S. Naval Operations and General Marshall Chief 
of Staff, U. S. Army to British Joint Chiefs of Staff , August 13,1942. RG 218 190/1/11/6, 
Records of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, Geographic file 1942-1945, #383.21, Box 3, 




The British replied that they did not have the resources to provide 
specific anti-aircraft support to the defence of Saudi oil installations other 
than the general air defence plans for the region. The British Joint Chiefs 
'welcomed' an American anti-aircraft detachment since the Saudis had 
expressed willingness to allow the guns to be installed and manned by 
Americans, provided they trained Saudis in using them as well. 121 Despite 
British reluctance, it was the view of the Joint Planning Staff Committee 
that Saudi oil installations were in an area of British strategic responsibility 
and therefore the British should supply anti-aircraft protection. If the 
United States were to do so it would disperse the strength of its units 
elsewhere. In any case the JPC felt it unlikely that an air attack from Axis 
forces would occur. Thus the Committee decided against sending anti- 
aircraft guns or personnel to Saudi Arabia. 122 
In Washington the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia was yet to 
be realised, the Arabian Peninsula was seen as far from the battlefield and 
there was little concern of an overt physical threat to oilfields there. This 
was of no comfort to CASOC which was extremely anxious over the 
slightest possibility of a threat to their prize concession. Yet it would not be 
long before Washington and its military planners would also come to view 
the Saudi fields with hawk like interest. 
The British Threat and Lend Lease Aid for Ibn Saud 
Prior to America's entry into the war, there was little interest in foreign oil 
reserves. American domestic production accounted for 63 per cent of the 
world's crude oil output. In contrast Iraq, Iran and the Persian Gulf 
12'Brigadier General Dykes, British Joint Staff Mission, Washington to General Deane, U. S. 
joint Chiefs of Staff, October 13,1942. Records of the U. S. joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, 
Geographic file 1942-1945, #383.21, Box #3, Folder: 'Arabia', USNA 
122 Notes of 42nd Meeting of U. S. Joint Planning Staff (JPS), October 21,1942, Records of the 
U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, Geographic file 1942-1945, #383.21, Box #3, Folder: 
'Arabia', USNA 
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combined produced only 5 per cent? 23 Once the United States entered the 
war however, it became clear that demand for oil and petroleum products 
would be enormous. Washington could not expect to be able to fulfil 
domestic fuel needs and those of the Allied war effort as well. The 
government's Petroleum Coordinator estimated that American reserves 
could be depleted in a matter of a few years, making it necessary to 
significantly increase the discoveries of new oil deposits. 124 Exacerbating 
matters was the fact that since 1939 discoveries of new American fields had 
been declining in relation to consumption. This threatened to leave the 
United States vulnerable to oil shortages. 125 It was in these circumstances 
that foreign oil deposits, especially those located near theatres of 
operations, were considered important assets to develop and protect from 
falling into Axis hands. 126 
The potential shortage of oil supplies was clearly of concern to the 
State Department's own Petroleum Advisor-Max Thornburg. Having 
served as a Vice President of the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) 
before joining government service, Thornburg was well informed about 
Middle East oi1.127 He was a strong supporter of American oil companies 
abroad and greatly concerned that foreign oil corporations, backed by their 
respective governments, had an unfair advantage over American firms. 
These concerns stretched to include America's ally, Britain, which already 
123 Painter, Oil and the American Century, p. 9. Also Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic 
Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, New York: Simon&Schuster 1991, p. 393. 
124 This was the assessment of the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator (OPC). President 
Roosevelt had created the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator (OPC) to analyse U. S. 
military and civilian petroleum needs and make recommendations that would ensure 
uninterrupted and secure oil supplies were available to the United States at all times. The 
Deputy Director of the OPC was Ralph Davies (no relation to Fred Davies), a senior Vice 
President of the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL). He recruited much of the 
OPC staff from oil company personnel. See Painter, Oil and the American Century, p. 12. 
lu William B. Heroy, Director of Reserves, Office of the Petroleum Coordinator cited in 
report entitled The Importance to the United States of Foreign Oil Reserves in General and of 
Saudi Arabian Reserves in Particular, December 29,1942, RDOS, RG 59, Office of 
International Trade Policy: Petroleum Division, Box 6. 
126 Transportation of Allied oil supplies was fraught with difficulty as in the early stages of 
the war many oil tankers were lost in German U-Boat attacks. By May 1942 gasoline was 
rationed in the United States. Miller, Search for Security, pp. 56-57. 
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had considerable political influence in Saudi Arabia. Thornburg believed 
that Britain would seek to maintain a dominant position even after the 
war. 128 He recommended to the Secretary of State that more active 
measures be taken to secure foreign oil deposits for U. S. strategic interests. 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, past financial and political support to Ibn Saud 
gave Britain the upper hand and could hinder the advancement of 
American interests: 
The financial assistance received from the British has 
introduced a British influence in Saudi Arabia that did not 
previously exist. There is no assurance from the study of 
British policy in the past that this influence may not 
ultimately be used to the detriment of the vital American 
interests in Saudi Arabia. 129 
Sharing Thornburg's concerns were officials in the NEA Division. They felt 
that it was vital to establish a clear policy towards Saudi Arabia to prevent 
British influence from harming American interests in the Kingdom. 130 
Although it was recognised that the King had shown "unswerving loyalty 
to the British" he had "been careful not to permit any substantial British 
economic foothold in his country". 131 The fact that an American company 
had been allowed to acquire an oil concession was seen as an indication 
that the King did not want to be wholly dependent on Britain. He had 
turned to the United States to help develop the resources of his country. 
This meant that there was still an opportunity for the United States to 
benefit from the foothold established by CASOC. To leave the King to 
127 Anderson, ARAMCO, the United States and Saudi Arabia, p. 32. 
128 Memorandum Thornburg to Herbert Feis, State Department Economic Advisor, May 
26,1943, RDOS, Office of International Trade Policy: Petroleum Division, Box 6, USNA. 
Also Thornburg to Welles, January 12,1943, cited Painter, Oil and the American Century, p. 
15. 
129 Max Thornburg cited in State Department report, The Importance to the United States of 
Foreign Oil Reserves in General and of Saudi Arabian Reserves in Particular, December 29,1942, 
RG 59, RDOS, Office of International Trade Policy: Petroleum Division, Box 6, US-National 
Archives. 
iso This is indicated by departmental memos in RDOS-Saudi Arabia, 1930-1944, T1179, 
USNA. 
13l Memo Principle Factors Relating to Saudi Arabia, November 25,1941, RDOS/T1179/R3. 
This memo was the culmination of reports from several NEA officials. 
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survive on the rations of British aid would not bode well for American 
interests and would place Ibn Saud more firmly under London's control: 
"If the British, alone and by themselves, get Ibn Saud through his 
difficulties they may seek a future recompense at the expense of American 
interests in that country". 132 
Oil company executives were also becoming more concerned over 
Britain's growing influence in the Kingdom. With the Allied war effort 
fully underway Britain could move to dominate both the Saudi political 
and economic system. Company executives were particularly concerned 
over British plans to establish a currency-issuing bank in Jeddah, which 
would be run from London by the Currency Control Board. This would 
increase the leverage Britain had on the financial affairs of the Kingdom 
and pull the Saudi economy into the 'Sterling block'. 133 Oil company 
payments and financial transactions within the Kingdom would then have 
to be conducted in British currency, draining the company's dollar 
reserves. 134 In a memo to the Secretary of Interior, the President of Texas 
Oil, William Rodgers stated: "Concern is felt over the rapidly increasing 
British economic influence in Saudi Arabia because of the bearing it may 
132 Ibid. 
3330il company representatives frequently employed the British threat in discussions with 
senior officials but it is unclear whether the oil men actually believed in it. Correspondence 
and reports submitted to a U. S. Senate committee indicate that oil company officials did 
not fear the physical threat of a British take over of their concessions. See CASOC 
correspondence of Rodgers, Collier and Moffet, submitted to the U. S. Senate Hearings: 
Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, especially correspondence of January-February 
1943, pp. 25350-25386, and p. 24807. 
134 If Saudi Arabia converted to Sterling currency it would cause the oil company severe 
financial complications since company revenues would be received in British pounds. 
Wartime restrictions on currency conversion would restrict their ability to convert pounds 
into dollars. This would hamper the company's ability to pay its dollar obligations (debts) 
and ultimately affect profitability. See Rodgers testimony to U. S. Senate Hearings: 
Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, pp. 24828-24833. Benjamin Shwadran argues that 
the oil company was "gravely concerned" over its future and the security of the 
concession. He cites company correspondence as evidence that the oil men were afraid 
that their concession was going to be revoked and taken over. This author having looked 
at the correspondence cited by Shwadran would argue that the oil men were concerned 
more about the ramifications of Saudi Arabia becoming a Sterling currency state and did 
not fear so much the actual loss of their concession. See Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and 
the Great Powers, p. 308, and U. S. Senate, Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, pp. 
25417-25435. 
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have on the continuation of purely American enterprise there after the 
waz "135 
Meanwhile reports were coming from the American Minister in 
Cairo, Alexander Kirk, that Britain was taking all the credit for providing 
Ibn Saud with financial support-which in fact came from American Lend 
Lease aid to HM Government: 
after watching operation of system by which American 
assistance is channelized through the British, I have gained 
impression that we have hereby lost considerable prestige in 
the eyes of Saudi Arabians who have been increasingly to 
feel that the British were their only friends in need. 136 
As a, result of Thornburg's recommendations, the NEA and Kirk 
recommended to the Secretary of State that Lend Lease aid be made 
available directly to Saudi Arabia. With Cordell Hull on one of his many 
trips to England, Dean Acheson was in the post of Acting Secretary. He 
found the reports from Kirk and Thornburg compelling and was inclined 
to agree with their conclusions. Acheson dispatched a memo to the Lend 
Lease Administrator, Edward Stettinius requesting that Saudi Arabia be 
made eligible for aid. The language of the request was similar to that used 
over a year earlier by CASOC president James Moffet; the Saudi 
Government was described as pro-Ally and Ibn Saud's "unswerving 
sympathy for and loyalty to the United Nations' cause" was of 
"inestimable value"137 Moreover the granting of aid was necessary to 
"facilitate the prosecution of the war". 
While anxious to comply with the request, Stettinius could not do so 
without Presidential authorisation. The request was forwarded to the 
M Rodgers memo, February 8,1943 text printed in U. S. Senate, Petroleum Arrangements 
with Saudi Arabia, p. 25386. 
136 Kirk to Secretary of State, January 18,1943, FRUS 1943: IV, pp. 856-857. 
237 Acheson to Lend-Lease Administrator, Stettinius, January 9,1943, FR US 1943: IV, pp. 
854-855. Acheson also would have realised that Saudi Arabia was the only major political 
entitiy in the area that was not eligible for Lend Lease. Turkey had been made eligible on 
November 7,1941, Egypt on November 11,1941, Iraq on May 11,1941, Iran on March 10, 
1942. 
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White House on January 11,1943.138 There the matter was lost in the maze 
of more pressing issues facing the chief executive. 139 President Roosevelt 
was an enigmatic, sometimes ambiguous, and contradictory leader and 
delays in the Roosevelt White House were common. His leadership style 
has been the subject of debate among presidential historians but his 
manipulative personality has been well-established. Roosevelt was a 
careful and calculating politician, maintaining control by concentrating 
decision making in the White House. He ran domestic policy and dictated 
foreign affairs over the heads of his cabinet secretaries and often pitted 
subordinates against each other. He would solicit the opinion of one only 
to have the response ridiculed. One biographer of the President noted that: 
"he could be devious, manipulative and at times even dishonest with the 
Congress and the country-11140 Roosevelt did not like to delegate authority 
nor did he like to make judgements in a hurry. He was reported to have 
"elevated procrastination to an art form". While the hopes of CASOC had 
been raised by the possibility of Presidential interest in Saudi oil, their 
proposal languished in the White House awaiting an executive decision. 141 
The lack of progress in Washington only made oil company 
executives more determined and more active. It became clear that 
Congressional support would have to be enlisted and pressure applied on 
government agencies in order to push matters forward. William Rodgers, 
president of Texas Oil Co. and H. D. Collier, president of SOCAL, both 
parent companies of CASOC, were pressed into this mission. They left the 
comfort of their San Francisco corporate headquarters to lobby Congress 
and other senior administration officials in the Capital. One of their first 
meetings was with Harold Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior and the 
l3$ Stettinius to Acheson, January, 12 1943, FRLIS 1943: 1V, p. 855. 
139 For a more in depth profile of Roosevelt see Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American 
Foreign Policy, pp. 255-261. Also Warren Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime 
Statesman, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 7. Also John Charmley, G: urchill's 
Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940-1957, London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1995, p. 15 and Rubin, Secrets of State, p. 41. 
140Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 548. 
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Petroleum Administrator for War (PAW). Ickes was in charge of U. S. 
government oil procurement and was responsible for promoting 
government cooperation with the oil industry. Collier and Rodgers raised 
their concerns with Ickes over the British threat to the "biggest and richest 
oil reserves in the world". 142They warned that British companies, with the 
support of London, would "edge in on their concession" unless 
Washington provided assistance to the Government of Saudi Arabia and 
did so quickly. 
Ickes was urged to support a proposal for Lend Lease aid to be 
extended to Saudi Arabia, thus forestalling any chance that their prized oil 
concession be "cancelled and given over to the British"143 Despite the fact 
that it was his role to increase American oil production, Ickes listened with 
interest but was non-committal. He had years of antagonistic relations with 
the oil industry and was not enthusiastic about helping a private oil 
company out of its problems. However, he certainly was willing to further 
the involvement of his department and secure vital resources for the war 
effort. l44 
In fact Ickes was extremely interested in Saudi oil and assigned his 
deputy, Ralph Davies, to look further into the concession. Davies 
represented Ickes on the powerful inter-departmental board, the 
Committee on International Petroleum Policy (CIPP). 145 Comprising of 
141 Kimball, The juggler, p. 98. 
142 Report of meeting between Secretary of Interior, Harold Ickes, William Rodgers and H. 
D. Collier, February 7,1943, in Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior File, 
Harold Ickes Papers, Manuscript Division, U. S. Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., 
pp. 7425-7426. See also testimony of Ickes before U. S. Senate Hearings: Petroleum 
Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, p. 25232. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ickes had made two unsuccessful attempts to nationalise the oil industry, first in 1935 
then again in 1940. There were also moves by Ickes and the White House to restrict the 
production of oil in order to stabilise the industry. As a result most oil executives 
distrusted him and the Roosevelt administration. See Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the 
Cold War in the Near East, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 181-182 
145 Ironically, Davies was himself an ex-oil man who had left a post as vice-president of 
Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) to join government service when the war began. See 
Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, p. 308. The CIPP consisted of 
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officials from the State, War and Interior Departments, CIPP was 
responsible for developing long term oil policy. Davies learned that 
Rodgers and Collier were seriously pursuing the matter with as many 
Government officials as would listen and that they were desperate for 
assistance. In fact the oilmen had also arranged to give a presentation to 
CIPP itself. Following the meeting with the oil men Davies noted that the 
majority of committee members were in favour of protecting access to 
Saudi concessions and providing the King with American aid. 
After various discussions CIPP proposed that in return for granting 
aid to the King, the United States should hold the Saudi oil fields as a 
reserve petroleum stockpile in the ground. Furthermore, the Committee 
recommended that the United States Government take ownership of the 
California Arabian Oil Company (CASOC) in order to ensure that Saudi oil 
was made available for the strategic use of the United States. The CIPP 
suggested that the US Government make an outright stock purchase which 
would make the protection and development of Saudi oil concessions a 
matter of U. S. national security. 146 
Ralph Davies gave his enthusiastic backing to this proposal. It was 
highly likely that administrative control of the project would be given to 
his boss, the Petroleum Administrator for War, Harold Ickes. Indeed his 
hand could be seen in the CIPPS' pursuit of this strategy. Ickes was a long 
time opponent of the oil industry and their resistance to Government 
regulation. He had made his reputation taking on industry leaders and 
members of Congress who were opposed to his attempts to fix prices and 
set oil production quotas. Moreover, Ickes sincerely believed that it was his 
duty as a patriot to protect the nation from the "unfair practices" of the 
representatives of State, War and Interior Departments, see Painter, Oil and the American 
Century, pp. 36-37. 
i46This proposal was originally made by William Bullitt, the Under-Secretary of the Navy. 
The details of this proposal were described to Ickes by his deputy Ralph Davies. See entry 
for Sunday, February 14,1943, Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior File, Harold 
Ickes Papers, Manuscript Division, U. S. Library of Congress, Washington, DC, p. 7448. 
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corporate sector. 147 The prospect of increasing American oil reserves at the 
expense of a private company was very appealing. Ickes saw the take over 
of the CASOC oil concessions in Saudi Arabia as an opportunity for both 
himself and his department to take a leading role in securing vital 
American interests. It was with this in mind that Ickes became motivated to 
obtain financial aid for Ibn Saud. By ensuring the stability of the King's 
regime Ickes hoped that the oil concessions could safely remain in 
American hands. 
In order to gain executive support for the plan Ickes arranged to 
meet President Roosevelt in the White House on February 16,1943. During 
the course of their conversation Ickes brought up the issue of oil. He 
lamented the lack of a coherent policy that would adequately guarantee 
petroleum supplies for U. S. forces. He pointed out that American 
companies in Saudi Arabia had "probably the greatest and richest oil field 
in all the world" and yet Washington was providing no help to the Saudi 
government. America needed to ensure the stability of the current regime 
and maintain its access to such a valuable commodity. In contrast, Great 
Britain had provided more than $20 million in aid to the Saudi King and 
they were known to never overlook any opportunity "to get in where there 
was oil". 148 Ickes informed the President that he believed Britain was 
undermining the CASOC concession and would continue to do so unless 
Washington stepped in to help Ibn Saud. 
The President had already received recommendations from the State 
Department and a request for authorisation from the Lend-Lease 
Administrator regarding Saudi aid. However, it took the aggressive 
l4lDiary of Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior File, Harold Ickes Papers, MSS 
(Manuscript Division), U. S. Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Ickes disdain for the oil 
industry is articulated in his diary. See also Ickes remarks cited in Stoff, Oil, War and 
American Security: 1941-1947, pp. 13-14. 
148 Diary of Harold L. Ickes, pp. 7462-7463. MSS, U. S. Library of Congress. 
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lobbying of Ickes to push the President to act. 149 Within forty-eight hours of 
his meeting with Ickes, Roosevelt issued Executive Order #8926, declaring 
that "the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United 
States". This made Ibn Saud eligible to receive funds from the Lend Lease 
budget. '5° It had only been eighteen months earlier that the same President 
had brushed off the King as being 'too far afield' to warrant American 
assistance. 
Although the issue of financial aid had concluded there was still 
concern over the vulnerability of the American concession and the long 
term effects of British domination in Saudi Arabia. The Division of Near 
Eastern Affairs (NEA) was convinced that British policies in the Middle 
East would make a "muddle of the area". 151 British and French colonial 
administration had created a "jigsaw pattern of Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and 
Transjordan" fostering numerous political and social problems. 152 It was 
feared that similar policies could be implemented in Saudi Arabia-with 
artificial divisions carving up the country among various factions. This was 
thought to be even more likely in the event of Ibn Saud's death. Britain 
could intervene in the succession process and impose a Government that 
might be inimical to American interests. For as long as "Ibn Saud lives the 
American concession probably is secure". 153 After his death however, there 
were no guarantees about what path his successor might take. 
Saudi Arabia was gradually being recognised as important to 
American strategic interests and with increasing concerns about British 
interference Washington s fears would gradually outstrip even those of the 
149 Before approving aid President Roosevelt wanted to check first to see if Britain had any 
objections. See Ickes meeting with President Roosevelt, February 16,1943, U. S. Senate 
Hearings: Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, p. 25233. 
l50 Roosevelt to Lend-Lease Administrator, February 18,1943, FR US 1943: IV, p. 859. 
is' Memorandum on Principle Factors in the American Position in the Middle East, May 26, 
1943, RDOS, Office of International Trade Policy: Petroleum Division 1943-1949, Box 6, US- 




oilmen. lm Indeed after expending much effort to gain Washington's 
support for Saudi Arabia the oil men would be unprepared for the 
overwhelming interest that would soon develop. 
Petroleum Reserves Corporation: Washington Enters the Oil Business 
By the middle of 1943 interest in Saudi oil had broadened to include the 
logistics and supply officers in the War and Navy Departments. Estimates 
from military planners had indicated that it would not be possible to 
satisfy both civilian and military requirements of crude oil from domestic 
American production alone. Increased demands for petroleum products 
were also anticipated for naval and air operations in the Pacific and new 
offensives in Europe. Military representatives to the Committee on 
International Petroleum Policy were anxious to follow through on the 
earlier proposal to take over the CASOC concession. Subsequently the 
Committee made a formal request for the establishment of a Petroleum 
Reserves Corporation (PRC) which would have the task of securing a 
controlling interest of CASOC, as well as options on other foreign oil 
concessions? s5 This was followed by a direct request by the Chairman of 
the Joint Chief's of Staff, Admiral Leahy, to the President recommending 
the creation of the PRC and the "immediate acquisition of a controlling 
interest by the U. S. Government in Saudi Arabian oil concessions". 156 
i54 Sensitivities about British dominance in Saudi Arabia were inflamed when it was 
discovered that Ibn Saud had used the British Minister in Jeddah to obtain supplies of 
American arms from the Lend Lease programme -effectively giving Britain credit for 
material provided by the United States. The Secretary of State, protested to the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Leahy. The Admiral was able to deal with the 
issue much quicker than the State Department because the British joint Staff had set up a 
liaison office in the War Department to facilitate Allied military cooperation. In contrast 
the State Department would have to wait until the British Ambassador received 
instructions from the Foreign Office before issues could be resolved. Secretary of State to 
Admiral Leahy, May 25,1943, FR US 1943: IV, pp. 1-3. 
25s CIPP memo to Secretary of State, March 22,1943, RDOS, Office of International Trade 
Policy: Petroleum Division, CIPP Memoranda File, Box 19, US-National Archives. 
156 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt, June 8,1943, FR US 1943: IV, 
p. 921. See also Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, p. 312. 
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However, the White House did not take up the proposal right away. 
The President initially asked Leahy to discuss the matter further with the 
Secretary of State. 157 The takeover of a private American company would 
certainly draw criticism from the oil industry and its allies in Congress . 158 
Roosevelt sought to avoid negative publicity for his administration. 
Historians would later argue that it was also typical of the Presidents 
leadership style to put off crucial decisions. One of Roosevelt's most 
significant weaknesses "was an unwillingness to face unpleasantness until 
there was no option but to do so" 159 While another Roosevelt biographer 
noted: "lacking a general principle by which to make foreign policy, 
Roosevelt improvised from one situation to another. The result was a 
jumble of separate and somewhat clashing policies. "160 
The lethargy over the PRC matter prompted Ickes to approach the 
President himself. Meeting in the White House on June 16, the Secretary of 
Interior urged the President to come forward with a coherent policy on oil. 
The civilian economy was drawing on naval reserves to meet its 
requirements and immediate action was needed to increase the pool of 
accessible oil. To Ickes surprise the President seemed ignorant of these facts 
and responded with the suggestion that domestic production would be 
enough to satisfy American needs. An exasperated Ickes noted that the 
President "didn't have the least conception of the oil situation in this 
country". 161 Ickes argued that whatever was left in America's own reserves 
should be left intact for future use and the U. S. should "buy cheap oil from 
157 Memo of Admiral William Leahy, June 11,1943, FR US 1943: IV, pp. 921-922. 
258 Report of meeting with President Roosevelt on June 16,1943, in the Diary of Harold L. 
Ickes 
p. 7881-7882. Manuscript Division (MSS), Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. 
159 Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance, p. 12. 
160 James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, New York: Harcourt Brace, 
1956 p. 249. For other works on Roosevelt's personality and leadership style see Dallek, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, and Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin 
Roosevelt as a Wartime Statesman. 
161 Roosevelt-Ickes meeting June 16,1943, in the Diary of Harold L. Ickes pp. 7881-7882 
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other lands" for immediate needs. 162 Roosevelt however, was not moved 
and did not authorise any action. 
Frustrated at the lack of success with the president, Ickes mobilised 
support from colleagues in other departments. In a series of meetings held 
in June 1943 representatives of the Interior, War, Navy and State 
Departments worked out a detailed proposal for the acquisition of foreign 
(essentially Saudi) oil reserves to be submitted to the President. All parties 
unanimously agreed that the Petroleum Reserves Corporation should be 
created as soon as possible. The issue of control of the corporation, and the 
type of interest or ownership to be acquired in Saudi reserves, could be 
"left to further study". 163 Almost as an afterthought it was suggested that 
certain members of Congress be approached for "their informal 
approval". 1" With this broad support from both the military and the 
cabinet Ickes went back to the President to argue for the measure, in doing 
so he pushed Roosevelt to authorise the creation of the Petroleum Reserves 
Corporation. 165 
Though many in the State Department had been in favour of the 
principle behind the PRC, there were differences over the method by which 
oil reserves would be secured. The Secretary of State was not enthusiastic 
about the outright purchase of CASOC, believing it better for the PRC to 
simply engage in a contractual arrangement with the oil company to 
supply a fixed amount of oil per year. Of particular concern was the 
possible indication to the Arab world that the United States had 
162 Ibid, Ickes was also anxious to get Presidential approval because through the PRC he 
would have the ability to initiate considerable control over oil production and distribution. 
163 The meetings took place on June 17,19,21, and 24,1943. Subsequently this report was 
made part of a joint memorandum and sent to the President. The signatories of the joint 
memo were Secretary Cordell Hull (State), Henry Stimson (War), James Forrestal (Navy), 
Harold Ickes (Interior), June 26,1943, FR US 1943: IV pp. 924-930. 
164 Secretary Cordell Hull (State), Henry Stimson (War), James Forrestal (Navy), Harold 
Ickes (Interior), June 26,1943, FRUS 1943: 1V pp. 924-930. 
265 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vols. I-II, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948, 
Vo1. II, p. 1520. See also Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, p. 310-314. 
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imperialistic designs on the Middle East. 166 Ownership of CASOC would 
place a Saudi Arabian national resource and its future economic prosperity 
squarely in American hands. Although it was certainly necessary for 
Washington to provide more active and consistent support for American 
business it preferred to steer clear of overt involvement in the domestic 
affairs of Saudi Arabia. CASOC personnel had already established a good 
working relationship with the King, his government and the local 
townsmen-in a culture very different from that which American officials 
were accustomed to. State Department officials acknowledged that it 
would be difficult to find, in significant numbers, American officials who 
could understand and operate in an Arab environment. CASOC had 
shown that it could operate the concession on its own and satisfy the 
interests of the United States as well. 167 
Ironically, Ickes own advisory board was also against the stock 
purchase of CASOC. It argued that oil resources would be better managed 
and marketed by private enterprise and venture capitalists. Moreover, any 
government that tried to enter into the oil business could find itself 
overextended. The advisors believed that: 
Any direct participation by the Government of the United 
States in foreign oil operations, whether alone or in 
partnership with private corporations will discourage private 
enterprise and will not only increase the political 
complications but will retard the orderly development of the 
worlds oil resources. 168 
Oil Company Take Over: A Strategy of Failure 
166 For State Department's opposition to a government take over of CASOC, see Hull, The 
Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II, London: Hodder&Stoughton, 1948, pp. 1520-1522. 
Alexander Kirk, the former Minister to Saudi Arabia was also very much against this. See 
Kirk to Secretary of State, July 27 1943, FR US 1943: IV, p. 935. 
267 Ibid. 
i68 See report entitled'A Foreign Oil Policy for the United States' prepared by Foreign 
Operations Committee of the Petroleum Administrator for War (PAW), November 5,1943, 
Secretary of Interior Files, Box 159, Foreign Oil Policy File, Harold Ickes Papers, MSS, U. S. 
Library of Congress. 
ABEDW-SIX 254 
However, Ickes believed that Saudi oil would only be secure in the long 
run if the United States Government was involved.. Soon after the 
president's approval of the PRC initiative Ickes called in oil company 
representatives, William Rodgers and H. D. Collier. They were informed 
that in the interest of national security the United States Government 
would take over, through stock purchase, the entire CASOC operation. The 
two men were stunned-Ickes noted in his diary: "I found myself looking 
into the faces of two surprised and shocked individuals. I had literally 
taken their breath away". 169 
Rodgers and Collier had approached Washington in order to 
stabilise the relationship between the oil company and the Saudi regime, 
not to have CASOC taken over. They had no desire to become business 
partners with government bureaucrats. To do so would be to forfeit 
enormous revenues and complicate their relationships with other oil 
companies and foreign governments. Moreover, CASOC had spent 
millions of dollars on exploration and development of the Saudi 
concessions---costs which the U. S. Government would be unable or 
unwilling to reimburse. Both men vehemently objected to the proposal 170 
Nevertheless, Ickes aggressively pursued the issue and was 
determined to obtain company acquiescence. In numerous meetings with 
corporate officials Ickes tried various ways to re-negotiate the proposal. An 
offer to reduce the government stake in CASOC to 51 % was rejected. So too 
was a bid to allow SOCAL and Texas Oil to each retain one third stake in 
CASOC-with the remaining third held by Washington. 171 After successive 
169 Diary of Harold Ickes, pp. 8050-8051, MSS, Library of Congress, See also Painter, Oil and 
the American Century, p. 42 and Yergin, The Prize, p, 398. 
17oMeeting with Rodgers and Collier, September 15,1943, Diary of Harold L. Ickes, p. 8185. 
See also meetings on October 15,1943, Ibid., pp. 8285-8286. CASOC was offered the task of 
management and development of the Saudi oil concession as well as a the chance to aid in 
a government plan to construct a 100,000 (b. p. d. ) barrel per day refinery. Rodgers 
responded that it was unlikely that post war demand for oil would be enough to require 
such a large capacity refinery and that a refinery with a 35,000 b. p. d. capacity was good 
enough. 
17lln addition, Texas Oil was demanding that the government also pay out $40 million to 
reimburse the company for its investment in exploration and development of the Saudi 
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meetings Ickes finally concluded that the oil company executives were just 
unwilling to cooperate. He still needed to obtain their consent to the 
CASOC take over because despite the wartime necessity of oil, forcibly 
taking the company over would have caused an uproar throughout 
American industry and Congress. 
Officially the negotiations between the government and the oil 
companies were confidential but matters were further complicated by leaks 
to the media. Yet when a front page article in the Wall Street journal 
reported that the government was trying to take over the Saudi Arabian 
concession from two of America's largest oil companies, it caught many in 
the oil industry by surprise. 172 Moreover, the article stated that the 
negotiations were not proceeding amicably. Subsequent media reports 
provided further details on the difficulties surrounding the negotiations. 
On November 13,1943 it was reported that the talks had broken down. 
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, had been patiently observing these 
developments. He had doubts about the wisdom of pursuing the CASOC 
take over at all costs. Particularly worrying was the damage that would be 
done to the prestige of the United States. The lack of progress in the 
negotiations could indicate to Ibn Saud that the United States was not 
committed to the development of his country's oil resources and the 
welfare of his kingdom. This in turn, might be used to the advantage of the 
British and to "serve to build up their post-war position in the Middle East 
at the expense of American interests there". 173 Moreover, Hull had reports 
from: 
concession. See Murray Memorandum to Secretary of State, December 14,1943, FR US 
1943: IV pp. 948-949. 
in Wall Street journal, of 26 October and 13 November, 1943. For the concerns raised by 
these reports see FRUS 1943: IV pp. 940-941. 
In Hull beleived that Britain's hold over Ibn Saud came from the $34 million in aid that 
she provded between 1940-1943. Secretary of State, Hull to Secretary of Interior, Ickes, 
Nov. 13,1943, FR US 1943: IV, pp. 941-943. Fortunately for Washington Ibn Saud was not in 
the least upset. In fact he considered it "perfectly natural" for the United States 
Government to become involved in business ventures. This was of course the common 
policy of the British government so it would have come as no surprise to the King. In fact 
Ibn Saud seemed to think that it might signify greater American assistance to his country. 
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sources of unquestioned reliability that influences will be 
brought to bear upon King Ibn Saud in the not distant future 
for the purpose of undermining his confidence in the 
American interest in his country's petroleum resources. 174 
The Secretary believed it foolish to jeopardise America's interests by 
allowing the PRC initiative to become a tool for increased British influence 
in Saudi Arabia. It was more effective to approach the British directly and 
negotiate a comprehensive agreement to resolve oil questions in the 
Middle East. Hull dispatched a memo to Harold Ickes urging that the PRC 
plan be held in abeyance because of the harmful effects it was having on 
America's reputation and future interests. 175 
Ickes however, did not see it this way. He had made it his own 
personal challenge to secure oil reserves for the United States and was 
reluctant to relinquish his crusade. The creation of the Petroleum Reserves 
Corporation was in his eyes, in the best interest of the government, as well 
as being a means to "strengthen the position of the companies". 176 Ickes 
also had his sources in the State Department which indicated to him that 
Ibn Saud did not object to Washington's involvement in the concession. 
Britain should have no objections to the involvement of the U. S. 
Government in American corporations when she herself operated in such a 
manner. Ickes believed that it was vital that United States Government be 
in a position that "approximates the position of the British Government" in 
order to maintain American interests in Saudi Arabia. 177 Despite the leaks 
to the media, the adverse publicity and the potentially unhappy oil 
corporations Ickes was determined to see the PRC plan go ahead. 
See Ibn Saud's view in Minister Murray to Secretary of State, November 3,1943, FR US 
1943: IV, p. 941. The animosity Hull felt towards Ickes can be seen in the Memoirs of Cordell 
Hull, pp. 1515-1525. 
174 Secretary of State, Hull to Secretary of Interior, Ickes, Nov. 13,1943, FR US 1943: IV, 
pp. 941-943. 
175 Secretary of State, Hull to Secretary of Interior, Ickes, January 5 1944, FRLIS 1944: V, 
pp. 10-11. 




President Roosevelt, had been keeping abreast of the increased 
tension between the Secretaries of State and Interior over the PRC issue. 
However, the President himself was known to encourage friction among 
his subordinates so that they would have to come to him as the final 
arbitrator of disputes. 178 The two were ordered to resolve their differences 
quickly. Although he chastised his cabinet men, the President did not take 
a stand himself. He allowed the two men to pursue separate policies, 
perhaps in order to see who would be the victor. Therefore Ickes was 
allowed to pursue talks with the oil companies in order to "find out just 
where the United States stands", while Hull was given clearance to 
proceed with preliminary discussions with London to settle petroleum 
questions in the Middle East. 179 
As it turned out Ickes would soon find himself on the weaker 
ground. In his determined effort to get the Government into the oil 
business he expanded the PRC plan to include a proposal for the building 
of a trans-Arabian pipeline stretching from the Arabian Gulf to the 
Mediterranean. The United States would build, own and operate the 
pipeline and charge regional oil companies for its use. However, once this 
news went public, Ickes faced a barrage of opposition from across the oil 
industry. Many domestic producers balked at the idea of the Government 
funding a pipeline which would allow cheap foreign oil to flood the 
American market. Even members of Congress began to take a critical look 
at the Petroleum Reserves Corporation. A Senate Committee was set up to 
investigate petroleum policy and the usefulness of the PRC. The collapse 
of the stock purchase plan and the hostility to the pipeline left Ickes with 
178 Irwin Gellman, Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1995, pp. 11-16. Roosevelt always kept his advisors 
and cabinet members guessing. Decision making was concentrated in his hands and he 
frequently made policy without informing the cabinet departments concerned. The 
Secretary of State would often not know what foreign commitments the President had 
made. Roosevelt was also known to 
force individuals who he knew disliked each other to 
work together. 
179 Roosevelt to Secretary of State, and Secretary of Interior, January 10 1944, FRUS: V, 
p. 16. 
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no more proposals to offer and his efforts to take over the CASOC 
concession came to an end. 180 
Meanwhile, the Secretary of State had been working hard to 
establish a dialogue with the British to resolve petroleum issues on a 
bilateral basis. He set up the Committee on Anglo-American Petroleum 
Matters to bring together officials from both sides who would establish 
clear guidelines on the responsibilities of the two governments regarding 
Middle Eastern oil. 181 An invitation was extended to the Foreign Office for 
talks in Washington but the response was lukewarm and London first 
wanted to know the "precise level" at which the talks would be held- 
whether it would be senior or junior diplomats. They also requested an 
advance copy of the agenda before they agreed to participate. 182 
In response Hull gave London a detailed proposal on the issues he 
sought to put on the table for discussion. These ranged from the quantity of 
oil to be produced and its pricing, to concession rights and the interests of 
the countries that produced oil in the Middle East. Yet instead of 
reassuring the Foreign Office this raised more suspicion. London knew that 
Washington was trying to take over the operations of American oil 
companies in Saudi Arabia and questions were raised about whether there 
was also a plan to take over other American oil companies which had 
stakes in Iraq and Iran. In those countries the oil operations were joint 
ventures where British firms (and therefore the British government) held 
the majority stake. 
Uneasy about American intentions the British response to the talks 
was cordial but firm. His Majesty's Government would be willing to 
discuss oil issues in preliminary stages but the substance of any discussions 
180 For a more detailed account of these events see Miller, Search for Security, pp. 95-99. 
Also Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and the United States Foreign Policy, 1943- 
1945, New York: Random House, 1968, pp. 294-313. 
1s, Secretary of State to President, December 8 1943, in Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 
VoI. II, p. 1521. For details on the background of the Cabinet Committee that Hull 
assembled see Baram, Department of State in the Middle East: 1919-1945, pp. 225-226. 
182 British Ambassador Halifax to Secretary of State, February 7,1944, FR US 1944: III, p. 94. 
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had to be "world wide in their general scope and will not be specifically 
confined to any particular oil bearing region. "183 Furthermore, the Foreign 
Office wanted the discussions to be held in London by junior officials. 
Topics of discussion were to be limited to those of a technical nature and 
any discussion of concession rights was strenuously rejected. 184 There was 
no desire to provide an opportunity for the United States to acquire rights 
in the predominantly British run oil concessions in Iraq and Iran. 
Under increasing and unwanted attention from Congress and with 
the media circulating rumours of an Anglo-American disagreement over 
oil, Roosevelt pushed Hull to begin the discussions and also insisted that 
no topic be off limits. 185 He wanted the meetings to cover thoroughly all 
petroleum matters, including concession rights. The State Department also 
put a great deal of pressure on the Foreign Office, which set off alarm bells 
in Downing Street. Winston Churchill found the aggressive conduct of the 
State Department disconcerting. The Prime Minister cabled Roosevelt 
expressing his concern with what seemed to be "a desire to deprive us of 
our oil assets in the Middle East on which among other things, the whole 
supply of our Navy depends". 186 Churchill pointed out that any 
discussions on oil would certainly arouse discontent in Parliament and that 
as such discussions should be low key and of a technical nature. Roosevelt 
provided a direct response to the Prime Minister: 
You point to the apprehension on your side that the United 
States desires to deprive you of oil assets in the Middle East. 
183 British Embassy to Department of State, February 18,1944, FR US 1944: 11I, pp. 97-98. For 
further British views see Ann Orde The Eclipse of Great Britain: The United States and British 
Imperial Decline 1895-1956, London: MacMillan, 1996, pp. 149-150. 
184 Memo of Conversation, Petroleum Advisor with Lord Halifax, February 18,1944, FRUS 
1944: II1, pp. 97-98. Also Kolko, The Politics of War, p. 301. 
185 For the Secretary of State's account of that period see Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 
II, p. 1524. 
186 Churchill to President Roosevelt, February 20,1944, C-583, re-printed Public Record 
Office material in Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, ed., W. Kimball, 
London: Collins, Vol. 11,1984, p. 734. 
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On the other hand, I am disturbed about the rumor that the 
British wish to horn in on Saudi Arabian oil reserves 187 
Furthermore the president indicated that he firmly believed that 
discussions had to be directed from the Cabinet level and that he could not 
change his position. As the potential for a major breach among allies 
loomed, Roosevelt assured Churchill that "we are not making sheep's eyes 
at your oil fields in Iran or Iraq'. 188 This was reciprocated by the British 
Prime Minister who returned the assurance that Britain had no intention of 
'horning in' on American interests in Saudi Arabia. However, Churchill 
was clearly concerned that the United States had post war ambitions in 
Middle East oil: 
Thank you very much for your assurances about no sheeps 
eyes at our oilfields in Iran and Iraq. Let me reciprocate by 
giving you the fullest assurance that we have no thought of 
trying to horn in upon your interests or property in Saudi 
Arabia. My position on this is, as in all matters is that Great 
Britain seeks no advantage, territorial or otherwise, as a result 
of the war. On the other hand she will not be deprived of 
anything which rightly belongs to her after having given her 
best services to the good cause. 189 
For Roosevelt this incident proved more than ever the need to come to a 
basic understanding between the two 'governments. Fortunately his 
assurances had calmed British fears and the Foreign Office indicated that it 
would be sending a delegation for talks in Washington. They still insisted 
however, that discussions be preliminary and of a technical nature, leaving 
cabinet level talks to determine the final agreement 19o A series of meetings 
were held throughout April 1944 leading to a 'Memorandum of 
187 President Roosevelt to Churchill, February 22,1944, R-474/I, Ibid., pp. 744-745. 
President Roosevelt's comments are also cited in Stettinius to Winant, Feb. 24,1944, FR US 
1944: III, pp. 101-102. 
188 President Roosevelt to Churchill, March 3,1944, FR US 1944: 111, p. 103. 
189 Churchill to President Roosevelt, March 4,1944, C-601, Churchill & Roosevelt: The 
Complete Correspondence, Vol. III, pp. 17-18. 
i90 See Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, pp. 188-189 and Kolko, The Politics of War, 
pp. 300-304 and Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, p. 184.. 
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Understanding'. 191 It was a broad agreement and intentionally vague but it 
satisfied both sides. The British were pleased with the clauses that 
stipulated that existing oil concessions would remain unchanged while 
American negotiators were happy with clauses that indicated government 
restrictions would not be allowed to impede the development of petroleum 
resources in the Middle East. 192 
Yet despite Anglo-American progress, problems on the ground 
were still making the officials in the NEA sceptical. Reports of British 
interference were still coming from Jeddah and this threatened to broaden 
the Allied disagreements over Saudi Arabia. 
191 Memorandum of Understanding, text printed in FRUS 1944: 111 pp. 112-115. 
192 Following Cabinet level discussions in July-August an Anglo-American Petroleum 
Agreement was formally signed. However, opposition from Congress and oil industry 
leaders meant that the agreement was never ratified. Memorandum of Understanding, text 





In January 1944 the State Department reorganised the Division of Near 
Eastern Affairs in order to deal with the increasing demands of America's 
activity and interest in the Middle East. A new, larger entity, the Office of 
Near Eastern and African Affairs was created, consisting of three sub- 
departments: Near Eastern Affairs (which covered Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Arabian Peninsula, Syria, Turkey and Greece); 
Middle Eastern Affairs (covering Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, India, and 
Iran) and African Affairs (which dealt with all of Africa except, Algeria, 
Egypt and South Africa)? 
This recognition of greater American involvement in the Middle 
East was also manifested in the upgrading of the diplomatic presence in 
Saudi Arabia to a full time resident Minister. The new Minister, James 
Moose was based in Jeddah and found that on his first trip to Riyadh, the 
King lost no time in listing grievances against the British. The complaints 
concerned the withholding of his share of pilgrimage tariffs from the 
previous year and the fact that no announcement on the amount of aid that 
he would be receiving for 1944 had been made. British parsimony had 
made life extremely difficult and would "ruin his country" if it continued. 
Moreover, Ibn Saud informed Moose that the only reason he kept ties with 
Britain was out of concern that "they might loose their restraint on his 
enemies, such as the Hashemite family". 2 
Though appreciative of past help, the King was clear in his desire to 
have direct American assistance. Perhaps one day, Ibn Saud told Moose "it 
might be necessary for Saudi Arabia to look to the United States of America 
for all its requirements". 3 The newly arrived Minister took Ibn Saud at face 
value and quickly wired Washington with grave predictions of the 
1 Baram, The Department of State in the Middle East, p. 67. 
2 Report of meeting between Moose and Ibn Saud, in Minister Jeddah (Moose) to 
Secretary of State, April 29,1944, FR US 1944: V, p. 695. See also Minister Jeddah (Moose) to 
Secretary of State, March 13,1944, FRUS 1944: V, p. 676 
3 Ibid. 
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consequences of Britain's insufficient aid provisions. He suggested that the 
State Department increase the amount of Lend Lease aid by - 20 million 
riyals for 1944.4 
The King was tactful in his discussions, always speckling his 
comments with praise for Britain, but invoking the urgent needs of his 
people as the reason for appealing for greater American financial 
involvement. It was typical of his negotiating style, and despite his claims 
of acute financial woes Ibn Saud would not submit to terms that did not 
suit him best. A case in point was a British offer to loan him half a million 
pounds which he refused because London wanted the revenues from the 
1944 pilgrimage to act as security. It did not seem odd to the King that he 
should be complaining of his financial situation to James Moose at the 
same time he was turning down a loan from Britain. 5 By holding out the 
King could get outright grants from America instead of having to worry 
about paying back loans to the British. 6 
The American eagerness to please the King disturbed the British 
Minister in Jeddah, Stanley Jordan. As a seasoned Foreign Service officer, 
Jordan felt he knew 'how to treat Middle East potentates'. He had been 
attempting to implement strict financial controls on the Saudi 
administration and had planned to withhold further subsidies until fiscal 
reform was fully implemented.? This was part of a general Foreign Office 
move to cut back its expenditures. Britain had already provided over £8 
4 Moose to Secretary of State, April 29,1944, FRUS 1944: V, p. 695. 
5 It did not seem to concern the American Minister that the King had turned down the 
loan. In fact from the tone of the report it seems that the King was using the example of his 
refusal to indicate to the Minister how much he desired to reduce reliance on Britain and 
turn to the United States, Ibid. 
6A 1944 report by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the Central 
Intelligence Agency, characterised Ibn Saud's policy as one of "cleverness, tenacity and 
open mindedness". The report gave high marks to Ibn Saud for managing to play off 
competing Bedouin interests and for dealing with major powers. If ever the Caliphate 
issue arose again the OSS believed that Ibn Saud was a prime candidate to take on the 
role. The OSS was already beginning to classify countries in terms of their communist and 
nationalist leanings. Office of Strategic Services Report "The Position of Saudi Arabia 
within the Arab World", February 4,1944, OSS Research and Analysis Reports 1941-1961, 
Report # 1652, RDOS, M1221, US-National Archives. 
7 Jordan to Foreign Office December 31,1943 PRO FO 371/40267/E364/325/25. 
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million pounds in aid to Saudi Arabia. The Foreign Office believed that "a 
proportion of the subsidy is wasted" by the inefficiency of the 
administrative system. 8 Therefore Saudi demands for a 1944 budget of 109 
million riyals could not be accepted when an already bloated deficit of 102 
million riyals for 1943 was still being carried: 9 
It is apparent that the Saudi Arabian Government have made 
no effort to cut their coat according to their cloth and that 
they will spend as much money as His Majesty's Government 
are prepared to give them. 10 
It was proposed that after June 1944 the Saudi Government should expect a 
drastic reduction and should reduce its expenditures accordingly. 11 
Yet Ibn Saud responded shrewdly. Lamenting his financial and 
political position the King requested Britain to provide financial experts to 
advise his administration and a military expert to train his army. The King 
had appointed his third son, Mansur as the commander in chief of the 
Saudi army. As Mansur had no formal military experience Ibn Saud sought 
to obtain British training, preferably with Sunni Muslim instructors, to 
come immediately to help establish a modern Saudi army. Adding a twist 
to his request, Ibn Saud mentioned that the Americans had already offered 
to provide such training but that he preferred Britain to do so. Jordan was 
suitably impressed by the seeming candor of the King and reported to 
London: "I cannot stress too strongly the importance which Ibn Saud 
attached to his request.. . the King neither wishes their (American) 
interference in internal administration of the country nor can they supply 
Moslem officers". 12 
8 Report entitled 'The Future of Saudi Arabia' part of Baxter Minute, March 16,1944, PRO 
FO 371/40265/E1775/128/25. 
9 Revenue was expected to be only 37 million riyals. The deficit for 1944 estimated at 72 
million riyals. See Minister Cairo (Kirk), to 
Secretary of State, January 13,1944, FRLIS 
1944: V, p. 672. 
10 Foreign Office Minute, February 16,1944 PRO FO 371/40267/E364/325/25. 
21 Foreign Office to Minister Jeddah, February 121944, FO 371/40267/E1127/325/25. 
12 Resident Jeddah (Jordan) to Foreign Office, March 3 1944, PRO FO 
371/40267/E1408/325/25. 
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In a small revision of their earlier decision, the Foreign Office 
decided to extend subsidy of foodstuffs to Saudi Arabia up till July 31 1944 
and to provide £10,000 per month for the running of Saudi missions 
abroad. 13 Ibn Saud's ploy had garnered some extra benefits. While the 
Foreign Office wanted Jordan to inform the American Minster of the 
decision there was concern that this might lead to a sudden unilateral 
increase by the Americans - something London wanted to avoid. 
The American Minister disagreed with the British approach to the 
problem and believed that the budget tightening measures were coming at 
completely the wrong time. 14 The King needed to strengthen his realm, and 
combat his internal foes and the spread of Axis propaganda. Every effort 
had to be made to provide for the Saudi government's needs. More 
upsetting to Moose was that he was being kept in the dark about Jordan's 
meetings with the King during which supply and economic policy issues 
were discussed. The Americans attempts to glean the nature of the 
discussions were brushed off-15 When Moose made his own inquiries he 
discovered that Jordan had put forward suggestions to set up a British 
bank and learned of the proposed appointment of a British financial 
advisor to the Saudi court. Furthermore, he discovered that Jordan was 
seeking the removal of the head of Mining Operations and Public Works, a 
senior court official who was friendly towards the United States 16 Moose 
cabled Washington about the evasiveness of his British counterpart. He 
warned that Jordan's intervention in the administrative operations of Saudi 
Arabia looked "remarkably, like an attempt to establish British influence 
here". 17 Moose strongly advocated that the United States take over the 
entire supply and financing situation. It was only "with assurance of such 
13 Foreign Office to Minister Jeddah , March 16 1944, PRO FO 371/40267/E1160/325/25. 
14 Moose to Secretary of State, April 30,1944, FR US 1944: V, p. 696. See also Moose to 
Secretary of State March 30,1944 in RDOS T1179/R8, US-National Archives. 
is Moose to Secretary of State, April 30,1944, FR US 1944: V, p. 696 
16 The official was Najeeb Salha, the head of Mining Operations and Public Works who 
Jordan believed was grossly negligent in his duties. 
17 Moose to Secretary of State, April 30,1944, FR US 1944: V, p. 696. 
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help the King will be able to resist British pressure. Without it he is 
vulnerable". 18 
With these fresh reports from Jeddah the Secretary of State notified 
the President that the British Minister in Jeddah had worked to remove 
Saudi officials friendly to the United States and had pressured the King to 
agree to the appointment of a British economic advisor. Efforts were also 
being made for Saudi contracts with the US Army Corps of Engineers to be 
diverted to British firms. 19 Hull believed that British pressure might lead to 
a future demand for a "quid pro quo in oil". The Secretary recommended 
that the United States grant additional financial and economic assistance to 
Saudi Arabia "in order to safeguard adequately the American national 
interest in the great petroleum resources of that country. " 20 More 
importantly, such additional aid should be channelled through a joint 
Anglo-American aid programme with each side contributing on a 
fifty/fifty basis. It would be necessary to conduct talks with the British to 
establish the parameters of the programme. 
Presidential approval arrived quickly and a team of State 
Department negotiators were dispatched to London to begin talks. The so- 
called Stettinius Mission was named after its head, Under Secretary of 
State, Edward Stettinius. However, the chief negotiator was Wallace 
Murray, head of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. 21 After arriving in the 
British capital, the American delegation learned that a British Army 
detachment was en route to Saudi Arabia on a training mission-a 
development which seemed odd, since an American military mission was 
18 Ibid. 
19 Hull discusses the nature of the British threat and reports by Moose in his memoirs, 
Hull, 
The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II pp. 1514-1515. 
20 Hull also recommended that a central bank be set up to ensure American influence in 
the Saudi economy. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II, pp. 1514. Details of Hull's 
proposal can also be found in a Memorandum to the 
President, April 3,1944, RDOS, 
Records of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Lot File 57 D298, Box 6, US-National 
Archives. 
n Anglo-American negotiations and disagreements on a number of issues during the 
meetings in Enlgand can be seen in 
Campbell, ed., The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 
pp. 35-71. 
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already in Saudi Arabia doing that very same job. Foreign Office officials 
quickly explained that they were sending Muslim soldiers who could be 
stationed in Holy cities and who would have greater freedom of 
movement 22However, to the Americans it appeared to be yet another 
move to put pressure on Ibn Saud. 
When this report reached Washington, Secretary Hull ordered the 
American Minister in Jeddah to keep a close watch on British movements 
in the country. Moose was instructed to take every opportunity to visit the 
court and to maintain close ties with the King. At the same time, Hull 
sent a letter of protest to the British Ambassador in Washington 
complaining about British policy in Saudi Arabia. 24 This was the beginning 
of a series of communiques between London and Washington. The Foreign 
Office believed that the Americans were over-reacting and simply did not 
appreciate the corrective measures that were being implemented in Ibn 
Saud's regime. An exasperated Foreign Secretary cabled the Ambassador 
in Washington: 
The State Department must not overlook the fact that in Saudi 
Arabia, as elsewhere in the East, temptation to play the 
Americans and us off against each other is very considerable. 
There is, we fear little doubt that a good deal of graft exists in 
Saudi Arabian Government circles and our Minister has 
recently been campaigning against this. In so doing he has to 
our knowledge earned the enmity of various influential 
persons-25 
The Foreign Office laid much of the blame for the awkward relations with 
Washington on the inexperience of the American Minister in Jeddah. In 
department minutes the character and integrity of James Moose was often 
criticised. He was regarded as a "second rate man" who had taken a big 
22 Winant, US Ambassador in London to Secretary of State, April 27,1944, FR US 1944: V, 
p. 692. 
23 The Secretary actually wanted a more permanent presence and sought to have an 
American officer appointed to serve at the court of the King-something London claimed 
was not practical for the United States since only Britain had Muslim military officers, 
Secretary of State to Moose, April 18,1944, FRUS 1944: V, p. 687. 
24 The Secretary's letter was forwarded to London. British Embassy, Washington to SOSFA, 
May 3,1944, PRO FO 371/40265/ E2811. 
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leap from his previous posting as a junior official in Tehran and had 
become overwhelmed by his new responsibilities in Saudi Arabia. 26 He 
was supposedly jealous of the position that his British counterpart had 
attained in the Saudi court. 27 Interestingly, the memoirs of Lawrence 
Grafftey-Smith, the British Minister who succeeded Jordan, described the 
latter as an irritable man who suffered from chronic flatulence and had 
formed a dismal opinion of the country in which he served. 28 
Nevertheless, it frustrated the Foreign Office that Washington did 
not seem to appreciate the long term effects of unrestricted spending and a 
lack of administrative checks in the Saudi administration. 29 The appetite for 
largesse among the local population was never ending and unless the 
King's expenditures were reduced, the amount of financial assistance he 
requested from the Allies would spiral with each new year. It was essential 
to put a limit on subsidies and encourage fiscal responsibility. America's 
compulsive rush to satisfy the King's every whim and fancy without 
question was not healthy for the local administration and would ultimately 
harm Britain s hard earned position. As a Foreign Office memo noted: 
The Americans are out to bribe, or buy, Ibn Saud and now 
that the principle of joint interest in Saudi Arabia has been 
accepted they are trying to force up the price to a point at 
which we will drop out and they will be left alone. 30 
Washington viewed the situation very differently. An American company 
had made substantial capital investments in Saudi Arabia and had been 
entrusted with extracting the principle resource of the country. There could 
be no doubt that: "the preponderant interest in the Saudi Arabian economy 
u SOSFA to Ambassador Washington, May 7,1944, PRO FO 371/40265/ E2811/1407/G. 
26 Several officials berated the conduct of the American Minister in a FO Departmental 
Minute, May 23,1944 PRO FO 371/40265/E3105/128/25. 
27 The Foreign Office also warned Jordan to handle Moose carefully and look out for 
attempts by Ibn Saud to take advantage of 
friction between allies. FO to Cairo for Jordan 
(Jeddah) May 7,1944, PRO FO 371/40265/ E2720/1407. 
28 Grafftey-Smith, Bright Levant, p. 255. 
29FO Departmental Minute, May 25,1944, PRO FO 371/40265/E3105. 
30 FO Departmental Minute, May 25,1944, PRO FO 371/40265/E3105. Also SOSFA to 
Ambassador Washington, 28 May 1944, PRO FO 371/40265/E3105/1407. 
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is unquestionably American in character and will presumably remain so 
for many years to come" 31 
Secretary Hull was willing to acknowledge that due to Britain's 
historical position and her interests in the East, she had primary military 
responsibility in the region. However, the United States had political 
responsibility. In a gesture of compromise Hull suggested that Britain send 
a military officer to head an Anglo-American military mission while 
Washington would select a financial advisor to serve at the court of the 
King. 32 
That was not acceptable to the Foreign Office-Britain's economic 
and political interests in Saudi Arabia were deemed far greater than 
Washington's. The American analysis of the Saudi economy failed to take 
into account the steady rise in pilgrimage revenues. A large number of 
pilgrims were citizens of the British Empire and contributed far more than 
the 4 million riyals the American oil company paid in royalties each year. 
Foreign Office calculations indicated that even during the war, up to 40 
million riyals were earned from pilgrim dues and this was expected to 
increase by up to 100% after the war. Therefore, American claims to have 
the preponderant interest in the Saudi economy were simply a 
"misconception of the facts". 33 
In looking at official communications from both sides of the 
Atlantic, it is clear that great efforts were being made to stabilise Ibn Saud's 
regime through different approaches to the issue. Neither Washington nor 
London wanted to alienate the King or concede hard won influence on 
him, and as such Ibn Saud was able to maximise as much aid and 
assistance as possible both from the United States and Britain. 
31 U. S. Secretary of State to Maurice Peterson, Foreign Office, July 1,1944, FRUS 1944: V, 
p. 711-713. This was despite the desire by the U. S. Military to secure Saudi oil concessions 
either by a government buy out of CASOC or 
by the oil companies keeping an option for 
United States Government of not less than 1 billion barrels. See Memo by Army-Navy 
Petroleum Board Jan 17,1944 FR US 1944: V p. 17-20. 
32 Secretary of State, (Hull) to American Legation Jeddah, May 1,1944, RDOS, T1179/R4. 





Though anxious about his financial solvency Ibn Saud could not get a 
definitive response on the exact amount of aid he could expect. It was the 
summer of 1944 and stocks of food and supplies had dwindled. Gifts and 
largesse to tribal chiefs were cut back while salaries of government workers 
were at least four months in arrears. In urgent need of concrete assistance, 
not simply gestures of aid, Ibn Saud dispatched urgent messages to the 
British and American Legations. He requested immediate assistance and 
gave a subtle warning that if he did not receive a positive response - he 
would go elsewhere for support 34 
The veiled threat had the desired effect. Fearing the worst, British 
and American officials, who had been dragging out their meetings in 
London, decided to conclude negotiations quickly and settle the joint 
supply issue. Instructions were sent out from London and Washington to 
ministers in Jeddah that a joint Anglo-American supply programme had 
been agreed 35 Immediate dispatch of 40,000 tons of cereals, 4,500 tons of 
dates and 3,000 tons of sugar could be expected. The King was to be 
informed that a portion of the goods supplied to him should be sold on the 
market as a means of raising revenue. The total value of the goods was £3 
million. Though Britain would not provide additional financial aid, the 
United States would give 10 million silver riyals on Lend Lease. In order to 
maintain the King's subsidies a three month supply of foodstuffs would be 
kept stored as a reserve in Jeddah. 36 
Rather than being pleased at the settlement of the Anglo-American 
aid package the King was extremely disappointed. After making numerous 
34 It was feared that the king might turn to Axis support. Ibn Saud to American and British 
Governments, June 17,1944, FR US 1944: V, p. 706. 
35 The contents of the joint supply programme can be found in a memo from Secretary of 
State to British Ambassador, Washington, July 1,1944, FRLIS 1944: V, p. 711-713 and 
accompanying British Embassy aide-memoire, Ibid. 
36 One of the conditions of this was that the reserve stockpiles would be managed by 
American/ British diplomatic missions. This was to prevent pilfering and embezzlement. 
The details of the joint supply programme were worked out in July-August, Minister 
Jeddah to Secretary of State September 8,1944, FR US 1944: V, pp. 736-737. 
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requests, which had gone unanswered for months he was offered a paltry 
sum of aid. Lamenting the situation the King reiterated the dire financial 
situation of his government 37 The quantity of foodstuffs allocated would 
not be adequate for the pilgrimage season, let alone for the rest of the year. 
Deaths due to starvation were reported in southern Hijaz and there were 
harsh conditions in Najd, as the distribution of food had been suspended 
because of depleted stocks. There was also a shortage of vehicles for 
transportation and the distribution of supplies into the interior of the 
country. Ibn Saud appealed, as he had done many times in the past, for 
more substantial assistance. 
As usual, Moose listened gravely to the Kings' complaints and 
cabled Washington about the monarch's dissatisfaction. He also informed 
the British minister about Ibn Saud's statement and was surprised when 
Jordan expressed doubts about the King's sincerity. 38 It was Jordan's belief 
that Ibn Saud was actually satisfied with the aid received, despite what the 
American minister may have heard, and that he was simply trying to get 
more out of the naYve Americans. The figures of the joint supply 
programme, which London had submitted, derived from Jordan's own 
calculations of the annual consumption of foodstuffs and Saudi needs. 
Jordan's word carried considerable weight in the Foreign Office and his 
recommendations on the amount of aid that Britain should supply were 
carefully followed. The King would have to learn to balance his budget and 
cope with whatever amount of supplies he had. 
The American approach was different and was based on the belief 
that it was better to send more aid than necessary rather than less. British 
estimates were seen to be too low. Secretary of State, Hull decided that: "in 
37 Moose to Secretary of State, August 6,1944, FRUS 1944: V, pp. 723-724. 
38 Reports of meetings with lbn Saud and Jordan, cited in Moose to Secretary of State, June 
22 1944, FRUS 1944: V, p. 710 and August 6,1944, FRUS 1944: V, pp. 723-724. Jordan was 
aware of the largesse that the King handed out to maintain loyalty and supply the many 
tribal chiefs living in Riyadh and that there must be extra stocks of foodstuffs kept for that 
purpose. In June of 1944, food stocks were supposedly down to 1,363 tons but this was just 
the amount available for general public distribution. In actual fact there were 2,105 tons 
stocked but the balance was distributed at the Kings discretion. 
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the absence of accurate statistical data to the contrary, we must accept the 
King's statement that the quantities scheduled are insufficient to meet his 
country's needs" 39 Washington would unilaterally increase aid to the 
King. Moose was asked to inform the King that Washington was consulting 
with the British Government, which they had to do under the agreement of 
the joint supply programme, and would expedite the shipment of 
additional supplies. Moose was also instructed to inform Jordan of these 
developments. 
The British Minister was furious upon hearing of the American 
plans. He felt that Washington was violating the joint supply agreement by 
increasing aid of its own accord. Moreover, Jordan could not accept that 
the King's situation was as desperate as he claimed. He felt that Saudi 
needs were exaggerated and that the Americans were simply indulging 
them 40 It was also very embarrassing for Britain because the Foreign Office 
had already firmly told the King that the amount of assistance provided in 
the joint Anglo-American supply programme could not be increased for 
that year 41 Though Jordan could not do anything about Washington's 
move, relations between British and American officials in Saudi Arabia 
worsened considerably. 
In light of the tension between American and British diplomats in 
Jeddah, Secretary Hull decided that it was time to withdraw James Moose. 
It was important to bring in someone who could become close to Ibn Saud 
and move out from the shadow of the British Minister. As a replacement 
Hull selected Colonel William Eddy-a Marine Corps officer and fluent 
Arabic speaker. Raised in Beirut, he understood the culture and customs of 
the Middle East 42 He had also served as the Naval Attache in Cairo and 
39 Hull to American Economic Mission, Middle East, Cairo, August 14,1944, FRUS 1944: V, 
p. 727. 
*° Moose to Secretary of State, August 16,1944, FRUS 1944: V, p. 728. 
42 SOSFA (Eden) to Emir Faisal, August 22,1944, cited in FR US 1944: V pp. 731-732. 
42 Eddy himself was willing to be military advisor but reluctant to take on a finance role 
until specific plans to increase United States aid were established. See Secretary of State to 
Minister Resident, April 18,1944, FRUS 1944: V, p. 687. 
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had been Chief of the O. S. S. in North Africa at the time of the Allied 
landings. 
Eddy would also be given the added advantage of having his post 
promoted to Minister Plenipotentiary-a promotion which Secretary Hull 
secured from President Roosevelt just before Eddy's appointment. This was 
designed to indicate to Ibn Saud the importance with which Washington 
held Saudi Arabia. However, it made no difference to Stanley Jordan that a 
new American minister was in place. Anglo-American relations in Saudi 
Arabia remained "a little precarious" 43 Jordan was still upset at the 
disruption that the American decision to unilaterally increase aid to Ibn 
Saud caused to his plans for reform. In response Jordan had his own 
unilateral declarations to make. He informed Eddy that an Indian Muslim 
had been selected to act as financial advisor to the King and that he would 
be followed by representatives of the British Eastern Bank which would be 
setting up offices in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the British military mission 
would be strengthened, which would in turn ensure adequate security for 
warehouses storing food and materiel reserves to prevent local officials 
from squandering them. Eddy quickly cabled Washington that the British 
were clearly making every effort to assert themselves 44 
Ibn Saud also lost no time in nurturing the sympathies of the new 
Minister. The King sent his advisor Yusuf Yassin to speak with Eddy on an 
issue of the "greatest importance, in the strictest confidence"45 The King 
was certain of President Roosevelt's friendship towards his country and 
had high expectations of the United States. However, since America had 
joined the British in providing aid the King found that the combined 
supply and financial aid package was less than what the British had given 
for 1943 alone. This was particularly disquieting since the British were 
ceasing their financial subsidy altogether. Therefore, the net result of 
*3 Grafftey-Smith who replaced Jordan as Minister and got on well with Eddy and spoke 
highly of the American in his memoirs. See Grafftey-Smith, Bright Levant, p. 257. 
** Eddy to Secretary of State, September 7,1944, FRUS 1944: V, p. 734. 
*S Report of meeting between William Eddy and Yusuf Yassin, on September 6,1944, 
described in Eddy to Secretary of State, September 7,1944, FR US 1944: V pp. 734-736. 
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America's participation allowed Britain to be relieved of half of her 
obligations while Saudi Arabia benefited nothing and in fact lost. 46 
Yassin argued that if the United States was content to have its 
economic activity reduced and defined by its ally then it should 
understand if Saudi Arabia yielded to British wishes and interests in order 
to survive: "Without arms or resources, Saudi Arabia must not reject the 
hand that measures its food and drink. "47 After all the United States could 
lose interest after the war, and there was no guarantee of long term 
commitment to Ibn Saud. After this long build up Yassin came to the point. 
The King wished to know if there was some way "on a basis that leads far 
beyond the war" under which Saudi Arabia and the United States could 
collaborate alone. 48 The King certainly was capable of employing clever 
approach's to gain points with Washington and perhaps increase rivalry 
among the allies. 
These statements raised concern in the Department Near Eastern 
Affairs that U. S. -Saudi relations were entering a dangerous phase and that 
American interests would be compromised either due to British 
machinations or from the complete financial collapse of the Saudi 
government. One route to achieving greater American support for Saudi 
Arabia was through the increased involvement of the U. S. military. The 
Department was aware that the strategic value of Saudi oil was becoming 
more apparent to logistics and supply officers who were anxious to fulfil 
the requirements of the forces fighting in Europe and the Far East. It was 
+6 Barry Rubin states that Yassin blamed the situation on "the machinations of the British" 
and advocated US: Saudi collaboration to counter Britain's threat. See Rubin, Great 
Powers in the Middle East, p. 56. This author however, after reviewing the Eddy's report of 
the conversation disagrees with that point. Yassin clearly stated that Ibn Saud regarded 
Britain as his ally. Yassin told Eddy that it was "understood that neither (the U. S. nor Ibn 
Saud) wishes a break of confidence or cooperation with the British". In looking at Eddy's 
report it seems more reasonable to argue that Yassin was trying to embarrass the U. S. by 
stating that Washington had let its policies be "reduced and defined" by London. The 
Americans were being chiding into providing greater help. See Report of meeting between 
William Eddy and Yusuf Yassin, on September 6,1944, FRUS 1944: V pp. 734-736. 
*7 Eddy to Secretary of State, September 7,1944, FRCIS 1944: V, p. 734. This meeting may 
have been a significant factor in Washington's subsequent decision to increase the amount 
of cereals to 50,000 tons for 1944. 
48 Ibid. 
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hoped that these oil procurement needs would propel the United States 
towards greater involvement in the Kingdom's affairs. 
The Expansion of U. S. Military Presence 
Interest in Saudi Arabia had been steadily growing in the Departments of 
War and Navy, particularly among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CASOC 
concession in Saudi Arabia was increasingly being recognised as 
strategically important, being one of only two, wholly American operated 
oil concessions in the Middle East (the other was in Bahrain) 49 While 
content to allow the State and Interior Department's to lead on diplomatic 
matters relating to Saudi Arabia there was an increasing desire for a more 
active role in oil policy. The unsuccessful bid of the Petroleum Reserves 
Corporation made it clear to the joint Chiefs that direct involvement would 
be necessary. Military planners were to include the fields of eastern Arabia 
in defence and re-supply strategies of the war and Saudi oil reserves came 
to be perceived as part and parcel of America's overseas strategic assets, 
especially as an American company ran the Saudi concession. The 
Secretary of War, Henry Stimson stated: 
Both from a long and short range point of view the most 
important military interest in Saudi Arabia is oil and closely 
following this in importance is the right to construct airfields, 
the use of air space, and the right to make aerial surveys in 
connection there with. 50 
49 Secretary of State, Hull to Admiral William Leahy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 15, 
1943, RDOS, Office of International Trade Policy: Petroleum Division, 1943-1949, Box 1, 
US-National Archives. The majority of American ventures in the area had British partners 
as the majority shareholders. This in effect meant that the British Government was in 
control. The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) was a prime example of this -American 
companies had minority shares in concessions in Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar and Oman. An in 
depth history and development of the IPC from the 1920's can be found in Shwadran, 
Middle East Oil and the Great Powers, Chapter VIII. See especially pp. 246-248 for a 
breakdown of American and British partners. 
50 Secretary of War to Secretary of State, October 27,1944, RDOS, Office of International 
Trade Policy-Petroleum Division, 1941-49, Box 6, US-National Archives. See also FR US 
1944: V pp. 748-749. 
ABEDIN-SEVEN 276 
Logistics officers of the U. S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFME) 
and the Air Transport Command were keen to capitalise on the American 
presence in Saudi Arabia by acquiring air transit rights in the country. By 
cutting across northern Arabia supply aircraft could shorten the distance 
on the Cairo to Karachi flights by 212 miles. 51 Not only would this amount 
to a significant saving on fuel consumption but it would speed the delivery 
of aircraft, supplies and equipment to the Pacific theatre. Having 
emergency landing sites and refuelling stations in Saudi Arabia was 
thought to be one way of improving air travel in the Middle East generally. 
The State Department gladly approached the Saudi authorities for 
permission to conduct reconnaissance flights, ground surveys and for 
clearance to set up an airfield. It seemed a straightforward request and in 
line with the war effort and an avenue for greater support for Ibn Saud. 
Few problems were anticipated, but in fact, the Saudi response was not 
very enthusiastic. 
The official reply was rather ambiguous: "studies and discussions to 
remove great obstacles must precede decision to grant permission or 
not. "52 Yet behind the scenes considerable tension resulted from the 
American request. The prospect of allied warplanes crossing over Saudi 
territory was a contentious issue. The King wanted to know details of air 
routes, types of surveys, the direction from which aircraft would enter 
Saudi airspace and the direction in which they would leave. To a largely 
rural and nomadic population, the sight, as well as sounds, of aircraft 
passing overhead could incite fear and hostility. There was particular 
sensitivity to American planes flying over certain populated areas and 
51 Secretary of War, Stimson to Secretary of State, Hull, October 27,1944, FR US 1944: V, pp. 
748-751. Miller argues that it was in October 1944 when officials in the Near Eastern 
Affairs office came up with idea of involving the War and Navy departments in paying for 
the use of facilities thereby increasing revenue for Saudi Arabia, Miller Search for Security, 
p. 118. But the War Department had already developed an interest during March-April of 
that year. James Gormly however, also supports the March-April time frame, Gormly, 
'Keeping the Door Open in Saudi Arabia', Diplomatic History, Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 1980, 
pp. 189-205. 
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prohibitions were made on flying over the towns of al-Jauf, Tayma and 
Hail. 53 
Domestic critics of the King might gain further ammunition to 
accuse the King of handing over control of the country to foreigners. 54 
More importantly there was a great desire to avoid the political 
complications that would ensue if any of the American aircraft were fired 
upon causing death or injury to the crew. Though not explicitly mentioned 
by the King or his advisors there was no doubt a healthy concern for British 
reaction to the latest American request. The commitment of the United 
States to Saudi Arabia was by no means assured at that point and Ibn Saud 
was certainly not confident enough to risk upsetting his old supporter. 
The less than immediate Saudi response came as a surprise to 
Washington and suspicions were aroused of possible British involvement. 
This seemed well founded after reports indicated high ranking British 
military officers were averse to the United States gaining preferential air 
transit rights in what was considered a traditional British military area. 
Eddy reported: 
Most authentic confidential source confirms that British told 
Saudi Government to refuse aerodrome to US Army at 
Dhahran. Royal Airforce Chief Cairo stated to same source 
that Air Ministry London would not concur in US Army 
request for Dhahran aerodrome 55 
The -State Department called in the Counsellor at the British Embassy, 
Michael Wright, to explain the situation. In a meeting with Assistant 
Secretary of State Adolf Berle, the Councillor was subjected to a barrage of 
52 These concerns were articulated to the American Minister by Yusuf Yassin, Ibn Saud's 
acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. See Eddy to Yusuf Yassin, July 29,1944, FRUS 19: V, 
p. 661. 
53 These were towns in the north of the country and areas where the loyalty of beduin 
tribes were not fully assured. 
54 Minister Eddy to Yusuf Yassin, July 29,1944, FRUS 1944: V, p. 661. 
55 See Eddy's cable sent via the American Legation in Egypt. Minister in Egypt to Secretary 
of State, October 6,1944, FRUS 1944: V, p. 663. 
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accusations. 56 Berle was furious that Britain had interfered in the American 
request: "There was no law in heaven or earth which entitled anybody to 
interfere with our building an airfield for legitimate purposes in Saudi 
Arabia. "57 The Counsellor assured Berle that His Majesty's Government 
was not trying to undermine American interests in Saudi Arabia and that 
there must be some misunderstanding. 
After returning to the Embassy Wright did discover, after making 
his own inquiries, that there had indeed been complicity of the Air 
Ministry in the matter 58 He could only suggest that the American War 
Department approach its counterpart in London, explain the situation in 
order to gain British support for the airfield in Dhahran-59 However, the 
American General Staff was reluctant to do so, fearing that the British joint 
56 Wright was the public relations man at the embassy and it was his job to put a positive 
gloss on Britain and divert criticism of British policy to the United States. See Anderson, 
Terry. The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War 1944-1947, London: University of 
Missouri Press, 1987, p. 34. 
57 Memo of conversation by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle with Michael Wright, 
Counsellor, British Embassy, October 9,1944, FRUS 1944: V, p. 664. Berle was the son of a 
liberal Boston minister who graduated Harvard at 18 and law school at 21. He had served 
as an adviser to President Wilson at Versailles and was handpicked by Roosevelt to serve 
in the State Department. The two men shared similar views and Berle had direct access to 
the President. Berles' attitude to the British official was indicative of the general feeling of 
the White House. Rubin, Secrets of State, p. 27. 
58 Memo of telephone conversation between Wright and Murray Nov. 11,1944, FR US 
1944: V, p. 668. Royal Air Force officials believed that it was unnecessary for the United 
States to have an airfield in Saudi Arabia since there was already an American field on 
Bahrain. However, what the RAF had been unaware of was that the U. S. Army Air Force 
planned to introduce new, large capacity cargo planes on the supply routes to the Pacific 
theatre which could not take off and land from the small Bahrain field. 
It should also be noted that, during this period there were fundamental differences 
between British and American approaches to international air transit rights. The United 
States wanted air transport firms to be able to pick up and discharge cargo or passengers 
freely along international routes. Britain did not wish to have free open movement but 
sought controlled and restricted flights-feeling threatened that in the long run American 
capitalism and air superiority would overwhelm British carriers. It was at a session of the 
International Civil Aviation Conference held in November 1944 in Chicago that America 
hoped to have its proposals-termed the Fifth Freedom adopted as international policy. 
However Britain strongly opposed the measure. British aviation and RAF officials had 
axes to grind because of this issue. See Alan Dobson, Peaceful Air Warfare: The United 
States, Britain and the Politics of International Aviation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Also 
Crane Brinton, The United States and Britain, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945, 
pp. 177-181. The summer of 1944 also saw a Anglo-American dispute over civil air rights 
in Iran which was sparked by American attempts to secure American landing rights at 
Abadan. See FRUS 1944: V, pp. 486-497. 
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Staff would demand shared use of the Dhahran base. 60 Since it had no 
desire to share facilities, the War Department took matters into its own 
hands. Major General Benjamin Giles, Commander of USAFME was sent to 
the eastern province of Saudi Arabia to assess the situation himself. Giles 
arrived with a team of engineers who conducted surveys and took soil 
samples. It is not clear, whether Giles received prior Saudi Government 
permission for his mission since there appeared to be no official Saudi 
welcome or acknowledgement of the General's visit. Giles did meet briefly 
with U. S. officials in Dhahran but not with senior Saudi ones. By the time 
he left, less than 24 hours later, the General was satisfied that he had found 
a suitable site to build an American air base near the town of Dhahran 61 
However, the success of the mission was clouded by the discovery that 
two British officers also arrived in Dhahran from Bahrain around the same 
time as General Giles. Dressed as civilians, the two men were on a scouting 
mission of their own-to find a suitable site for an RAF airfield in Saudi 
Arabia. 
The American response was angry. Secretary of State Hull sent a 
stern letter to the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, complaining 
that British policy on the ground seemed the opposite of the co-operation 
that London sought to cultivate. 62 Hull asserted that he had reports from 
the field implicating the British Minister in Jeddah as well as the Air 
Ministry in London of interfering in the matter of landing rights. It seemed 
59 Memo of telephone conversation between Wright and Murray Nov. 11,1944, FR us 
1944: V, p. 668. 
60 In a Memo from the War Department to the NEA it was pointed out that "The Army Air 
Forces considers that joint tenancy of the Dhahran airfield with British forces would be 
most undesirable". Memo Colonel John Bowen, War Department General Staff to NEA, 
November 22,1944, FRUS 1944: V p. 669. 
61 U. S. Consulate, Dhahran to Secretary of State Oct. 12,1944, FR US 1944: V p. 665. (The 
United States opened a Consulate in Dhahran March 4,1944). See Moose to Secretary of 
State, March 4 1944, FRUS 1944: V, p. 659. In discussions with ARAMCO the King 
indicated that he had more confidence in the long term assistance of the British, rather 
than the Americans. The Americans worried that Ibn Saud's confidence in the United 
States was at an all time low. 
62 Secretary of State (Hull) to SOSFA, Foreign Office, cited in Secretary of State to US 
Ambassador, London (Winant) October 17,1944, FRUS 1944: V, pp. 666-667. 
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like "a reversion to a dog eat-dog-policy" 63 For Hull, it was clear that to 
depend on wartime economic and military aid to ensure the financial 
stability of Ibn Saud was not a feasible long term strategy. The United 
States Government would have to assist in some concrete way, not only 
during wartime but for some time afterwards, in order to maintain the 
stability of Saudi Arabia. To do otherwise would leave the Kingdom reliant 
on Britain and subject to the whims of parsimonious colonial officials. 
The Changing of the Guard 
The NEA devised a five year financial subsidy package that would provide 
Ibn Saud with $57 million over a five year period from 1945-1950.64 It was 
hoped that this would cover the deficits of the Saudi administration until 
such time that pilgrimage and oil revenues could balance the budget. The 
majority of this, some $37 million, would represent payment for oil 
reserves that would be maintained for use by the U. S. Navy. A further $20 
million was to be paid by the War Department for air transit rights and for 
the building of airfields. The proposal was passed to the Secretary of State 
and was deemed "a relatively small investment" to protect American 
interests in Saudi Arabia. 65 
However, before the proposal could be fully examined Cordell Hull, 
aged seventy three and suffering from ill health, resigned as Secretary of 
State. 66 The strain of wartime responsibilities had exhausted him and he no 
longer felt capable of physically keeping up with the demands of the post. 
Hull left office on November 27,1944 and was succeeded by his long time 
63 Ibid. For Eddy's reports on British obstruction of American interests see Eddy to 
Secretary of State, Nov. 24 and 28 1944, FRUS 1944: V pp. 752-753. Eddy remarked "Jordan 
will lead British effort to embroil us in resentment of King by proposing drastic reduction 
in subsidy". 
64 Chief of NEA, Murray to Under Secretary of State, Stettinius, November 11,1944, in 
RDOS, Office of International Trade Policy: Petroleum Division 1943-1949, Box 6, US- 
National Archives. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Hull was suffering from the dual effects of diabetes and tuberculoses. He had been 
diagnosed with these problems as far back as the summer of 1932-well before becoming 
Secretary of State. He hid his illness from the public and perhaps from the President as 
well. See Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II p. 1255. 
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deputy, Edward Stettinius. 67 Stettinius was inexperienced in foreign affairs 
and was known more for his administrative skills. Before the war he had 
been an executive in the U. S. Steel company. His appointment to the State 
Department in September 1943 was in part an attempt to solve the 
Department's administrative woes. Among his contributions was serving 
as lend lease administrator and reorganising the Department's internal 
structure, including the creation of twelve new offices. This included four 
geographical offices which were made directly responsible to the Under 
Secretary of State. 
As previously mentioned the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 
became part of the larger Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs 
(ONEA) with Wallace Murray as its new director! Stettinius also made 
appointments of two men to Under Secretary of State-Joseph Grew, a 
career diplomat and Dean Acheson a fiery lawyer. Both men were 
methodical administrators and would greatly influence American policy 
towards Saudi Arabia. Joseph Grew often stepped up to the post of Acting 
Secretary of State during Stettinus' frequent trips to Europe. 
Fortunately for Ibn Saud, Stettinius was already apprised of the 
situation in Saudi Arabia and pursued an active policy to protect American 
relations with the kingdom. 69 First, he instructed the American Minister in 
Jeddah, William Eddy to reduce information sharing with the British 
67 Hull's retirement would leave a significant gap in the administration's relations with 
Congress and in dealing with foreign affairs generally. His replacement was believed to be 
someone who would not challenge President Roosevelt's control over policy, Dallek, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, pp. 502-503. Stettinius account of his 
experiences can be found in Thomas Campbell, and George Herring, eds., The Diaries of 
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. New York: Franklin Watts, 1975. 
68 The number of State Department employees also increased. The figure had risen from 
974 in 1939 to 3,767 by 1945. The numbers of foreign service officers rose from 3,730 to 
about 7,000. See Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, p. 234, fn56. 
69 Stettinius also benefited from the efforts of his predecessor in developing the interest of 
the military. In addition to the War Department and the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of the 
Navy came to believe that American control of Saudi oil was important for retaining 
American prestige and bargaining power in international agreements. With Pacific theatre 
operations expecting to increase and post-war demands for petroleum supplies likely to 
be high it was "patently in the Navy's interest that no part of the national wealth be lost at 
this time". Secretary of the Navy to Secretary of State, December 11,1944, FRUS 1944: V, 
p. 755-756. 
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Minister Stanley Jordan. Meetings between Eddy and the King were to be 
kept confidential. 7° The nature of such discussions with the King should 
not be relayed to Jordan unless the King specifically requested that the 
British be informed. More importantly, Eddy was not to consider any 
proposals by Jordan that would reduce aid to Saudi Arabia. Stettinius also 
informed the Foreign Office of the instructions sent to Eddy, to emphasise 
the point that Jordan was hampering Allied cooperation 71 
Second, Stettinius revived the NEA proposal with the White House 
and sought permission to submit a bill to Congress for a multi-million 
dollar aid package for Saudi Arabia. The President was amazed that an oil 
producing country could be in such financial hardship, and asked in 
incredulity: "what the hell they were doing with all the money"? 2 Stettinus 
had to make a persuasive case to convey to the President the need to assist 
the Kingdom : 
If such help is not provided by this Government, 
undoubtedly it will be supplied by some other nation which 
might thus acquire a dominant position in that country 
inimical to the welfare of Saudi Arabia and to the national 
interest of the United States 73 
However, Stettinius also realised that Congress would only grant approval 
if it was assured that the subsidies to Saudi Arabia were not for the benefit 
of a single private corporation-i. e. CASOC, (which in December 1944 
7° Secretary of State to Minister Jeddah, December 24,1944, FR US 1944: V, pp. 756-757. See 
also Secretary of State to Minister Jeddah, December 9,1944, Ibid., pp. 755. 
n The British Ambassador remarked that "with Hull's departure and Stettinius's 
appointment as Secretary of State, the direction of foreign policy was taken over by what 
in fact amounted to a small committee composed of members of the White House and the 
State Department" in Annual Report and Political Review of the United States for the First 
Quarter of 1945, Halifax (British Ambassador, Washington) to SOSFA (Eden) June 16 1945, 
re-printed in Hachey, ed., Confidential Dispatches: Analyses of America by the British 
Ambassador 1939-1945, p. 264. 
72 Stettinius meeting with FDR, December 22,1944, in Campbell, ed., The Diaries of Edward 
Stetinius, Jr., p. 204. 
73 Stettinius to Roosevelt, December 22,1944, FRUS 1944: V, pp. 757-759. It should be noted 
that that James Gormly in his article'Keeping the Door Open in Saudi Arabia', Diplomatic 
History, Vol. 4., No. 2, Spring 1980, attributed the above cited remarks to President 
Roosevelt to indicate the importance that was given to aid for Saudi Arabia. Yet as has 
been shown here these words are actually those of the Secretary of State, Edward 
Stettinius. 
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became known as the Arabian American Oil Corporation-ARAMCO). 
Domestic oil corporations would certainly oppose any such legislation. 
Unwilling to rely solely on Congressional funding Stettinius also made 
submissions to the Export-Import Bank to gain development loans. It was 
hoped that military projects would also bring services, supplies and 
equipment to Ibn Saud's government. The King was certain to "adopt a 
much more independent attitude" towards Britain if he was assured that 
the United States would "extend aid on a long term basis". 74 In the 
meantime Stettinius planned to carry over the 1944 programme into 1945 
until Congress approved the concrete plans for long term funding. 
Stettinius also hoped to increase the output from Saudi oil fields to provide 
revenue for Ibn Saud. Oil company officials however, made it clear that 
wartime conditions would not allow for significant increases to production 
particularly with materials and equipment needed for expanded drilling 
still subject to rationing. 75 
Stettinius wanted Ibn Saud to know of the great efforts being made 
in Washington to obtain assistance for his country. Eddy met privately 
with the King to reassure him that a substantial financial and economic aid 
package would be provided on a long-term basis76 Though pleased with 
the news, Ibn Saud was more interested in making another complaint 
about the British Minister. While the American Minister was deemed as 
someone of 'goodness and honour' the British Minister was another 
matter: 
Jordan is our enemy and an enemy of the USA too. To the 
extent of his power he has sought to prevent our good 
relations and to injure my country. Except for his evil 
74 Secretary of State (Stettinius) to Roosevelt, December 22,1944, FR US 1944: V, pp. 757- 
759. Following this Stettinius began frequent trips to Britain and Europe and became more 
involved in Allied strategy and post war planning. His deputy, Under Secretary of State 
Joseph Grew took on the role of day to day policy management as Acting Secretary of 
State. In fact, of the 240 days Grew served in office, 166 were as Acting Secretary of State. 
See Baram, The Department of State in the Middle East, p. 144 and Kuniholm, The Orgins of 
the Cold War in the Near East, p. 235. 
75 Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, December 22,1944, FRUS 1944: V, p. 757-759. 
76 Secretary of State to Eddy, December 24,1944, FR US 1944: V, p. 759. 
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influence I am sure the mutual interests of Saudi Arabia and 
the USA would have developed more rapidly months ago? 7 
Once this report reached Washington the Secretary of State had had 
enough. The Foreign Office realised that despite Jordan's sincere efforts to 
follow policy, relations with United States were strained because of him. 
Jordan was recalled and on February 7,1945, Lawrence Grafftey-Smith 
replaced him as British Minister in Jeddah. By the time the new Minister 
settled in Ibn Saud was embarking on a historic meeting with President 
Franklin Roosevelt-a meeting that marked the beginning of America's 
close interest in Saudi Arabia. 
AHistoric Meeting 
In January 1945 Allied leaders, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met in Yalta 
to discuss the post war agenda. Among the topics discussed were the 
United Nations Organisation and trusteeship over the colonies of Axis 
powers. One issue of particular concern to Roosevelt was the Middle 
East -especially Palestine. It was here at Yalta that several historians claim 
the President came up with the idea enlisting the aid of the King of Saudi 
Arabia on the issue. 78 Since the United States had provided significant 
assistance to the King and the State Department had always noted the 
influence that Ibn Saud had on the Arab world Roosevelt felt it time to 
meet the desert King. 79 
77 Eddy was surprised at the extent of the animosity with which the King held forth about 
the British Minister. Report of Meeting with Ibn Saud in Eddy to Secretary of State, 
January 1945, FRUS 1945: VIII, pp. 846-847. 
78 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, pp. 511-512 and Freidel, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt: Rendezvous with Destiny, pp. 582-592. Details of the preparations and 
discussions surrounding the Yalta Conference can be found in FR US 1945: The Conferences 
at Malta and Yalta, Washington, D. C.: US GPO, 1955. 
79 Roosevelt had also been approached by Jewish leaders in the United States who sought 
his help to pass a bill in Congress endorsing the establishment of a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine. This raised concerns about the controversy it could create with Britain, 
particularly after the assassination of Lord Moyne, the British Minister of State for the 
Middle East and opposition from Arab countries. However, Roosevelt's military advisors 
were opposed to the bill. Such a bill had the potential for creating conflict in the region 
which might require the diversion of vital Allied troops to the Middle East when all 
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However, the idea of meeting with Ibn Saud and discussing 
Palestine was in fact something the President had been thinking of for 
some time. 80 According to the notes of Edward Stettinius, Roosevelt 
articulated strong personal views on the subject in a November 1944 
meeting with senior State Department officials: 
The president feels confident, however, he will be able 
to iron out the whole Arab Jewish issue on the ground 
where he can have a talk. He thinks Palestine should 
be for the Jews and no Arabs should be in it, and he 
has definite ideas on the subject. It should be exclusive 
Jewish territory. 81 
There has been much historical discussion about Roosevelt's personal 
views on Palestine. To his advisors, the President made it appear that the 
issue could be resolved through personal diplomacy. Presidential advisor 
David Niles records that Roosevelt privately said he could "do anything 
that needed to be done with Ibn Saud for a few million dollars". 82 It was his 
single-minded determination to accomplish the task himself which led the 
President to keep his intentions secret from other leaders at Yalta. 
Instructions were sent to the American Minister in Jeddah to make 
arrangements quietly. Only on the last day of the Yalta Conference did 
resources were required for the war in Europe. See Anderson, The United States, Great 
Britain and the Cold War, pp. 31-32. 
80 See also Bishop, FDR's Last Year, pp. 434-446. However, in meetings with Under 
Secretary of State Edward Stettinius in November 1944 Roosevelt made clear references to 
his desire of meeting Ibn Saud for the purpose of solving the Palestinian issue, 'Calendar 
Notes' of meeting of November 10,1944 and November 15,1944, The Diaries of Edward R. 
Stettinius, pp. 170 and 174 respectively. 
81'Meeting with President Roosevelt', November 10,1944, The Diaries of Edward R. 
Stettinius, p. 170. Present at this meeting were Secretary Hull and Under Secretary of State 
Edward Stettinius. 
82 Niles Memorandum, 26 May 1946, Official File #204, Truman Papers, Harry Truman 
Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri, USA, cited in Miller, Search for Security, 
p. 200. Although the memo was written more that a year later it indicates Roosevelt's 
attitude towards Ibn Saud prior to the meeting. Roosevelt had also made plans to meet 
with King Farouk of Egypt and Haile Selaisse of Ethiopia so the meeting with Ibn Saud 
was following a pattern and may not have been as unique as is sometimes portrayed. 
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Roosevelt mention to Churchill that he was going to meet with the Saudi 
monarch. 83 
A warship U. S. S. Murphy was dispatched to pick up Ibn Saud in 
Jeddah on February 12. From there the Murphy would rendezvous with the 
President's ship-the destroyer USS Quincy, at the Great Bitter Lake in the 
Gulf of Suez. 84 During the two day journey aboard the Murphy the King 
was entertained with demonstrations of the ships firepower and a 
deployment of depth charges. John Keating, the Captain of the vessel noted 
that the King quickly tired of these displays and chose to retire to the large 
tent that had been erected on the ships' deck. The remaining Saudi party 
had preferred to remain above deck since most had "probably never been 
on a boat so large, and some had never even seen the sea before". 85 
The King had also given strict instructions to maintain contact with 
Jeddah where his son Prince Faisal was in charge. It became the duty of one 
court official to frequent the ship's communications room to verify that all 
was well in the Kingdom. The radio operator was intrigued at first by the 
transmission he was asked to send. It consisted of the only word in the 
international code that the Saudi official seemed to know-"OK". After a 
short pause the reply from shore would come - "OK". However, intrigue 
83 Roosevelt had worried that the conference would drag on with arguments raging over 
exact wording of agreements. On February 10 he warned Churchill that he would be 
leaving the following day to meet with Ibn Saud, King Farouk of Egypt and Haile Selaisse 
of Ethiopia. Churchill was so alarmed by Roosevelt's meetings with Middle Eastern 
leaders that he quickly arranged to meet them himself. See Charles Bohlen, Witness to 
History, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973, pp. 202-203. 
s4 minister Jeddah (Eddy) to Secretary of State, February 211945, RDOS, T1179/R3/2- 
2145. The importance of this meeting was highlighted by the Deputy Minister of 
Information of Saudi Arabia, Fouad Al-Farsy in a lecture given in Houston, Texas, on 
October 16 1986, which was printed as 'Saudi American Relations in a Changing World' in 
Arab-American Affairs, Winter 1986-87, No. 19, pp. 23-27. A detailed account of this meeting 
is also provided in Bishop, FDR's Last Year. pp. 434-446, which contains interviews with a 
number of those present during the visit including; Secret Service agents, the President's 
Naval Attache-William Rigdon, members of the ships crew, Captain John C. Keating as 
well as Anna Roosevelt, the President's daughter who had accompanied her father on the 
trip. Other sources for this meeting are William Eddy, FDR Meets Ibn Saud, New York: 
AFME, 1954; Warren Kimball, Forged in War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Second World War, 
London: HarperCollins, 1997, pp. 318-319; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 593-594. 
85 Bishop, FDR's Last Year, p. 436. 
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later turned to exasperation as the radio operator was tasked to repeat this 
exact routine every half hour, on the hour -day and night for two days. 86 
Modern observers of the Middle East may find it fitting that the first 
meeting between a President of the United States and a King of Saudi 
Arabia took place on Valentines Day, February 14,1945 - given that it 
marked the beginning of an intimate and politically charged relationship 
that would prove to be one of the closest in the Middle East this century. 
Yet during this first encounter, aboard the USS Quincy, there was a certain 
amount of posturing by both leaders. The King sought greater American 
aid and support for Arab causes, while the President was keen to assess 
what role the King might play in achieving American foreign policy 
objectives. The two leaders sat for several sessions with William Eddy 
acting as interpreter. Also present, at various stages of the discussions were 
Presidential advisor, Harry Hopkins and Assistant Secretary of State, 
Charles Bohlen. 
As discussion ensued Roosevelt brought up the issue of Jewish 
immigration to Palestine. In response Ibn Saud asked why the Allies did 
not turn over the 'choicest lands and homes of the Germans' to the Jews 
instead-making the oppressors pay for their aggression. The King did not 
understand why the Allies could not force the Germans to take 
responsibility for Jewish refugees. 87 If in fact Germany could not support 
all the survivors of the war, then the Allied nations should absorb them 
within their own countries. 88 Jewish immigrants from Europe were 
culturally different from the Arabs of the Middle East. They also had 
86 The Murphy's radio operator was so bewildered by the constant repetition of the same 
message that he asked the chief communications officer of the Quincy if there was some 
greater significance to the phrase "OK? OK", Bishop, FDR's Last Year, p. 436. 
87 The King had registered his concern about United States policy in Palestine as early as 
1938 in a letter to President Roosevelt, November 29,1938, FR US 1938: 11, pp. 994-998. See 
also Ibn Saud to Roosevelt, April 30,1943, FRUS 1943: IV, pp. 773-775. The King's letters 
are also re-printed in Almana, Arabia Unified, pp. 286-292 and pp 298-301 respectively. For 
American accounts of these discussions see Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 594; Bishop, 
FDR's Last Year, pp. 444-445. 
88 Ibn Saud's views on Palestine have also been articulated in Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 335- 
337; Van Der Meulen, The Wells of Ibn Saud, p. 134; Lacey, p. 271, and McLoughlin, pp. 164- 
165. 
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greater technical knowledge and skills that would allow them greater 
economic prosperity at the expense of the Arabs. 89 Although "at no point 
did the King become rancorous", he did complain about the granting of 
millions of dollars of American and British aid to the immigrants to build 
farms and cities. 90 Such funds and proper training could be given to the 
local Arabs to build those things. Ibn Saud argued that Jewish forces were 
"armed to the teeth, not to fight Germans but to fight Arabs". 91 
According to Bohlen, "Ibn Saud's calm and reasoned statement had a 
profound effect on Roosevelt" 92 William Eddy also reported that the 
President was caught off guard by the candour of Ibn Saud. He was 
surprised at the confidence and determination with which the King 
spoke. 93 However, despite his boast of being able to do what he wanted 
with Ibn Saud, Roosevelt did not pressure the King to support American 
policy in Palestine-nor did he attempt to link the issue with American aid. 
In fact, the President reassured Ibn Saud that the United States would not 
make hostile moves against the Arabs and that the King would be 
consulted prior to any final settlement. Also discussed was the post war 
situation and how Saudi Arabia could benefit by joining the new 
international system under the United Nations Organisation. 94 The King 
agreed to send his son Amir Faisal as head of a Saudi delegation to attend 
the inaugural ceremony of the United Nations in San Francisco 95 
Although Roosevelt had not obtained support for Jewish 
immigration into Palestine he nevertheless felt that he had met a noble 
89 Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 203 
90 Harry Hopkins, Presidential Advisor, who was present during the meeting, cited in 
Bishop, FDR's Last Year, p. 445. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Assistant Secretary of State, Charles Bohlen was also present aboard the Quincy. 
Bohlen, Witness to History, p 204. 
93 Minister Jeddah (Eddy) to Secretary of State, March 3,1945, RDOS, T1179/R3/3/345. 
Also Eddy, FDR Meets Ibn Saud, pp. 29-31. For accounts of this meeting taken from the 
interviews of the President's Naval Attache and Secret Service Agents, see Bishop, FDR's 
Last Year, pp. 434-436. 
94 Kimball, Forged in War, pp. 318-319, also Eddy, FDR Meets Ibn Saud, pp. 29-31. In order to 
satisfy the requirements of becoming a founding member of the United Nations 
Organisation, Saudi Arabia had to formally declare war on Germany. 
95 McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, p. 168. 
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and respected Arab leader. Ibn Saud had not changed Roosevelt's views on 
Palestine but the King believed that he had received assurances that Arab 
wishes would be honoured. When the President returned to Washington 
he instructed the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers to assist in the building of 
infrastructure projects, road works, airfields and to provide other necessary 
services to Saudi Arabia 96 
Soon after, in a speech to Congress on March 1,1945 Roosevelt 
lavished praise on the Saudi ruler. The President remarked that he had 
learned more about the Middle East in a five minute conversation with Ibn 
Saud than in the exchange of two or three dozen letters 97 Roosevelt was 
also keen to support Congressional funding for Saudi Arabia. Following 
his speech to Congress, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the 
staff of the NEA organised several meetings with members of the House of 
Representatives and Senate leaders to discuss plans for more aid to Saudi 
Arabia 98 
On March 8, Acheson and his staff, along with officers from the 
Army and Navy met with the Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn; the 
chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, Carl Vinson, and the 
majority floor leader, john McCormack. During the course of the meeting 
Acheson briefed the group on the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia and 
in its capacity as a major oil producer. Though the United States and 
Britain had provided assistance through Lend Lease, there was still an 
anticipated Saudi deficit of at least $50 million over the next five years. If 
this deficit was not met the stability of the Saudi government would be 
compromised and would threaten the American hold on oil concessions. 
96 Roosevelt's final actions concerning Saudi Arabia were detailed in Acting Secretary of 
State (Joseph Grew) to President Truman, May 23 1945, FR US 1945: VIII, pp. 900-901. In 
this despatch the Secretary was updating the new President on the status of American. 
Saudi relations as conducted by Roosevelt. See also Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 204 
97 Address to Congress by President F. D. Roosevelt, March 1,1945, text printed in The 
Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Volume 4,1944-1945, New York: Harper 
Bros., 1950, p. 584. 
98 State Department Memorandum of Conversation, March 8,1945 Participants: Acheson, 
Kane, Bard, Vinson, Drewry and McCormack, RDOS, T1179/R3/3-845, See also FRUS 
1945: VIII, pp. 861-863. 
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The immediate response of the Army and Navy representatives was to 
propose the construction of an airfield at Dhahran and to maintain Saudi 
oil to relieve the drain on American reserves. 99 
Acheson indicated that if Congress was inclined to offer support, 
there were several methods by which aid could be channelled: by an 
outright grant; a government loan that would be secured by oil deposits; or 
by an unsecured loan that would be repaid from revenues derived from the 
sale of oil. Speaker of the House Rayburn looked favourably upon the 
proposal, as did the other members. Nevertheless they advocated that the 
State Department take an indirect approach in dealing with Congress 
because "if the entire matter were stated at some length in a bill this would 
require extensive hearings in which strong attitudes might be taken by 
various private interests". 100 It was recommended that proposed legislation 
should not specify the purpose of the funds, except in the most general 
terms. The Secretary of State should be left to dispose of the funds through 
the State Department but would be accountable to relevant Congressional 
committees. Furthermore any proposal for aid would stand a better chance 
if it were on a quid pro quo basis, with Saudi oil being provided to the U. S. 
military at a reduced rate. In consultation with Senate leaders a plan was 
formulated to fund Saudi Arabia through Export Import Bank loans. It was 
left to Acheson to draw up detailed proposals before proceeding with 
drafting legislation. 101 
Acheson was also advised to watch out for opposition from Senators E. H. 
Moore of Oklahoma and Tom Connally of Texas who, along with friends in 
the domestic petroleum lobby, did not favour Washington subsidising 
991bid. 
lOOState Department Memorandum of Conversation : Acheson, Kane, Bard, Vinson, 
Drewry and McCormack, March 8,1945, RDOS, T1179/R3/3-845. Also FRUS 1945: VIII, 
pp. 861-863 
101 The response from Senate leaders was also favourable. The Senate Majority Leader, 
Barkley informed Acheson that they were "unanimous in their opinion that some action 
was required" to ensure the American hold on the Saudi concessions. Memo of meeting 
between Acheson and Senators Barkley, George and Walsh (Barkley was Senate Majority 
Leader; George was Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and Walsh was Chairman 
of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee), May 17,1945, FRUS 1945: VIII, pp. 895-896. 
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foreign oil operations-nor would they be supportive of long term post- 
war aid to foreign governments. They opposed government interference in 
private industry in general and believed that investment in petroleum 
deposits within the United States should be the focus. 102 Even the Lend 
Lease Act which provided a lifeline to Allied forces during the war had 
been opposed by such hard line politicians and their lobbyists. 103 
With complications looming in Congress the feeling among senior 
State Department officials was pessimistic. With the failure of the 
Petroleum Reserves Corporation venture officials were: 
quite certain that similar opposition will develop against any 
proposal for either the purchase of a foreign oil reserve by the 
Navy, or the use of U. S. Government funds to keep King Ibn 
Saud favourably disposed towards the private American 
company now holding the oil concession. 104 
Dean Acheson attempted to keep options open and continued to work on 
other channels, especially the Export-Import Bank. 105 
The Death of Roosevelt 
The sudden death of President Roosevelt on April 12,1945 
threatened to derail the entire aid process. His successor, Harry Truman 
had only been Vice President for eighty-two days and apart from Cabinet 
102 Memo of meeting between Acheson and Senators Barkley, George and Walsh- 
(Barkley was Senate Majority Leader, George was Chairman of the Senate Finance 
Committee and Walsh was Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee), May 17, 
1945, FRUS 1945: VIII, pp. 895-896. 
103 For background on the Lend Lease Act see Warren Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: 
LendLease, 1939-1941, Baltimore, 1969, particularly chapters 1-3; Beard, President Roosevelt 
andthe Coming of the War, pp. 160-172. For an account of Congressional reluctance to grant 
foreign aid, which was written during the war. See Brinton, The United States and Britain, 
pp. 163-164. Also Stephen Ambrose, and Douglas Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American 
Foreign Policy Since 1938, New York: Penguin, 1993. pp. 6-8. 
104 Asst. Secretary of State Clayton to Asst. Secretary of State, Dunn, April 7,1945, FRUS 
1945: VIII, pp. 869-871. 
105 The subsequent problem with loans involved getting approval to take Saudi oil as 
collateral for loan security. Memo of meeting between Acheson and Senators Barkley, 
George and Walsh (Barkley was Senate Majority Leader, George was Chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee and Walsh was Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs 
Committee), May 17,1945, FR US 1945: VIII, pp. 895-896. 
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meetings, had met Roosevelt only twice in that period. 106 Truman knew 
little of foreign affairs and less still about Roosevelt's policies but found 
himself thrust suddenly into the Presidency at a crucial time. Moreover, 
Truman had not been privy to many of his predecessor's decisions and he 
leant heavily on Roosevelt's advisors to guide him. Truman had not been 
involved in the discussions on Saudi oil nor was he familiar with details of 
the debate over the Petroleum Reserves Corporation. 
Nevertheless, the State Department was anxious for the new 
President to take action on Saudi oil. Joseph Grew, then Acting Secretary of 
State, briefed Truman on the importance of Saudi oil. Grew noted that 
there was support available from members of Congress who had been 
consulted on the issue of aid to the Kingdom and that they required further 
cultivation: 
All agreed that, because of Saudi Arabia's strategic position 
in relation to the Pacific War, and even more importantly, 
because of its vast oil resources now under concession to 
American nationals the United States has a vital interest in 
the stability of Saudi Arabia. 107 
Additional briefings were given to the President by the Under Secretary of 
the Navy, Ralph Bard and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. 
However, Truman did not get to hear from Wallace Murray, one of the 
State Department's strongest supporters of Ibn Saud. Murray had left 
Washington to become Ambassador to Iran. His replacement as head of the 
Division was Loy Henderson, an Eastern European specialist who had only 
106 Truman became Vice President on January 20 1945 when Roosevelt was sworn in for a 
fourth term. He was appointed to replace Henry Wallace. Though he had been a Senator, 
Truman did not have experience, nor did he show any interest, in foreign affairs. He was 
particularly handicapped by not knowing Winston Churchill and the relationship between 
the two men got off to a strained start. See John Dickie, Special No More: Anglo American 
Relations, Rhetoric and Reality, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994, pp. 28-29. For full 
biography of Harry Truman see David McCullough. Truman, New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1992. 
107 Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to President Truman, May 23,1945, FR US 1945: VIII, 
pp. 900-901. 
See also Miller, Search for Security, pp. 136-137. 
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brief experience in Iraq and knew little about Saudi Arabia. 108 Henderson 
did not have the same fiery temperament as Murray. Nevertheless, Truman 
could see the necessity of approaching Congress for aid to Saudi Arabia. 
Grew was given the green light to propose legislation for a comprehensive 
financial assistance package for Saudi Arabia. That was what Roosevelt 
had endorsed and Truman, seeking to continue his predecessor's policies, 
followed through. 109 
However, the process of approval on an aid package would be long 
and drawn out and urgent appeals from Ibn Saud had increased since 
Roosevelt's death, partly out of concern that the United States might forget 
its new friend. 110 Reassurance came from the Secretary of State that the 
delays were administrative in nature and that the United States was very 
much committed to supporting his government. It was hoped that the 
Anglo-American aid package would soon be finalised and provide much 
needed relief for the King. 111 One piece of news that was encouraging was 
that the joint Chiefs of Staff had given the go ahead for the Dhahran 
airfield project which would bring military assistance to the Kingdom. 
However, despite this Ibn Saud was unhappy. He was still waiting for the 
full aid package that would bring foodstuffs, materials and supplies which 
he desperately needed to distribute as largesse to the tribes. Eddy cabled 
108 Henderson had served at the U. S. Mission in Moscow in the 1930's and later in the 
Division of Eastern European Affairs at the State Department. Henderson, like Joseph 
Grew, had strong anti-Communist sentiments. So much so that in the early days of the 
war he was an unpopular in Washington. Henderson officially took over as Director of the 
Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs on April 17,1945. See Kuniholm, Origins of the 
Cold War in the Near East, p. 237 
109 President Truman to Secretary of State, May 29,1945, FR US 1945: VIII, pp. 902-903. 
110 Eddy to Secretary of State, April 16,1945, FRUS 1945: VIII, p. 873. 
III Secretary of State (Stettinius) to Eddy, April 17,1945, FRUS 1945: VIII, pp. 874-875. The 
Joint Chiefs had overcome their previous reticence and had approached the British Chiefs 
of Staff for their support in getting Ibn Saud to approve the plan for an American airfield 
in Dharhan. The British agreed providing that the Royal Air Force had equal fly over and 
landing privileges. The Americans were satisfied that there would not be any permanent 
RAF forces stationed there and the British use of the field would be in case of emergency. 
The Secretary of State had hoped that this news would be well received by the King but he 
did not get the anticipated reaction. 
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the Secretary of State that the King was "troubled, indignant, convinced 
delay was unnecessary". 112 
More bad news came when the British Ambassador informed the 
Secretary of State that London intended to make drastic reductions to its 
subsidies for Saudi Arabia. The British proposal for the year 1945 was to 
provide the King with a maximum of $3 million (£1.4 million pounds)- 
half of what was provided in 1944.113 This was a time when State 
Department officials felt it crucial that assistance to Saudi Arabia be 
increased. The Foreign Office however, argued that their original subsidy 
had been intended only as a temporary "compensation for the fall in Ibn 
Saud's revenues from the pilgrimage". 114 Since pilgrim traffic had 
improved in 1944 and also because the oil company was expected to 
resume normal activities, Ibn Saud was expected to be in a position to 
purchase goods on his own account. If Britain was to maintain the large 
increase for 1945 it would mean that the King's income would be "at least 
four times higher than it was immediately before the war" and His 
Majesty's Government felt that there was "no justification for continuing 
the subsidy on its recent scale. " 115 Moreover, London argued that Ibn Saud 
should, for his own benefit, get off foreign subventions and manage his 
affairs with the resources he had at his disposal. In fact the Foreign Office 
was under pressure from the Treasury to reduce foreign subsidies because 
of the severe drain on the already impoverished British economy. 116 
More disturbing to American officials was London's insistence that 
Washington also follow suit and cut American aid so that the 50/50 basis 
of the joint aid programme be maintained? 17 The Foreign Office felt "very 
112 Eddy to Secretary of State, April 20,1945, FRUS 1945: VIII, pp. 878-879. 
113 Moreover much of that aid would be in the form of foodstuffs such as cereals, sugar 
and tea, not cash. British Ambassador, Washington, to Secretary of State, April 17,1945, 
FR US 1945: VIII, pp. 875-877. 
114 Ibid. 
I's British Ambassador, Washington, to Secretary of State, April 17,1945, FRUS 
1945: VIII, pp. 875-877. 
116 Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951, p. 190. 
117 This meant that the combined British and American assistance would drop to $10 
million. 
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strongly indeed that the abandonment of the principle of equal partnership 
would inevitably give the impression of Anglo-American rivalry which on 
political grounds both governments are anxious to avoid". 118 This was a 
clear sign of the differing position of the two Allied Governments. The 
American position was that Saudi Arabia could not go back to pre-war 
levels of income subsidy because the King needed substantially more 
assistance to develop the country and stabilise his regime. 119 Gordon 
Merriam, the chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs was convinced 
that British meanness was preventing effective government by Ibn Saud 
and was annoyed at British interference in American-Saudi relations. 
Merriam and others believed that the King should be left to administer his 
affairs as he saw best and not be ordered about like a colonial vassal. 120 It 
was necessary for Ibn Saud to maintain his prestige and to continue to 
distribute largesse to his subjects. American officials were convinced that 
the British did not have all the facts about Saudi needs. In the American 
estimate Ibn Saud would require $16 million above and beyond 1944 levels 
to sustain his government properly and only that would "meet the 
minimum essential needs of that country, both supply and budgetary" 121 
The Foreign Office however, was not convinced by American figures and 
stuck to its own estimates. There was no objection to Washington giving 
118 British Ambassador to Secretary of State, April 17,1945, FR US 1945: VIII, pp. 875-877. It 
was only later, perhaps in order to pacify Washington, that the British Ambassador made 
the State Department aware that Britain had informed Ibn Saud that there was no 
objection to the creation of an American air base at Dhahran. See Acting Secretary of State 
(Grew) to Minister Saudi Arabia (Eddy) April 26,1945, FRUS 1945: VIII, p. 885. This was 
significant because Ibn Saud had hesitated granting permission to the United States 
without prior British approval. 
119 Report entitled Supplemental United States Supply Program for Saudi Arabia in 1945, 
enclosed with Loy Henderson Memo, July 31,1945, in RDOS-SA, 1945-1949, US-National 
Archives. 
120 Ibid. 
In Secretary of State (Stettinius) to Eddy, April 18,1945, FR US 1945: VIII p. 877. Of the $16 
million thought necessary for Saudi needs the'supply' portion would cost $13 million. In 
order for Britain to provide half of that it would need to contribute 1,652,000, sterling 
pounds. This was just 375,000 pounds more than her original figure of 1,250,000 pounds. 
Washington thought that London should not make an issue over that amount of extra 
funds. See State Department to British Embassy, April 25,1945, FR US 1945: VIII, pp. 882- 
884. 
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more aid in the form of cultural projects or road construction but in regard 
to the joint aid programme London held firm. 122 
Realising that haggling with the British would delay matters further, 
Joseph Grew arranged for alternative means, independent of the joint 
supply programme, to channel assistance to the King. 123 Grew approached 
the Foreign Economic Administration to make plans to fund Ibn Saud 
entirely in case the British pulled out of the 1945 joint subsidy programme 
altogether. 124 But officials at State were anxious for the British to agree to 
an increase in the supply programme. The situation was becoming serious. 
Food shortages in Saudi Arabia had been exacerbated by locust plagues 
and drought. The American Minister in Jeddah was inundated with 
requests for additional cereals and other foodstuffs to compensate for the 
losses. 125 
Moreover, the King complained that he had heard nothing about the 
amount of aid that would be given for 1945 or for 1946. Plans for 
improvements in irrigation, water supply to the cities, transport services 
electricity and other services were on the cards but needed development 
loans -the type supplied by the Export-Import Bank. Further delays might 
force Ibn Saud to 'bleed' ARAMCO for money to stabilise his regime. Eddy 
warned that given recent events the King could not help but wonder if "the 
machinery of [the] American government will permit long range 
commitments to Saudi Arabia" and this was harmful to the prestige and 
interests of the United States. 126 
Grew could not offer any answer except to urge the King to be 
patient. The long range financial assistance programme of the type desired 
by Ibn Saud was "without precedent in United States history" and it was 
122British Ambassador to Secretary of State, May 16,1945, FRLIS 1945: VIII, p. 895. 
123 Reports from Jeddah were that Ibn Saud was incredibly upset over the delays in aid 
reaching him. Eddy to Secretary of State, April 20,1945, FR US 1945: VIII, p. 878. 
124 Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to Foreign Economic Administrator (Crawley), 
February 14,1945, FRLIS 1945: VIII, pp. 850-851. See also Grew to Crawley, March 23,1945, 
p. 866, Ibid. 
125 Eddy to Secretary of State, June 21,1945, FR US 1945: VIII, pp. 911-913. 
126 Ibid. 
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necessary to find creative ways to finance the endeavour? V The timetable 
for aid was uncertain. Congress was not due to have hearings on foreign 
aid until the middle of June and approval would take weeks after that to 
filter through. All that could be done was to assure the King that the 
United States was taking strong interest in his welfare and the stability of 
his country. Grew hoped that at least the Dhahran airfield project and 
accompanying Army mission would provide certain tangible benefits on 
the ground. 
Meanwhile new developments in the war, brought changes to 
American priorities on the ground and the alteration to the War 
Department's troop re-deployment plans. Instead of transferring forces 
from the European theatre to the Pacific via the Dahran base in Saudi 
Arabia, they would be routed through the United States. Suddenly, the 
immediate need of a Saudi base of operations was called into question. It 
also appeared that, due to the rapid pace of the war, the Dhahran airfield 
might not be finished in time to be of much use. The War Department now 
realised that the expenditure of funds for the construction of an airfield in 
Dhahran on the basis of military necessity "would be of doubtful legal 
validity". 128 
The Secretary of War however, was willing to go ahead with the 
construction of the airfield if it was deemed to be in the national interest- 
which would require Presidential authorisation. Again for this crucial 
decision Stettinius was not in town and Grew was Acting Secretary of 
State. A methodical man, Grew was not apt to make recommendations 
without consulting experts. This gave great weight to the arguments of the 
NEA. 129 Grew would only ask Truman for approval after thoroughly 
checking with the Department's specialists. In a memo to the President 
dated June 25,1945, Grew pointed out that: 
127 Acting Secretary of State, (Grew) to Eddy, June 18,1945, FR US 1945: VIII, pp. 908-910. 
i28 Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to Eddy, June 25,1945, FRLIS 1945: VIII, p. 915. 
129 Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, p. 235. 
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The Saudi Arabian oil fields, which promise to be among the 
most valuable in the world, are now under concession to an 
American company. The continuance of that concession in 
American hands holds the out the best prospect that the oil of 
Saudi Arabia will be developed commercially with the 
greatest rapidity and upon the largest scale, producing 
revenues which will contribute to the betterment of the 
economic condition in Saudi Arabia, and in consequence, to 
its political stability...... The immediate construction by this 
country of an airfield at Dhahran, to be used for military 
purposes initially but destined for an ultimate civil 
utilization, would be a strong showing of American 
interest 130 
As it happened, the matter would have been Grew's decision anyway since 
the day after this recommendation was put to the President, Edward 
Stettinius resigned as Secretary of State. Within twenty four hours 
Presidential authorisation for the building of the Dhahran airfield was 
granted 131 Subsequently the State Department received news that the 
Export-Import Bank had approved a loan to Saudi Arabia-"provided 
adequate security for repayment could be made". 132 
Britain and the Emergence of a New American Policy 
Though the State Department believed that an increased American 
presence in Saudi Arabia added stability, for Ibn Saud the growing 
relationship with America was causing problems. Hashemite propaganda 
emanating form Transjordan and Iraq accused the Saudi ruler of 'selling 
out' to Europe and America. Internally, Muwahhidun hard-liners were 
130 Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to President Truman, June 26,1945, FRUS 1945: Vlll, 
p. 915-917. 
131 Truman gave his approval in a memo directly to the joint Chiefs of Staff. See President 
Truman to Admiral Leahy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 28,1945, FRUS 1945: VIII, In 43, 
p. 917. Edward Stettinius resigned as Secretary of State on June 27,1945. 
132 The difficulty lay in the fact that world currencies were not easily convertible at that 
time and the majority of countries which purchased Saudi oil did so in sterling pounds or 
other currencies. The oil company estimated that after it had met other dollar 
expenditures such as salaries of employees, U. S income taxes, and the purchase of 
equipment, it would not make enough dollar exchange from the sale of Saudi oil to 
provide Ibn Saud with enough dollars to meet the repayments of the loan. Acting 
Secretary of State (Grew) to Eddy, June 27,1945 FRUS 1945: VIII, pp. 917-918. 
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becoming increasingly vocal about their opposition to the influx of foreign 
goods and personnel. Previously the King had managed to neutralise his 
detractors through a combination of subsidies for tribal leaders, gifts of 
food and clothes and the use of house arrest for persistent critics. His 
ability to maintain those policies had been seriously hampered by the 
delays in the aid and supply programmes placing him in an uncomfortable 
situation. 
Thus when the State Department came up with a plan to dispatch a 
U. S. Army military mission to Saudi Arabia the King was cautious. He 
certainly needed aid but with each shipment came potential criticism and it 
seemed only prudent to accept the aid he needed most. Meanwhile, the 
State Department was anxious, in light of delays in other aid programmes, 
to save face and send something to the King. The Army had drawn up 
plans to train pilots, ground crews, and technicians and provide medical 
services at different locations around Saudi Arabia. Since it would be a 
military operation no prior Congressional approval would be required and 
the Saudi Government could gain access to materials that were restricted 
by war-time rationing. 133 
However, when the American Minister went to finalise these 
arrangements, he found that the King was not interested in the offer. Ibn 
Saud listed three reasons for declining to accept the mission. The first was 
due to the criticism by "fanatical reactionary subjects" who opposed any 
foreign presence and would only be further inspired against the King. 
Second, Ibn Saud wanted to deflect accusations made in the Arab press that 
he was a puppet of the non-believers and under foreign military 
occupation. Third, was the possible objection by the British. 134 Eddy 
133 Ibn Saud wanted to know if the building of the Dhahran airfield was contingent on his 
acceptance of the military mission. When he was reassured that the United States was 
providing services which it believed Saudi Arabia sought and that there was no 
compulsion to accept the military mission, the king declined. Report of Eddy meeting with 
Ibn Saud in Vice Consul Dhahran, (Sands) to Secretary of State, July 4,1945, FR US 
1945: VIII, pp. 920. 
134 Vice Consul Dhahran, (Sands) to Secretary of State, July 4,1945, FRUS 1945: VIII, pp. 
920. Sands was conveying the content of Eddy's discussions with the King. Ibn Saud was 
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suspected that the refusal of the military mission was also a sign that the 
King was reluctant to break away from Britain's hold on him and was a by 
product of America's tarnished image. The Minister reported that "the 
King seems to be reverting to the belief that, however powerful and 
friendly the United States may be, Britain continues to dominate the 
Middle East". 135 
News of the King's refusal was received with incredulity at the State 
Department: "The King has for over 2 years pressed this Govt. to have US 
Army provide services that he now rejects" 136 Especially frustrating was 
Ibn Saud's seeming failure to understand the importance of the Army 
mission. The Army was the only branch of the U. S. Government capable of 
acting independently and, in this case, without cost to the King. The 
mission would have set up a number of infrastructure projects to provide 
vital services to the people and bolster the King's transport and 
communications capability. It was also a necessary component of the 
Dhahran airfield project. Cancellation of the mission could set back plans 
for the airfield as well as delay the building of necessary infrastructure 
such as roads, services and utilities. 
The King would still be reliant on foreign aid and under the 
influence of outside powers. Again there was distinct anti-British sentiment 
in the State Department and concern that even if further assistance was 
given to Ibn Saud, Britain would reap the benefit: "the US Govt. might 
build an airfield in the center of great American oil reserves only to find it 
controlled and operated by some nation other than Saudi Arabia". 137 It 
seemed clear that the King's reaction to the American proposal was "a 
reversal of policy that apparently can be explained only in terms of British 
concerned about the repercussions of having military personnel moving about the 
country. There was not so much worry about the Dhahran airfield because the personnel 
would be confined to a small area around the base and be far way from the Holy cities. 
135 Eddy to Secretary of State, July 8,1945 FR US 1945: VIII, pp. 923-926. 
136 Frustration among senior officials at State was apparent in the correspondence. See 
Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to Eddy, July 13,1945, FR US 1945: VIII, pp. 928-929. 
137 Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to Eddy, July 13,1945, FR US 1945: VIII, pp. 928-929. 
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pressure". 138 London was viewed as opposing any American activity in 
Saudi Arabia which gave even the appearance of political or military 
superiority. Eddy confirmed this on the ground: "I am convinced [the] 
British do not want [the] United States to build [a] Saudi army or air force, 
preferring themselves to 'rescue the land' if disorder arose as they have 
rescued Syria and Lebanon". 139 
Eddy felt strongly that the United States should deal with Ibn Saud 
on its own terms without British strings attached: "I hope we never join in 
joint subsidy or supply again". 140 However, he was to be disappointed. In 
an eleventh hour move the British caved in and the Foreign Office agreed 
to settle the joint supply programme. A combined figure of $10 million was 
put forward with the British contribution being £2.5 million pounds (the 
equivalent of $5 million). 141 
The finalising of the subsidy programme did not reduce State 
Department worries. Still smarting from the King's refusal over the military 
mission, officials did not want to lose more ground and rushed to conclude 
negotiations on the Dhahran airfield. On August 5, General Benjamin Giles, 
Commander of the USAFME, flew to Saudi Arabia to finalise the 
agreement. This time he was received by the King and the American 
Minister with great ceremony. At the negotiating table matters were 
complicated by the American desire for a long lease, which the King was 
reluctant to give. Failing that, Giles sought access for American commercial 
138 Ibid. 
139 The British had also been reluctant to approve American civil aviation to use Saudi 
facilities and also had been less than helpful when the US wanted to install direct 
communication cables to Washington. Eddy to Secretary of State, July 14,1945, FRUS 
1945: VIII, pp. 929-930. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Since the State Department did not think that $10million was enough for Ibn Saud it 
organised a separate supplemental supply program worth $6 million. Part of this would 
be made up by minting 10 million riyals for the Saudi Government (equivalent to $1.4 
million). Another $1.6 million would be sent in further supplies, including: 287 Trucks- 
valued at $1,400,000; Radio equipment-$134,000; Farm equipment-$37,000; Distillation 
Plant- $34,000; Garage equip: $30,000; Writing paper-$7,500; Passenger cars-$5,000. A 
further $3 million would be sent in silver riyal coins. Secretary of State to Eddy, July 4 and 
July 5,1945, FRUS 1945: VIII, pp. 918-922. Also Secretary of State (Grew) to Eddy July 16, 
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carriers with special access rights and rates, to use the airport after the war. 
As an incentive the Army would build a hospital, a road from Dhahran to 
Riyadh over 350 miles of the toughest dessert terrain-all without charge. 
Giles thought it was "a neat little gift which would especially delight the 
king" and assumed it would be an offer the king could not refuse. 142 
However, during the negotiations Ibn Saud was not as impressed as 
the General had hoped and was more concerned with the appearance of 
retaining his sovereignty and jurisdiction. While he agreed to the 
construction of the base he insisted that it would remain the property of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, that the Saudi flag should fly over the airfield, 
as well as over any inland posts, emergency landing fields, and stations 
where navigational equipment was set up. Ibn Saud himself admitted that 
the presence of the flags would camouflage the American presence at the 
sites and reduce the likelihood of Bedouin or Ikhwan attacks on the 'the 
King's property'. 143 
Furthermore, the King made the stipulation that only civilian 
personnel could be allowed to build the three projects and that the men 
who constructed the airport should not be in uniform. General Giles was 
amazed at the request as all of the Army engineers, technicians and 
workmen who would be involved in the construction were in uniform. It 
was not possible to demobilise and convert them into civilians while a war 
was on, just to build what was in fact an army project. The King however, 
insisted and Giles could not convince him otherwise. Even a request from 
Washington did no good. Giles had no choice but to leave in frustration 
without resolving the issue. The King maintained his position and did not 
1945, FRUS 1945: VIII, pp. 930-931 and Secretary of State to U. S. Ambassador in London, 
August 8,1945, FRUS 1945: VIII, pp. 940-941. 
142 Memorandum on "U. S. Relations with Saudi Arabia" May 15 1946, by Nils E. Lind, 
Attache, Legation Jeddah, RG59/250/49/32/7, Lot File 57/D/298, Box 10, 
RDOS/RONEA 1941-1961 USNA. The discussions surrounding the Dhahran agreement 
are covered in some detail in the memo. Lind was Eddy's subordinate deputy at the 
Legation. 
143 Eddy to Secretary of State, August 8,1945, FR US 1945: VIII, pp. 943-945. 
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understand why the army workers could not simply take off their uniforms 
during the construction period. 
In the meantime, the war with Japan ended, putting to rest the 
problem of finding civilian workmen. In fact the question arose again as to 
whether the military should still continue with the building projects. The 
War Department decided to go ahead, but only with the airfield, not the 
road or the hospital. In a final round of discussions conducted by Minister 
Eddy an agreement was reached that provided the United States 
Government operational control of the airfield for up to three years. 
Following this period, administrative control would be handed to the 
Saudi Government, with the proviso - which the joint Chiefs had insisted 
upon- that the Saudis could not turn over the field to a third power. 144 
Eddy had expected there to be specific prohibitions placed on the conduct 
of Christian worship, but the King did not bring up the subject. 145 
Nevertheless, the Minister felt that the whole episode had harmed United 
States prestige. 
The end of negotiations marked the first official U. S. Government 
project on the ground in Saudi Arabia and the beginning of a long 
relationship of military co-operation. It provided the State Department 
with relief as it was an indication of American commitment to the country 
and because it established a channel for aid as the presence of an American 
installation in the country made all the difference when soliciting aid from 
Congress. The Dhahran airfield agreement came at a time when priorities 
were beginning to shift in Washington. The end of the war in Europe was 
approaching and the justification for funding Saudi Arabia would become 
more difficult. The Lend Lease programme itself was slated to expire in 
144 One of the immediate effects of the deal was the influx of over 3,500 foreign workers to 
build the field. This included 1500 Italians, 500 Iraqis and Iranians, 1000 Yemenis, 25 
Egyptians and 500 Americans. It would be the first time that such large numbers of 
foreigners entered the country and Ibn Saud kept them far away from major cities to avoid 
inciting criticism from the Ikhwan and other conservative elements. 
145 However, the King was concerned that American servicemen not abuse a provision for 
personal recreation as an excuse to import prostitutes, Eddy to Secretary of State, August 
8,1945, FR US 1945: VIII, pp. 943-945. 
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December 1945. Existing State Department methods of letter writing and 
playing up America's anti-colonial reputation were deemed "hopelessly 
inadequate". 146 
Moreover, there was a feeling that it was unrealistic to continue to 
rely on Congressional appropriations when in many circumstances it 
would be "embarrassing and difficult to justify publicly". A case in point 
was the reluctance to admit publicly that the United States was proposing 
to grant a large aid package to a relatively insignificant Middle Eastern 
country which played no active role in the war effort. Nevertheless, while 
officials at the NEA worked behind the scenes to formulate legislative bills 
and negotiate Export Import Bank loans, the Saudi Government faced 
crises with no indication of when relief was expected. 147 Yet at the same 
time there was a growing concern over the ascendancy on the Soviet Union 
and fears of communist expansion in the Middle East. 
The Spectre of Communism 
Many senior officials at the State Department and within the Division of 
Near Eastern Affairs, had long held strong anti-Communist views. 148 As an 
Allied victory became assured the expansion of Soviet forces caused great 
concern among officials such as Joseph Grew, Gordon Merriam, Loy 
Henderson, and Wallace Murray. There was a general belief among these 
officials that American interests were noble and free from the taint of 
colonial domination and that the United States had to assert itself and play 
a more active role in raising the economic and social conditions of the 
146 Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to Secretary of State, Oct. 9,1945, FR US 
1945: VIII, pp. 43-44 
147 One of the main delays in the latter had been the lack of dollars to meet repayments. 
This was due to Saudi oil primarily being sold in countries where payments were made in 
sterling pounds or other currencies. A world wide shortage in dollars and lack of 
convertibility between currencies meant that regardless of how much oil Saudi Arabia 
sold, it would not be able to meet dollar requirements to pay off interest, let alone the 
principle, of any loan. This fact made American bankers reluctant to approve loans to Ibn 
Saud. 
148 See Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980; Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 
1938, New York: Penguin, 1993. 
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peoples of the Middle East in order to ensure that the natural resources of 
the region remained "in the hands of people following the paths of 
democratic civilisation rather than those of Eastern dictatorships" 149 
The head of NEA, Loy Henderson was particularly keen to employ a 
more dynamic policy in the Middle East. His only experience was in Iraq 
but he brought his concerns about Soviet expansion into the department. 
Many of his colleagues at the European desk, including Acheson, were not 
initially interested in the Middle East. However, there was a strong ally in 
Joseph Grew. Both men shared anti-Communist sentiments and believed 
that the Soviets would not give up control over Eastern Europe, but were 
seeking to encroach into the Near and Far East150 
The State Department policy, according to the NEA, was that the 
United States should assist countries in the region to improve economically 
and create a higher standard of living for local people and to encourage 
trade and foster democratic ideals. Barriers to trade should be reduced and 
an orderly development of resources should be encouraged without 
discrimination and restriction. Yet throughout the Middle East the State 
Department could see that democracy and free enterprise was under threat 
from the authoritarian regime of the Soviet Union. According to one report: 
The policy of the Soviet Unions in the Middle East appears to 
possess two direct objectives; achievement of security along 
its Middle East frontiers and the prevention of a coalition of 
the capitalist countries in the Middle East against the Soviet 
Union. An indirect policy of the Union may be the extension 
of its social and economic systems throughout the Middle 
East. Consequently, the area is a fertile field for friction and 
activities which may threaten Middle East security and world 
peace. 151 
With the war in Europe over there was no need to continue to provide aid 
to the Soviet Army. President Truman signed an executive order that 
149 NEA Memorandum prepared for President Truman, no date, FRUS 1945: VIII, pp. 45-48. 
15o See Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, p. 237 and p. 241 
151 Report by the Coordinating Committee of the Department of State, May 2,1945 
American Economic Policy in the Middle East, in "Aspects Department of State Thinking on 
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ended all aid shipments to Russia. 152 However, this led to concerns that 
Russia might be encouraged to move into the Middle East 153 One reason 
was the fact that over 40,000 soldiers of the Red Army were already 
occupying northern Iran-originally this had been part of a wartime 
Anglo-Russian bid to neutralise an Iranian government with pro-German 
sympathies and also to secure Soviet supply lines. 154 The measure was 
supposed to be temporary, but as the war went on and Anglo-Russian 
relations deteriorated the intentions of Soviet troops became suspect 155 
Poised near the frontiers of the Persian Gulf, Soviet intervention in the 
greater Middle East seemed entirely possible. It had been acknowledged as 
early as 1944 that: 
the Russians would like to expand their influence and gain 
some sort of long-term foothold, through the concession of a 
free port or by some other means, upon the shores of the 
Persian Gulf. This, of course, would place the Russians within 
a very short distance not only of the oil fields in southern 
Iran, Iraq and Kuwait, but also of those in Bahrein and 
eastern Saudi Arabia. 156 
Russia could also threaten British lines of communication to the Gulf 
emirates and to India. Moreover, it was likely that Russia would use any 
signs of unrest in the Gulf as an excuse for intervention. Economic crises 
Political and Economic Polices if the United States in the Near and Middle East for the 
Postwar Period", FRUS 1945: VIII, p. 33-48. 
152 Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, pp. 62-63. On May 8 1945, 
President Truman ordered that aid to the Soviet Union be suspended. 
153 Rubin, Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle Over U. S. Foreign Policy, 
pp. 42-43. 
154 On August 25,1941 in a combined effort 40,000 Soviet troops entered Iran from the 
north and 19,000 British soldiers entered from the south. The occupation was designed to 
prevent Axis forces from achieving control of Iranian oil fields and the world's largest 
refinery at Abadan. See Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, pp. 140-14 8. 
iss Moscow embroiled itself in Iranian politics and had close links with the Iranian 
Communist Party (Tudeh). Soviet attempts to influence domestic policies and support for 
the nationalisation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company concerned Britain. Russian 
pressure was so intense that at one point the Prime Minister of Iran resigned. See 
dispatches from the American Ambassador, Tehran to Secretary of State, November 1, 
1944, FR US 1944: V, pp. 464-465 and Memo by Secretary of State (Stettinius) to President 
Roosevelt, December 6,1944, FRUS 1944: V, pp. 482-483. For more on Anglo-Russian 
tension in Iran see Rubin, Great Powers in the Middle East, pp. 73-109 and Kolko, Te Politics 
of War, pp. 298-299. 
156 Murray to Stettinius October, 27,1944, FRUS 1944: V, pp. 624-626. 
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erupting in Saudi Arabia followed by domestic unrest posed "a danger that 
either Great Britain or Soviet Russia would attempt to move into Saudi 
Arabia to preserve order and thus prevent the other from doing so" 157 
America already had "heavy commitments" elsewhere but the British were 
well established in the Middle East. There were over 20,000 British troops 
in the Suez Canal Zone fully equipped for war. Furthermore, Britain had 
military installations and naval facilities throughout the area in Khartoum, 
Haifa, Transjordan, Iraq, Bahrain and Aden. 158 The war strengthened the 
British desire to retain her power in the Middle East. The region was a vital 
link between parts of her empire and it was an area where British interests 
were directly affected by Russian activities. The Soviet Union might see 
British positions in Iran, Turkey and Greece as a threat and therefore be 
mobilised to act in 'defence'. 159 It became more feasible if Britain retained 
her position in the area and Washington maintained primary military 
responsibility of Middle East security under Britain. 
While recognising the need to maintain Britain's position in the area, 
it was clear that the United States would have to encourage Anglo- 
American collaboration over economic interests and minimise excessive 
competition. American officials believed that British could not implement 
her economic policy without American help and that London knew this 
fact. 160 Britain too, understood that she could not face a major war in the 
Middle East without American assistance. Both countries recognised the 
need to strengthen the Saudi Government: 
A strong and independent Saudi Arabian Government in the 
Near East, where two great world powers come into contact, 
is less likely to fall victim to war breeding aggression than a 
isr Wallace Murray to Dean Acheson, January 27,1945, RDOS-SA, T1179, US-National 
Archives. 
159 Ovendal, Ritchie, Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 
1945-1962 London: Leicester University Press, 1996, pp. 2-3. 
159 Orde, The Eclipse of Great Britain: The United States and British Imperial Decline, p. 163. 
160 State Department Memo British and American Positions in the "Pentagon Talks of 1947" 
Between the U. S. and U. K. Concerning the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, FRUS 
1947: V, p. 516. 
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week and disintegrating state vulnerable to economical and 
political penetration. 161 
It was for this purpose that NEA deputy chief, Gordon Merriam proposed 
that Congress create a special fund with an annual budget of $100 million, 
to be used at the discretion of the President, for the "purpose of furthering 
the political and strategic interests of the United States in the Middle 
East". 162 The fund would be used to make loans and subsidies on a non- 
commercial basis-to Middle East countries to develop infrastructure and 
socio-economic standards. This was essentially similar to the pre-war 
British policy of providing grants and subsidies to Middle East rulers to 
engender loyalty. In this case the intention was to prevent Soviet inroads 
and prop up weak potentates 163 
While a worthy plan, it was doubtful that Congress, already 
reluctant to commit resources abroad, would give approval. With the war 
coming to a conclusion there would be little enthusiasm to provide up to 
$100 million annually for the expenses of a foreign government. Even the 
Lend Lease Bill itself had taken the forceful personality and wartime 
pressure of President Roosevelt to be passed through the legislature. Lend 
Lease was scheduled to be terminated the day after the Japanese surrender. 
Truman was unlikely to take on the Congress and was viewed as being 
incapable of such a task. 164 
161 Wallace Murray to Dean Acheson, January 27,1945, RDOS-SA, T1179, US-National 
Archives. Murray summarised for Acheson the importance of Saudi Arabia to the United 
States. Acheson was to use the information to lobby Congressmen for their support of 
State Department measures to grant post-war aid for Ibn Saud. 
162 Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to Secretary of State, Oct. 9,1945, FR US 1945: VIII, 
pp. 43-44 
163 There were fears that the Soviet Union could, within a few years, re-enter the world 
stage and become a serious challenger to the United States. A State Department report of 
July 1945 claimed: "the potential of the Soviet system in world trade is actually great and 
could slay us in Middle East markets and world markets generally". Report entitled 
American Economic Policy in the Middle East, prepared by A. B. Calder, July 14,1945, 
RONEA-DOS, Subject File 1941-1951, Lot File 57 D298, Box 6, US-National Archives. 
Calder was former 15' Secretary at the U. S. Embassy in Moscow and then later posted to 
Cairo. Concern over Soviet expansion is also articulated in a memo by Loy Henderson to 
Acheson, Dunn, Hickerson, FRUS 1946: VII, pp. 1-6. 
164 Within the State Department there were concerns that Truman's lack of experience in 
foreign affairs would hamper his ability to conduct an effective foreign policy. See Under- 
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However, with encouragement from Dean Acheson and Joseph 
Grew, Truman did take the bold step of granting an extension of Lend 
Lease to Saudi Arabia. In an unprecedented move Truman signed a special 
Presidential order which exempted the Kingdom from the termination 
conditions of the Lend Lease Bill and allowed the War Department to 
provide Saudi Arabia with both military and civilian supplies without 
Congressional scrutiny. 165 At the same time, the State Department's 
Division of Financial Affairs also came up with additional funds for Ibn 
Saud. They proudly informed the NEA that with some creative thinking 
they had formulated a plan for a development loan of $25 million 
distributed over a five year period and which could be repaid out of future 
oil royalties 1 With American aid in hand and royalties from oil flowing, 
Ibn Saud's financial crises had ended. 
It could be said that Truman's extension of lend lease for the sole 
benefit of Saudi Arabia was highly ironic-given that the rest of the nations 
that had sacrificed much for the Allied war effort were suddenly cut off. 
Saudi Arabia was not a democracy nor had it contributed troops to the war 
effort nor faced Axis armies. However, this was indicative of the growing 
importance placed on Saudi Arabia in light of the emerging threat from 
Soviet Russia and the beginning of the Cold War. 
Secretary of State (Acheson) to Chief of NEA (Merriam), October 18,1945, RONEA-DOS, 
Subject File 1941-1951, Lot File 57 D298, Box 6, US-National Archives. Charles Bohlen, 
Head of the Division of Eastern European Affairs at the State Department (and later 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union) also shared this view. See Bohlen, Charles. Witness to 
History, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, pp. 211-212. See also Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and American Foreign Policy, pp. 548-549 
165 Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to Eddy, September 11,1945, FRUS 1945: VIII, p. 
952. See also Secretary of State (Byrnes) to Secretary of Treasury (Vinson) October 22, 
1945 RDOS T1179/R3; Baram, The Department of State in the Middle East, p. 236 
166 Financial Affairs official estimated that in the period 1946-1950 the Saudi government 
would need $25 million after which it time it would be able to balance its budget. In the 
small print it was specified that at least $20 million had to be spent on the purchase of 
American goods and the remainder on development projects. So Ibn Saud would not have 
free control of his expenditure. See Director of Office of Financial and Development Policy 
(Collado) to President of Export-Import Bank (Taylor), October 19,1945, FR US 
1945: VIII, pp. 960-963. See also Memo of conversation between members of NEA, Financial 
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In the period following the end of the war the focus of the United States 
shifted away from the British presence in Arabia to peace making on two 
continents; the administration of Japan and Germany. This was hampered 
by the fact that Truman's policies were slow to develop and the new 
President lacked the confidence and the experience of his predecessor to 
develop his own policies. Roosevelt had controlled policy himself while the 
State Department's influence "remained limited". 167 Truman tried to 
maintain Roosevelt's old policies without perhaps fully understanding how 
they had been intended to work, nor could he employ the same divide and 
rule tactics to get results from his subordinates. Although his predecessor 
had been able to pit one cabinet member against another, in the case of 
Ickes and Hull for example, this was not Truman's style. 
Moreover, Truman did not enhance his ability to form coherent 
policy when he selected James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State. A former 
judge who had served a brief term in the House of Representatives Byrnes 
had no experience in foreign affairs. Neither it seems did he have much 
patience for lessons in international affairs from his State Department 
advisors. Byrnes spent most of the first six months in office outside 
Washington. When he did come to foreign policy meetings, Byrnes was 
frequently unprepared and chose his own 'shoot from the hip' strategy. 
The long absences and private decision making process alienated senior 
officials and "produced disorientation and dissension" in the State 
Department. 168 
Changes were also occurring in Britain with the election of a new 
labour Government and Clement Attlee as Prime Minister. With the death 
of Roosevelt and the defeat of Churchill the personal diplomacy that had 
Affairs Division and officers from British Embassy, Washington, November 30,1945, 
FRUS 1945: VIII, pp. 973-974. 
167 Rubin, Secrets of State, p. 33. 
268 Byrnes was appointed on July 3 1945; Anderson, The United States, Great Britain and the 
Cold War, pp. 88-89. 
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characterized Anglo-American relations had come to an end 169 The new 
government found two groups in the American administration: "the first 
ignores us altogether or regards us as a hindrance to American interest. 
The second accepts us as a valuable junior partner in an Anglo-American 
concern". 170 Britain was also in a considerably weaker economic situation. 
In fact London was seeking a massive financial aid package of $4.4 billion 
from the United States. 
Prime Minister Attlee was more concerned in resolving domestic 
economic crises than enforcing British dominance in Saudi Arabia. The 
Foreign Office resolved to inform Ibn Saud that as far as His Majesty's 
Government was concerned he "should make arrangements to secure all 
supplies for 1946, through commercial channels". ln There was little 
interest in engaging in another joint subsidy programme with the United 
States: 
The chaos in Saudi Arabian Government finances, indeed, 
defies description..... After years of British (later Anglo- 
American) subsidy, and of unfailingly generous 
accommodation by the American Oil Company and the 
United States Government in the matter of advances and 
credits, the Government is, if not pauperised, completely 
demoralised, and no flickering sense of financial 
responsibility remains-172 
Ironically, in the immediate post war period Italy, Germany and France 
had been removed from the scene and as such Britain was unchallenged in 
the Middle East (the exception being the American presence in Saudi 
Arabia). Yet Britain's own weakness meant that her presence was 
169 Attlee disliked the limelight and did not have the flamboyant personality of Churchill. 
He preferred to work by committee rather than take direct charge himself. See Anderson, 
The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, p. 82 
170 Balfour to SOSFA, August 18,1945, FO AN 2505/4/5, cited in Anderson, The United 
States, Great Britain and the Cold Warp. 88 
171 British Embassy to State Department, November 21,1945, FR US 1945: VIII, pp. 969-969. 
172Grafftey-Smith to Bevin 'Annual Report on Saudi Arabia 1946', February 5,1947, in FO 
371/60295B E1095/1095/25. Oil royalties for 1946 were to be $8 million while for 1947 
they were estimated at $14 million. Also had taken from ARAMCO $11 million in 
advances from royalties. At the same time the Saudi Government owed $2 million for 
surplus War Department material supplied on 5 years credit. 
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somewhat hollow. In fact after the independence of India in 1947 the whole 
raison d'etre for British defence of strategic routes in Middle East would 
end. Egypt and Iraq were independent polities and the one remaining issue 
in the Middle East was the question of Palestine. It was here that the role of 
Ibn Saud could be useful but both the Labour Government in Britain and 
the Truman administration differed with Ibn Saud on that issue. 
With Truman still developing his own 'doctrine' the joint Chiefs and 
military strategists were looking at the Middle East in light of the activities 
of the Soviet Union 173The Joint Chiefs increasingly saw Saudi Arabia as 
part of a buffer zone between Russia and the British Mediterranean: "If the 
peoples of the Middle East turn to Russia, this would have the same impact 
in many respects as would military conquest of this area by the Soviets" 174 
Within this zone existed the oil reserves of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The 
Joint Chiefs classified them as "absolutely vital" to the security of the 
United States and were determined that if the Soviets made any move to 
deny America access to these reserves to ensure they did not succeed. 175 
Scholars such as Rubin have argued that after the war the United 
States did not want British assistance in supporting the Saudi 
government. 176 Yet Washington was keen on British involvement-but 
under American leadership. Britain's historic attitude had been extremely 
protective of her position in the Gulf, and with an economy weakened by 
war and reliant on American assistance, Britain had to give Washington the 
upper hand, in order to retain its position there. 
173 The military was also looking into wholesale conversion of energy sources from coal to 
oil which made Saudi reserves of great importance. Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the United 
States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945-1962, London: Leicester University 
Press, 1996, p. 27. See also FRUS 1947: III, pp. 485-514 
174 Memo from JCS to the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), June 21, 
1946, FR US 1946: VII, pp. 631-633. This committee was created in December 1944 to 
provide the State Department with advice on political and military affairs from other 
departments, which would be helpful in the development of foreign policy. The records 
of the SWNCC can be found in RDOS, RG 353, Microfilm reference M1195 at the US- 
National Archives in Washington D. C. 
l75 SWNCC memo, October 12,1946, FRUS 1946: VII, pp. 529-532. See also Henderson to 
Acheson, October 8,1946, FRUS 1946: VII, pp. 523-525. Henderson was conveying to 
Acheson at State the views of the joint Chiefs. 
176 Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, p. 66. 
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With this new power dynamic, Anglo-American policy focused 
increasingly on the threat posed by Soviet expansion. 177 The world entered 
an era where Cold War American interests worked to prevent the Soviet 
Union from gaining a foothold in the oil rich Arabian peninsula and 
provide Saudi Arabia with the financial and security guarantees that 
would ensure the legacy of the Al-Saud family dynasty. 178 
177 State Department Memo British and American Positions in the "Pentagon Talks of 1947" 
Between the U. S. and U. K. Concerning the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, FRUS 
1947: V, pp. 511-521. Washington's primary concern was focusing on the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Union was seen more in light of the explanations of George F. Kennan who in his 
famous long telegram of 22 February 1946 analysed Soviet policy as one which the United 
States could not cooperate. Russian motivations and Soviet paranoia about security and 
ideological expansion would preclude cooperation. See George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925- 
1950, Boston: 1960, pp. 583-598. 
178 Memo Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to Secretary 




Abdul Aziz Al-Saud is a remarkable figure in the history of the Arabian 
Peninsula. Despite his beginnings as the ruler of a seemingly insignificant 
desert polity he rose to international attention and was courted by the great 
powers of the nineteenth and twentieth century, Britain, Russia, Turkey and 
the United States, to name a few. All the time he successfully navigated his 
fledgling polity into the modern world maintaining his power through 
political expediency and the manipulation of religious and ideological 
symbols, thus maintaining a link between faith and loyalty to the state and 
limiting the extent that the message of social and religious reform interfered 
with his burgeoning political power. 
In the wake of such feats descriptions of this man have ranged from a 
brilliant, charismatic leader who conquered Arabia in the name of Islam with 
his fiery band of Ikhwan warriors to romanticised depictions of a simple ruler 
who managed his realm using a money chest stored under the bed of his 
minister of finance. l 
This thesis has attempted to separate the myth of Ibn Saud from the 
reality and to correct previously help misconceptions about his outlook and 
motives. For example, it has been clearly shown in the course of this work 
that the challenges of maintaining his rule, supplying his soldiers, granting 
largesse to his supporters and extended family meant that the thrust of Saudi 
expansion was often less to do with ideological Wahhabism than with the 
practical need for political and economic security? 
1 William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1984, p. 176. Khalid bin Sayeed referred to policies of Abdul Aziz as "shrewd and 
unsentimental". See Khalid bin Sayeed, Western Dominance and Political Islam, Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1995, p. 78. 
2 In 1941 for example Ibn Saud was providing a direct subsidy to over half a million people 
and was feeding thirty thousand on a daily basis. The subsidies were a form of largesse to 
tribal chiefs, beduins and others. Hundreds came to the Ibn Saud's quarters in Riyadh alone 
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Equally important in the development in Saudi strategy was the 
primary role played by the Kuwaiti ruler Mubarak Al-Sabah. Mubarak 
nurtured the young Abdul Aziz and gave political and economic support for 
the conquest of Najd. In fact, the less than glamorous reality is that the Al- 
Saud began the twentieth century as pawns in a larger political chess game 
between Kuwait, the British Indian Government and the Ottoman Porte. 
Although Abdul Aziz later emerged from the shadow of his Kuwaiti mentor 
and successfully employed the latter's strategy of encouraging conflict and 
confusion between the great powers. Like Mubarak, Abdul Aziz took 
advantage of the insecurities and bureaucratic infighting among Ottoman, 
British and American governments departments. 
Previous scholarship has underestimated just how early Ibn Saud 
established treaty relations with the Porte and the degree to which British 
intelligence had gained knowledge of his activities. Ibn Saud's gregarious and 
generous nature allowed him to cast a memorable impression on British 
officials whom he wished to charm. Shakespeare, Philby, Dickson, and at 
times Cox, were full of praise for the Najdi ruler .3 It has been shown the 
degree to which Ibn Saud was able manipulate these otherwise intelligent and 
manipulative individuals. Despite several authors noting the closeness of 
Captain Shakespeare to the Najdi ruler, the British Agent had so completely 
misread Ibn Saud that at one point he confidently assured his superiors that 
the Najdi ruler had no intentions to expand his realm whatsoever. 4 It was the 
minority voices of figures like John Keyes, who had little contact with the 
for their daily meals. See Memorandum on Saudi Arabia, October 28,1941, Records of the 
Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Saudi Arabia, 1930-1944, Microfilm 
#T1179, Reel 3, US-National Archives, Washington, D. C. 
3 The Political Agent, Bahrain, Harold Dickson, declared that Ibn Saud was "without rival 
throughout Arabia..... His bluff, candid and open-hearted manner serve to act as cover for one 
of the astutest brains that can be found. " See Report of Political Agent, Bahrain August 12, 
1920 (H. R. P. Dickson) IOR L/P&S/10/936/B349. 
4 Shakespeare to Hirtzel, June 27,1914, PRO FO 371/2124/28966. 
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ruler, that had the more sceptical and realistic assessments of Ibn Saud and his 
intentions. 
As demonstrated in this thesis, British policy during the First World 
War was divided by the tensions between officials in Cairo, Delhi, and 
London. Much of the literature regarding this period focuses on the years 
following the outbreak of the First World War. Even Philby, who has written 
much on Saudi Arabia, does not delve deeply into the pre-war tensions 
between Ibn Saud, the Porte and Britain. 5 The fact that Shakespeare first 
established his links with Ibn Saud in late 1913 is overshadowed by the 
attention given to the period after Britain declared war on the Porte in 
November 1914.6 
Previous writers, such as Jacob Goldberg, have noted with surprise that 
a Muslim ruler could forsake the support of the Ottoman Sultan and instead 
turn to Britain, the colonial conqueror of Muslim India. In fact, the focus of 
Wahhabi doctrine was the internal enemy of Islam-the muslirikeen, (those 
who had turned away from the 'true Islam'). It was the mission of the 
Wahhabi movement to reverse the rise of so called 'deviant' practices and 
innovations in religious life. This enabled Ibn Saud to focus the Ikhwan on 
fellow tribesmen in the Arabian interior.? 
This thesis has also examined the origins of the Ikhwan and questioned 
the common assumption that Abdul Aziz was entirely responsible for 
founding the movement himself. Moreover, it has questioned the assumption 
that the Ikhwan rebellion of 1929 was caused by the curtailment of their 
religious mission to fight the 'infidel' because of Britain's warning to Ibn Saud 
5 Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 270-272, See Kostiner, MOSA, which, for example, focuses on the 
1916-1936 period 
6 The Declaration of War, signed by King George on November 5,1914, can be found in PRO 
371/2145. The political background leading up to Britain's declaration of war on the Porte has 
been discussed elsewhere. See Adelson, Roger. 'The Formation of British Policy Towards the 
Middle East 1914-1918', Ph. D. thesis, Washington University, 1972. 
7 Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia, pp. 40-41. 
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not to attack the mandates of Iraq and Transjordan. In fact, the Ikhwan 
challenge to Ibn Saud was more political than religious. 
The three leaders of the Ikhwan revolt of 1929, although publicly 
critical of Ibn Saud for his betrayal of Wahhabi principles, were in fact 
dissatified at the lack of power granted to them. The most notorious, Faisal 
al-D} wish was clearly out to gain political power for himself. As a 
descendant of a noble tribe he also had equal claim to political authority and 
was resentful of its denial to him. For all his condemnation of Ibn Saud's close 
relations with the disbelieving British, al-Dwish approached the British .J 
Agent in Kuwait, Harold Dickson for support to establish his own political 
N- 
entity. Later while on the run from Ibn Saud, al-Dýwish asked Dickson to take 
his family under his protection. And ultimately, al-Drish the 'fanatical .. / 
Ikhwan' chose to surrender himself to the British rather than to Ibn Saud. 
It is true that raised in cosmopolitan Kuwait, Ibn Saud was far better 
able to appreciate cultural and religious diversity of Hijaz than many of the 
Ikhwan and religious ulema that came from Najd. Yet it was nevertheless 
surprising to many at the time just how shrewdly Ibn Saud handled the 
situation in Hijaz. Aware of the potential threat from the Ikhwan Ibn Saud 
had always been careful not to provide them with positions of power. Thus in 
the Hijaz he was careful to minimise the involvement, despite their key role in 
conquering the territory, and he appointed his son Faisal as amir to ensure 
smooth relations with the population. 
Ibn Saud also found in Hijaz a pre-existing bureaucracy as well as a set 
of more complex socio-political interactions than in central Arabia. There were 
merchants' guilds, an organised government structure and Hijazi society was 
already familiar with the motorcar, telegraph and telephone. Contrary to 
common perception Ibn Saud did not introduce these modern inventions, they 
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were already present in Hijaz, but he did ensure that such technology was 
harnessed and used elsewhere in the kingdom. 
Ibn Saud also strengthened his relations with local businesses and Hijaz 
became a source of capital for the newly established Saudi government. 
Merchant families were approached for loans and in return were able to gain 
exclusive agencies and contracts. 8 In fact after the conquest of Hijaz Ibn Saud 
was to become increasingly reliant on the settled urban and business 
communities to provide support for the Kingdom. A process which continues 
today. 
This work has also shown the slow pace of development in Saudi- 
American relations. Despite his attempts to engage Washingtons attention it 
was not until February 1943, a full ten years after the opening of American oil 
operations, that the United States Government took active interest in Saudi 
Arabia. This was the result of intense personal lobbying by senior oil company 
executives at the highest levels of government, including President Roosevelt 
and not the result of the shrewd diplomacy of Ibn Saud .9 However, this early 
involvement of the White House in Saudi affairs provided Ibn Saud with an 
advantage in his relations with America over Britain. The British Prime 
Minister had seldom taken an active interest in his country and it wasn't until 
Roosevelt met Ibn Saud in 1945 that Churchill made the effort to establish 
rapport with the King 1° 
8 Many of his early benefactors were wealthy merchant families of non-tribal origin who had 
long established commercial links such as the families of Alireza and al-Qusaibi. This would 
later expand to include the Kamel, Ka'ki, Jameel, Bin Mahfouz, and Al-Zamil families among 
others. 
9 Barry Rubin, 'America as junior Partner: Anglo-American Relations in the Middle East, 1919- 
1939' in The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1919-1939, ed. Uriel Dann, New York: 
Holmes&Meier, 1988, pp. 238- 251. Also Miller, Search for Security, p. xvi. 
10 Prior to 1939 not even senior officials at Whitehall had much information about Ibn Saud 
despite the historic relationship Britain had with him, See Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi 
Arabia, p. 332. 
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Nevertheless, officials in the State Department and the oil company 
lacked confidence when dealing with Arab rulers. Their lack of experience 
meant that they could not always read 'between the lines' and were 
susceptible to over-react to Ibn Saud carefully contrived statements. Any 
dissatisfaction with American policy registered by the King was assumed to 
be a general dislike of things American. The oil company worried that they 
would lose their concession and millions of dollars it already invested. Their 
concern was translated to fear in government circles making it imperative to 
improve Saudi-American relations-even if that was at the expense of Anglo- 
American relations. 
Although American officials respected Britain's experience in the 
Middle East, they were deeply suspicious of her possible colonial intentions li 
Disagreement with Britain over the nature and scope of assistance to Ibn Saud 
was to plague Anglo-American relations throughout the war. 12 Ibn Saud was 
able to play off these tensions to his advantage and was able to convince 
Washington that Britain was starving him of vital resources and promulgated 
the fear that British policy would bring ruin to the Saudi economy leading to 
the destabilisation of his regime. 13 
The period 1944-1945 saw the greatest tension between the United 
States and Britain over Saudi Arabia. Rivalry extended to the point where 
Churchill was competing with President Roosevelt to out do generosity to Ibn 
Saud. 14 This subsequently led to a presidential'order that gave Saudi Arabia 
11 Kuniholm, p. 243 and Rubin Secrets of State p. 37 
12 Kolko, Gabriel. The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose, Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1969, pp. 50-51. Mikesell, Raymond, 'Oil and Foreign Policy' in Encyclopedia of 
U. S. Foreign Relations, B. Jentleson and T. Patterson ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997, pp. 303-308 
13 Miller, Search for Security, p. 125. 
14 When he learned that Roosevelt had given him a wheelchair as a gift Churchill tried to out 
do this by presenting the King with a Rolls Royce motor car. Howarth p. 108. Also Interview 
Ambassador Hermann Eilts, London, May 25 2000. 
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exclusive rights to receive coveted Lend Lease aid, even after the end of 
hostilities with Japan. Saudi Arabia was the only country in the world to be 
granted such an exception despite never having fired a shot in support of the 
Allies. 15 The United States gained the advantage and by 1946 had supplanted 
Britain as the main guarantor of political and financial stability of Saudi 
Arabia and the Al-Saud. 16 Britain suspended her subsidy altogether bringing 
to a close its pre-eminent position in Saudi Arabian affairs. American Cold 
War interests began to dominate relations with the founding father of Saudi 
Arabia. 
The notion of Ibn Saud as the benevolent father was typically 
represented by Philby when he noted that Ibn Saud was : 
so conscious of his personal responsibility for the proper guidance of 
his people that he has never been able to delegate authority, even in the 
smallest matters. The arrival of a guest, the breakdown of a motor car, a 
minor illness in the family, and other apparently trivial incidents claim 
his personal attention side by side with State problems of the highest 
importance. 17 
The sons of Abdul Aziz continue to draw on the symbolism of their founding 
father to inculcate a sense of national solidarity. They seek to enforce loyalty to 
the faith and the ruling family as crucial elements in the identity of Saudi 
Arabians. When the current ruler, King Fahd, attained power he referred to 
this link by noting that the principle aims of his father in creating the 
Kingdom were to establish a state based on "monotheism and the Islamic 
Sharia and to revive the ancestral way [the rule of the Al-Saud]". 18 Crown 
Prince Abdullah also stated unequivocally that King Abdul Aziz was "a man 
15 Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to Eddy, September 11,1945, FRUS 1945: VIII, p. 952 
16 Orde, The Eclipse of Great Britain: The United States and British Imperial Decline, p. 150. 
17 Philby, Arabian jubilee, pp. 224-225. 
18 Speech by King Fahd given on 3 Shawwal 1402, cited in Mohyiuddin Al-Qabesi, ed., The 
Holy Quran and the Sword: Selected Addresses, Speeches and Interviews by King Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, 
Riyadh: Saudi Desert House Publishing, 1998, p. 32. 
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who stands as a symbol of the nation, a nation which in turn is the ideal 
embodiment of such a symbol. This is our reality. This is, after God our 
unifying leader". 19 Alongside the portraits of King Fahd and Crown Prince 
Abdullah that hang in government buildings, schools, universities and 
thousands of private sector offices and numerous public places, is one of 
Abdul Aziz, the noble father of the nation. 20 
Although new economic realities and challenges to the socio-economic 
fabric of Saudi society are forcing change to take place, the sheer size of the 
Al-Saud, numbering some 7000 members, means that the ability of the family 
to affect change remains significant. Their network of inter-relationships with 
business and tribal families is complex and diverse and very much 
entrenched. They continue to court western powers for the same reasons as 
their founding father; the desire to maximise economic and security interests, 
and ensure the longevity of the house of Al-Saud. Abdul Aziz has indeed 
provided an immense inheritance to his sons and whatever their future, he has 
left his indelible legacy on the politics, people and history of the Arabian 
Peninsula. 
19 Message of Crown Prince Abdullah Al-Saud, on the Occasion of the National Day of Saudi 
Arabia, September 23,1998, cited in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Special Report 1993, London: First 
Magazine, Winter 1998. 
20 Patriotic fervour reached a peak in 1998-1999 when a series of festivals, conferences and 
cultural events where held dedicated to Abdul Aziz to mark the centenary (according to the 
Arabic, Hijri calendar) of the capture of Riyadh. The nation-wide celebrations were, according 
to a Ministry of Information statement of 22nd of January 1999 (5th of Shawwal 1419), to 
perform several functions: 1. Assert the bounty of Allah. "Proclaim and rehearse the bounty of 
your Lord. " (Qur'an 93: 11) 2. Honor the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King 
Abdulaziz Ibn Abdul Rahman Al-Saud 3. Deepen national pride and loyalty to the lofty 
principles upon which the Kingdom of Saud Arabia is based 4. Affirm the aims of the State 
and its Islamic legitimacy 5. Reflect on the advancements achieved over the past 100 years. 6. 
Establish the importance of this occasion through works, and programs, and participation 
from government agencies and Saudi nationals. 
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